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Mathematics is generally known for its absolute truths. Nobody doubts that
2 + 2 = 4. Nevertheless, the very foundations of mathematics, including the
exact nature of basic mathematical notions such as the concept of number,
are still under debate. Even hotter debates arose in the eighteenth century
as the result of the huge impact of the scientific revolution of the early
modern period. The work of for example Copernicus, Newton and Leibniz
had a huge impact on philosophy, especially with regard to epistemology
and metaphysics. In retrospect, the eighteenth century can be regarded
as one in which the longer term effects of the scientific revolution were
gradually realized. Regarding Euclidean geometry and Newton’s physics as
paradigmatic for science, Kant’s theoretical philosophy aimed to provide a
strong foundation of Newtonian physics. At the same time, the mathematical
achievements of the scientific revolution gradually became independent of the
natural sciences due to the work of mathematicians such as Euler, Lagrange,
and Gauss. Throughout these developments, mathematics was gradually
transformed into the more formalized and abstract field as we know it today.
As a result, Bolzano was confronted with a problem that differs from that
of Kant, namely to provide a strong foundation for modern mathematics
since the eighteenth century philosophical reflection on these issues was still
modeled after Euclidean geometry and Newton’s physics.
The present study provides a historical reconstruction of Bolzano’s philo-
sophical struggle to reconcile the mathematical method of the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition and Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori principles with
the issues raised by the developments on the field of mathematics, such as the
growing independence of the field of analysis from geometry. It traces the
development of Bolzano’s logic and epistemology back to the main strands of
2 Introduction
German philosophy in the eighteenth century, namely the influential work
of Wolff, Meier, Kästner, Kant, and Schultz.
The main debates of the time concerned the (alleged) methodological
differences between philosophy and mathematics as well as the nature of
the principles and demonstrations on which mathematical knowledge re-
lies. Accordingly, this study first of all provides a conceptual analysis of
the methodology of mathematics, the so called mathematical method as pre-
sented in the influential textbooks of Wolff. Important topics are the role of
construction in definitions and demonstrations as well as the definition and
organization of the mathematical disciplines, but the most controversial issue
is whether mathematics merely clarifies existing knowledge, like philosophy
clarifies notions such as ‘causality’, or that it extends our knowledge, just
as the discovery and classification of new species of animals in the field of
biology.
The early Bolzano regarded mathematics as a discipline that extends our
knowledge by employing the Kantian notion of synthetic a priori principles.
Since the early Bolzano mainly focused on the notion of synthetic a priori
principles, I investigate in detail the notion of synthetic a priori in Kant’s
philosophical reflections on mathematics during the eighteenth century, its
roots in Wolff’s method of mathematics, and Bolzano’s work during the first
decades of the nineteenth century. As an unexpected outcome, my study also
sheds a new light on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics by explaining the
notions of analyticity and construction in pure intuition in terms of Kant’s
mereological terminology, which is hardly discussed by commentators.
Over the last few decades a growing interest in the history of analytic
philosophy can be observed. According to Beaney, analytic philosophy has
become aware of its history and partly transforms itself into a study of the
history of analytic philosophy.1 This includes a growing interest in the
work of Bolzano due to his work on the notions of analyticity and logical
consequence, as he is generally regarded as the first philosopher to develop
these notions in a way akin to later analytic philosophy. Writing a history of
analytic philosophy in opposition to continental philosophy, however, has
also led to a picture of Bolzano as the anti-Kant. Fortunately, recent studies
1Beaney, 2013, p. 56-60.
3provide a much more subtle view.2 Especially in the early stages of writing
the history of analytic philosophy, there was a tendency to position Bolzano,
and Frege too, as if their work appeared out of the blue.3 By contrast, my aim
is to investigate how the early Bolzano developed his ideas by studying his
predecessors. The present study thus contributes to what Beaney describes as
‘new analyses, interrogations, and narratives that renegotiate the positioning
and oppositioning involved in those traditions and disciplines’.4
Among other things, the present study provides such a renegotiation with
regard to the role of Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori in Bolzano’s early
work. Bolzano is often described as the grandfather of analytic philosophy
who radically departed from the philosophy of Kant, in particular his notion
of a priori synthetic judgments. Given Bolzano’s numerous highly innovative
ideas, this view is certainly tempting. However, my more detailed investi-
gation of his early work shows that Bolzano not only intensively studied
the work of immediate predecessors and contemporary philosophers, but
also developed his ideas, applying and adopting distinctions and ideas he
considered to be appropriate, by means of a thorough understanding of these
works. His work includes an extensive study of many publications on logic
and epistemology in his time, as well as many works of Kant. Apart from
the detailed and extensive remarks in almost all of his published works, the
notes in his diaries show that he was very much aware of the philosophical
and mathematical publications of his time. This is true in particular of Kant.
Choice of primary texts
While the work of Coffa (1991) and Proust (1989) provide an overview of
Bolzano’s mature position within the history of philosophy, the present
study investigates more in detail how the early Bolzano developed his ideas by
investigating the German philosophers of the eighteenth century in relation
to the vast amount of notes and unpublished manuscripts that are published in
the Gesammtausgabe of Bolzano’s work during the last decades. Accordingly,
my treatment of Wolff and Kant as well as the existing commentaries on their
work is adjusted to this aim.
2Cf. Textor, 2013; de Jong, 2010.
3Cf. Beaney, 2013, p. 52-53.
4Beaney, 2013, p. 60.
4 Introduction
This study aims at a historical reconstruction of the birth of Bolzano’s
philosophy of mathematics rather than a systematic comparison of Kant
and Bolzano. A merely systematic similarity between earlier thinkers and
Bolzano does not suffice for the attribution of an influence. Apart from
strong similarities in terms of philosophical content, evidence of a historical
link must be found. My choices concerning the authors to be discussed are
based on the references to them that I found in the manuscripts, notes and
published early works of Bolzano. Due to the impressive work by Jan Berg
and Bob van Rootselaar many of his notes have been published in accordance
with high philological standards in the Gesamtausgabe. All these materials
have been studied to obtain information that is relevant for the aims of the
present study. Many of my conclusions concerning the early Bolzano greatly
depend on these manuscripts and notes. Some of them provide summaries
and comments by Bolzano on the books he was reading. These books
vary from works that were recently published to famous publications of
the past, such as the work of Schultz, Wolff, and Kästner, including their
mathematical textbooks. Quite often, the summaries are intertwined with
notes that reveal Bolzano’s own thought on the topics that are discussed in
these publications. They provide a fascinating insight into how someone
like Bolzano developed his ideas. They also show that, differently from
most philosophers, Bolzano develops his philosophy, logic, and mathematics
in close connection to one another. Among his mathematical notes one
finds notes on logic and within texts on logic one often finds mathematical
examples. Quite often the notes are fragmentary, but in some cases longer
lines of thought and argumentation can be reconstructed over several pages
of notes. Focusing on the development of Bolzano’s ideas, I do not take into
account his mature Wissenschaftslehre (1837) and the commentaries on this
work insofar as they do not take into account Bolzano’s earlier work. While
I provide a detailed study of Bolzano’s early work, I do not analyze the final
mature solutions of theWissenschaftslehre.5
My treatment of Kant relies on quite a lot of texts about general logic. Dur-
ing the last decades, Kant’s general logic has received an increasing attention.
Several interesting recent studies show the crucial and systematic contribution
5An introductory overview can be found in Lapointe, 2011.
5of general logic to his theoretical philosophy.6 These studies enable a better
understanding of concepts that play a crucial role in Kant’s major works,
such as the Critique of pure Reason. The earlier neglect of Kant’s general logic
is not surprising given its peculiar place within Kant’s textual inheritance.
Kant never published a work devoted to logic itself, but nonetheless presup-
poses a general logic in the transcendental logic of the first Critique. Instead
of writing about logic, Kant lectured for several decades on this topic and
commissioned Jäsche to write a handbook of logic. The result was published
in 1800 but depends on earlier material. It is certain that Jäsche used the notes
that Kant wrote in his personal copy of Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre
during his long period of lecturing from Meier’s work.7 Yet, the Jäsche Logic
is not just a copy of these notes. Quite some selection and even text writing
was involved. Research reveals that Jäsche’s contribution goes much further
than merely ordering and selecting notes.8 Erdmann even argued in 1880 that
a certain transcript of some of Kant’s lectures is more influential than Kant’s
notes in his copy of Meier’s Auszug because many crucial phrases of the Jäsche
Logic and this transcript are almost identical. Unfortunately, the transcript
was lost. Thus, there are enough reasons to treat the Jäsche Logic with caution.
Fortunately, several other transcripts, written by attenders of Kant’s lectures
at different points in time, are available. Among them are the Bauch Logic,
Hechsel Logic, andWarschauer Logic.9 Most of them were composed during
the 1780s. Combined with some passages of the first Critique, these lectures
can be used to evaluate the content of the Jäsche Logic and to determine to
what extent it represents Kant’s thoughts on logic.
In the present study, I will draw on the Jäsche Logic, the lectures on logic
and metaphysics, and Meier’s influential Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, for
Pozzo convincingly argues for a relatively strong influence of Meier’s work.10
I draw from these materials, especially with regard to the mereological notions
of Kant. Although these mereological notions are explicitly mentioned in
the first Critique when Kant presents the mathematical principles of the
understanding, he hardly discusses them in his published work, although
6de Jong, 1995; Anderson, 2004; Anderson, 2005; Tolley, 2007; Zinkstok, 2013.
7IX:4; Meier, 1752a.
8Cf. Boswell, 1988; Boswell, 1991.
9Kant, 1998a; Kant, 1998b.
10Pozzo, 1998; Pozzo, 2000.
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he uses them on several occasions. The notes of his lectures on logic and
metaphysics, taken by several students, provide important information about
these distinctions. On some occasions, Kant’s notes in the margins of his
own books (Reflections) are also helpful, although they are often difficult to
interpret. In all cases, the point that is made should be consistent with other
material as crucial choices of interpretation cannot depend on tiny details. I
only quote the Jäsche Logic because it provides some relatively clear passages,
but only when its content is confirmed by other lectures on logic. In line
with the impressive work of Shabel, I will draw from the textbooks on logic
and mathematics by Wolff to sketch the mathematical context in which Kant
developed his ‘philosophy of mathematics’.11
Overview
From a broader perspective, the present study provides new insight into two
philosophical developments, namely that of Kant’s philosophy of mathemat-
ics as filling a gap of Wolff’s mathematical method and the focus of the early
Bolzano on the Kantian notion of synthetic a priori principles. Accordingly,
the first half of this study consists of three chapters on the most influential
German philosophy of mathematics in the eighteenth century, namely the
philosophy of mathematics of Wolff and Kant. The second half employs the
results of the first half to gain insight into the development of the philoso-
phy of mathematics of the early Bolzano during the first two decades of the
nineteenth century.
The first chapter goes back to the then dominating Leibniz-Wolffian back-
ground, which was shared by both Kant and Bolzano. Many of their concepts
and arguments make much more sense when they are understood as a reac-
tion to the rationalistic Leibniz-Wolffian tradition that dominated German
philosophy in the eighteenth century. Wolff’s textbooks on mathematics and
logic were widely used during the first half of the eighteenth century and even
remained influential till the first decades of the nineteenth century. Strong
traces of the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition can still be found in philosophical
reflections on mathematics until the first decades of the nineteenth century,
such as in the work of Bolzano.
11Shabel, 1998; Shabel, 2003; Shabel, 2006.
7In the first chapter, I introduce Wolff’s influential version of the so-called
‘mathematical method’, which stems from Euclid’s Elements as well as Leib-
niz’s philosophical work. As such, it introduces the concepts that together
constitute the mathematical method, which explains how mathematical
knowledge can be organized such that it is well-founded. Wolff’s presen-
tation of the mathematical method mainly discusses the traditional analysis of
concepts, the proper way of achieving definitions, and the nature of principles
and demonstrations.
Contrary to what is often assumed, I argue that construction already occu-
pies an important place in Wolff’s mathematical method, namely in relation
to Wolff’s conception of definitions and demonstrations. My emphasis on
the role of construction in Wolff’s mathematical method, results in two other
important topics that are to be discussed in the first chapter. Firstly, I argue
that his conception of mathematical concepts and geometrical proofs is not
as rationalistic as his philosophy is often described. Secondly, I investigate
whether Wolff’s mathematical method actually accounts for the role of con-
struction in geometrical demonstrations. Considering several options for
reconstructing such an account, I conclude that Wolff’s work lacks such an
account.
In the second chapter, I explicate how Kant reacts to Wolff’s view in his
early Prize Essay (1764).12 In this essay, Kant addresses the issues raised in
one of the most important methodological debates of the eighteenth century,
namely whether philosophical knowledge can be as certain as mathematical
knowledge and whether one can apply the same methods in both disciplines.
Contrary to Wolff, Kant argues for a fundamental difference between math-
ematics and philosophy, which relies on two distinctions. The first one
distinguishes between analytic definitions, which merely clarify existing con-
cepts, and synthetic definitions, which build new concepts out of existing
ones. The second one distinguishes between two ways in which signs play
a role in the constitution of knowledge. Either signs are used in concreto,
such as in mathematical formulas, or they are used in abstracto, such as the
letters in the word ‘causality’. While the first distinction between analytic and
synthetic definitions is extensively discussed by commentators, the second,
which involves fascinating passages on the role of signs in the constitution of
12II:273-301.
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a priori knowledge, has not yet received much attention. Yet, I argue, it is at
least as crucial as the distinction between analytic and synthetic definitions in
order to achieve the aim of the Prize Essay, namely to establish a fundamental
difference between mathematics and philosophy such that the former is capa-
ble of apodictic knowledge while the latter consists of knowledge that is less
certain. Taking the second distinction seriously with regard to both algebra
and geometry, I argue in the second chapter that Kant interprets construction
in geometry as the composition of a complex structure of signs.
In the third chapter, I interpret Kant’s notion of a priori synthetic judg-
ments from a new perspective, namely that of his mereological distinctions
between various ways in which parts can be combined into wholes. To this
end, I provide a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s mereological distinc-
tions that, to my knowledge, cannot be found in the secondary literature.
Extending the interpretation of analytic judgments by de Jong and Anderson,
I interpret Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in
terms of Kant’s mereological distinctions. I will investigate to what extent
distinct mereological structures are bound to specific faculties, and, accord-
ingly, to what extent they ultimately explain why the understanding as such
merely produces analytic judgments and why synthetic judgments, including
mathematical judgments, also require the faculty of sensibility.
My mereological perspective also puts Kant’s notion of construction in
pure intuition, which explains why mathematics consists of a priori synthetic
judgments, in a new perspective. Undoubtedly, the notion of construction
in pure intuition is the most debated notion of Kant’s philosophy of mathe-
matics. Many excellent studies on this topic, such as those of Longuenesse,
Friedman, and Shabel, have been published.13 Their sophisticated interpre-
tations increasingly take into account the historical context in which Kant
developed his ideas. The present study adds a perspective that not only allows
for a quite precise explanation of the nature of construction in intuition in
mereological terms, but also allows us to understand the philosophical con-
text of Bolzano, including those aspects of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics
that Bolzano considered to be problematic, such as the generality of diagrams
in geometric demonstrations.
More than most other commentators, I emphasize that Kant fully accepted
13Friedman, 1992b; Longuenesse, 1998; Shabel, 1998.
9Wolff’s method of mathematics as such, although Kant had to put it within his
transcendental idealism. Without the transcendental framework, the nature
of the method of mathematics would still be hidden, which would allow
the mathematical method to expand beyond the domain of mathematics.
This would result in unwarranted forms of philosophy, such the dogmatic
metaphysics of Wolff. It is no accident that Kant’s main discussion of con-
struction in pure intuition takes place within the methodological part of the
first Critique, which discusses the nature and limits of the two disciplines of a
priori knowledge, namely mathematics and philosophy.14 Indeed, investiga-
tion of the nature and the limits of the mathematical method by opposing
mathematics to philosophy in relation to our cognitive faculties, also yields
an epistemological foundation of Wolff’s method of mathematics. Yet, from a
larger perspective, the methodological part of the first Critique does not aim
at an exposition of construction in intuition, but merely at the exposition
of the contrast and limits of a priori knowledge. Along these lines, I argue
in the third chapter, that Kant incorporates the existing methodology of
mathematics in his transcendental philosophy rather than that he develops a
new foundation of mathematics.
The second half of this study investigates the early work of Bolzano. In
the fourth chapter, I first describe Bolzano’s motivation for working on
logic and the philosophy of mathematics. This motivation stems from his
view of the state of mathematics in the eighteenth century. He was highly
critical of the role of geometric proofs in other mathematical fields and is-
sued a fierce criticism of the role of construction and motion in geometry
as well as the role of geometric proofs in other mathematical fields. I ana-
lyze and summarize his arguments as they can be found in his early work,
including his notes, and clarify the historical factors that lead to Bolzano’s
criticism. During the eighteenth century, mathematical concepts like that
of infinitesimals gradually became an independent object of study. They
became independent from their application in the natural sciences and anal-
ysis became a mathematical discipline that is independent of geometry. At
the same time, German philosophers were still informed by textbooks in
14In my view, the remarks on the construction of lines in the section on the transcendental de-
duction merely illustrate the conception of synthesis that is required in the transcendental
deduction.
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the tradition of Wolff and were hardly aware of the consequences of these
developments in mathematics. Bolzano, however, seems to be one of the first
philosophers since Leibniz who not only had an adequate understanding of
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century developments in mathematics,
but also produced some important mathematical results himself, as he is still
known for his intermediate value theorem. Working at the frontier of the
eighteenth century developments in mathematics, Bolzano was fully aware
of its epistemological consequences. In the fourth chapter, I use Bolzano’s
work on this theorem as a prime example of how his continuation of the
developments in mathematics, i.e. the replacement of geometrical proofs
with so called purely analytic proofs, results in devastating criticism of any
role for construction or related notions, such as motion, in mathematical
proofs.
The remainder of the fourth chapter discusses Bolzano’s program of reform
of mathematics. In Bolzano’s early work on the method of mathematics
entitled Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik (1810),
Bolzano criticizes the traditional definitions of mathematics in terms of
quantity and provides a new definition. According to this new definition,
mathematics is concerned with the form of things. I argue that this new
definition is deeply influenced by Kant’s way of defining logic by means
of the term ‘form’. An unpublished manuscript, intended as the second
installment to the Beyträge, provides supplementary evidence for my claim.
Part of Bolzano’s program of reform was the reorganisation of mathe-
matics in such a way that all mathematical fields rely on a more general
theory entitled ‘general mathematics’. Neglected by the eighteenth century
tradition, the idea of general mathematics as a discipline distinct from more
specific mathematical disciplines is thus re-invoked by Bolzano. Assuming
that this idea did not appear out of the blue, I investigate whether his early
conception of general mathematics was already anticipated by authors of the
late eighteenth century who were known by the early Bolzano, such as the
Kantian Schultz. Taking into account Bolzano’s acquaintance with the work
of Schultz, it is quite likely that Schultz’s account of general mathematics
influenced Bolzano’s early conception of mathematics. The last part of the
fourth chapter reflects on the consequences of Bolzano’s program of reform,
including his new definition of mathematics, for the organization of the
11
mathematical disciplines and the sciences.
In the fifth chapter, I show that Bolzano’s early work was driven by a quest
for the a priori synthetic principles of the a priori sciences. In contrast to
most commentators on the early Bolzano, such as Rusnock, I will argue that
his early work was deeply influenced by Kant.15 The early Bolzano not only
adopted Kant’s definition of analytic and synthetic judgments, including the
view that mathematics is synthetic, but also used it to reform the mathematical
method. As we will see, the early writings of Bolzano provide ample evidence
for the claim that Kant’s distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments
plays a crucial role in Bolzano’s early view of science. As an example, I
describe Bolzano’s search for the a priori synthetic principles of ethics.
We will see how Bolzano again raises Kant’s question as to how a priori
synthetic judgments are possible. Since Bolzano explicitly rejects Kant’s
answer, which employs the notion of construction in pure intuition, while
accepting a priori synthetic principles as the foundation of a priori knowledge,
Bolzano is obliged to provide an alternative. On the basis of important notes,
I give a reconstruction of his alternative for Kant’s notion of construction
in pure intuition. In addition, I analyze notes in which Bolzano, similarly
to Kant, argues that analytic reasoning, that is, reasoning on the basis of the
laws of logic, does not yield analytic conclusions if one starts from synthetic
premises.
The sixth and final chapter provides a detailed reconstruction of Bolzano’s
early conception of general mathematics as concerned with mereological
composition. Substantiated by Bolzano’s early notes, I provide a novel
interpretation of his peculiar mereological notion of et composition, which
is the central notion of his conception of general mathematics. The second
half of the sixth chapter illustrates Bolzano’s early conception of general
mathematics by means of a detailed reconstruction of Bolzano’s treatment
of arithmetic in an early manuscript.16 Arithmetic is the first discipline
that is claimed to be analytic by analytic philosophers, such as Frege.17
Accordingly, it is of special interest if one, like Bolzano, aims to ground all





commentators too readily incorporate Bolzano as a forerunner of the Fregean
position. In my view, commentators of the early Bolzano like Rusnock
and Krickel are mistaken when they read a Fregean and a Leibnizean view
into Bolzano’s position concerning arithmetic.18 Substantiating my view, I
compare the proofs of arithmetical formulas as given by Leibniz, Schultz and
Bolzano and argue that Bolzano’s proof in the appendix to the Beyträge stems
from the Kantian Schultz rather than from Leibniz. Whereas Leibniz’s proof
does not involve the law of commutativity, Schultz’s proof relies on it as an
a priori synthetic principle. In the remainder of the sixth chapter, I give a
reconstruction of Bolzano’s conception of general mathematics and his theory
of discrete numbers on the basis of the unpublished second installment of the
Beyträge. This text provides sufficient material to argue that the early Bolzano
also regards the law of commutativity as an a priori synthetic principle.
Finally, I investigate how Bolzano changed his view concerning arithmetic
during the twenties until he published his extensiveWissenschaftslehre in 1837.
18Rusnock, 2000; Krickel, 1995.
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Chapter 1
Wolff’s Method of Mathematics
The widely spread textbooks of Wolff and his followers influenced reflec-
tions on mathematics and its methodology for more than a century.1 Recent
research has revealed the tight relation between Kant’s philosophy of mathe-
matics and the mathematical practice as laid down in the textbooks of Wolff.2
Commentators like Shabel explain several peculiar and problematic aspects of
Kant’s view by interpreting Kant in relation to the mathematics of his time.
Among them are the role of construction and the central place of geometry
in relation to other parts of mathematics such as algebra.3 In my view, the
relevance of Wolff for a systematically sound and historically adequate inter-
pretation is not limited to Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, but extends
to that of Bolzano. Especially the interpretation of Bolzano’s early work,
written during the first decades of the nineteenth century, greatly benefits
from knowledge of Wolff’s philosophy. As I will argue in the second half of
this study, many passages can only be understood properly insofar as they
are interpreted as a reaction to Wolff and his followers. Although, from
a contemporary perspective, Wolff’s view seems already outdated when it
was written down, his texts shaped the great methodological debates of the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
This chapter provides the necessary Wolffian background for a proper un-
derstanding of the views on mathematics of Kant and Bolzano. It introduces
the Euclidean or mathematical method as it was understood by German
1For a historical study see Sommerhoff-Benner, 2002, p. 40.
2See Shabel, 2006; Shabel, 2003.
3Cf. Shabel, 1998.
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philosophers in the eighteenth century and presents Wolff’s method and
terminology as a systematic whole.4 My interpretation will mainly focus on
Wolff’s German Logic and the introductory chapter of his German mathemat-
ical textbook because they established the German terminology later used
by Kant and Bolzano.5 The first section provides a short introduction into
the historical and philosophical context of Wolff’s methodology (§1.1). In
the subsequent sections, I roughly follow the structure of standard traditional
textbooks on logic of which the theoretical part is divided into a part on
concepts, definitions, and objects (§1.2, §1.3, §1.4), judgments (§1.5), and
inferences (§1.6).
Apart from an introduction to the Wolffian framework, this chapter also
provides some surprising arguments for a correction to the rationalistic view
on Wolff. According to the common rationalistic interpretation, Wolff
maintains that knowledge merely involves reasoning on the basis of the laws
of logic and the principle of sufficient reason. Shabel for instance describes
Wolff’s account of mathematics as a form of logicism.6 In my view, two
factors disturb the rationalistic perspective on Wolff, namely the role of
experience in real definitions of mathematical concepts (§1.3) and the role
of diagrams in mathematical proofs (§1.6). While the final section of the
first chapter argues that Wolff hardly accounts for the epistemological status
of the diagram and the premises it provides, although he acknowledges the
role they play in demonstrations, I will show in the third chapter that Kant’s
philosophy of mathematics can be understood as filling in this gap. In a
similar way, my analysis of Wolff’s mathematical method in this first chapter
contributes to a better understanding of Bolzano’s early work. Especially the
sections on definitions and the modality of objects allow to understand the
difficulties Wolff’s method of mathematics has to face when accounting for the
developments in the eighteenth century towards a conception of mathematics
4Such an interpretation can hardly be found in the secondary literature. Shabel provides
the most extensive and detailed account. Several authors mention elements of Wolff’s
methodology, but a detailed interpretation of how all elements together constitute a
system is absent (Cf. Wolters, 1980; Lenders, 1971; Engfer, 1982). Tutor focuses on Wolff’s
methodology and the historical developments within Wolff’s work but does neither show
nor interpret the systematic relations between the elements of Wolff’s methodology (Tutor,
2004).
5Wolff’s Latin versions of these texts are consulted insofar they provide important details.
6Cf. Shabel, 2006, p. 95-96.
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that allows for more abstract objects of study, such as complex numbers and
infinitesimals, without relying on geometrical or physical interpretations.. As
we will see in chapter four, these difficulties motivated Bolzano to radically
reject the role of construction in Euclid’s method and revise the mathematical
method.
1.1 Background
To a large extent, Wolff’s influence was the result of publishing many text-
books that became widely used throughout the eighteenth century. Wolff
published an extensive German textbook on mathematics comprising all do-
mains of mathematics, including a chapter on the method of mathematics as
early as 1710.7 Only a few years later, in 1713, he published an even more
extensive Latin textbook on mathematics of which Wolff himself claimed that
the demonstrations were more rigorous.8 These works are not only highly
informative of mathematics as taught at the universities of Germany, but
also with regard to mathematical method itself. His German Logic, which
appeared in print in 1712, discusses the mathematical method more in de-
tail using several mathematical examples.9 Wolff was the first to choose the
German language for mathematical and philosophical texts. In this respect,
Wolff shaped the German terminology in which philosophy, logic and the
method of mathematics was taught and discussed throughout the eighteenth
century.10 Not only the German terminology, but also the Wolffian math-
ematical method itself can be found in all subsequent discussions in the




10His works were widely known in the eighteenth century and his work was reprinted many
times. Several translations of his mathematical textbook , among them Dutch, French,
Polish and Russian, were published. See also the historical study by Sommerhoff-Benner,
2002, p. 40. In addition to Frängsmyr, who defends the importance of Wolff for the
eighteenth century, I emphasize that his influence on the philosophy of mathematics can
also be observed in the first half of the nineteenth century (Frängsmyr, 1975). To me
it seems that reflections on for example the concept of number by nineteenth century
authors like Bolzano, Ohms, and Grassman are still influenced by Wolff’s treatment of
these concepts, at least in the sense that it was Wolff’s treatment they wanted to improve
upon.
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Kästner and Karsten.11 These successors of Wolff where highly positive about
his work. Even as late as 1786, Wolff’s introductory chapter on mathematical
method is repeated almost without modification in Kästner’s textbook.12
Although Wolff and Kästner were quite influential as writers of widely
used textbooks, they did not contribute to the development of mathematics
itself, such as for example Euler. Their main merits in mathematics did not
consist of contributions to mathematics, but of the education of mathematics
as a rigorous system. Yet, they did not merely pass on mathematical knowl-
edge. Contrary to contemporary textbooks, the textbooks of the time did
not only serve an educational purpose. Wolff, for example, explicitly claims
that the method of demonstration and the method of teaching coincide.13
Accordingly, the authors of these textbooks gathered existing mathematical
knowledge in such a way that it is organized according to the philosophical
program of Wolff. Students were not primarily trained to answer mathemati-
cal questions, but they had to gain insight in why a mathematical theorem is
true. As a result, the study of mathematics not only provided mathematical
knowledge but also trained the mind to reason in accordance with the laws of
logic.14 As such, the mathematical textbooks of the time show both the rigor
of mathematics and the success of Wolff’s philosophical program.
Throughout his career, Wolff emphasized the importance of the so-called
mathematical method. The structure and content of this method is to a
large extent determined by the eighteenth century interpretation of the
Elements of Euclid.15 The details of Wolff’s methodology will be discussed in
the subsequent sections, but it boils down to a foundational approach that
requires knowledge to be organized into definitions, principles, theorems and
proofs.
The term ‘mathematical method’ and its paradigmatic application by Euclid
11Kästner, 1758; Karsten, 1778. Being published more than seventy years later, the textbooks
of Kästner indicate how long the textbooks of Wolff were in use. Several authors claim
that Wolff’s textbook was used for more than half a century. Cf. Jentsch, 1980; Pahl, 1913.
12Kästner, 1758.
13Cf. GWI:1, p. 246-247, XV, §7, §9.
14GWI:12, p. 3-4; GWI:1, p. 208, p. 246-247, XV, §7-9.
15For a discussion of this topic see Engfer, 1982. In Wolff’s early years one can only find a
rather superficial use of the mathematical method (Cf. Tutor, 2004, p. 20). Wolff himself
is aware of the fact that he merely uses this method as a manner of writing (GWII:1, p. 33,
§29). In his subsequent writings, the mathematical method has a much more substantial
role (Cf. Tutor, 2004, p. 23).
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may easily led to the view that this method stems from mathematics and
that Wolff’s universality claim transfers the method from mathematics to all
other domains of knowledge. However, in his Discursus Praeliminarus, an
introduction to his Latin logic, Wolff claims that the so-called ‘mathematical
method’ is not mathematical in nature, but maintains that the mathematical
method applies to all domains of knowledge. Although mathematics is the
discipline from which the method originates and in which it is applied most
successfully, the method is not by itself bound to mathematics. For Wolff, the
term ‘mathematical method’ merely refers to the most successful and widely
known application of the method in Euclid’s Elements. This method consists
of a way to construct (geometrical) objects and an ‘axiomatic’ way to build
truths about these objects upon well defined concepts and a few principles.
Throughout this study, we will see more in detail how Wolff, Kant, and the
early Bolzano adopted this method, each in different manner, to account for
mathematical knowledge.
While maintaining the universal applicability of the mathematical method,
Wolff makes a fundamental threefold distinction with regard to knowledge:
knowledge is either historical, philosophical, or mathematical.16 Whereas
historical knowledge consists in information about what happens in either
the material or immaterial world, philosophical knowledge provides insight
into the reasons of what happens.17 The third type of knowledge, namely
mathematics, is defined as the science of the quantitative aspects of things.18
Wolff explicitly compares the rules of those philosophical and mathematical
knowledge and concludes that they are identical.19 They share a common
methodology: philosophy does not derive its method from mathematics nor
vice versa. Rather, these two kinds of knowledge independently develop their
method from the same ground, namely the concept of certainty. Although,
the rules of the methodology are made explicit in the field of philosophy called
16GWII:1, p. 5, §3; p. 7, §6; p. 15, §14.
17This broad definition of philosophy includes the knowledge of physical cause-effect relations.
18Cf. GWII:1, p. 29, §28. All examples offered in the Discursus Praeliminarus pertain to
physics and one cannot find any reference to a notion of mathematics as the science of
abstract objects, or the quantity of abstract objects (Cf. GWI:1, p. 119, §15). Accordingly,
the Wolffian domain of mathematics included disciplines we would nowadays attribute to
physics.
19GWII:1, p. 160-163, §139.
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‘logic’, this does not mean that these rules are specific to philosophy.20 Since
they stem from the same ground, the exposition of the rules of philosophical
method can also be read as an exposition of the mathematical method and
vice versa. Thus, in his textbooks Wolff applies philosophical ideas and
demonstrates the success and universality of the ‘mathematical’ method. The
remainder of this chapter explains Wolff’s method as a consistent and coherent
system.
1.2 Concepts
The analysis of concepts, which stems from Descartes and Leibniz, plays a
crucial role in the methodological debates of the eighteenth century. For
example, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments of Kant
and the early Bolzano, which will be discussed extensively in later chapters,
relies on the extent to which concepts can be analyzed into constituents.
This section introduces the theory of concepts as it was prevalent in German
philosophy of the eighteenth century.
In his German Logic, Wolff describes concepts (Begriffe) as ‘representations
of a thing or object in the thought’.21 Such a representation comes in three
different types, namely as an image, a word or a sign. The last two differ from
the first in that they are indirect.22 When a word or a sign represents a thing
or object, it refers to the object without revealing the essential properties or
characteristics of the object. Focusing on the content of concepts themselves,
this section only discusses concepts as representations of things by means of
images.
One must be aware that the eighteenth century notion of representation
also involves a cognitive act rather than merely the objective content of what
is represented. Since, the term ‘concept’ refers to general representations, it
also involves a cognitive act. As a result, the same thing can be represented
by multiple concepts in such a way that only the cognitive act differs. One
could say that the quality of the concept can differ among definitions and
20GWII:1, p. 73, §61.
21GWI:1, p. 123, I §4. In the English translation of 1770 the terms ‘notion’ and ‘idea’ are used
interchangeably for the German term ‘Begriff’.
22The early Kant employs these differences to account for the differences in certainty between
mathematical and philosophical knowledge as we will see in chapter 2.
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human beings.23 For example, a child has a more confused concept of the
sun compared to an astronomer. Extending Leibniz’s distinctions, Wolff
developed a detailed account of several stages between a confused and a
perfectly clear concept.24
Wolff presents several distinctions to describe the cognitive status of con-
cepts (see figure 1.1). The positive part of each distinction builds upon the
previous one such that each step increases the cognitive status of the concept.
Concepts are called clear if the representation of the concept allows one to
recognize something as falling under that concept.25 A concept is clear if it
can be used for classification. For example, the concept ‘circle’ is clear if one
can recognize a thing as a circle. A young child has a clear concept of a circle
when she is able to put a cylinder through the fitting hole in a box. Clearness





















Figure 1.1: The cognitive status of concepts
A clear concept is distinct if one is able to mention explicitly the character-
istics (Merkmale) by means of which one recognizes something as belonging
to that concept. Only those characteristics that are essential to the concept
are taken into consideration. Wolff provides the example of a circle, which
23Of course, the same thing can also be represented by multiple concepts in such a way that
their meaning differs. For example, the object ‘sun’ is both represented by the concept
‘sun’ and the wider concept ‘star’.
24Although the notion of distinct and clear ideas stems from Descartes, Wolff’s explanation
of these terms stems from Leibniz.
25GWI:12, p. 6/7, §6, 7; GWI:1, p. 126-127, I §9-10.
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is ‘a curve that closes on itself of which each point has the same distance
to the center’.26 Obviously, a distinct concept is also clear, for if one can
mention the characteristics, one is able to recognize an object as something
to which the characteristics apply. Clearly, this relation does not hold vice
versa. A young child may be able to distinguish between circles and squares
without being able to describe the differences, let alone to point out what
is essential to each of them. Another example, offered by Wolff, employs a
color: a person can be able to recognize something as red without being able
to mention the characteristics of ‘red’.27
The next two steps, that of completeness and adequateness, can be re-
garded as distinctions concerning the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
distinctness, respectively. The first one regards a concept as complete if no
characteristic is missing. In this case, the characteristics are always sufficient
to distinguish the represented object from others.28 We can assume that the
characteristics do not overlap. When my concept of a square is that of a
shape with four right angles, the represented object (a square) cannot be
distinguished from a rectangle since a characteristic is missing. Contrary to
the notion of distinctness, Wolff’s description of incompleteness requires a
quantitative interpretation of completeness:
A distinct concept is [...] incomplete if one is not able to sum up
all characteristics, but only a few.29
According to Wolff, completeness does not enforce qualitative requirements
on the characteristics of a concept, but merely requires that one knows all
characteristics. Thus, completeness cannot be achieved by replacing character-
istics by better ones, but by adding missing characteristics.
According to Wolff, incomplete concepts can be found in many learned
writings.30 As an example he mentions the Cartesian concept of body as
(inaccurately) defined by extension: it fails to distinguish body from space.
A mathematical example is a concept of a circle as ‘a curve that closes on
26GWI:12, p. 7, §8: ‘eine in sich selbst laufende krumme Linie eingeschlossene Figur, deren
jeder Punct von dem Mittelpuncte desselben gleich weit weg ist’.
27GWI:12, p. 7, §9; GWIII:77, p. 18.
28GWI:1, p. 129, §15; GWIII:77, p. 19.
29GWI:1, p. 129, §15: ‘Ein deutlicher Begriff ist [...] unausführlich, wenn man nicht alle
Merckmahle, sondern nur einige zu erzehlen weiß’.
30GWIII:77, p. 20.
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itself’ which fails to distinguish between a circle and an ellipse. A complete
concept of ‘circle’ requires an extra characteristic, namely that each point has
the same distance to the center. The description of an incomplete concept
merely expresses the incomplete set of characteristics that are known, while
the concept is still that of a ‘circle’ and accordingly only meant to represent
circular objects. One cannot say that this incomplete concept is in fact the
concept of a conic section, since the intended object to be represented is a
circle. Although a characteristic is missing, the incomplete concept has the
cognitive stage of clearness which suffices to recognize circular objects as
circular.31
The qualitative aspect of a distinct concept is covered by the subsequent
distinction between adequate and inadequate concepts. A distinct (and thus
clear) concept is adequate when the characteristics themselves are distinct con-
cepts.32 In fact, Wolff recursively applies the distinction between distinct and
confused concepts to the characteristics of distinct concepts. This is possible
because characteristics themselves are concepts, that is, representations of
things or objects in thought. In this manner, excluding simple concepts, a
concept a is analysed into other concepts that function as the characteristics
of concept a.
Wolff’s example takes a clock as ‘a machine, which, by the strokes on a
bell, indicates the hours’.33 This concept is adequate if one also has distinct
concepts of the striking on a bell, of the hours, and of the indication. Wolff
here in fact recognizes the recursive nature of adequate concepts although he
did not have the term at his disposal. A concept is adequate to some degree
(Grade). If one is able to analyze (zergliedern) the concept ‘hour’ further into
the twenty-fourth part of a day, one has attained a higher degree of adequacy.
A mathematical example is the concept of a parallelogram as ‘a quadrilateral
with two sets of parallel sides’ in which the characteristic ‘quadrilateral’ can be
analyzed into ‘a polygon with four sides and four vertices’. Further analysis
of the characteristic ‘polygon’ results in ‘a plane figure that is bounded by a
31As we will see later, with respect to mathematical concepts this is, even in his pre-critical
years, entirely different for Kant.
32The asymmetric relation between clear and distinct also applies to the relation between
distinct and adequate: adequate concepts are always distinct, but not all distinct concepts
are adequate.
33GWIII:77, p. 21, §16.
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closed path, composed of a finite sequence of straight line segments’.
This process of analysis need not always, and as Wolff admits, often cannot,
be finished by arriving at primitive, unanalyzable, simple concepts.34 A fully
adequate concept is neither always possible nor always required. Proofs rely
on adequateness insofar as they rely on properties of objects represented
as distinct characteristics of concepts. Although a demonstration requires
some degree of adequacy, neither adequacy, nor any other cognitive status
is required to possess the concept. Mathematics depends on distinct and
adequate concepts insofar as these concepts are required to fully demonstrate
the theorems.35 For example, a proof of 2 + 2 = 4 requires distinct and
adequate concepts of the involved numbers, but such a proof does not require
a fully adequate concept of ‘number’ in general. Again, the relation between
the two subsequent steps in cognitive status of the concept is asymmetric: an
adequate concept is complete, but a complete concept need not be adequate.
For Wolff, the adequacy of a concept seems to presuppose completeness.
Yet, it is at least a theoretical possibility to think a concept A without pos-
sessing a distinct concept of one of the characteristics while at the same time
thinking a distinct concept of some of the other characteristics of A. How-
ever, this theoretical possibility is irrelevant given the purpose of Wolff’s
distinction between completeness and adequacy. In my view, the aim of this
distinction is to determine whether one can go on and on in the analysis
of the concept and recursively attain distinct concepts of the characteristics.
Doing so will definitely not make the concept any better if characteristics
are still missing. Ambiguities must be resolved before further analyzing the
characteristics of the concept. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that it makes
no sense to completely analyze one characteristic of a concept and at the same
time leave other characteristics obscure or confused. Therefore adequacy
presupposes completeness.
The described distinctions constitute the basis for Wolff’s notion of analysis
and his theory of definition as we will see in the next section. Throughout the
eighteenth century these distinctions, formulated by Wolff in German terms,
remain crucial, especially for Kant and Bolzano when distinguishing between
analytic and synthetic judgments as we will see in subsequent chapters.
34GWI:1, p. 131, §18.
35GWI:12, p. 8, §12.
1.3 Nominal versus Real Definitions 23
1.3 Nominal versus Real Definitions
Wolff’s notion of definition (Erklärungen) is based on this theory of concepts.
Definitions explicitly express those characteristics of a concept by means of
which a thing is thought.36 This means that a definition relies on a concept
that is at least distinct. Even though Wolff does not explicitly state this of
definitions in general, he certainly assumes that all parts of the definiens of a
definition are distinct, especially within the domain of mathematics. Since
a proper definition cannot omit a necessary characteristic, it needs to be
complete. Therefore, a definition is also a complete concept: it makes all
characteristics of a concept explicit. For example, a definition of a square
makes it impossible to conflate a square with a rectangle. A complete and
distinct concept thus provides all characteristics of the concept and thereby
defines the concept.
Within Wolff’s system definitions do not have the epistemological status
of propositions (Sätze) or judgments. They do not express a truth about
something. Definitions establish concepts such that they can be used in a
demonstration or proof rather than that they ascribe a predicate to a subject.
This is not to be understood in a genetic sense. The definition does not
give birth to the concept as the concept was already there. According to
Wolff, the definition is merely the result of a process of analysis that ends
when it arrives at a complete concept consisting of all characteristics of the
concept. Although definitions do not generate concepts, they are the starting
point for establishing principles as we will discuss later (§1.5). As such, they
are prerequisites for demonstrations, which explains why Wolff claims that
mathematics must strive after distinct and complete concepts.37
Following Leibniz and others like Spinoza and Hobbes, Wolff distinguishes
between nominal and real definitions. He describes the former as the ‘enumer-
ation of the properties whereby a thing is distinguished from all others’, for
example: ‘a clock is a machine that shows the hours’.38 Such an enumeration
is not necessarily complete in that it contains all properties, let alone all
36Only necessary characteristics, that is, concepts standing for elements always belonging to
the thing, are taken into consideration (GWI:1, p. 144, I §42).
37GWI:1, p. 131, §18; GWI:12; GWI:25, p. 3, §12.
38GWI:1, p. 144, I §41.
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essential characteristics.39 Instead of essential properties, a nominal definition
only indicates properties that are derivative of essential properties. Although
these properties suffice to distinguish things from each other, they do not
suffice to describe the essence of a thing. By contrast, a real definition must
contain all essential characteristics of the defined concept.40 More specifically,
real definitions provide clear and distinct concepts that show the manner
in which a thing is possible.41 Thus, real definitions are not only complete
concepts, but they also show the possibility of the represented object.42In
fact, Wolff regards this as the primary role of real definitions. In the next
chapter, we will see how Kant criticizes Wolff for exactly this aspect of his
conception of real definition.
Contrary to nominal definitions, real definitions themselves show how the
represented thing can come into existence.43 Since real definitions contain
the essential characteristics of the defined concept, they explain ‘the manner
in which a thing is possible’.44 A real definition of a clock is one that shows
the clockwork, namely the mechanism of geared wheels which explains how
the clock is possible. In his textbook on mathematics, Wolff is more specific
about the kind of possibility that is crucial for real definitions:
Insofar as real definitions are concerned, they show how a thing is
possible, that is, in which way something comes into existence.45
Wolff emphasizes that one must be sure about the possibility of a concept
39GWI:1, p. 146-147, I §48.
40GWI:1, p. 211.
41GWI:12, p. 6, §4.
42According to Lenders, Leibniz connects the distinction of nominal versus real definitions to
different grades of distinctness in concepts (Lenders, 1971, p. 38). A nominal definition is
clear and distinct but inadequate, whereas a real definition is adequate if the possibility of
the thing defined by it can be known a priori. To my knowledge, the connection between
adequacy of real definitions and a priori knowledge hardly plays a role in the work of
Wolff.
43GWI:11, p. 495. Wolters interprets real definitions such that ‘in Realdefinitionen muß
bewiesen werden, daß der Bereich des Definiendums nicht leer ist.’ (Wolters, 1980, p.
47). Indeed, in modern terms a real definition has a non-empty domain. Yet, the term
‘bewiesen’ is misleading, since a real definition does not contain a demonstration in the
sense the word has in Wolff’s mathematical or philosophical method. Wolff formulates
it such that real definitions show (zeigt) the possibility (GWI:1, p. 144, I §41). This
terminology is in line with the role of experience in the justification of real definitions.
44GWI:1, p. 143, I §41.
45GWI:12, p. 12-13, §22: ‘Was die Erklärungen der Sachen betrift, so zeigen dieselbigen, wie
eine Sache möglich ist, das ist, auf was für Art und Weise sie entstehen kan.’.
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in order to have a correct definition of the concept. For example, a circle
is defined as the motion of a line around a fixed point.46 In this case, one
must be certain that a line can be attached to a fixed point and then be turned
around. If we compare this real definition to the nominal definition of a circle
as ‘a curve that closes on itself of which each point has the same distance to
the center’ it turns out that a real definition involves a notion of construction
in the sense of coming into existence (entstehen). A real definition provides
a description of how the represented object can be construed.47 Thus, the
content of the characteristics and their combinations together make explicit
how the concept has a counterpart in reality. According to Wolff, in geometry
it is relatively easy to attain real definitions: ‘the motion of points yields
lines, the motion of lines yields planes, the motion of planes yields solids’.48
As the examples indicate, the real definition provides how the represented
object is possible. Accordingly, the notion of possibility associated with real
definitions is richer than a mere absence of contradictions (logical possibility),
as will be discussed more in detail in the next section.
According to Wolff, a demonstration requires that the possibility of the
object be warranted.49 In the case of a real definition this possibility is ex-
plicitly expressed by the definition of the concept representing the object.
Nominal definitions, on the other hand, require in addition a proof of the
possibility of the represented object, since the definition itself does not war-
rant its possibility. Although Wolff emphasizes the need for warranting the
possibility of what is defined, he does not explicitly give priority to real
definitions. Both real and nominal definitions can be compared to each other
in order to establish principles.50 Most likely, Wolff remains positive about
nominal definitions because he thinks that they can often be used to find
the real definition.51 Nevertheless, this requirement implies that nominal
46GWI:12, p.6, §4
47This aspect can easily yield a misunderstanding. As stated before, Wolff’s notion of
definition should not be regarded as a theory of concept formation. The contrast of
formation between nominal and real definitions only applies to the represented object, not
to the defined concept itself.
48Cf. GWI:12, p 16, §28; GWI:1, p. 148, §51.
49I follow Wolff in using the term ‘object’ to refer to what is defined in the context of real
definitions. In fact, a concept is defined of which it must be proved that an object is
possible in reality that falls under that concept.
50GWI:12, p. 16, §29.
51GWI:1, p. 146, 1, §45
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definitions can only be used if the possibility of the defined objects is war-
ranted by either a real definition of these objects, or by a proof relying on
constructive elements identical to those of a real definition. To me it seems
that according to Wolff a nominal definition of an object can only be used if
its real counterpart is given too, especially in the case of mathematics. From
a foundational perspective, nominal definitions are superfluous.
The question rises: where does the evidence concerning the possibility
of the thing or object come from? Neither logical consistence nor logical
possibility, or in contemporary terms, consistence with a possible world, is a
sufficient condition for the possibility of the defined object. For according to
Wolff, reality determines what is possible:
When a straight line moves around a fixed point a circle is de-
picted. This enables one to understand that a circle is possible. A
thing that actually can be construed must also be possible.52
Another passage even more explicitly states that the justification of the pos-
sibility of attaching a line to a fixed point and move it around stems from
experience (Erfahrung).53 More in general, Wolff maintains that the possibil-
ity expressed in a real definition is justified by an appeal to either experience
or previous results of correct inferences.54 Since no real definition can be
solely based on inferences because the chain of inferences must come to an
end, any real definition in the end relies to some extent on experience.55
52GWI:12, p. 6, §4: ‘Ein Circul werde beschrieben, wenn sich eine gerade Linie um einen
festen Punct beweget. Denn hieraus begreifet mann, daß ein Circul möglich ist. Was man
würcklich machen kan, muß auch möglich seyn’.
53GWI:12, p. 15, §27.
54GWI:12, p. 15, §27.
55While commentators are increasingly aware of the differences between Leibniz and Wolff,
Sommerhoff-Benner insists on a mutual influence (Sommerhoff-Benner, 2002). However,
in the case of the concept of real definitions, central to the method of mathematics, the
dating of a text by Leibniz as written between 1679 and 1685 strongly suggests a direct
influence on this topic:
Die Nominaldefinition besteht in der Aufzählung der Merkmale oder Hilfsmit-
tel, die ausreichen, ein Ding von allen anderen zu unterscheiden; wenn man
diese Merkmale und Hilfsmittel nun weiter zergliedert, gelangt man endlich zu
den Grundbegriffen. [...] Bey der Aufstellung von Realdefinitionen ist somit
sorgfältig zu beachten, daß ihre Möglichkeit gewiß ist oder daß die Begriffe, aus
denen sie bestehen, miteinander vereinbar sind. (Leibniz, 1992, p. 138-139)
In this passage, Leibniz’s explains the possibility of real definitions in terms of the con-
sistency of its concepts. Wolff’s German texts and his work on mathematics however
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Hence, for Wolff the possibility to define concepts ultimately depends on
experience. This means that not every combination of basic elements, such
as motion, straight line and fixed point, is actually possible. In other words,
some combinations do not result in real definitions.
When Wolff describes several ways to find real definitions in his mathemat-
ical textbook, he alludes to the example of a triangle:
If one really perceives that a space is enclosed within three straight
lines, one has no doubt that it is possible to enclose a space by
three lines or not, that is, whether the definition of a triangle
with straight lines is possible or not.56
Thus, the actual experience of a triangle yields the possibility of a triangle.
According to Wolff, one can infer the possibility of other concepts from this
one by removing determinations. For example, the possibility of a triangle,
defined as space enclosed by three lines, yields the possibility of the concept
of shape (space enclosed within lines) by removing the determination ‘three’.
In this manner, real definitions can be derived from others by the omission
of properties. However, the opposite, namely addition of properties is not a
valid strategy to attain definitions of which the possibility is warranted. The
possibility of a space enclosed by three lines does not guarantee the possibility
of its being enclosed by two or four lines. Wolff discusses the example of a
figure consisting of two lines in hisGerman Logic.57 He seems to explain how
to experience the impossibility of something. It follows from the concept
emphasize that a real definition explains how the object comes into being, strongly suggest-
ing that consistency alone does not suffice. Leibniz explicitly mentions simple concepts
(Grundbegriffe). A term, which does neither occur in the mathematical works of Wolff
nor in his German Logic, but nevertheless seems to be a presupposition of his system.
This also makes clear that the application of distinctness to the characteristics in the case
of adequateness, must be repeated until one arrives at simple concepts which cannot be
further analyzed into other characteristics or concepts. Contrary to Leibniz, Wolff does
not emphasize that the level of simple concepts can, and must be reached, but that the
process analysis must be put forward as far as required for the demonstration of given
theorems. To me it seems that Wolff’s lack of attention to simple concepts stems from his
focus on analysis while Leibniz was mainly interested in a synthetic process of building
complex concepts from simple concepts.
56GWI:12, p. 10, §20: ‘Wenn ihr wurklich wahrgenommen, daß ein Raum in drey gerade
Linien eingeschlossen sey, so habt ihr keinen Zweifel daruber, ob ein Raum in drey
gerade Linien könne eingeschlossen werden, oder nicht, das ist, ob die Erklärung des
geradelinichten Dreyeckes möglich sey, oder nicht.’.
57GWI:1, p. 141, §35.
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‘figure enclosed by two straight lines’, that two straight lines can cross each
other at two different points. Obviously, this is not possible.58
Unfortunately, Wolff is not entirely clear why exactly the consequence
is impossible. Maybe Wolff would argue that it is impossible because it
contradicts other definitions, axioms or theorems. However, the context
alludes to the notion of real possibility as described above. Thus, according
to Wolff, it cannot be a merely logical notion of possibility that accounts
for the impossibility of a diangle (Zweyeck), although, as we will see in the
next section, a real impossibility always coincides with a contradiction in the
concept. The surprising role of empirical data on the field of mathematics
is further confirmed in the Discursus Praeliminaris, where Wolff states that
mathematics always presupposes historical knowledge, that is, knowledge of
facts:
Even mathematics presupposes certain historical knowledge from
which it infers the concepts of its objects and some axioms. I
here speak of pure mathematics.59
Apparently, Wolff is aware of the surprising role of experience, since he adds
that his claim applies to pure mathematics.60 This strikingly empirical theory
of definitions forms the basis for Wolff’s method of mathematics. Ultimately,
any theorem relies on a real definition of the kind that I just described.
1.4 Impossible Concepts and Objects
As we have seen in the previous section, Wolff defines mathematical concepts
by means of real definitions in order to show the possibility of their objects.61
According to Wolff, the definition explains how the mathematical object can
be construed. Since the definition provides the content of the concept, the
58Of course, assuming Euclidean space as even early nineteenth century mathematicians did.
59GWII:1, p. 13, §12: ‘Sogar die Mathematik setzt eine gewisse historische Kenntnis voraus,
woraus sie den Begriff ihres Gegenstandes und einige Axiome ableitet. Ich spreche hier von
der reinen Mathematik’. Cf. GWII:1, p. 7, §7. Further confirmation concerning the role of
experience can be found in the chapter on the method of mathematics where experience is
mentioned as one of the grounds of a demonstration (GWI:12, p. 25, §43).
60To my knowledge, this is one of the very few occasions where Wolff uses the term ‘pure
mathematics’.
61See §1.3.
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possibility of the represented object is intrinsically bound to the possibility
of the concept. This intrinsic bond between the content of a concept and its
represented object adds an ontological role to conceptual analysis: the analysis
of the content of a concept determines the possibility of the represented object.
Wolff’s treatment of the example of a figure enclosed between two straight
lines, that is, a diangle, illustrates the ontological role of conceptual analysis:
It is determined by deduction whether a concept is possible:
either when we show how such an object (Sache) can come into
being, or when we investigate whether something follows from
it of which we already know that it is possible or not. [...] I
conclude that a diangle is impossible because from the possibility
of a diangle it follows that two straight lines can intercept at two
points. However, it is evident that these lines cannot intercept at
more than one point.62
This passage illustrates how Wolff equates the possibility of the object with
the possibility of the concept. Analysis of a concept, that is, knowledge of the
real definition of a concept reveals how the object is possible. The possibility
of an object can be known directly via the explanation of the construction
of an object in a real definition, or indirectly because the possibility of the
object yields contradictions with properties of objects of which we already
know that they are possible.
For Wolff, the impossibility of a concept always manifests itself in the form
of a contradiction between the parts of the concept (or their consequences).
Wolff’s identification of contradiction and impossibility is so strong as to
hold also in its negated version. Accordingly, the absence of contradiction
implies the possibility of a concept and its represented object:
Possible is that which does not involve a contradiction, or, that
which is not impossible. For from the fact that it does not involve
a contradiction, it follows that it is not impossible. But when
possible and impossible are contradictory opposites by definition,
it is established. If A is not impossible, it is evident that it is
possible.63
62GWI:1, p. 141, §35.
63GWII:3, p. 65, §85: ‘Possibile est, quod nullam contradictionem involvit, seu, quod non est
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Thus the impossibility of the object also implies the impossibility of the
concept itself.64 According to Wolff, contradiction implies impossibility, and
a contradiction indeed occurs in the case of a diangle.65
Wolff does not provide an alternative status to the dichotomy of possible
and impossible. According to Wolff, there are only two options, either a
concept is possible or it consists of empty words:
But when we determine something to our own liking, we cannot
know whether the concept is possible or we are merely thinking
empty words.66
Without the possibility of the signified objects, merely signifiers, that is,
merely words remain. For Wolff, this means that not even a thought is
signified. Due to the underlying notion of signification the content of the
concept collapses when the reference is missing. Thus, impossible objects
cannot be represented by a fully fledged concept.67 As said before, according
to Wolff a concept is a representation that comes in three different types:
image, word, and sign.68 In all cases, the straightforward underlying theory
of signification implies that a proper concept requires a referent. In order to
have such a referent, this referent must be possible. Hence, no proper concept
can represent an impossible object.
The impossibility cannot always be known very easily. Complex concepts
might eventually lead to contradictions. Such a complex concept is deceptive
since all basic constituents properly represent an object. What remains is a
word, that is, a sign, that does not denote anything.69 Wolff and his followers
regarded for example a diangle as purely an expression (terminus), in which
impossibile. Etenim ex eo, quod quid nullam contradictionem involvit, concluditur, quod
non sit impossibilie. Cum vero vi definitionis possibile atque impossibile sibi opponantur
tanquam contradictoria; ubi constat. A non esse impossibile, eo ipso constat, quod
sit possibile. Nil igitur obstat, quo minus impossibilis definitione supposita possibile
definiatur negative, removendo seilicer ab eo impossibilis definitionem, seu negando
de eodem, quod ipsi opponitur.’. Cf. Baumgarten, 1757, §7, XVII:24, translated in
Baumgarten, 2013; GWI:2, §12, p. 7/8.
64Cf. GWI:1; Wolff, 1995, p. 141 §35.
65Cf. GWII:1, p. 62, §79; GWI:1, p. 140, §33.
66GWI:1, p. 140, §33.
67Cf. GWI:1, p. 151, II §1; p. 123, I §4.
68See 1.2.
69For Wolff the term ‘word’ merely refers to the sequence of the letters ‘w’, ‘o’, ‘r’, and ‘d’.
Wolff’s view stems from Leibniz (see Leibniz, 1989; Burkhardt, 1980, p. 155).
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we do not really have a representation, but merely an empty word.70 As such,
the concept of a diangle cannot be used in a science, that is, science cannot
provide principles and prove theorems involving the concept of diangle.71
Thus, Wolff’s theory of signification underlying the relation between words
and concepts does not offer the option to regard concepts without reference
to an object as proper concepts. The notions of contradiction, impossibility,
and emptiness coincide. As a consequence no room is left for ontologically
problematic concepts, such the contradictory concept of imaginary numbers
(square root of -1) or infinitesimals. In later chapters, we will see that Kant
offers a more advanced theory of concepts, while the early Bolzano solves this
problem by means of a distinction between objects and concepts in thought.
1.5 Principles and Theorems
As we have seen, definitions provide distinct concepts of which all charac-
teristics are made explicit. As such, they provide a sound starting point for
demonstrations. However, definitions cannot directly be used in syllogistic
inferences, since the latter require premises that have the form of subject-
predicate judgments. Accordingly, after establishing definitions, Wolff’s
mathematical method employs them to attain the first element that has the
form of subject-predicate judgments. These are called principles (Grundsätze)
or ‘axioms’ in a mathematical context.
Despite the crucial difference in logical form, the principles of Wolff’s
system are very close to definitions because they immediately stem from
definitions. Starting with definitions, one ‘considers that which is contained
in the definitions and immediately infers something from them’, which
results in one or more principles.72 The immediate relation to definitions is
characteristic of principles and, according to Wolff, distinguishes them from
theorems (Lehrsätze).73 While both principles and theorems have the form
70Cf. GWI:1, p. 140, §33; GWII:1, §135.
71The theorem ‘diangle is an empty concept’ does not belong to a scientific discpline, like
mathematics or geometry.
72GWI:12, p. 16, §29: ‘dasjenige betrachtet, was in den Erklärungen enthalten ist, und
schliesset etwas unmittelbar daraus’.
73Analogous to axioms, theorems have a practical version, called problems (Aufgaben). Similar
to postulates, they state how something can be made. Some passages seem to indicate that
one can transform them into each other (GWI:12, p. 28/29, §47).
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of subject-predicate judgments, they differ with regard to their justification.
In the case of principles one immediately infers (schliessen) something from a
single definition. If something cannot be known through a single definition,
one has to take into account multiple definitions from which a theorem might
be inferred.74 Thus, contrary to principles, theorems do not rely directly
on definitions, but instead rely indirectly on principles. As we will see in
the subsequent section, it is the purpose of demonstrations to show how
theorems rely on principles by means of syllogistic inferences.75
When discussing principles, Wolff introduces his version of the traditional
distinction between axioms and postulates. A principle is either an axiom
or a postulate. Whereas axioms show (zeigen) that something is the case,
postulates show that something is actually possible in the sense that it can
be made or construed. Wolff’s example of an axiomatic principle is the
proposition ‘All lines drawn from the center to the perimeter are equal in
length’. Relative to the concept of circle defined as motion of a line around
a fixed point, it is immediately clear that all lines from the center to the
perimeter are equal. An example of a postulate is ‘between every two points
a straight line can be drawn’.76
A postulate resembles a real definition insofar as they both affirm a pos-
sibility of construction. Yet, they differ in epistemological status: whereas
a definition explicates concepts, a postulate only states a certain possibility,
which at best is only a partial explication of the concept. Following im-
mediately from a definition, the postulate’s possibility is warranted by the
possibility of the definition. Since postulates follow from a definition, they
must not be confused with the grounds for a definition itself. In the example
of the circle, Wolff describes the latter as ‘whether one can attach a line to a
fixed point and move it’.77 In this case the grounds are experience, whereas
in the case of the postulate the ground is the definition. Of course, this
definition is itself grounded in experience, hence, the postulate is indirectly
grounded in experience.
Despite these differences, both axioms and postulates are principles, that is,
74GWI:12, p. 21, §37.
75GWI:12, p. 27, §45.
76GWI:12, p. 17, §30.
77GWI:12, §26.
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they follow immediately from definitions. The immediacy stems from the
insight that a demonstration is neither required nor possible. In other words,
principles are unprovable, but not in the sense that a demonstration cannot
yet be found. In the case of a principle, the attribution of predicate to subject
is such that a demonstration is simply not required. For demonstrations
consist of syllogistic inferences and these are not applicable because of the
manner in which the principle attributes a predicate to a subject.78 AsWolters
remarks, definitions have a ‘Begründungfunktion’ because principles stem
directly from definitions, not as logical consequence, but ‘per intuitum’.79
Wolff emphasizes that the ground of a principle, regardless of whether it is an
axiom or postulate, relies on the certainty of the definition it results from:
One cannot be certain whether the principle is true or not, unless
one has investigated the possibility of the definitions. Otherwise
one does not know anything other than that the principles are
correct insofar the definitions are possible.80
According to Wolff, the evidence of principles relies on the possibility of
constructing the defined object as ensured by real definitions. This clearly
indicates the importance of proving the possibility of definitions as discussed
in the previous section. One must be aware that a principle is not self-evident
in the strict sense of the word, because its truth depends on the evidence
concerning the possibility of the object that corresponds to the definition on
which the principle relies.81 Thus, the truth of Wolff’s principles does not
rely on self-evident propositions or logical truths alone.
Yet, in the German Logic one can find a remark that suggests otherwise.
Here Wolff regards identity propositions ( leere Sätze), like ‘all animals are
animals’, as the ideal form of principles since such a proposition satisfies
the unprovability criterion for principles.82 In the same sentence, Wolff
78We will see later how the early Bolzano employs this insight to characterize principles as
the attribution of simple predicates to simple subjects (§5.7).
79Wolters, 1980, p. 45.
80GWI:12, p. 17, §31: ‘Man kan demnach nicht eher versichert seyn, ob der Grundsaß wahr
sey oder nicht, bis man die Möglichkeit der Erklärungen untersuchet hat. Sonst weiß man
nichts, als daß die Grundsätze richtig sind, wofern die Erklarungen möglich.’
81The English version of Wolff’s German Logic published in 1770 is rather misleading in this
respect. It adds a sentence, not present in the German original, with the phrase ‘manifest
from the terms’ (GWIII:77, p. 72, V §13).
82GWI:1, p. 162, III §13.
34 Chapter 1 Wolff’s Method of Mathematics
requires not only an understanding of the words, but also that the object in
question (Sachen) be represented. Taken together this means that identity
propositions are principles not because of the general formal law of identity,
which can be applied to an identity proposition without even knowing the
words that are identical, but because representation of the subject yields
characteristics that are identical to the representation of the predicate. Within
Wolff’s system one cannot infer something extensionally without grasping
the content of concepts. In this sense, Wolff’s logic can be characterized
as intensional. Recall, Wolff’s notion of real definition.83 For example, a
circle must be represented by its real definition. From this representation
it follows immediately, without any syllogistic inference, that all lines from
center to perimeter are equal. This peculiar position stems from what one
could call the psychological nature of Wolff’s logic, which relies both on
ontology and psychology.84 Wolff’s German Logic describes concepts as the
representation of a thing in our thought.85 Whereas we will see later how
Kant takes this seriously by focusing on the capabilities of our faculties,
Bolzano will distinguish strictly between the objective and subjective aspects
of concepts.
1.6 Mechanical versus Genuine Mathematical
Demonstrations
According to an informal expression of Wolff, ‘a demonstration is a proof
which leaves no manner of doubt in the mind’.86 In terms of the formal
part of traditional logic the absence of doubt is secured ‘if one can carry
out ones syllogistic reasoning to such an extent that the last syllogisms have
nothing but definitions, clear experiences, and other empty propositions as
its premises’.87 This phrase starts from the theorem that is to be proved
and then reasons back via syllogisms towards the premises. Clearly, Wolff
83See §1.3.
84GWII:1, §88-90; Engfer, 1982, p. 225.
85GWI:1, p. 123, I §4.
86GWI:1, p. 172, III §21, p. 92.
87GWI:1, p. 92, III §21, p. 172: ‘Und man nennet ihn eine Demonstration, wenn man seine
Schlüsse so weit hinaus führen kan, biß man in dem letzte Schlusse nichts als Erklärungen,
klare Erfahrungen und andere leere Sätze zu Förder-Sätzen hat’.
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alludes to the analytical method which starts from a proposition, proceeds by
analysis (Zergliedern), and ends with the premises. This analytical method is
opposed to the synthetic method, which starts with definitions, proceeds by
synthesis, and ends with the conclusion.88 A syllogism is not only a method
of demonstration, but also a means for the invention, that is, for the discovery
of truth.89 TheMathematical Lexicon defines a demonstration as a strict chain
of syllogisms:
A demonstration is a proof which can be analyzed into formal
syllogisms as its only constituents such that the conclusion of the
previous one forms the premise of the subsequent one, and no
syllogism assumes a premise that is not already previously proved
as correct.90
Wolff readily admits that such a complete chain of syllogistic reasoning is
usually not given in all its details. Quite often, the premises (Fördersätze) are
omitted because they are clear to an experienced reader. However, the infer-
ences (Schlüsse) themselves, which together constitute a complete chain from
axioms to a theorem, are always required. If not, the analysis (Zergliedern) of
theorems into axioms, definitions, and identities fails.
88Many different notions of analytic versus synthetic method can be found in texts of the
seventeenth and eighteenth century. For an overview see Tonelli, 1976.
89GWI:1, p. 175, §24.
90GWI:11, p. 501: ‘Eine Demonstration ist ein solcher Beweis, der sich in lauter formliche
Schlüsse zergliedern lasset, und zwar dergestalt, daß die Hintersätze der vorhergehenden
wieder Fördersätze in den folgenden abgeben, und kein Fördersatz in einem Schlusse
angenommen wird, der nicht schon vorher richtig erwiesen worden [ist]’. Note that on
this occasion Wolff describes the concept of demonstration from the perspective of the
synthetic method.
















Figure 1.2: Overview of Wolff’s Mathematical Method. Arrows indicate a foundational relation.
This notion of demonstration completes the elements of Wolff’s math-
ematical method which is summarized in figure 1.2. According to Wolff,
real definitions are the ultimate ground of any truth insofar they ensure the
possibility of that which is defined. Principles immediately follow from
these definitions without requiring any rule of inference. Theorems result
from both definitions, principles, and other theorems by means of syllogistic
inferences. Thus, according to Wolff, the apodictic nature of mathematical
knowledge depends on the achievement of a rigorous demonstration. Such
a demonstration may either follow the synthetic method by starting from
definitions or the analytic method by starting from theorems. One might
question whether it is really possible to establish such a chain of syllogisms
for the mathematical proofs of that time. This topic is beyond the scope of
this writing, but Wolff certainly felt the need to show this as much as he could
since he claimed his Latin work on geometry to provide the most profound
demonstration one can find.91
In Wolff’s work one can find two kinds of demonstration, a distinction espe-
cially relevant with regard to the issues raised by Kant’s texts on mathematics,
91GWI:11, p. 669; GWII:29.
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namely a mechanical versus a genuine mathematical demonstration. The
Mathematical Lexicon defines a mechanical demonstration as ‘such a proof
that one, by means of the required instruments, the thing that is to be proved,
investigates and judges it to be correct’.92 In the Mathematical Lexicon, as well
as in his texts on private education, Wolff illustrates the distinction between
mechanical and genuine mathematical proofs by means of the paradigmatic






Figure 1.3: Mechanical demonstration.
The mechanical proof of this theorem starts with drawing the half of a
circle with B as its center. With the same opening of the compass one draws a
partial circle within the triangle with A respectively C as its center (see figure
1.3). Consider the partial circles around A and C. The distance between the
points where the partial circle crosses the triangle can be transposed to the
point where the half of a circle around B crosses the triangle. In this manner,
the compass reveals that the angles of A, B, and C together make up the half
of a circle, which equals two right angles. Both in his educational texts and
the Mathematical Lexicon, Wolff regards a mechanical proof as suitable for
beginners who experience mathematics as difficult. Thus, the purpose of a
mechanical demonstration is pedagogical in that it helps to gain insight into
the theorem and the reason of its truth. Notwithstanding a lack of scientific
rigour, a mechanical demonstration eventually leads to an understanding of
the genuine mathematical proof.
92GWI:11, pp. 506-507: “ein solcher Beweiß, da man vermittelst nöthiger Instrumente die
Sache, so erwiesen werden soll, untersuchet und sie richtig befindet’. Apart from Shabel,
this distinction does not seem to be noticed in secondary literature. Sommerhoff-Benner
mentions it as an example of Wolff’s educational texts but neither explains nor employs it
in an interpretation (Sommerhoff-Benner, 2002, p. 291).
93GWI:12, p. 173-175, §23; GWI:11, p. 507; GWI:12, §101; GWI:21, pp. 593-597.







Figure 1.4: Genuine demonstration.
Wolff’s example of a genuine demonstration in his German Logic is illu-
minating in that it explicitly makes clear which kind of premises justify the
conclusion.94 Starting from a triangle ABC, Wolff’s first step is to draw a
line DE through top C parallel to AB. In figure 1.4, the inner angles of the
triangle are indicated with 1, 2, and 3, the outer angles on the top with I and II.
On the basis of this numbering the next step is to conclude that ∠1 = ∠I and
∠2 = ∠II. These conclusions require a previously demonstrated theorem.
Wolff refers to a theorem of his mathematical textbook, which states that the
alternate angles of a line crossing two parallel lines are equal.95 This theorem
can only be applied when alternate angles occur. That they indeed occur in
our case, does not follow from the definition of a triangle, which does not
use the notion of alternate angle or parallel lines at all.
According to Wolff, surprisingly, it follows from the figure (see figure 1.4,
S1 and S2 in figure 1.5):
[The figure reveals] that the angles I and 1 are alternate between
the parallels AB and DE. As a consequence the angles I and 1 are
also mutually equal. This is the first formal syllogism [S1] which
every one must conceive, who from conviction is to admit, that
the angles I and 1 are mutually equal.96
94The purpose of the paragraph where Wolff’s describes this demonstration is to show how
formal inferences ( förmlichen Schlüsse) constitute a demonstration in the field of geometry.
In accordance with the general validity of the ‘mathematical’ method it is neither limited
to geometry nor to mathematics. A few paragraphs later Wolff describes a case on the field
of physics (GWI:1, p. 176, IV §25).
95GWI:12, §97; GWI:25, §72.
96GWI:1, p. 174, IV §23: ‘Die Figur giebet: 1 und I sind Wechsels-Winckel an Parallellinien
AB und DE. Daher schliesset er die Winckel 1 und I sind einander gleich. Siehe den ersten
förmlichen Schluß, der sich ein jeder gedencken muß, wenn er überführet seyn will: die
Winckel 1 und I sind einander gleich.’
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S1
1 and I are alternate angles on parallel lines AB and DE (figure)
Alternate angles of a line crossing two parallel lines are equal (theorem)
1 and I are equal ∴
S2
2 and II are alternate angles on parallel lines AB and DE (figure)
Alternate angles of a line crossing two parallel lines are equal (theorem)
2 and II are equal ∴
S3
I, 3, and II are at one point of line DE (figure)
All angles at one point of a line are together 180◦ (theorem)
I, 3, and II are together 180◦ ∴
S4
1 and I are equal, 2 and II are equal (S1, S2)
I, 3, and II are together 180◦ (S3)
1, 2, and 3 are together 180◦ ∴
Figure 1.5: Chain of syllogistic inferences.
The next step relies on another theorem, namely that all angles at one point
of a line together are 180°.97 Similarly to the previous step the figure with
the triangle at drawn parallel line plays a crucial role (S3 in figure 1.5):
[The figure reveals] that the angles I, 3, and II stand on the same
[straight] line DE, and at the same point C therein. [Therefore]
the angles I, 3 and II are together equal to two right angles.98
On the basis of properties shown in the figure the theorem can be applied
resulting in I + 3 + II = 180. The combination of this inference with the
97GWI:12, §59; GWI:25, §38.
98GWI:1, p. 174, §23: ‘Die Figur giebet: die Winckel I, 3 und II stehen an einem Puncte C
auf einer Linie DE. Daher schliesset er: die Winckel I, 3 und II machen zusammen 180°’.
The translation of 1770 starts with ‘On a farther view of the figure, we form this other
intuitive judgment’. Cf. GWI:12, p.154.
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results of the first two gives us the desired conclusion 1 + 3 + 2 = 180 (S4
in figure 1.5). Superficially, this genuine demonstration contains an element
similar to the role of instruments and the terminology of drawing lines in
the case of a mechanical demonstration, namely the first step of drawing a
line parallel to AB. Although this seems evident at first, there are decisive
reasons against such an interpretation. The mechanical demonstration uses
instruments, not only to construct a figure, but also to demonstrate the thesis
that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. In fact, the three
angles 1, 2, and 3 are added to each other and compared to 180° by means
of an instrument. The compass performs the reasoning that takes the form
of syllogistic inferences in a genuine demonstration. The fact that the angles
together equal 180° is seen in the figure whereas in the case of a genuine
mathematical demonstration both the addition and the comparison is not
performed diagrammatically but by means of syllogisms. In the case of a
genuine demonstration the line is only drawn so as to designate several angles.
Thus, the role played by the step of drawing a line differs from the use of
instruments in a mechanical proof.
Although mathematics is the paradigmatic example where his methodology
is maximally realized, Wolff admits that even in mathematics the use of
syllogistic forms is not always clear. Very often, premises are not made
explicit.99 Therefore Wolff describes what is going on in the demonstration
of this theorem and concludes:
The demonstration thus consists of four formal syllogisms, but
their premises are omitted, as they are brought to mind, either
by the references, or by intuiting the figure, or by considering
what has been already demonstrated.100
Although premises are not always made explicit, and sometimes even con-
fusedly represented, they are nevertheless presupposed. They are left out,
although implicitly present, because they are trivial. In the passage just
99GWI:1, p. 172, §21.
100GWI:1, p. 174, §23: ‘Solchergestalt bestehet der Beweiß aus vier förmlichen Schlüssen,
von denen aber die Förder-Sätze weggelassen werden, weil sie theils durch die Citation,
theils durch das Anschauen der Figur, theils durch den Context in das Gedächtnis gebracht
werden’. Some pages earlier Wolff writes: ‘Die Mathematici lassen unterweilen beyde
Förder-Sätze weg, weil der eine aus der Citation, der andere aus der Figur ins Gedächtniß
gebracht wird’ (p. 172, §21).
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quoted, three cases can be distinguished. In the case of the theorems it is a
matter of remembering and referring to a previously established truth. Wolff
calls this reference (Citation). Another case is that in which the premise can
be assembled during the proof. For example, the fourth inference is a simple
combination of two mathematical truths relying on identity (Context). The
most interesting implicit premises are those present in the figure, which Wolff
here describes as ‘intuition of the figure’ (Anschauen der Figur).101 According
to Wolff, the premisses can be left out on the condition that ‘the reader can
bring them to his mind’. Yet, they are required for complete distinctness
(volkommen Deutlichkeit).102 Wolff thus acknowledges the important role
they play.
Although Shabel provides a detailed and fascinating analysis of several
elements of Wolff’s treatment of mathematics relevant to the interpretation
of Kant, she also neglects some important aspects.103 Among them are
the empirical foundation of real definitions, and the role of diagrams in
Wolff’s demonstrations. Despite her recognition of the role of construction
in Wolff’s work, Shabel claims that diagrams play no role in Wolff’s method
of mathematics:
Rigorous logical analysis of mathematical concepts and proposi-
tions is sufficient to account for mathematical truth. [...] Wolff
takes every step of a mathematical demonstration to rest on con-
ceptual analysis and syllogistic inference, and thus conceives of
diagrammatic evidence as reducible to logical evidence.104
In my view, this rationalistic description of Wolff is misleading.105 Although
the steps of a demonstration indeed rely on ‘conceptual analysis and syl-
logistic inference’, the premises not only consist of identity propositions
but also of real definitions and clear experience.106 Contrary to Shabel’s
101This is not the only place where Wolff ascribes such a role to diagrams. Similar phrases can
be found in the Mathematical Lexicon (GWI:11, p. 502).
102GWI:1, p. 179, §27. Apparently, the term ‘complete distinctness’ here is not used in the
more technical sense of §1.2 because it does not refer to concepts, but to premises.
103Cf. Shabel, 2003.
104Shabel, 2006, p. 95.
105In chapter 6, I will criticize a similar rationalistic interpretation of the early Bolzano.
106GWI:1, p. 172, §21. In this respect Wolff does not seem to follow Leibniz as claimed by
Shabel (Shabel, 2006, p. 96).
42 Chapter 1 Wolff’s Method of Mathematics
interpretation, Wolff does not reduce diagrammatic to logical evidence, but
explicitly acknowledges the role of diagrammatic evidence as the starting
point of syllogistic inferences. The step of establishing the premises of a
syllogistic inference in some cases relies on diagrams. Although it is the un-
derstanding that provides clarity, experience and diagrams also play a crucial
role in Wolff’s mathematical method. As we will see in chapter 3, this aspect
explains why and how Kant criticized Wolff with regard to the analytic nature
of mathematics.
Unfortunately, Wolff does not explicitly say anything about the episte-
mological status of the figure and the premises given by it although he
acknowledges the role they play in demonstrations. Yet, in my view, the
role of diagrams might be part of the presuppositions of a demonstration as
mentioned by Wolff in the already quoted passage:
A proof is called a demonstration if one can carry out ones
syllogistic reasoning to such an extent that the last syllogism
has nothing but definitions, clear experiences, and other empty
propositions as its premises (Förder-Sätze).107
The conclusion of a demonstration is thus based on syllogistic reasoning,
which requires a starting point. This starting point can be of three kinds:108
1. Principles: a principle that immediately stems from a single real defini-
tion.
2. Clear experience: propositions that stem from experience.
3. Identity propositions: propositions of the form ‘A is A’.109
107GWI:1, p. 172, §21: ‘Und man nennet ihn [der Beweis] eine Demonstration, wenn man
seine Schlüsse so weit hinaus führen kan, biß man in dem letzten Schlusse nichts als
Erklärungen, klare Erfahrungen, und andere leere Sätze zu Förder-Sätzen hat’. Translation
is mine. See also GWI:1, p. 210, IX §1.
108The context of the passage and its formulation warrant the assumption that Wolff here
provides an exhaustive list.
109Wolff must have erred in some way when writing the phrase ‘andere leere Sätze’, which
assumes definitions and clear experiences to be empty propositions. Their is no sensible
way to apply the attribute ‘leer’ to definitions or clear experiences. Either ‘leer’ is written
instead of ‘unbeweisbar’ or ‘andere’ must be omitted. Most likely ‘leer’ is used in the sense
of ‘unbeweisbar’ which means that a demonstration is neither required nor possible. The
only other empty propositions are identity propositions.
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Let us consider of which kind the premises are that are revealed by the
figure. The syllogistic reasoning (figure 1.5) makes clear that the premises
revealed by the figure are not identity propositions. Another option is that
the premises immediately stem from a definition. They can only immediately
stem from a definition if a real definition of the angles 1, I, 2, and II is
possible. A real definition of angle I seems to be ‘the angle between AC
and DC where DE is a straight line parallel to the base AB through top
C of a triangle ABC’. Together with a similar definition of angle 1 and a
definition of alternate angles one might argue that the first premise of the
first syllogism immediately follows from these definitions.110 Although the
definitions of angle I and 1 explain how these angles are possible, they are
not real definitions as discussed before.111 Take for example the definition
of a circle. It does not describe the essential properties of just one instance
or object, but of a certain type of objects. A definition does not refer to a
particular object or construction in a diagram. Instead, a definition consists
of the characteristics of a general concept which can be used to represent
multiple objects. In modern terminology, the so called definitions of angle
I and 1 have the form of Russell’s definite descriptions. Thus, the premise
revealed by the figure cannot be a principle that immediately stems from a
real definition. Hence, the only candidate left is that of clear experience. Let
us consider this candidate more in detail.
Although Wolff uses the combination of ‘clear’ and ‘experience’ several
times, it is not entirely perspicuous what he means by it. The explanation
most in accordance with his notion of clear concepts is that a ‘clear experience’
refers to a proposition that stems from experience and that uses only clear
concepts as its predicate and subject. The problem now is how broad Wolff’s
notion of experience is. A superficial investigation of Wolff’s concept of
experience reveals that it relies on having sensations (Empfindungen).112 In
the German Logic,Wolff describes having sensations as follows:
I say however that we have sensations of something when we are
conscious of it as present to us. Thus we perceive pain, sound,
110See the first premise of S1 in figure 1.5.
111See §1.3.
112GWI:1, p. 181, V §1.
44 Chapter 1 Wolff’s Method of Mathematics
light, and our own thoughts.113
The last part, that our own thoughts also belong to sensation is the only
candidate that might not require a physically drawn figure responsible for a
clear experience of the premises. Several passages in other works of Wolff,
however, make this interpretation of the relation between sensations and
thought almost untenable.114 At several places in his work he clearly indicates
that sensations of outer objects cause our thoughts. Thoughts in this sense
are called sensations. This seems to leave us with the unattractive option
of a clear experience of a physically drawn figure as the justification of the
premises that stem from the figure.
At this point Wolff’s texts hardly give any evidence or hint. Yet another
interpretation might solve the problem. Real definitions in fact explain
concepts in terms of construction. From this perspective, the drawing of a
line in the first step could be interpreted as combining the representation of a
triangle with that of a line. From these combined representations the premises
immediately follow. The premises in fact follow from a construction in which
the representations that are described by these definitions are combined. Recall
the three ways in which a concept can represent a thing according to Wolff,
namely as an image, a word or a sign.115 Against the background of the
first one, a pictorial kind of representation, it then seems natural to write
in such a case that ‘the figure reveals’. Some confirmation of such a role of
representations can be found in the German Logic:
We cannot represent to ourselves a thing as a triangle, that is, a
space enclosed within three lines without directly grasping that
it must contain three angles.116
Although this shows that Wolff’s notion of representation allows for such an
interpretation, the problem remains whether this can be linked to the passage
113GWI:1, p.123, I §1: ‘ Ich sage aber, daß wir etwas empfinden, wenn wir uns desselben als
uns gegenwärtig bewußt sind. So empfinden wir den Schmerz, den Schall, das Licht und
unsere eigenen Gedanken’. Translation by the author.
114Cf. GWI:2, p. 122, §220; Meissner, 1737, p. 158.
115See §1.2.
116GWI:1, p. 162, III §13: ‘[M]an kan sich die Sache nicht vorstellen, ohne daß man darinnen
zugleich erblicket, was ihr beygeleget wird, als ein Dreyeck, oder eine Figur in drey Linien
eingeschlossen, ohne daß die drey Winckel mit darbey seyn sollten’. Translation by the
author.
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‘the figure reveals’, and more specifically to ‘intuition of the figure’. Moreover,
such a combined representation still differs from a definition in that it refers
to particular angles. Such a case is not accounted for in Wolff’s methodology.
Nevertheless, this seems to be the most convincing interpretation.
In sum, despite the problem to find a Wolffian explanation of premises that
stem from a figure the conclusion that diagrams play a crucial epistemological
role is inevitable. The rationalistic nature of Wolff’s philosophy does not
rely on the absence of experience and diagrams as sources of truth, but
in the emphasis on thought as the source of clear and distinct concepts.
The crucial role of diagrams, as well as, the role of construction in real
definitions, illustrate how Wolff’s view of mathematics is modeled after
Euclidean geometry. Although Wolff’s presentation of the mathematical
method does not pay attention to the role of diagrams in demonstrations at
all, Wolff’s explanation of a geometrical demonstration actually acknowledges
the role of diagrams. As a result, Wolff’s work asks for a more explicit
theory accounting for the construction of figures and its relation to the
chain of syllogistic inferences yielding the theorem. In the next two chapters
I will investigate how Kant answers this question with his conceptions of
examination of the universal under signs and the notion of construction in
pure intuition. Whereas Kant seems to provide the foundation for the role of
diagrams that Wolff’s philosophy of mathematics lacks, Bolzano will reject
the role of construction and diagrams in demonstrations altogether, as we






The previous chapter introduced the influential method of mathematics
as presented by Wolff in his textbooks on logic and mathematics. As we
have seen, Wolff claims that the method of mathematics is universally valid
and regards it as applicable to any domain of knowledge. This claim was
highly controversial during the eighteenth century.1 Yet, it was commonly
accepted, even by Wolff himself, that philosophy, including metaphysics,
lacks the apodictic nature of mathematics. Against this background, the topic
of the prize essay contest of the Berlin Academy of 1761 is not surprising:
is philosophy - that is, metaphysics and ethics - capable of the same level
of evidence as mathematics? Kant’s contribution to this contest, entitled
Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie
und Moral, issued the most fundamental criticism of Wolff’s position of the
time.2
This chapter offers an interpretation of those parts of the Prize Essay that in-
form us about Kant’s pre-Critical views on the methodology and philosophy
of mathematics. My aim is to reconstruct Kant’s early view on mathematics
1Crusius for example discusses a much wider variety of methods and demonstrations in his
Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis (Crusius, 1747).
2Kant’s Prize Essay was published in 1764, but written two years earlier. Winner of the
essay contest was Mendelssohn with his contribution Abhandlung über die Evidenz in
metaphysischen Wissenschaften. In both contributions signs play a role when describing the
epistemology of mathematics.
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by relating the claims made in the Prize Essay to the then dominating Wolf-
fian view on mathematics. In this essay, Kant argues that mathematics and
philosophy are fundamentally different because of methodological differences.
The first two sections of this chapter introduce the two distinctions on which
these differences rely. Kant distinguishes, first, between analytic and synthetic
definitions (§2.1). Whereas philosophy looks for analytic definitions by ana-
lyzing confused concepts, mathematics composes concepts out of simple ones
by means of synthetic definitions. The second distinction is that between
the examination of ‘the universal in abstracto through signs’ in philosophy
and the examination of ‘the universal in concreto under signs’ in mathematics
(§2.2). Given the crucial nature of the innovation that takes place in these
short passages it is remarkable that detailed analysis of these parts can hardly
be found in the secondary literature.3 Often, the role of construction in the
geometrical examples of the Prize Essay is interpreted from the perspective of
common interpretations of Kant’s treatment of geometry in the doctrine of
method in the first Critique. However, in my view, this interpretation raises a
devastating problem, namely a violation of the aim of the distinction because
this aim requires the distinction to have exactly the same meaning with regard
to arithmetic, which, in my opinion, is not supported by Kant’s text.
After the introduction of the analytic-synthetic and in abstracto-in concreto
distinctions, the third section explains in detail how the latter distinction
can be interpreted such that it applies in the same manner to arithmetic and
algebra, as well as, geometry (§2.3). In my view, existing interpretations
neglect fascinating details of the Prize Essay, especially the passages concerned
with the role of signs. I will argue that in concreto does not stand to in
abstracto as an example or a particular object stands to a universal concept,
but that the two terms designate a difference in the nature of the signs of
philosophy and mathematics. We will see how the early Kant employed
Leibnizean ideas on the role of signs in mathematics. In my view, Kant
extends the then common treatment of arithmetic as a system of signs to
geometry in order to base a fundamental difference in certainty between
3A notable exception is Koriako, one of the few scholars that pay detailed attention to
the Prize Essay in relation to the philosophy of mathematics rather than merely the
methodological differences between philosophy and mathematics. As we will see, however,
he seems to overlook the additional character of the pictorial resemblance of geometrical
signs (Koriako, 1999, p. 78).
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mathematical and philosophical cognition on the in abstracto-in concreto
distinction.
The final section explains how the distinctions contribute to Kant’s posi-
tion in the eighteenth century debate on the method of mathematics (§2.4).
As we will discuss in the next chapter, these two distinctions continue to be
constitutive elements of Kant’s approach to mathematics.4 The two distinc-
tions together characterize the nature of mathematics as a science that depends
on the composition of concepts by means of synthetic definitions and the
composition of complex signs. In a different way, the idea of mathematics as
a science of composition will return more explicitly in Bolzano’s early work
as I will discuss in the final chapter.
2.1 Analytic versus Synthetic Definitions
During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the words ‘analytic’ and
‘synthetic’ came in use for a wide range of distinctions in philosophy, mathe-
matics, and physics.5 Even within philosophy there is not something like the
analytic-synthetic distinction. Within Kant’s oeuvre one can find at least three
important philosophical analytic-synthetic distinctions, namely the distinc-
tion between analytic and syntheticmethod, analytic and synthetic definitions,
and between analytic and synthetic judgments.6 This section focuses merely
on the distinction between analytic and synthetic definitions as introduced by
Kant in his Prize Essay (1764). We will see how Kant employs this distinction
to radically criticize Wolff on the universality of the ‘mathematical method’,
which was one of the most important philosophical controversies of the
4A third constitutive element, namely the idea of space and time as forms of intuition, is
added in his dissertation of 1770. Note that Kant had not yet developed the notions of
space and time as forms of intuition at the time he wrote the Prize Essay. The earliest
lecture notes that contain passages describing mathematics in terms of pure intuition and
construction are written down a few years after the publication of Kant’s dissertation.
Accordingly, the term ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) must be read without this connotation in
Kant’s texts from the sixties. In his early work, Kant uses the term ‘intuition’ in the then
common context of the degree to which a cognition can be ‘imagined’ clearly, for example
when he writes that ‘the degree of certainty increases with the degree of intuition to be
found in the cognition of the necessity of a truth’ (II:291). Cf. II:296.
5Cf. Tonelli, 1976. For a thorough historical study of the rise of the idea of philosophy as
analysis under the influence of the mathematical notion of analysis see Engfer, 1982.
6Several other, less important, distinctions can be found in Kant’s lectures on logic, for
example between analytic and synthetic subordination (XXIV:291).
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eighteenth century.
Kant’s explanation of this distinction employs the then common method-
ological distinction. In the influential works on metaphysics, logic, and
mathematical method of Wolff, analysis (Zergliederung) became central, but
not so much in opposition to ‘synthesis’. At least, the works of Wolff hardly
describe it as such. Analysis rather seems to be opposed to invention or
discovery (inventio).7 Whereas the former breaks down something complex
into its constituents, for example a syllogism into premises and a conclusion,
the latter employs propositions to construe a syllogism. In a Wolffian context,
the analytic-synthetic distinction thus applies to the procedure or method
that is followed. This procedure consists either of the analysis of, for example
a thesis into basic constituents, or of the invention of a thesis starting from
basic constituents, which in the case of a theorem consist of definitions and
principles. An explicit formulation of this methodological opposition can be
found in a Kantian text on logic:
Analytic is opposed to synthetic method. The former begins
with the conditioned and grounded and proceeds to principles (a
principiatis ad principia), while the latter goes from principles to
consequences or from the simple to the composite. The former
could also be called regressive, as the latter could progressive.
Note. [...] Analytic method is more appropriate for the end
of popularity, synthetic method for the end of scientific and
systematic preparation of cognition.8
According to the traditional distinction, an analytic method of reasoning
starts from something complex in order to discover its simple constituents,
whereas a synthetic method starts from simple elements combining them
into a complex whole. Whether the analytic or synthetic method needs to be
7When Wolffians refer to a synthetic presentation (Darstellung), this must not be confused
with themethodological analytic-synthetic distinction itself. The outcome of an application
of the analytic method can be presented either in an analytic or in a synthetic manner. The
first starts with the thesis and finishes with the premises and definitions, the second the
other way around.
8IX:149. I chose this passage from the Jäsche Logic because of clarity from a systematic point
of view. It emphasizes the methodological nature of the distinction. One might doubt that
this opposition was already recognized in such a clear manner in the sixties. Nevertheless,
this passage shows what was already implicit.
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applied depends on the starting point. Thus, the methodological distinction
is a relative one in that the analytic and synthetic methods of reasoning are
reversible.9 The remark in the quoted passage in the Jäsche logic shows that
Kant and others were aware of the relative nature of this distinction, since
analysis is more suitable for the purpose of popular, synthesis for scientific
work on knowledge. Apparently, these distinctions mainly concern the order
in which knowledge is presented. In the end, the methodological distinction
merely applies to the exposition of knowledge since both are reversible.
In his Prize Essay, Kant employs the well-knownmethodological distinction
as an introduction to his new distinction between analytic and synthetic:
There are two ways in which one can arrive at a general concept:
either by the arbitrary combination of concepts, or by separating
out that cognition which has been rendered distinct by means of
analysis.10
In this manner, Kant employs the strategy of starting with a dichotomy
concerning the source of the topic, in this case concepts.11 We arrive at
concepts by means of two methods: either by the abitrary (willkürlich)
connection of concepts or by isolation (Absonderung). In the traditional
logic of the time, isolation is the process in which we compare several similar
concepts in order to distinctly represent the characteristics that separate them
from each other.12 For example, when we compare the concept ‘human being’
with the concept ‘non-human being’, we discover that we can distinguish
between the two by means of the characteristic ‘rational’. Abstracting from
these differences, we can put together all other characteristics, namely those
that are shared, into one concept, in this case ‘animal’. Isolation thus implies
at least a partial analysis of the concept resulting in a clear and distinct
cognition of at least a part of the concept involved. Herder’s notes of Kant’s
earliest lectures on logic, written around the same time, claim that this role
of analysis does not allow for ‘novel’ concepts in the case of isolation:
No concept arises by means of isolation: (as the name indicates,
9Cf. Tonelli, 1976, p. 20.
10II:276.
11Later on, he will also use this strategy with regard to the source of cognitions in his
dissertation of 1770 and in the first Critique.
12Cf. Meier, 1752a, XVI:550, §259.
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isolation merely changes what is in it), but the concepts become
distinct by means of it.13
In this passage, Kant criticizes the logic textbook of Meier, which he used
for his lectures on logic. Contrary to Meier, Kant maintains that isolation
does not result in a novel concept. Although not formulated as explicitly as
in this lecture, Kant alludes to Herder’s position in the Prize Essay. When
he introduces the two ways to arrive at a concept at the very beginning of
the Prize Essay, he uses the neutral term ‘arrive’ (kommen). In his further
explanation of these two ways of arriving at concepts, Kant describes the
different results in more specific terms. In the case of an arbitrary connection,
Kant employs the notion of arising (entspringen).14 An arbitrary connection
thus yields a novel concept. Isolation, however, merely clarifies a concept
according to Kant. Hence, the results of analysis will merely consist of
distinct concepts. Thus, whereas isolation makes distinct what was already
present, the arbitrary and deliberate connection of concepts gives birth to
a new concept. Having introduced a dichotomy concerning the origin of
concepts, Kant proceeds by associating each kind of concept formation with
a particular domain of knowledge. Since Kant is concerned with general a
priori concepts, these domains are philosophy and mathematics. According
to Kant, mathematical concepts are always produced by means of an artificial
connection or synthesis:
Mathematics only ever draws up its definitions in the first way
[arbitrary combination]. [...] The concept which I am defining
is not given prior to the definition itself; on the contrary, it only
comes into existence as a result of that definition. Whatever
the concept of a cone may ordinarily signify, in mathematics
the concept is the product of the arbitrary representation of a
right-angled triangle which is rotated on one of its sides. In this
and in all other cases the definition obviously comes into being
as a result of synthesis.15
13XXIV:1099, my translation of: ‘[D]urch die Absonderung entspringt kein Begriff: (es wird
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Thus, Kant maintains that the connection of concepts in a mathematical
concept is at the same time a connection of mathematical objects to each
other. The definition not only explains how the mathematical object comes
into being, which is the purpose of real definitions according to the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition, but also gives birth to the corresponding mathematical
concept.16 Kant regards Wolff’s real definitions as an employment of the
synthetic method. Accordingly, Kant maintains that the synthetic method
results in a different kind of product, namely synthetic definitions. In con-
trast to Wolff’s claim of universality, Kant takes a radically different step in
relegating this kind of definition exclusively to mathematics.
By contrast, philosophy has an entirely different starting point:
In philosophy, the concept of a thing is always given, albeit
confusedly or in an insufficiently determinate fashion.17
Since in philosophy concepts are already given in a confused form, the task
of philosophy is entirely different:
It is the business of philosophy to analyse concepts which are
given in a confused fashion, and to render them complete and
determinate. The business of mathematics, however, is that of
combining and comparing given concepts of magnitudes, which
are clear and certain, with a view to establishing what can be
inferred from them.18
Whereas mathematics artificially connects fundamental concepts to reach
conclusions via syllogisms, philosophy merely clarifies concepts. In philos-
ophy definitions are the end point whereas they are the starting point of
mathematics. The difference in task of philosophy and mathematics must
not be confused with the difference between mathematical and philosophical
concepts. A mathematical concept, like space, can be a topic of philosophical
analysis.19
As we have seen in the previous chapter, it was common to distinguish




19According to Koriako’s reading of Kant, one can even speak about the philosophical
investigation of mathematical objects, such as a triangle (Koriako, 1999, p. 73).
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of a new concept by combining existing concepts into a new one, for example
the combination of ‘figure’ with ‘three sides’ results in ‘triangle’.20 In his
mathematical textbooks, Wolff does not relegate a particular form of arriving
at a concept to mathematics, but treats all the forms, also discussed in his
German Logic, as equal citizens in the first chapter on the methodology of
mathematics. For Wolff the result is the same: both the clarified and the
new concept are clear and distinct. Both cases can occur in any domain of
knowledge, including philosophy and mathematics. While Kant alludes to
a common distinction when speaking of two ways to arrive at concepts, he
maintains, contrary to Wolff, that the way of arriving at a concept has impact
on the result itself.
Contrary to Wolff, Kant also applies the methodological analytic-synthetic
distinction to the resulting definitions themselves. This crucial step has
two important consequences. First of all, Kant’s conception of synthetic
definitions already renders mathematical concepts into complete concepts.
Since mathematical concepts are construed out of basic concepts by means of
synthetic definitions, they are by their very nature already clear, distinct, and
complete. For construction of new concepts out of other concepts inevitably
implies that one knows all constituents from which new concepts are built
up, that is, no characteristic can be missing and all characteristics are distinct
down to the most primitive building blocks, namely the most simple concepts
of mathematics. In geometry for example, the concepts of point, line, and
motion are building blocks of other geometrical concepts. Thus, whereas
the nature of philosophical concepts as given in a confused form asks for
an analysis leading to analytic definitions, such an analysis is completely
superfluous in mathematics.
The second consequence is that Kant’s application of the methodological
distinction ceases to be merely methodological. For a methodological dis-
tinction only affects the way the result is reached, but not the result itself.
Such a methodological distinction would not suffice to make a fundamental
distinction between mathematics and philosophy. Remind that the method-
ologies are reversible. Which method is used only depends on the starting
point. Only if ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ are attributed to the result of analy-
sis respectively synthesis itself, namely a definition, can one fundamentally
20See §1.3.
2.2 Examination in abstracto versus in concreto 55
distinguish two classes of definitions which each correspond to a different
domain of knowledge. On the basis of the methodological differences Kant
concludes concerning the certainty of mathematics and philosophy:
What we have established here is this: the grounds for suppos-
ing that one could not have erred in a philosophical cognition
which was certain can never be as strong as those which present
themselves in mathematics.21
Thus, the difference in methodology of mathematics and philosophy also
affects the epistemological status of the achieved results. Subsequent sections
will discuss the differences in more detail. Here it suffices to see how Kant
extends common methodological distinctions to the results of applying the
distinctive methodologies: the nature of the applied methodology determines
whether the produced definitions are analytic or synthetic. Thus, the method-
ological nature of the discipline determines the maximal amount of certainty
of produced knowledge.
We have seen how the distinction between analytic and synthetic defi-
nitions contribute to a fundamental difference in the status of concepts in
mathematics and philosophy. The following two sections examine how Kant
further corroborates this difference by means of a distinction between the
structure of the signs employed in mathematical and philosophical knowl-
edge. The final section has to clarify whether Kant’s new conception of
definitions has far reaching implications for the certainty of knowledge, and
if so, whether apodictic certainty can only be achieved in mathematics (§2.4).
2.2 Examination in abstracto versus in concreto
The second constitutive element of Kant’s fundamental distinction between
philosophy and mathematics is the distinction between ‘examination of (be-
trachten) the universal in abstracto’ and ‘examination of the universal in con-
creto’.22 Whereas philosophy examines the universal in abstracto, for example
by analyzing the concept of extension, mathematics examines the universal in
concreto, for example the properties of equilateral triangles. This distinction
21II:292.
22II:278.
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is also invoked in the context of Kant’s famous discussion on geometry in
the Critique of pure Reason. Influenced by the common interpretation of
Kant’s later view on the nature of mathematics, this distinction is hardly
studied in its own right.23 As a result, the distinction is, so it seems, often
considered to mean that, for example in geometry, one first has to construct
a particular triangle and then infer true judgments about triangles in general
by abstracting from properties specific to the constructed triangle, such as
the size or the angles. According to this reading, the concrete thing that is
investigated universally is the particular, constructed triangle. Mathematics
starts from a particular intuition and proceeds with a generalization, while it
is the other way around in philosophy. Although this reading might seem
quite acceptable after reading the doctrine of method of the first Critique, it
is also quite problematic. Since Kant’s explanation of this distinction is first
of all based on algebra in which such a transformation from particular to gen-
eral plays no role, it can hardly be an appropriate reading of the Prize Essay.
This reading thus has to face the problem how this works in arithmetic and
algebra, especially because in the Prize Essay the only aim of the distinction is
to distinguish between mathematics and philosophy. Moreover, as I empha-
sized before, although a comparison can be very helpful to clarify possible
differences between Kant’s early and late positions, the interpretation of the
Prize Essay must not be informed by later (versions of) distinctions. In my
view, the Prize Essay in fact presents us with the opposite problem: it is clear
how the distinction between in abstracto and in concreto applies to arithmetic
and algebra, but not how it can be applied in a similar manner to geometry.
The subsequent parts of this chapter attempt to show how the distinction
between in abstracto and in concretomust be understood in order to attain a
reading that not only provides a coherent application of the distinction to
all mathematical disciplines, but also attributes a role to the distinction that
is in line with the overall aim of the Prize Essay. This section focuses on the
exact formulation of the distinction while the following section explains how
it applies to both algebra and geometry.
In the Prize Essay, Kant formulates his second step toward a fundamental
distinction between philosophy and mathematics as follows:
23An exception is the detailed study of Koriako, and to a lesser extent, the work of Carson
(Carson, 1999; Koriako, 1999).
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Mathematics, in its analysis, proofs and inferences examines the
universal under signs in concreto; philosophy examines the uni-
versal by means of signs in abstracto.24
Merely some examples to illustrate examination of the universal in concreto do
not suffice to corroborate Kant’s claim. Kant must show that this distinction
makes sense for all parts of mathematics. Kant explains this distinction by
appealing to the (pure) mathematics of his time, which consisted of two parts:
arithmetic and geometry. According to the then dominating textbooks on
mathematics, as we will see more in detail later, algebra is a form of arithmetic,
namely arithmetic with unknown quantities.
Kant starts his explanation of the distinction with the first part of pure
mathematics, namely with arithmetic of both undetermined quantities (alge-
bra) and numbers:
In both kinds of arithmetic, there are posited first of all not things
themselves but their signs, together with the special designations
of their increase or decrease, their relations etc. Thereafter, one
operates with these signs according to easy and certain rules, by
means of substitution, combination, subtraction and many kinds
of transformation; so that the things signified are themselves
completely forgotten in the process, until eventually, when the
conclusion is drawn, the meaning of the symbolic conclusion is
deciphered.25
I will further explain this in the next section, but it is relatively unproblematic
to accept that arithmetic can be treated as a system of signs. While some signs
are used to represent numbers, others stand for operations on these signs.
This explanation in terms of algebra and arithmetic is immediately followed
by a note on geometry:
Secondly, I would draw attention to the fact that in geometry, in
order, for example, to discover the properties of all circles, one
circle is drawn; and in this one circle, instead of drawing all the
possible lines which could intersect each other within it, two
24II:278.
25II:278.
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lines only are drawn. The relations which hold between these
two lines are proved; and the universal rule, which governs the
relations holding between intersecting lines in all circles whatever,
is considered in these two lines in concreto.26
At least at first sight this geometrical example does not seem to have much in
common with the arithmetical explanation. Since it seems to pertain to a pro-
cess of generalization rather than to some form of signification. Do we have
to understand the geometrical explanation in terms of signification or does
signification not play a crucial role in both arithmetic and geometry? In my
view, it is of uttermost importance that the interpretation of this distinction
renders it as support for the main aim of the Prize Essay, namely to establish
a fundamental distinction between mathematics and philosophy. Therefore, a
convincing interpretation must reconcile the two forms of in concreto, as well
as, explain how the distinction provides a strong methodological difference
between mathematics and philosophy. In the following subsections I will
argue that Kant’s text and its historical context make it inevitable that he
regarded signification to be crucial for both arithmetic and geometry.
2.3 Mathematics as Examination of the Universal in
Concreto under Signs
In the Prize Essay, the meaning of in concreto is determined by the role of
signification. To understand how Kant considers signification to play a role
in geometry one has to investigate Kant’s explanation of signification in the
case of arithmetic more in detail in connection to the mathematical textbooks
of the time. Taking into account Wolff’s treatment of these topics in his
mathematical textbooks, the following subsection discusses how algebra and
arithmetic examine the universal in concreto under signs (§2.3.1).27 Unfor-
tunately, Kant does not provide an exposition of how geometrical proofs
resemble arithmetical proofs in representing a symbolic structure. Never-
theless, it is my contention that the Prize Essay presupposes a concept of
26II:278.
27At the time it was common to let signs play a role in mathematics. Mendelssohn for
example also applies the distinction between in concreto and in abstracto in relation to
signs, although in a different manner than Kant (Mendelssohn, 1764, p. 33).
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‘geometrical proof’ as a complex of symbols similar to an algebraic formula
instead of a geometrical proof as a drawing.28 On the basis of the role of
diagrams and fragments of Kant’s text that describe geometrical figures as
symbols, I will argue that the early Kant treats geometry as a system of
symbols (§2.3.2).29
2.3.1 Algebra and Arithmetic as a System of Symbols
As we have seen, the notion of signification plays a crucial role in the dis-
tinction between examination in concreto versus examination in abstracto.
As Kant does not explicitly introduce a particular notion of signification,
he relies on the notions common at the time. Within the context of his
introduction of this distinction Wolff relatively extensively discusses significa-
tion systems. He mentions a wide variety from music notation to numeral
systems, syllogisms (for example barbara), arithmetic, and algebra.30 The
latter not only contains signs for quantities, but also signs that signify the
connections and relations (Verhältnisse) between quantities.31 Having a rather
broad concept of sign, including words, Wolff recognizes that there are crucial
differences among signification systems.32 Accordingly, he distinguishes be-
tween four kinds of signification. The first kind concerns cases in which signs
are only used to refer to things in a handy manner. The second kind is secret
writing used to cover things up. This stands in opposition to the third case in
which signs represent things (more) distinctly (deutlich).33 Wolff mentions a
remarkable example of distinct representation: the signs for dancing which
had just been invented by French dance masters. They define basic signs for
movements which allow to depict complex dances like the ‘passe pied’ (figure
28The difference resembles that of the difference in computer technology between the repre-
sentation of pictures as vectors and bitmaps. While the latter represents a picture by means
of a color value for each point in a grid of a certain resolution, the former represents a
figure as a collection of lines and other geometrical objects with particular properties and
connections to each other.
29See §1.6.
30For an interesting application by Wolff to practical philosophy see Torra-Mattenklott, 2005.
31GWI:2, 174, §317.
32I choose to describe the then common theories of signification on the basis of Wolff’s texts
because of the widespread use of these texts and their influence on Kant and Bolzano.
Although the ideas concerning signification stem from Leibniz, his texts on these topics
were not yet known in the eighteenth century. Cf. Wilson, 1995.
33GWI:2, 174, §317.
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Figure 2.1: Signs for the baroque dance passe pied
2.1).34 Another example is the naming system of the forms of syllogistic
inferences.35 The fourth kind of signification uses signs as means to discover
something (Erfinden), that is, to achieve new knowledge. It belongs to the art
of discovery (Erfindungskunst). Examples of the art of discovery are algebra
and, to a lesser extent, arithmetic. Wolff’s mathematical textbooks indeed
define both arithmetic and algebra in terms of finding numbers.36
The four kinds of signification are quite different in aim. Whereas signs
merely serve as a convenient tool in the first two categories, they have a
34See Feuillet, 1700.
35Lambert published an important contribution to logic and epistemology entitled Neues
Organon around the same time as Kant’s Prize Essay. He devotes quite some effort to
introduce new systems for depicting concepts, judgments (propositions) and syllogisms
in a clear manner (Lambert, 1764, p. 119, 124). Lambert attempts to define signs that
properly depict the extension of concepts in order to make the validity of the conclusion
of a syllogism evident.
36GWI:12, p. 37, 1549.
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substantial epistemological role in the last two. Accordingly, only the last
two categories are relevant for interpreting Kant’s Prize Essay. According
to Wolff, signs are especially useful in the context of the art of discovery.
In this context, the signs are even more bound to rules, such that these
rules deserve a science on its own, namely the art of signs (Zeichenkunst).
Unfortunately, according to Wolff, this science had not yet made sufficient
progress.37 Regardless of the kind of signification system in question, Wolff
considers symbolic knowledge to have the advantage of distinctness compared
to our sensations (Empfindungen). Words and signs are meant to distinguish
things.38 In some cases, he notes in his German textbook on metaphysics,
the signs even reveal the content of what they represent:
It is possible that clarity is also brought into symbolic knowledge
and as it were bring in front of the eyes what is to be found in
a thing and through which one distinguishes it from the others
such that when they are compared to each other according to the
compound signs, which are interchangeable with the concepts,
one can also perceive the relations of things compared to each
other.39
This more intrinsic relation between sign and concept is the case in the
naming of syllogisms. For example, the the three letters ‘a’ in the name
‘barbara’ indicate that the two premises and the conclusion of this type of
syllogisms have the form of a general quantification. In a more complex way
this also applies to arithmetic and algebra. In his textbook on mathematics
Wolff describes algebra along similar lines:
In algebra one encounters the most perfect way of reasoning. For
algebra represents the concepts of things by signs and transforms
37GWI:2, p. 179, §324. Wolff here refers to the then newest and most adventurous project of
the art of signs, namely the ars combinatoria of Leibniz, which aimed at the ‘computation’
of human thought and reasoning.
38GWI:2, p. 179, §319.
39GWI:2, 179, §324: ‘Es ist möglich, daß auch in die figurliche Erkenntnis eine Klarheit und
Deutlichkeit gebracht wird, und sie eben dasjenige gleichsam vor Augen stellet, was in
einer Sache anzutreffen ist, [und dadurch man sie von andern unterscheidet,] dergestalt
daß, wenn [sie] nach diesem zusammengesetzte Zeichen, die den Begriffen gleichgültig
sind, gegen einander gehalten werden, man auch das Verhalten der Dinge gegen einander
daraus ersehen kan’.
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the inferences [...] in an easy way to connect the signs to each
other and to disconnect the signs from each other.40
This idea is indeed present in Wolff’s treatment of arithmetic and algebra
in his mathematical textbooks. In his treatment of arithmetic and algebra,
Wolff first defines a basic collection of arbitrarily chosen signs to designate
numbers. In accordance with the pedagogical aim Wolff uses the common
decimal system with the usual notation.41 Although Wolff does not present
the notation system of numbers with modern rigour, the usual notation is
quite explicitly introduced as an arbitrary choice, including the meaning of
the location of a digit and the use of zero’s as filling empty locations, such as
in the case of ‘20’.42 Subsequently, he provides rules for what we nowadays
call operations on these signs, such as addition, subtraction, multiplication,
and division. These rules explain how to perform an operation in terms of the
defined signs. Within Wolff’s mathematical method, modeled after Euclid’s
Elements, these operations are presented as problems (Aufgaben), such as the
problem ‘add several numbers’.43 Wolff’s solution of this problem provides
the rules to solve this problem in general, that is, it provides a practical
method to find the correct number. In the example of addition, Wolff’s rules
describe the traditional method of addition roughly as follows: write all units,
tens, etc. below each other, draw a line under the numbers, add the units
and write the sum below the line, etc. Strictly following his methodology,
Wolff provides each solution with a proof that relies on the definitions of
the signs and the principles of arithmetic.44 According to Wolff, algebra is
generalized arithmetic in which one uses general signs, usually letters, instead
40GWI:12, p. 1548: ‘Ihr treffet in der Algebra die allervollkommenste Manier zuraisonniren
an. Denn sie stellet die Begriffe der Sachen durch Zeichen vor, und verwandelt die Schlüsse
[...] in eine leichte Manier, die Zeichen mit einander zuverknüpfen und von einander
zutrennen’.
41Wolff first designates numbers with names, and assigns signs to them. Since words such as
names are also signs for Wolff, this intermediate step is irrelevant (GWI:12, p. 47). He
remarks that several systems are possible, among them binary notation, for which he refers
to Leibniz. Wolff remarks that the common use of a decimal system is due to the fact that
we have ten fingers.
42GWI:12, p. 48.
43From this perspective, Martin’s claim that Kant at least regards arithmetic as axiomatic
because it relies on postulates fits within the then common treatment of arithmetic (Martin,
1972, p. 126).
44Cf. GWI:12, p. 51.
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of numerals.45 Accordingly, he treats algebra along similar lines, that is, as a
form of arithmetic in which the quantities are undefined numbers that are
represented by letters. Thus, Wolff’s textbooks indeed treat arithmetic and
algebra as manipulation of arbitrary signs.
Wolff’s treatment of algebra and arithmetic perfectly matches Kant’s de-
scription, both in content and terminology. The signs themselves, such as ‘+’,
are concrete representations, but as such also represent universal concepts,
such as the concept of addition. In my view, Kant’s notion of ‘examina-
tion of the universal under signs in concreto’ constitutes a methodological
understanding of the role of systems of signification in Wolff’s treatment of
arithmetic and algebra. For the latter was very well known to him since he
used Wolff’s textbooks to teach mathematics from 1753 until 1763. A sketch
of a treatment of arithmetic in terms of signs and rules can also be found
in notes by Herder’s on what presumably were lectures on mathematics by
Kant .46 Whereas Wolff’s mathematical method, including the use of signs,
applies to all disciplines, Kant relegates philosophy and mathematics each to
a different type of signification. Contrary to Wolff, Kant contrasts the kind
of signification proper to mathematics to the role of signs in philosophy:
The signs employed in philosophical reflection are never any-
thing other than words. And words can neither show in their
composition the constituent concepts of which the whole idea,
indicated by the word, consists; nor are they capable of indicating
in their combinations the relations of the philosophical thoughts
to each other.47
The signs of philosophy are completely different in nature compared to the
signs of mathematics because they do not mirror the relations between what
they signify. Contrary to the signs of mathematics, the signs of philosophy
are nothing more than names that refer to particular objects. As a result, in
philosophy one must have the thing as such in mind because:
In this case, neither figures nor visible signs are capable of express-
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Nor can abstract reflection be replaced by the transposition of
signs in accordance with rules, the representation of the things
themselves being replaced in this procedure by the clearer and
the easier representation of the signs. The universal must rather
be considered in abstracto.48
Although Leibniz en Wolff might agree with Kant that the results of philoso-
phy are not yet such that it can investigate the universal in particular, they
still take it as an ideal that is at least theoretically possible. Kant however
regards it as impossible since philosophy deals with already given concepts.49
In fact, the positive side of this passage describes Kant’s view on the nature of
mathematics. According to Kant, Mathematics consists of figures or visible
signs that express the thoughts or relations between them. Mathematical
thinking manipulates the signs in accordance with rules. In transforming
visible signs, mathematics thus examines the universal in concreto.
2.3.2 Geometrical Knowledge via the Universal in Concreto
As emphasized before, Kant introduces the notion of examination under signs
as a fundamental characterization of mathematics. Therefore it must apply to
all parts of mathematics, including geometry. The aim of this section is to
extend my interpretation of ‘examination of the universal under signs’ in the
case of arithmetic and algebra to geometry.
Following the same strategy as in the case of arithmetic and algebra, we
first look at the then common treatment of geometry. Since mathematics is
most succesful in realizing the ideal of science as a system of signs, one would
expect Wolff to provide some details about how to deal with geometry in
this way when presenting geometry in his mathematical textbooks, but these
textbooks lack such a treatment. Nevertheless, Wolff’s own use of diagrams
in geometry does allow, and in fact requires, a symbolic interpretation. Such
a symbolic interpretation would provide an epistemological explanation of
the important role of diagrams as discussed in the previous chapter. For
48II:279.
49One might question whether the Prize Essay already indicates the later view that the concepts
of philosophy are given due to the nature of our human faculties. An investigation of this
question is outside the scope of this project. An affirmative answer would bring Kant even
closer to Wolff.
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Kant there is even more at stake. In order to distinguish mathematics from
philosophy by means of a difference in the kind of signification, he must
provide a symbolic interpretation of geometry.
Similar to Wolff’s conception of geometrical demonstration (see §1.6),
Kant’s second explanation starts with drawing a diagram, in this case a circle:
Secondly, I would draw attention to the fact that in geometry, in
order, for example, to discover the properties of all circles, one
circle is drawn; and in this one circle, instead of drawing all the
possible lines which could intersect each other within it, two
lines only are drawn. The relations which hold between these
two lines are proved; and the universal rule, which governs the
relations holding between intersecting lines in all circles whatever,
is considered in these two lines in concreto.50
The second step consists in drawing two lines within the circle. These lines
are arbitrarily chosen from the infinitely many possible intersecting lines.
The third step of this example is that the relations that hold between these two
lines are proven. Unfortunately, Kant is much too hasty in his description
of this example because it is unclear what actually is proven. He does not
give a complete example, but uses the abstract term ‘relation’ to designate
any possible theorem about the two intersecting lines.51De Jong claims that
Kant clearly alludes to proposition 35 of book III of Euclid’s Elements which
states:52
If in a circle DBCA two right lines AB, DC cut each other, the
rectangle comprehended under the segments AE, EB, of the one,
shall be equal to the rectangle comprehended under the segments
CE, ED of the other.53
50II:278.
51From the background of Wolff’s mathematical textbook it might be argued that Kant
had the relation of ‘equal length’ in mind. However, according to Wolff this conclusion
immediately follows from the definition of a circle and therefore has the status of an axiom
that does not require a proof at all. Therefore we must look for something else.
52de Jong, 1997, p. 153.
53Barrow, 1732, p. 61. This version is based on Barrow’s Latin textbook on geometriy, which
roughly follows Euclid’s Elements. Barrow’s treatment of geometry was known to Wolff
and most likely to Kant as well.
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The proof is actually quite complicated and involves distinguishing four cases
(see figure 2.2). Although I hesitate to grant Kant clarity in this case, the
quoted proposition of Elucid’s Elements is indeed the most likely candidate,
especially because Kant also uses the example in an essay written in the same
period as the Prize Essay and two decades later in the Prolegomena.54 The
choice of such a complicated example is remarkable. For it was not generally










Kant’s rather short description of the example com-
plicates the interpretation of the conclusive sentence be-
cause it suggests that a generalization is at stake as taken
for granted by most commentators.55 Careful reading
of the conclusion focusing on allen Zirkeln, however,
brings to the fore that it alludes to two generalizations.
The first one generalizes from the particular drawn cir-
cle to ‘all circles whatsoever’. The second concerns
a generalization from two intersecting lines to all in-
tersecting lines in general. The questions now are (1)
whether the proof indeed relies on a generalization from
particular to general, (2) whether any of these general-
izations is relevant to the distinction, (3) where the in
concreto versus in abstracto distinction fits in.
The relatively straightforward interpretation of the
latter distinction in an arithmetical context involved the
role of signs. However, the conclusion in the geomet-
rical example shows no trace of a sign at all. A possible
interpretation could be that mathematics examines the
universal in concreto because it proceeds from something in particular to
something general. In our example, geometry would investigate the univer-
sal in concreto because it generalizes from the drawn particular circle to all
circles in general. While this might be attractive insofar Kant’s first Critique
is concerned, it faces several problems.56 First of all, this interpretation is
54II:94; IV:320, §38.
55Cf. de Jong, 1997, p. 154; Carson, 1999, p. 636.
56In my view, even in the first Critique a geometrical demonstration does not involve a
generalization (see §3.5).
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completely at odds with the rather straightforward interpretation of the same
distinction in the context of arithmetic. For the arithmetic example does not
involve a generalization at all. Recall the aim of the distinction, namely to
establish a fundamental distinction between philosophy and mathematics. In
my view, one cannot build a fundamental distinction between philosophy and
mathematics upon a distinction that only applies to one half of the domain
of mathematics, namely arithmetic. Furthermore, the term universal (allge-
meine) in Kant’s formulation of the distinction is not opposed to in concreto.
It just alludes to the general nature of the object of both mathematics and phi-
losophy. Likewise, the quantifier over circles in the geometrical explanation
does not stand in opposition to the particular circle drawn on the blackboard,
but simply alludes to Kant’s view that both mathematics and philosophy
examine things universally. Finally, as we will see, such an interpretation
ignores the expression ‘under signs’ in Kant’s formulation of the distinction
and several phrases in Kant’s text that associate geometry with signs. Thus,
the second question can be answered negatively: none of these generalizations
is relevant to the distinction. The example merely sketches how the geometer
draws concrete circles and lines to infer universal conclusions.
Fortunately, Kant provides another geometrical example to illustrate the
opposition of mathematics to philosophy. Contrary to philosophy, math-
ematics allows the use of a single sign instead of the general concept. Kant
illustrates this with the following example:
Suppose, for example that the geometer wishes to demonstrate
that space is infinitely divisible. He will take, for example, a
straight line standing vertically between two parallel lines; from a
point on one of these parallel lines he will draw lines to intersect
the other two lines. By means of this symbol he recognizes
with the greatest certainty that the division can be carried on ad
infinitum.57
Apparently, Kant considers the construed diagram as a (complex) symbol as
57II:279: ‘Wenn z.E. der Messkünstler darthun will, dass der Raum ins unendliche theilbar
sei, so nimmt er etwa eine gerade Linie, die zwischen zwei Parallelen senkrecht steht, und
zieht aus einem Punkt einer dieser gleichlaufenden Linien andere, die solche schneiden.
Er erkennt an diesem Symbolo mit größter Gewissheit, dass die Zertheilung ohne Ende
fortgehen müsse’.
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he designates the diagram with the term ‘symbol’. This presupposes the idea
that in geometry the drawn lines are signs for general mathematical concepts.
Accordingly, the two intersecting lines of the circle in the previous example
are signs for any combination of two intersecting lines. The first chapter
discussed Wolff’s method of mathematics illustrated by the famous example
of the angles of a triangle.58 This case can be interpreted in a similar way.
The constructions contained in the definitions result in signs for each mathe-
matical object. In the example two mathematical objects are drawn, namely
a triangle and a line. Accordingly, the diagram consists of a combination of
two signs. The combination allows to decipher these signs, which results in
cognizing the relations between these lines. The premise of the example that
refers to the figure merely claims that certain relations hold. In my view, it is
no coincidence that Kant repeatedly uses terms like relations (Verhältnisse) in
his Prize Essay. The symbolic constructions in diagrams establish relations.
These relations between signs represent the truths expressed in geometric
theorems. Similar to Wolff’s treatment of algebra and arithmetic, the rules
for constructing complex symbols in the form of diagrams are not explicitly
formulated, but are implicit in the definitions that are employed when con-
structing the diagram. From a contemporary point of view, it is easy to see
that the assumptions of Euclidean geometry are also implicitly presupposed
by the symbolic construction.
The construction of complex symbols in geometry does not differ from
arithmetic or algebra. The two intersecting lines of the example of a circle
are signs for any intersecting line, similar to the manner in which the letter
a stands for any quantity or the manner in which the numeral 3 stands for
an amount of three objects. As such the step from the two drawn lines to all
intersecting lines in general cannot be called a generalization, certainly not in
the sense of a generalization from a particular object. For a symbol already
represents a concept in general. This is especially clear in this example where
the proof does not directly appeal to all intersecting lines, but distinguishes
between four cases: each case signifies a different kind of relation between
the intersecting lines. To me it seems that Kant opted for this complicated
example precisely for this reason: it is the best example of how symbols
and signification are at stake in geometrical diagrams. Thus, because Kant
58See §1.6.
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describes the diagram of the example as a symbol, the first question must be
answered negatively: the proof does not involve a step of generalization.
One might doubt that Kant indeed had such a symbolic interpretation of
geometry in mind. Apart from the previously quoted passage describing the
diagram as a symbol, the Prize Essay describes the diagrams of geometry more
in general as signs:
Furthermore, in geometry the signs are similar to the things
signified, so that the certainty of geometry is even greater, though
the certainty of algebra is no less reliable.59
This sentence reveals quite a lot about Kant’s view of geometry that is not
explicitly stated elsewhere. First of all, Kant regards the diagrams of geometry
to be signs.60 This passage also shows that Kant distinguishes between the
diagram as a sign for a mathematical object, like the sign ‘2’ stands for any
collection of two objects, and the diagram as a pictorial representation of
the mathematical object. While the usual signs for numbers do not resemble
what they signify, diagrams, understood as signs, mirror the content of their
mathematical object. It is of uttermost importance that Kant in this sentence
describes this aspect of diagrams as additional (überdem). Compared to the
signs of arithmetic and algebra, the signs of geometrical have an additional
similarity to the signified thing. Apart from the usual signification structure,
the signs of geometry also have a pictorial similarity (Ähnlichkeit) with the
signified mathematical objects. The comparison to algebra and the expression
furthermore (überdem) confirm my claim that Kant attributes exactly the
same role to signs in geometry as he does in algebra. For, apparently, Kant
does not regard the pictorial resemblance as essential for examining the
universal in concreto, since the signs of algebra lack such a resemblance but
also suffice. Thus, although the pictorial resemblance of diagrams contributes
to the certainty of geometrical knowledge, it is by no means necessary to
examine the universal in concreto.
In his important study of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, Koriako, one
of the few scholars that pay detailed attention to the Prize Essay in relation
59II:292.
60At the time it was quite usual to discuss theories of signification in relation to methodological
issues concerning the difference between philosophy and mathematics. Cf. Mendelssohn,
1764; Kästner, 1758, p. 43.
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to mathematics, seems to overlook the additional character of the similar-
ity of geometrical signs.61 According to Koriako’s reading, Kant considers
geometry to differ from algebra and arithmetic in that ‘im geometrischen
Zeichen wird nicht ein Objekt repräsentiert, sondern präsentiert: es ist selbst
im Zeichen anwesend’.62 However, in my view this can only mean that the
geometrical sign stops being a sign at all, because it is essential for a sign to
represent something. A sign that no longer represents something changes
into an arbitrary drawing. As a result his interpretation violates the theory
of signification of the time. In fact, the similarity is misleading in that the
diagram seems to be merely a pictorial presentation rather than a symbol.
However, the resemblance of the sign with the signified thing is secondary
since Kant explicitly describes it as additional.
This additional aspect of geometrical symbols must not be confused with
their primary role as signs. Only if one takes the additional similarity as
the primary function of the diagram and forgets about the symbolic aspect
one can attribute some form of generalization from a particular instance
to an abstract object to the proof. My interpretation of the similarity as a
secondary, additional, aspect of geometrical signs is further supported by the
fact that Kant implicitly merely applies an at the time common distinction
between arbitrary (willkührliche) and essential signs. The former have no
pictorial resemblance with the signified thing. For example, the sign 2 is an
arbitrary sign when it denotes the number 2. Essential (wesentliche/reelle)
signs, on the other hand, have a pictorial resemblance with the signified thing.
In geometry one can find many essential signs, for example the sign4, which
represents a mathematical object, namely a triangle. Some Roman numerals
are essential signs insofar they stand on their own, like the sign II indicating
the number 2.63
61Carson is aware of the role of signs, but does not pay attention to the way in which this
role differs between geometry and arithmetic, as she holds the mistaken view that Kant
opposes philosophy to geometry rather than mathematics in general (Carson, 1999, p.
636, 641).
62Koriako, 1999, p. 79.
63The Roman system as a whole does not rely on pictorial resemblances. Note that one could
design a notation system for arithmetic that does have a pictorial similarity, just as one can
design a notation system for geometry without pictorial similarity. Later in the eighteenth
century, Maaß provides such an example for arithmetic, and also describes geometry as
a system of signs (Maaß, 1796, p. 11 §23). Ironically, both Maaß and Eberhard used the
symbolic role of diagrams in their famous criticism of Kant to support their view that
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Unfortunately, a potentially problem for my interpretation of the term
in concreto arises when Kant describes the signs of mathematics as means to
knowledge by means of the senses:
For since signs in mathematics are sensible means to cognition,
it follows that one can know that no concept has been over-
looked, and that each particular comparison has been drawn in
accordance with easily observed rules etc. And these things can
be known with the degree of assurance characteristic of seeing
something with one’s own eyes. And in this, the attention is
considerably facilitated by the fact that it does not have to think
things in their universal representation; it has rather to think the
signs as they occur in their particular cognition which, in this
case, is sensible in character.64
On a first reading without background knowledge of the commonly known
theory of signification of Leibniz this would perfectly suit the interpretation
of in concreto as a concrete particular individual thing. According to Koriako,
Kant treats signs as examples of general concepts, not as references to these
concepts:
Wer Zeichen als ‘sinnliche Erkenntnismittel’ verwendet, der ver-
wendet sie nicht als Repräsentationen allgemeiner Begriffe, son-
dern als Beispiele dessen, was unter die Allgemeinbegriffe fällt.65
However, as I argued before, this interpretation violates the very nature of
signs. Undoubtedly, Koriako intends the phrases ‘einzelnen Erkenntnis’ and
‘sinnliche Erkenntnismittel’ to support his claim. However, the interpretation
of these terms as referring to mathematical examples of mathematical concepts
completely ignores the fact that these phrases are repeatedly and explicitly
connected to signs. The signs themselves are the ‘sinnliche Erkenntnismittel’
and have the form of ‘einzelnen Erkenntnis’. Whereas such an interpretation
seems natural when the signs in geometry are not regarded as references but
as drawings, this is much less obvious in algebra and arithmetic. Maybe,
mathematics does not require pure intuition.
64II:291.
65Koriako, 1999, p. 83.
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it is just for this reason that Koriako gives an example from arithmetic,
namely 2 + 2 = 4. He claims that both 2’s do not stand for a concept but
for different instances of this concept. Again, he neglects the signification
structure. The ‘2’ is not an instance, but just a sign that refers to a certain
quantity as defined when the notation is introduced. To me it seems that
Koriako’s interpretation is at odds with both Wolff’s treatment of numbers in
his mathematical textbooks and Kant’s description of arithmetic and algebra
as encoding and deciphering.
Recalling the then common theory of signification as exposed by Leib-
niz and his followers, the passage can easily be explained on my reading.
Signs have the advantage that they can be perceived by the outer senses.66
As Burkhardt claims, on the Leibnizean view combinations of signs allow
such a complex sign to reveal the relations between the represented things.
According to Burkhardt, Leibniz allows pictorial signs in later stages of his
career, including the New Essays, precisely one of the few works of Leibniz
known in the eighteenth century:
Doch haben sie, wenn sie bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllen, ein
der Willkür entzogenes Verhältnis (proportio) zu den Dingen
und ihren Beziehungen, und Zeichen die dieselben Gegenstände
bezeichnen, haben eine Art von Relation unter sich, die ebenfalls
der Willkür entzogen ist und die Beziehungen zwischen den
Dingen wiedergibt.67
The underlying problematic aspect of essential signs is that their resemblance
to the signified thing tends to obstruct their role as a sign. According to
Leibniz, it is crucial that the signs replace the represented abstract thought.
Only on this condition are arbitrary signs able to function as signs. As Dascal
puts it very clearly:
[W]henever one reasons in algebra, the ideas corresponding to
the symbols employed are not evoked or presented to the mind at
66In the work of Leibniz, namely in the table of definitions, we can find the definition that
a sign is something perceived from which we can infer the existence of something not
perceived (Burkhardt, 1980, p. 175; Leibniz, 1966, p. 122).
67Burkhardt, 1980, p. 182; GP VII192. According to Burkhardt, Leibniz allows pictorial signs
in later stages of his career, including the New Essays, precisely one of the few works of
Leibniz known in the eighteenth century.
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each step, as required by Hobbes. If such a request were accepted,
says Leibniz, algebraic reasoning would become impossible, for
the mind would be permanently busy trying to get hold of evoked
ideas, with no capacity left to proceed in the reasoning itself. It
is essential, on the contrary, that, in this kind of reasoning, our
thought be ‘blind’, i.e. that the mind concentrate exclusively
on the signs themselves and on the operations performed upon
them, without caring to ‘interpret’ these signs as it proceeds. [...]
But ‘blind’ thought does not occur only in algebraic reasoning,
according to Leibniz. The only knowledge we can have of a
relatively complex notion - and most of our notions are of this
kind- is in fact ‘blind’ or ‘symbolic’[.]68
For Leibniz, calculations are nothing else then transformations of signs. The
result of such an operation is also valid for the thought represented by the
signs, although the represented ideas were absent during the transformation.
Exactly this form of symbolic knowledge is addressed in Kant’s description
of algebra, arithmetic, and geometry in the Prize Essay.
Signs are thus perceptual means to mathematical knowledge because they
‘blindly’ represent mathematical objects by an outer representation. This
makes it relatively unproblematic to proceed correctly and explains the suc-
cess of mathematics. According to my reading, the additional similarity of
geometrical signs tends to threaten the aspect of blindness. In so far geomet-
rical signs are similar to the represented objects, they are merely examples.
In this sense, they cannot be used as ‘sensible means to cognition’ (sinnliches
Erkenntnismittel).
The structure of the complex symbols of mathematics reflects the repre-
sented mathematical content. Whereas mathematics investigates the universal
under (unter) signs, philosophy investigates the universal by means (durch)
of signs. In the logical terminology of the time, the term ‘under’ usually
refers to the relation of a concept to its objects.69 A concept universally
represents the objects that fall under it. The characteristics of the concept
represent the properties of the objects. As a result, they can be manipulated
according to rules without having the signified things in mind. The last step
68Dascal, 1987, p. 42/43.
69Cf. Meier, 1752a, §260-263.
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is then described by Kant as deciphering of the signs, which is in fact a return
to the represented thought. As I have argued, this also applies to geometry,
although one is usually unaware of the step of deciphering because the signs of
geometry have an additional similarity to the represented object. In fact, for
contemporary readers the additional pictorial resemblance is so misleading as
to forget that the diagrams of geometry are signs.
2.4 Kant’s Early Contribution to the Methodological
Debate
Kant presented the two distinctions discussed in the previous sections with the
aim to separate philosophy from mathematics in terms of their methodology.
Being a response to the question of the Berlin Academy after the degree of
evidence possible in philosophy, the Prize Essay is not primarily concerned
with mathematics. Mathematics merely functions as the paradigmatic example
of apodictic knowledge. As such, mathematics is used by Kant as a standard
for apodeictic knowledge to measure philosophy. Such a standard tends to
make other domains less certain if only a slight reason of doubt can be found.
For Kant, the reasons of doubt in philosophy arise with the observation that
it is much more complicated to analyze confused complex concepts than to
connect simple concepts:
[I]t is far more difficult to disentangle complex and involved
cognitions by means of analysis than it is to combine simple
given cognitions by means of synthesis and thus to establish
conclusions.70
Since mathematics makes its own concepts by means of existing concepts
insofar as their distinctive features (Merkmale) are known, certain knowledge
of the characteristics of mathematical objects is possible. Philosophy, on the
contrary, analyzes given concepts that initially are only known confusedly.
According to Kant’s early work, the task of philosophy is to analyze given
concepts, that is, philosophy seeks to achieve clear knowledge of the distinc-
tive features of these concepts. As a result, the analysis of a confused concept
70II:282.
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is intrinsically bound up with doubt and uncertainty. This is entirely differ-
ent in mathematics because the origin of mathematical concepts is synthetic.
Mathematical concepts are produced rather than found. Therefore Kant
considers philosophical knowledge to be much less certain than mathematical
knowledge:
Now, firstly, mathematics arrives at its concepts synthetically; it
can say with certainty that what it did not intend to represent
in the object by means of the definition is not contained in that
object. For the concept of what has been defined only comes
into existence by means of the definition; the concept has no
other significance at all apart from that which is given to it by
the definition. Compared with this, philosophy and particularly
metaphysics are a great deal more uncertain in their definitions,
should they venture to offer any. For the concept of that which
is to be defined is given. Now, if one should fail to notice some
characteristic mark or other, which nonetheless belongs to the
adequate distinguishing of the concept in question, and if one
judges that no such characteristic mark belongs to the complete
concept, then the definition will be wrong and misleading.71
Although Kant hesitates to make strong claims about the limits in certainty
of philosophical knowledge, the difference in evidence is a difference in kind
of certainty rather than a difference in degree of certainty, since it relies on a
different origin of concepts. A more explicit and slightly stronger statement
can be found in the Jäsche logic:
Since one cannot become certain through any test whether one
has exhausted all the marks of a given concept through a complete
analysis, all analytic definitions are to be held to be uncertain.72
Despite the distance of the Jäsche logic to the Prize Essay in terms of history
and authenticity, it provides a clear formulation of what is already claimed in
the Prize Essay. Similar lines of thought can be found in several lectures on
logic, and, as we will see, in the first Critique.
71II:291.
72IX:142.
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The question rises what notion of certainty Kant had in mind. Meier’s
Vernunftlehre, a handbook for logic extensively used by Kant for his lectures,
distinguishes four forms of uncertainty. They are all subjective in the sense
that they are bound to practical aspects of the human faculties.73 They can
roughly be described as limits of our power to know, lack of attention, lack
of presupposed knowledge, and a too strong recognition of doubt. Of course,
from the perspective of the later Kant it seems that the first form could
explain why we are not able to completely analyze philosophical concepts.
However, the Prize Essay must and cannot be read in this anachronistic way.
The text does not provide any link to the human faculties in this respect but
instead starts and concentrates on the nature of two classes of definitions. In
Herder’s notes of an early lecture on logic, dated between 1762 and 1764,
Kant maintains that the application of mathematics might contain objective
grounds for uncertainty.74 According to these notes, objective uncertainty
occurs when there is lack of data (datis). The example from mathematics
seems to be that knowledge of the length of one side of a rectangle does not
suffice to know the perimeter of a rectangle.75 In this case the lack of data
has its source in the particular circumstances rather than in the nature of
mathematics or in the characteristics of mathematical concepts. Philosophy,
however, fundamentally lacks the data that are required to know whether
the analysis of a concept is complete. Thus, Kant complemented Meier’s
subjective notions of certainty with an objective notion of certainty. Such an
objective notion is required to ground an objective difference in evidence on
a fundamental distinction between philosophy and mathematics. Exactly this
notion of uncertainty is associated with analytic definitions in the Prize Essay.
Whereas apodictic certainty is possible and even the norm in mathematics,
it is impossible to reach the same level of certainty in philosophy because
its concepts lack the data required for apodictic conclusions.76 Despite all
controversies, Kant’s early ideal of science is similar to that of Wolff: both
73Meier, 1752a, §190; Meier, 1752b, §179.
74XXIV:1099. Zammito convincingly argues that although Herder becomes an independent
thinker, his notes of Kant’s lectures are largely coherent with the other texts of Kant
(Zammito, 2002, p. 148).
75Wolff’s mathematical lexicon defines ‘Seite’ as the part of a figure which determines its
‘Umfang’ (GWI:11, p. 945, 1137).
76Cf. II:292.
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regard mathematics as presented in Euclid’s Elements as the paradigmatic
example of apodictic knowledge. Contrary to Wolff however, Kant does
not regard philosophy to be able to achieve this ideal because philosophy is
intrinsically bound to the methodology of analysis of confused concepts.
The overall strategy of the Prize Essay is to focus on the sources of mathe-
matical and philosophical knowledge. As we have seen, the two crucial ele-
ments of Wolff’s method of mathematics that together establish the ground of
a theorem by means of construction are real definitions and demonstrations.77
Kant’s two distinctions of the Prize Essay introduce differences between phi-
losophy and mathematics at precisely these two elements. Whereas according
to Wolff all concepts, including mathematical ones, must be analyzed in
order to arrive at definitions, Kant maintains that definitions of mathematical
concepts are made by means of synthesis, that is, by means of composition.
Once the mathematician has composed such a synthetic definition out of
known constituents, analysis of this definitions is trivial, which explains the
apodictic standard of evidence in mathematics Moreover, Kant argues that,
contrary to Wolff, such a definition is unprovable. This disconnects the
definition from experience. Mathematical concepts result from a process of
synthesis of simple concepts, rather than a process of analysis of an already
given confused concept. Thus, the mathematical method of the early Kant
results from replacing Wolff’s notion of real definition with that of synthetic
definition (see figure 2.3). Kant in fact accepts the ‘upper’ part of the overview
of Wolff’s mathematical method, consisting of problems, theorems, axioms
and principles.78
77See §1.3 and §1.6.
78See §1.2.















Figure 2.3: Overview of Kant’s early mathematical method.
A second difference between Wolff and Kant is the latter’s emphasis on
the role of signs. This allows Kant to develop a more formal approach of
mathematics in which the role of diagrams in geometry is interpreted as a
kind of signification. The early Kant characterizes mathematics as a science
in which one works with signs instead of mental images of any sort. In
mathematics one does not possess a representation of the thing itself, even
in the case of geometry. This is only possible because the signs mirror the
structure of what they signify.79 Examination of the universal under signs in
concreto means that particular visible signs replace the structure and content
of universal concepts.
Recall the lack of an account for the role of diagrams in the work of Wolff.80
While geometrical constructions play a crucial role in Wolff’s demonstrations,
he does not account for this role in his method of mathematics. The character-
isation of mathematics as examination of the universal under signs in concreto
allows Kant to solve Wolff’s epistemological problem with diagrams because
79We have seen that Kant writes ‘under signs’ twice: both philosophy and mathematics
examine the universal under signs. So, the difference between mathematics and philosophy
is not that mathematics uses symbols and philosophy not as one might tend to think. So
Kant cannot draw on Leibniz’s distinction between intuitive and symbolic knowledge to
explain the distinction between investigation in abstracto and investigation in concreto.
80See §1.6.
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it explains why mathematical knowledge is apodictic without neglecting the
role of construction in geometry. In this manner, Kant not only accepts the
Wolffian role of diagrams in geometry, but also provides a justification of
Wolff’s use of diagrams by regarding them as complex signs, similar to the
signs of arithmetic and algebra. Thus, the interpretation of Wolff’s diagram
as a system of signs fills in the justificatory gap of Wolff’s methodology. The
strikingly modern aspect of this part of the Prize Essay is that Kant recognizes
the advantage of using a symbolic system. This Leibnizian reading of Kant’s
early texts about mathematics is further confirmed by Herder’s notes of
Kant’s lectures on metaphysics (1762-1764):
Any ground is either logical, according to which the consequence
follows by the law of identity, or real [...]. In all demonstrations
and in mathematics proofs are logical grounds.81
Thus, Kant’s conception of mathematical demonstrations relies on the prin-
ciples and syllogisms of logic. Applied to the clear, distinct, and complete
characteristics of synthetic definitions, these laws of logic provide the founda-
tion of all mathematical theorems. As we have seen, this process takes the
form of manipulating signs according to rules. This makes Kant’s early view
on mathematics much more Leibnizian than that of Wolff. The question
rises how and to which extent this changes when the notion of pure intuition
is introduced in later works of Kant. This and related questions will be
addressed in the next chapter.
81XXVIII:11, my translation of: ‘Aller Grund ist entweder logisch, durch welchen die Folge
per regulam identitatis gesetzt wird, [...] oder real. [...] In allen Demonstrationen und in




A Mereological Perspective on
Kant’s ‘Philosophy of
Mathematics’ in the first
Critique
The previous chapter argued that Kant, in his Prize Essay of 1664, ascribes a
symbolic role to geometrical diagrams to support his view that mathematics
can be of apodictic certainty, while philosophy cannot attain that kind of
certainty. Maintaining this view, Kant takes a more radical turn by relating
the status of knowledge to the faculties of understanding and sensation in both
his dissertation of 1770 and the first Critique. With regard to mathematics
this involves a crucial role for the faculty of sensibility in its demonstrations
and the construction of its objects. According to the later Kant, geometrical
diagrams rely on construction in pure intuition. Despite the crucial role
of construction, Kant merely provides a surprisingly short description of it
in the methodology chapter of the first Critique. Yet, commentators regard
construction in pure intuition as the most innovative and controversial aspect
of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics.
Extending the approach of Shabel, I will argue in this chapter that Kant’s
philosophy of mathematics is fully in accordance with the mathematical
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practice of the influential mathematical textbooks of Wolff.1 In my view, the
opposed approach of interpreting Kant from a contemporary perspective with
predicate logic as its dominating framework, as it can be found in the work
of Hintikka, tends to introduce anachronistic controversies into the interpre-
tation of Kant’s conception of construction in pure intuition.2 In agreement
with Rusnock and contra Friedman, I will argue that Kant’s position is not
based on insight in the limitations of logic when it comes to mathematics.3
In my view, the context shows that Kant’s concerns were philosophical in
nature, stemming from the eighteenth century debate on whether the method
of mathematics is applicable to all sciences.4 Accordingly, Kant fully accepted
the then widely spread treatment of logic and mathematics. From this per-
spective, Kant’s conception of construction in pure intuition merely explains
the role of diagrams as found in Wolff’s mathematical textbooks.
The most important task of this chapter is to trace back the difference
between philosophy and mathematics, via the faculties of understanding and
sensation, to a more fundamental distinction between different conceptions
of part-whole structures. As such, it provides a novel contribution to the lit-
erature on Kant’s theoretical philosophy. As I see it, the intrinsic connection
of these different part-whole structures to corresponding human faculties
constitutes the very heart of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The first
section of this chapter analyses the context of Kant’s remarks on mathematics
(§3.1). Subsequently, I reconstruct Kant’s theory of mereological notions
of subordination, coordination and their products row, aggregate, coalition,
and system (§3.2). In line with the interpretation of de Jong and Anderson,
the focus on mereological notions allows for a precise explanation of Kant’s
conception of analytic judgments in terms of a composition of subordination
between genus and species (§3.3).5 A later chapter will show that Bolzano had
a similar understanding of Kant’s conception of analytic judgments.6
Insight in Kant’s mereological theory also allows for an interpretation of
the notions of discursive reasoning and construction in intuition such that the
1Shabel, 2003; Shabel, 1998.
2Hintikka, 1967; Hintikka, 1974.
3Friedman, 1992b; Rusnock, 2004.
4Cf. Tonelli, 1959; §2.2.
5de Jong, 1995; Anderson, 2004; Anderson, 2005.
6See §5.3.
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latter no longer relies on a relatively vague a priori version of geometrical fig-
ures drawn with pencil on paper (§3.4). Apart from construction in intuition,
Kant also explicitly acknowledges the role of definitions, axioms, theorems,
and syllogisms. Accordingly, an important issue in the interpretation of
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation of mathematical
demonstrations to logical reasoning. How do the definitions, axioms, theo-
rems, and syllogisms fit into the picture if construction is interpreted as the
main, or even sole source of mathematical truths? The strict notion of deduc-
tion involved in an axiomatic system does not seem to leave room for another
truth revealing concept. Yet, Kant explicitly ascribes a level of rigorous proof
and evidence to mathematics that is the strongest within his epistemological
assessment of the sciences. In line with Shabel and Longuenesse, I will show
in detail how investigation of Wolff’s demonstrations of geometrical theo-
rems provides a straightforward explanation of how syllogistic reasoning and
construction together constitute a mathematical demonstration. I will argue
that Friedman’s opposition of those two aspects is somewhat misleading.
One of the most controversial aspects of construction in pure intuition
concerns the way in which it allows to draw general conclusions. According
to some commentators, such as Hintikka, construction in pure intuition
plays a role similar to the inference rule of existential instantiation in modern
predicate logic. In the subsequent section, I argue that Hintikka’s view is quite
misleading and maintain that Kant’s construction in pure intuition is always
already general and singular. In this respect, my interpretation of the Prize
Essay in the previous chapter turns out to be helpful in regarding geometrical
diagrams as symbolic ostensive constructions. Finally, I will explain how
Kant’s transcendental perspective affects and completes the mathematical
method as presented by Wolff (§3.6). Supplementary to Wolff, Kant provides
an epistemological foundation of diagrams as construction in pure intuition.
In this manner, Kant completes Wolff’s philosophy of mathematics.
3.1 The Context of Kant’s Remarks on Mathematics
The notion of construction in intuition can be regarded as the heart of Kant’s
philosophy of mathematics. Yet, his exposition of the notion of construction
in intuition in relation to mathematics almost exclusively occurs in the section
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entitled ‘doctrine of method’.7 Apparently, these passages primarily serve the
aim of this methodological part of the first Critique. Recent commentators
such as Friedman tend to underestimate the importance of the context of
these passages, although, in my view, the aim of the methodological part is
likely to have important ramifications for the interpretation of ‘construction
in intuition’. This section clarifies the aim of the ‘doctrine of method’ in
order to put the notion of construction in intuition into its proper context.
An important achievement of Kant’s architectonic of logic is the systematic
organization of logic into a doctrine of elements (Elementarlehre) and a
doctrine of method (Methodenlehre). Previous textbooks on logic generally
organize their content in sections on concepts, judgments, inferences, and a
quite diverse range of sections among which some about academic writing.8
As a result, these textbooks lack an overarching division of their content into
different parts. Kant’s division of logic into a doctrine of elements and a
doctrine of methods results in a part dealing with the basic constituents of
knowledge, namely concepts, judgments, and inferences on the one hand,
and a part about the ways in which these basic constituents can be used to
establish a systematic body of knowledge on the other hand. The latter, the
doctrine of methods, explains how the concepts, judgments, and inferences
treated in the doctrine of elements contribute to a systematic treatment of
scientific knowledge according to, for example, the mathematical or Euclidean
method. While the doctrine of elements explains the notions of concepts,
judgments, and inferences, the doctrine of methods prescribes that one, for
example, must start with definitions from which judgments, in this role
called principles, immediately follow. Although the textbooks of Wolff and
Meier also provide methodological content, they do not acknowledge that
the nature of this part of logic differs from the part providing theories of
7A few passages outside this section also touch upon the notion of construction in intuition,
but without mentioning the notion itself. Although the transcendental deduction can
be regarded as concerned with the presuppositions of any synthesis, including those of
construction in intuition, it does not employ the notion of construction, but merely
mentions ‘drawing a line’ as an example (B137-138; B154-155). As we will see, Kant’s
discussion of the axioms of intuition indeed constitutes an enlightening explanation of
the kind of cognition involved in construction in intuition (B203-204). Although Kant
here mentions geometry, he still does not explicitly claim to provide an explanation of the
notion of construction in intuition.
8Cf. Meier, 1752a; GWI:1.
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concepts, judgments and inferences. The theories about the latter are usually
universal in that they apply to all domains of knowledge. The appropriate
methodology, however, might differ depending on the domain of knowledge.
Kant’s division of logic into a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of methods
thus prepares the way for denying Wolff’s view concerning the universal
nature of the mathematical method.
In Kant’s architectonic of logic, the content of the doctrine of methods
depends on the nature of the logic in question. Kant distinguishes between
general, particular, and applied logic.9 The latter form of logic teaches how to
actually apply the rules of general logic. Applied logic for example explains
the source of errors.10 Contrary to a particular logic, general logic abstracts
from any content and merely considers the form of thought:
As general logic it abstracts from all contents of the cognition of
the understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to
do with nothing but the mere form of thinking.11
Contrary to general logic, a particular logic is specific to a particular do-
main of knowledge. A particular logic contains rules for correct thinking
insofar as these rules are specific to a science. Unfortunately, Kant did not
actually specify a particular logic. One could imagine that a particular logic
for contemporary mathematics, for example, would provide the notion of
mathematical induction. A particular logic for the mathematics of Kant’s
time might contain rules for attaining synthetic definitions.12 Kant divides
the elementary part of general logic into sections on the form of concepts,
judgments, and inferences. The methodology part of general logic system-
atizes these logical forms in general, since the doctrine of elements treats
the forms of knowledge in general. For example, it provides a distinction
between regressive and progressive reasoning.13
9For an extensive treatment of these distinctions, as well as, reconstructions of special and
particular logic see Zinkstok, 2013.
10Cf. B79; Zinkstok, 2011.
11B78.
12In his fascinating study, Zinkstok merely focuses on principles as candidates for a special
logic while to me it seems that the content of a particular logic might be much broader
(Zinkstok, 2013, chapter 4).
13Cf. IX:149.
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Figure 3.1: Kant’s architectonic of logic. The dotted lines represent the correspondence between
general and transcendental logic.
Apart from logic, Kant also organizes the Critique of pure Reason, as well
as the other Critiques, into a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of methods.
In the first Critique, the doctrine of elements takes the form of a transcen-
dental doctrine of elements (figure 3.1). This transcendental doctrine has a
part which general logic does not have, namely the transcendental aesthetic,
which discusses the notions of space and time, because the former does not
abstract from all content. General logic has no corresponding part because
the latter only considers the rules of the understanding and does not take
into account the faculty of sensibility.14 The parts of transcendental logic
that do correspond to parts of general logic are called analytic and dialec-
tic.15 The analytic is divided into a part about concepts of the understanding
(deduction of categories etc.) and principles of the understanding (axioms
of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, postulates
of empirical thought). These parts correspond to the parts on concepts
respectively judgments in the doctrine of elements of general logic, but the
topic of transcendental logic leads to an important difference. Contrary to
general logic, transcendental analytic does not merely investigate the form
of concepts and judgments as such. Whereas general logic neither provides
concepts nor first principles, transcendental logic provides concepts in the
14Cf. B80-82.
15One of the problems of Kant’s architectonic is that he also seems to provide a narrower
conception of logic when he designates the transcendental analytic and dialectic with the
title ‘transcendental logic’ thereby excluding the doctrine of method.
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form of the categories and judgments in the form of the principles of the
understanding.16
The identical title of the methodological parts of general and transcen-
dental logic might be misleading (figure 3.1). The identical title does not
mean that their content, or even the nature of their content, is identical. For
example, the methodological part of the Jäsche logic provides distinctions be-
tween the analytic and the synthetic method, between analytic and synthetic
definitions, and rules for logical division.17 As such, general logic merely
provides distinctions and rules without systematically employing them as
distinctive for a particular science.18 According to the first Critique, general
logic merely provides an unorganized box with tools that might be used to
achieve a systematic organization in a domain of knowledge:
For since general logic is not limited to any particular kind of
cognition of the understanding (e.g., not to the pure cognition of
the understanding) nor to certain objects, it cannot, without bor-
rowing knowledge from other sciences, do more than expound
titles for possible methods and technical expressions that are used
in regard to that which is systematic in all sorts of sciences.19
The abstract nature of general logic implies that its doctrine of method
cannot prescribe a particular methodology. As we will see, the doctrine
of methods of the first Critique however, predominantly and consistently
employs the notions of the doctrine of elements to assign different types
and domains of knowledge to their proper place. This difference between
16Kant’s general logic does not even provide the logical laws of identity and non-contradiction.
It seems this would violate the formality of general logic. Insofar as Kant’s transcendental
logic replaces Wolff’s metaphysics, Wolff and Kant agree on the proper place of the logical
laws since for Wolff as well they are part of general metaphysics.
17The lectures on logic are not divided into a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of methods,
but divided according to the textbook that was used in the logic courses (Meier, 1752a).
Therefore the lectures are not helpful in establishing the content of the methodology of
general logic. Nevertheless, most of the notions presented in the doctrine of methods of
the Jäsche logic can also be found in the lectures on logic.
18The only exception is that the methodology of Kant’s logic relegates a particular kind
of form of concept formation to mathematics. However, this mainly occurs in notes
to the sections and not in a systematic manner. Comparison of the treatment of the
same distinctions in the Jäsche logic and the first Critique, such as the distinction between
analytic and synthetic definitions, reveals that the former presents the distinction in quite
a neutral manner.
19B736.
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the doctrines of methods of general and transcendental logic stems from
the fact that transcendental logic does not abstract from all relations to
objects.20 The addition of aesthetics constitutes the crucial difference of
transcendental logic with general logic. Whereas general logic abstracts from
all contents, aesthetics limits the domain of transcendental logic by means
of an exposition of the pure forms of space and time. These forms of space
and time constitute the way in which transcendental logic relates to objects.
They enable transcendental logic to have the possibility of a priori relations
to objects as its topic.21
In accordance with the topic of transcendental logic, its doctrine of methods
has to show how the a priori relations to objects form a system. More
specifically, the doctrine of methods has to show that the treatment of a
priori relations is complete. The systematization of the a priori relations
to objects also implies the relegation of a priori knowledge to its proper
kind of a priori relation. The phrase between brackets in the quoted passage
implicitly indicates what kind of knowledge the doctrine of methods of the
first Critique must organize into a system, namely rational cognition (reine
Verstandeserkenntniss), that is, cognition achieved by the pure understanding.
The doctrine of methods thus provides a systematic ordering of rational






















Figure 3.2: Sources of rational cognition.
Such a systematic ordering requires an investigation of the sources of ra-
20See B80-82. For a discussion of the exact manner in which general logic is abstract see
Zinkstok, 2013, pp. 44-58.
21Cf. B79-81. Although it is quite a special way to narrow down general logic to a more
specific domain of objects, this nevertheless seems to be the main difference between
general and transcendental logic. Accordingly, I tend to regard transcendental logic as a
particular logic rather than a general logic, although Zinkstok argues convincingly in favor
of this position (Zinkstok, 2013, pp. 185-200).
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tional cognition, which leads to two possibilities. Rational cognition results
either from the analysis of concepts or from the construction of concepts
in pure intuition (indicated with arrows in figure 3.2).22 The former is the
domain of philosophy, the latter of mathematics. The systematic division
of rational cognition enables Kant to apply the distinctions provided by the
doctrine of methods of general logic in a manner so as to systematically
relegate all kinds of cognition to their proper place. Whereas analytic defi-
nitions belong to philosophy because they rely on the rational cognition of
concepts, synthetic definitions belong to mathematics because they rely on
the cognition of the construction of concepts. In sum, since the doctrine of
elements of transcendental logic takes into account the a priori relation to
objects, the doctrine of method provides a system for the a priori sciences,
namely philosophy and mathematics.
Further investigation of the doctrine of method confirms my interpretation.
The entire treatment of mathematics in the methodology part of the first
Critique is written from this perspective. As I will show, almost every passage
serves the purpose of illustrating the difference between mathematics and
philosophy thereby assigning each of them their proper place:
Mathematics is thoroughly grounded on definitions, axioms,
and demonstrations. I will content myself with showing that
none of these elements, in the sense in which the mathematician
takes them, can be achieved or imitated by philosophy and that
by means of his method the mathematician can build nothing
in philosophy except houses of cards, while by means of his
method the philosopher can produce nothing in mathematics but
idle chatter, while philosophy consists precisely in knowing its
bounds, and even the mathematician, if his talent is not already
bounded by nature and limited to his specialty, can neither reject
its warnings nor disregard them.23
Kant’s view fundamentally differs from the view Wolff expresses in his influ-
22The former can be divided into merely analysis of concepts which results in analytic
judgments according to the traditional metaphysics of Wolff and Baumgarten, or into
analysis of concepts in relation to a possible experience in space and time according to the
transcendental philosophy of Kant.
23B755.
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ential textbooks. For this reason, Kant systematically discusses the elements
of Wolff’s mathematical method to amend them in such a way that they apply
to mathematics only rather than to both mathematics and philosophy. In the
following I illustrate this for definitions and axioms.
The doctrine of methods contains a quite extensive passage on the notion
of definition. Similar to the earlier Prize Essay of 1764, Kant maintains that
the nature of the definitions is specific to the kind of knowledge. Kant
requires definitions to ‘exhibit originally the exhaustive concept of a thing
within its boundaries’.24 In accordance with the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition,
exhaustive or complete (ausführlich) means that the characteristics given by a
definition must be sufficient and clear enough to decide whether an object falls
under the defined concept.25 Furthermore, the definition must not provide
more characteristics than strictly necessary.26 Finally, the characteristics must
be primordial in the sense that they cannot be reduced to more primitive
characteristics.
Strictly speaking, empirical concepts cannot be defined because they lack
completeness. The same holds for a priori given pure concepts. Accord-
ing to Kant, the only proper definition can be of those concepts that one
composes themselves. The distinction between a priori given and handmade
concepts, such as ‘cause’ respectively ‘triangle’, coincides with the demarca-
tion of philosophy and mathematics along the same line drawn in the Prize
Essay with the distinction between analytic and synthetic definitions. In
this respect, the first Critique presents the same view as the Prize Essay (see
§2.1). Whereas philosophy analyzes given pure concepts in order to arrive
at analytic definitions, mathematics composes concepts by means of synthesis
thereby establishing synthetic definitions. Whereas (synthetic) definitions
are the starting point for mathematics, (analytic) definitions are the endpoint
for philosophy. Guided by these distinctions, Kant draws conclusions highly
critical of Wolff. The definitions of mathematics cannot be erroneous because
24B755.
25Cf. B755; 1.2; von Wolff-Metternich, 1995, p. 107. Kant is more strict than Meyer who
allows exhaustive definitions to contain superfluous characteristics (Meier, 1752a, §151,
XVI:355).
26Bolzano introduces the term überfüllte representations to designate definitions that do not
satisfy this criterion (WL, §69, p. 309-315).
3.1 The Context of Kant’s Remarks on Mathematics 91
the concept formation itself takes place by means of the synthetic definition.27
Contrary to the synthetic definitions of mathematics, the analytic definitions
of philosophy are never beyond doubt because the concepts are given in a
confused form. The analytic definitions might contain superfluous charac-
teristics or lack required characteristics. For this reason, Kant concludes that
the methodological role of definitions in mathematics fundamentally differs
from philosophy.
Let us investigate the role of axioms in the a priori disciplines as prescribed
by the doctrine of methods. Kant takes over Wolff’s characterization of
axioms as immediately following from definitions, but concludes that axioms
have the form of a priori synthetic judgments while the axioms of Wolff are
analytic.28 For analytic judgments do not follow immediately at all, since
they require analysis via intermediate characteristics.29 Contrary to Wolff’s
analytic axioms, Kant’s mediating form of cognition, namely pure intuition,
immediately connects the subject and the predicate. In contrast to concepts,
intuitions do not require an analysis into common characteristics in order
to cognize the subject and predicate as connected. This mediating form
of cognition is not available to philosophy because philosophy is merely
conceptual. Mathematics on the other hand is able to connect the subject and
predicate without requiring further analysis of the involved representations:
Mathematics, on the contrary, is capable of axioms, e.g., that
three points always lie in a plane, because by means of the con-
struction of concepts in the intuition of the object it can connect
27B759.
28Kant’s characterization of mathematics as consisting of a priori synthetic judgments is
puzzling with regard to some axioms that are presupposed by geometry when he describes
some of them as analytic on one occasion in the first Critique (B16). An example of such
an analytic axiom is ‘the whole is greater than its part’. For a discussion of their role in the
particular logic of mathematics see Zinkstok, 2013, p. 121-132. Most commentators doubt
whether they are indeed analytic according to Kant’s own definition, which of course
raises the question how to interpret this passage (de Jong, 2010, p. 248; Anderson, 2004,
p. 526). Anderson explains the passage as a slip of Kant’s pen, while de Jong claims that
they are neither analytic nor synthetic. My suggestion would be to regard it as the result
of doubt on the analyticity of some geometrical axioms by Kant himself and a strategic
defense of his position against the Wolffian’s. Another reason for Kant to reject these
common notions as principles of arithmetic might be that these common notions are not
specific to arithmetic and seem to be of a far more general nature.
29Identity judgments (A is A) are the exception.
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the predicates of the latter a priori and immediately.30
A priori construction thus allows for an immediate connection (synthesis)
of the predicate and the subject. The conception of axioms as immediately
evident implies that only mathematics can contain axioms.
In sum, just as the Prize Essay of 1764, the doctrine of methods provides a
sharp and fundamental distinction between philosophy and mathematics, thus
rejecting the Wolffian doctrine according to which the mathematical method
is generally applicable. Taking over several distinctions from the Prize Essay,
the doctrine of methods assigns both philosophy and mathematics to their
proper place thereby placing transcendental logic into a system. Almost every
sentence of the doctrine of method devoted to mathematics is subordinated
to this aim. Kant’s division of rational cognition in the doctrine of methods
not only organizes a priori cognitions, but also demarcates the two a priori
sciences:
The essential difference between these two kinds of rational
cognition therefore consists in this form, and does not rest on
the difference in their matter, or objects. Those who thought
to distinguish philosophy from mathematics by saying of the
former that it has merely quality while the latter has quantity
as its object have taken the effect for the cause. The form of
mathematical cognition is the cause of its pertaining solely to
quanta.31
According to Kant, the essential difference between philosophy and math-
ematics consists in a different form of a priori cognition. In the case of
mathematics this form consists in construction in pure intuition. As a result
of the nature of the forms of pure intuition, space and time, the domain
of mathematics consists of magnitudes. Subsequent sections will explain
this more in detail. The advantage of Kant’s way of distinguishing between
philosophy and mathematics is that the former also can have the concept of
magnitude as its object. For an analysis of the concept of magnitude results in
something that is entirely different from the result of the construction of mag-
nitudes in intuition. Yet, it also raises difficult questions. The most important
30B760.
31B743.
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one concerns the precise difference between cognition by the understanding
and cognitions in intuition. The aim of the subsequent sections is to acquire
an understanding of this difference as precise as possible by developing a
mereological perspective on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics.
3.2 Towards a Mereological Understanding of Kant’s
Philosophy of Mathematics
Scattered throughout Kant’s work we find passages that concern distinctions
formulated in terms like coordination, subordination, row, aggregate, and
system. They appear to be extremely general terms used to designate differ-
ent manners in which parts can be united into a whole. In this sense, the
distinctions concern mereological concepts. Using the notion in a loose way,
I will refer to these terms with the notion ‘mereological concepts’.32 It is
my contention that Kant’s way of distinguishing between these mereological
concepts plays a crucial role in central doctrines of Kant’s transcendental phi-
losophy, especially when Kant distinguishes sources of knowledge, establishes
their limits, and accordingly demarcates the sciences. As we will see in this
section, the mereological distinction between subordination and coordina-
tion captures the distinction between discursive and intuitive cognitions by
describing the differences between the structures of the produced cognitions.
In the transcendental aesthetic, for example, Kant relies on the distinction
between discursive and intuitive cognitions to argue for the non-conceptual,
and therefore intuitive nature of space.33 The mereological framework ex-
posed in this section will be used in subsequent sections to provide precise
explanations of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments
(§3.3) and the notion of construction in pure intuition (§3.4).
In none of his works, Kant explains his mereological concepts in the context
of an encompassing theory. Nevertheless, several important passages rely on
these concepts and explain them insofar as this is required for the purpose
in which the passage occurs. Apparently, Kant assumed them as common
background. The task of the first two subsections is to examine the closely
32Cf. Varzi, 2016.
33See §3.4.
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related distinctions between mereological concepts.34 The final subsection
explains how Kant’s argumentation in the transcendental aesthetic relies on
these mereological distinctions. As such, it illustrates the fundamental role
the mereological concepts play in Kant’s distinction between intuitions and
concepts.
3.2.1 Coordination versus Subordination and their Products
Although the distinction between subordination and coordination cannot
be found in Wolff’s work and Meier’s logic, it repeatedly occurs in the
influential work of Crusius. Crusius used it for example in relation to
concepts, judgments, causes, and purposes (Endzwecke).35 His description of
the difference between coordinate and subordinate connections of purposes is
quite helpful as an introduction to the basic idea of the distinction:
When multiple purposes are desired at the same time, they are
called coordinated purposes. They can also be restricted to follow
one after another. In this case, they are subordinated purposes.
[...] A sequence of subordinated purposes must come to an end;
at last there is a purpose that is not subordinated to another
one.36
One can for example have the coordinated desire to be both a good philoso-
pher and a good mathematician. In this case one independently longs to be
good at two separate professions. However, one could also have the same two
desires in such a way that being a mathematician is subordinated to that of
being a philosopher. In this case one wants to be a mathematician because it
contributes to the job of being a philosopher. In a similar way, the distinction
can be applied to causes. In the case that two causes are coordinated, the
effect will not occur if one of the two does not happen. However, if they are
34My approach is similar to the one sketched by Bell. The interesting article of Bell has a
similar approach in focusing on the role of mereology in Kant’s work. He takes crucial
first steps towards a mereological understanding of Kant, but suffers from an incomplete
account of Kant’s mereological distinctions by merely taking into account the passage in
the footnote on B201 (Bell, 2001, p. 5).
35Cf. Crusius, 1747, §133, p. 234; Crusius, 1747, §150, p. 276; Crusius, 1747, §237-238, p.
441-443; §276, p. 499; Crusius, 1766, §456, p. 993.
36Crusius, 1766, §456, p. 993.
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subordinated, the occurrence of the first cause will bring about the second
one. Thus, subordinated causes constitute a causal chain.
Similar to Crusius, Kant frequently uses two important mereological terms,
namely coordination and subordination. Most of Kant’s lectures on logic
explain the distinction between subordination and coordination, at least
in relation to concepts when discussing the relations between concepts in
terms of genus and species. In most lectures Kant also uses these two terms
to distinguish between kinds of cognitions (Erkenntnisse). As we will see,
the application to concepts is directly connected to the application of the
distinction to cognition itself. Yet, Kant also applies the distinction to causes,
substances, forces, actions, etc. Thus the distinction between coordination
and subordination is not specific to cognition, but is of a far more general na-
ture. Taking into account its wide use by Crusius and Kant, it was a common
distinction, which explains why Kant does not prominently introduce it in
the first Critique, despite its crucial role.
While Kant distinguishes between coordination and subordination to iden-
tify the nature of the connection between entities, he also introduces terms to
distinguish between the products (wholes) established by connecting entities.
The kind of connection usually determines the nature of the product. Espe-
cially Kant’s lectures quite often employ the terms ‘aggregate’ and ‘system’,
which were well-known at the time. The first term usually refers to a more
or less arbitrary collection of parts. Whereas an aggregate does not change
in a significant way if one would add or remove some parts, a system would
become redundant (überfüllt) respectively incomplete because in a system
every part has its proper place. Yet, this distinction does not describe all
possible ways in which parts can be connected. Several passages indicate that
Kant also distinguishes a third product, namely a row.37 This product results
from a third kind of connection. Kant’s lecture on metaphysics of Schön
describes the threefold distinction as follows:
Our cognition is either coordinated or subordinated. By means of
37Something similar can be found in Kant’s lectures on metaphysics of Schön and Volckmann
(XXVII:355). An explanation of ‘row’ in terms of subordination and aggregate and system
in terms of coordination can be found in many lectures on logic, but also at some places
in the first and third Critique (B112/XX:228). I deliberately translate ‘Reihe’ with ‘row’
rather than ‘series’ to avoid anachronistic associations with the modern mathematical
connotations of this term.
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subordination I cognize the relation of grounds to consequences
and consequences to grounds, which establishes a row. By means
of coordination I tie together my cognition as parts of a whole.
Subordination merely perfects my cognitions, whereas coordi-
nation extends them. Every whole of cognition is either an
aggregate or a system. In the case of a system the connection
is methodical, in the case of an aggregate the connection is at
random.38
According to Kant, cognitions are related to each other as a row, as an
aggregate, or as a system. In this manner, Kant employs the distinctions
of Crusius more systematically to account for all possible ways in which
cognitions can be connected. As the diagram shows (figure 3.3), the manners
in which cognitions can be connected result in different products. The
subordination of cognitions produces a row. In the case of coordination, Kant
distinguishes between a rhapsodic composition and a methodical composition:










Figure 3.3: Diagram of row, aggregate, and system in relation to subordination versus coordination.
38XXVIII:463, dated 1785-90, my translation of: ‘Unser Erkenntniß ist entweder coordinirt
oder subordinirt. Durch die Subordination erkenne ich das Verhaltniß der Gründe zu
den Folgen und der Folgen zu den Gründen, dies macht eine Reihe aus. Durch die
Coordination verknüpfe ich mein Erkenntnis wie Theile eines Ganzen. [...] Durch
Subordination wird mein Erkenntniß nur berichtigt, durch Coordination erweitert. - Ein
jedes Ganze einer Erkenntnis ist entweder Aggregat oder System. Beym System ist die
Verbindung methodisch, beym Aggregat rhapsodistisch’.
39Regardless of whether Kant actually employed nested compositions, at least theoretically a
part of a systematic whole might it self be an aggregative whole that is connected by means
of coordination. Kant actually uses such a complex nested constellation when explaining
disjunctive judgments (B111).
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Subordination delivers cognition of what is already presupposed, that is,
already implicitly present in a cognition. For example, the concept ‘man’
presupposes the concept ‘rational’. The former implicitly contains the latter.
Without the characteristic ‘rational’, the concept ‘man’ is impossible. Only
in the case of coordination do the parts constitute a whole. Whereas subor-
dination only results in a sequence of cognitions connected as grounds and
consequences, coordination produces a new whole. Accordingly, subordi-
nated cognition perfects cognitions in the sense that it improves knowledge
of the grounds of the cognition. Coordinated cognition, on the other hand,
extends knowledge in the sense that it adds something to a cognition. Con-
trary to subordinated cognitions, coordinated cognitions do not presuppose,
but complement each other. For example, the characteristics ‘rational’ and
‘living being’ together constitute the content of the concept ‘man’.
Before the next subsection provides more extensive examples of the three
products from the first Critique, we first need to complete our overview
of the kind of wholes that can be produced by the various connections.
The distinction between row and aggregate returns in the context of the
discussion of magnitudes in an important footnote of the second edition
of the Critique. The footnote explains Kant’s division of the principles of
the understanding into the mathematical principles on the one hand, and
the dynamical principles on the other hand. Dynamical principles, such as
for example the second analogy which claims that all changes have a cause,
establish a necessary synthesis whereas the mathematical principles establish
an arbitrary (willkürliche) synthesis of coordination. The footnote explains
the differences between the involved kinds of connections as follows:
All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio)
or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold
of what does not necessarily belong to each other, as e.g., the
two triangles into which a square is divided by the diagonal do
not of themselves necessarily belong to each other, and of such a
sort is the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything that can
be considered mathematically (which synthesis can be further
divided into that of aggregation and of coalition, of which the first
is directed to extensive magnitudes and the second to intensive
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magnitudes). The second combination (nexus) is the synthesis of
that which is manifold insofar as they necessarily belong to one
another, as e.g., an accident belongs to some substance, or the
effect to the cause - thus also as represented as unhomogeneous
but yet as combined a priori.40
The information provided by this passage is illustrated in figure 3.4. Since











product: Row Aggregate Coalition
Figure 3.4: Combination, connection, and composition in relation to row, aggregate, and coalition.
Kant first distinguishes between two kinds of combination (conjunctio),
namely connection (nexus) and composition (compositio). Subsequently, he
refines the products of composition into aggregate and coalition. Unfortu-
nately, this passage does not provide us with terms for the kind of connection
involved in these products. Yet, another passage of the first Critique specifies
the connection of coalitions as ‘fusing together’ (Zusammenfließen).41 In
this context, Kant uses the mereological notion of coalition to discuss the
possibility of fusing multiple substances together into a single one. Whereas
an aggregate of substances results in a complex substance, a coalition of sub-
stances results in a simple substance. If multiple substances fuse together,
nothing gets lost but the multiplicity. For example, when multiple metal
objects are heated, one can fuse them into one large metal object. A coalition
40B201-B202.
41B416.
3.2 Towards a Mereological Understanding of Kant 99












product: Row Aggregate Coalition System
example: genus/species extensive magnitude intensive magnitude transcendental principles
Figure 3.5: Summary of Kant’s mereological distinctions.
We have now obtained two classifications of Kant’s mereological concepts
on the basis of two crucial passages. In both passages, Kant discusses the
concept of aggregate and row. So I propose to take the distinctions of the two
passages together in order to attain a complete overview of Kant’s ‘mereo-
logical’ distinctions (see figure 3.5). Apart from terminological consistency
several texts support the fusion of the two classifications. Although the term
row and subordination are not used in the last passage (footnote) and the
terms nexus and compositio are not used in the first, multiple other reliable
texts link or equate them. A lecture on metaphysics of 1792 indeed describes
a necessary connection (nexus) as subordination.42 The overview (figure 3.5)
combines the previous classifications (figure 3.3 and 3.4) and clearly distin-
guishes between the distinctions in terms of combination and the resulting
product. For each product, the overview also mentions examples figuring
in Kant’s philosophy. The following section illustrates each product, and
thereby each kind of connection of parts by presenting its most important
use in Kant’s theoretical philosophy.
42XXVIII:628.
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3.2.2 Examples and Features of Row, Aggregate, Coalition, and
System
This section provides examples of each of the products of the four different
kinds of combinations offered by Kant’s mereological concepts. The examples
stem from Kant’s texts and almost without exception illustrate important
doctrines of his transcendental philosophy. The examples thereby provide
evidence for my claim that the mereological concepts are both shared and
presupposed by many important Kantian doctrines. Additionally, I try to
capture the differences between these mereological concepts as precise as
possible by means of predicate logic, which also allows us to see which
mereological distinctions Kant did not yet capture.43
Row
The products of subordination, namely rows, are properly speaking not
mereological wholes, but dependency relations. Kant distinguishes them
from the products of coordination precisely by claiming that the latter are
wholes built out of parts while the former are not. As the passages discussed
before indicate, subordination is characterized by a relation of necessity, that
is, a relation of ground to consequence, or condition to conditioned. The
early and later lectures on logic and metaphysics consistently employ the
distinction between subordination and coordination in the exposition of
concepts and characteristics. The Bauch logic provides a quite clear example
illustrating the difference between subordination and coordination:
When I deduce a characteristic from another one, I subordinate.
For example, a men is an animal. When I ask: what is an animal?
A living being. What is a living being? In this way, I attain sub-
ordinated characteristics. Coordinated characteristics constitute
expansive cognition - subordinated characteristics constitute pro-
found cognition. For example, gold is a body, complex, divisible.
These are subordinated notions, but for example gold is heavy,
43I use predicate logic with the predicate PP as a representation of the intuitive notion of
(proper) parthood. I adopt the common name for proper parthood to avoid confusion,
but I do not intend a full analysis of Kant’s mereological distinctions in terms of modern
formal mereology.
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gold does not burn, are coordinated notions of gold.44
The concept ‘animal’ is one of the characteristics of the concept ‘man’, which
means that man is a kind of animal, that is, the concept ‘man’ is subordinated
to the concept ‘animal’. Such a composition of concepts by means of subor-
dination results in a row of subordinated concepts. Analysis of the content
of concepts thus yields rows thereby achieving distinct concepts.45 From
a mereological perspective, the relation of subordination between concepts
thus establishes the way in which concepts are contained in other concepts.
On the other hand, characteristics can also be related by coordination. The
concept ‘man’ for example does not only have the concept ‘animal’ as its
characteristic, but also the concept ‘rational’. Whereas the concept ‘man’ is
subordinate to both the characteristics ‘animal’ and ‘rational’, the latter two
are coordinated to each other. The concept ‘animal’ is not a characteristic of
the concept ‘rational’ nor vice versa. The two characteristics ‘animal’ and
‘rational’ contribute to the clarity of the concept ‘man’ rather than to its
distinctness.46 Thus the most important example of something that has the
structure of a row, is the traditional analysis of concepts into a tree of genus
and species.
As the examples already indicate, the relation of subordination is a neces-
sary relation.47 The subordination of ‘man’ to ‘animal’ is not an arbitrary
one that is introduced for an external purpose, but necessarily results from
the very nature of the involved concepts themselves. Whereas the content
of the components of for example an aggregated whole need not be related,
subordination pressuposes such an ‘intensional’ relation. In the case of the
relation of species to genus the former contains the latter as its mark, which
renders their composition as subordination into a necessity.
44Kant, 1998a, p. 67, p. 109-110, my translation of: ‘Wenn ich [...] ein Merkmal aus dem
andern ableite, dan subordinire ich. z. B. Der Mensch ist ein Thier. Wenn ich frage:
Was ist ein Thier? Ein lebendiges Wesen. Was ist ein lebendiges Wesen? so erlange ich
subordinirte Merkmale. Coordinirte Merkmale machen eine ausgebreitete Erkentnis -
subordinirt eine tiefsinnige. z.B. Gold ist ein Körper, zusammengesetzt, theilbar pp das
sind notae subordinatate aber z.B. das Gold ist schwer, es verfliegt im Feuer nicht, das sind
Notae coordinatae des Goldes’.
45See §1.2.
46The Hechsel logic describes coordinated characteristics as an aggregate (Kant, 1998b, p. 41,
p. 337).
47Cf. B202.
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A second distinctive feature of the relation of subordination is that it
establishes a one-to-one relation. Within a row, every part is subordinated to
another part. Our example of the concept ‘man’ provides two rows, namely
the row ‘animal’ - ‘man’ and the row ‘rational’ - ‘man’. Within each row each
part, except the last one, is subordinated to exactly one other part. Nowadays
we would call this a sequence. This feature can be expressed more formally
as follows. Let S stand for the relation of subordination and assume that
the domain of quantification consists of all parts of a particular row. If x is
subordinated to y, the row cannot contain another part that is subordinated
to y nor can x be subordinated to any thing else than y: ∀x∀y(xSy →
¬∃z(zSy ∨ xSz)).48 Formulated in negative terms, the distinctive feature
of subordination consists in the absence of a one-to-many relation. As a
consequence, the relation of subordination differs crucially from the other
mereological connections in that a row does not establish a proper part-whole
structure. For Kant quite consistently reserves the terms ‘part’ and ‘whole’
for coordinative relations and describes subordinate relations as relations of
ground (Grund) and consequence (Folge).49 Thus, properly speaking, a row
does not establish a whole.
Note that this feature does not claim anything about the entities themselves.
Being a one-to-one relation, subordination does not imply that the involved
part itself can have only one relation. For example, if the cause A effects B,
B is subordinated to A, but this does not imply that A can have only one
effect, namely B. In the case of the relations of subordination between the
characteristics of a concept, such as the subordination of the concept ‘man’
to the concept ‘rational’, this does not imply that the concept ‘man’ cannot
have other characteristics. Thus, the mereological relations are external to
the entities, and accordingly neither limit nor hinge upon the nature of the
entities.
A third feature of the relation of subordination is that it renders the parts
heterogeneous. In a row of grounds and consequences for example, a part A
functions as the ground of consequence B. Thus the relation of subordination
48To avoid superfluous complexity, this formulation neglects transitivity, which seems to
be consistent with Kant’s use of the term subordination. Of course, the relation of
subordination is not reflexive so the formulation does not need to include z 6= x, z 6= y.
49Cf. XXVIII:171; XXVIII:463.
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renders part A into a different kind of part than part B. In the case of the
hierarchy of concepts, the concepts also stand in a relation that renders them
heterogeneous, namely as genus and species. Again, the mereological relation
does not express a property of the entity itself. Independent of the relation
of subordination, genus and species are homogeneous since both are concepts.
They only become heterogeneous as genus and species in virtue of the relation
of subordination. Contrary to subordination, the coordinated parts of an
aggregate and a coalition are homogeneous. as we will see later.50 Accordingly,
it cannot be a surprise that precisely these two mereological concepts are the
basis for Kant’s explanation of the notion of a magnitude as will be explained
when discussing aggregates and coalitions.
Aggregate
The mereological concept of aggregation is most well-known because Kant
often uses it in opposition to the mereological notion of a system to emphasize
the strong requirements of the latter. Whereas a system is produced by
methodical coordination, an aggregate is produced by rhapsodic coordination.
According to Kant, rhapsodic coordination still leaves open two options. The
rhapsodic coordination might be such that the parts remain distinct from
each other, in which case the resulting whole is called an aggregate. If they
would not remain distinct, they fuse together resulting in a coalition. Kant
employs the first option, namely that of an aggregate, to account for extensive
magnitudes.
Kant defines an extensive magnitude as follows:
I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation
of the parts makes possible the representation of the whole (and
therefore necessarily precedes the latter). I cannot represent to
myself any line, no matter how small it may be, without drawing
it in thought, i.e., successively generating all its parts from one
50The dynamic principles of the understanding are concerned with heterogeneous cognitions,
whereas the mathematical principles of the understanding are concerned with homoge-
neous cognitions (Cf. XVI:541). For example the second analogy of experience, which
claims that all changes in appearances have a cause, establishes a row of cause and effects.
As we will see, the axioms of intuition provide a homogeneous mereological structure to
given representations in order to cognize them as magnitudes.
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point, and thereby first sketching this intuition.51
The parts of an extensive magnitude precede the whole and are independent
of the whole. However, the whole depends on its parts. One cannot represent
a line without first representing its parts. Another example of an extensive
magnitude is a collection of 13 euro coins.52 The aggregative whole referred
to by ‘13 euro’ depends on the coins as its parts. The coins remain distinct
and removal of a coin causes the collapse of the whole ‘13 euro’, although it
produces a new aggregative whole, namely that of ‘12 euro’. Nevertheless
the coordination of coins is rhapsodic for two reasons.53 Firstly, the order of
coordination does not matter. Second, neither the coordination nor the parts
themselves render an aggregate into a systematic whole that can be said to be
complete as required by the mereological notion of a system. Neither the
parts nor the coordinative connection impose any limit on the aggregation.
Regardless whether one repeatedly adds or removes a part, the mereological
structure of aggregation remains intact.
Kant uses the notion of aggregation in the exposition of the first of his
mathematical principles of the understanding, namely the principle of all
axioms of intuition, to claim that all intuitions are extensive magnitudes:
Every appearance as intuition is an extensive magnitude, as it
can only be cognized through successive synthesis (from part to
part) in apprehension. All appearances are accordingly already
intuited as aggregates (multitudes of antecedently given parts).54
Thus appearances, which are empirical representations, have the mereological
structure of an aggregate since their cognition involves a synthesis from
part to part thereby constituting an aggregative whole. Since Kant defines
extensive magnitudes as having the structure of an aggregate, appearances are
extensive magnitudes.
In comparison to rows, the first most distinctive feature of aggregates is
that they possess a proper part-whole structure. The coordinated parts have a
51B203.
52Cf. B212.
53One might doubt whether Kant was able to distinguish between the two. As we will see,
Bolzano explicitly addresses the notion of order when discussing part-whole relations
(§6.2).
54B204.
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relation to something they have in common, namely the whole:
Cognitions are coordinated when they are related to each other
as parts to a common whole.55
Contrary to subordination, the coordination of parts thus establishes a one-to-
many relation between the whole and its parts. The coordinative connection
itself designates the connection between the parts, which is such that they to-
gether constitute a whole. Let C indicate a coordinative relation, PP a proper
part-hood relation, w a particular aggregate, and the quantification domain
consist of the parts of w. In predicate logic this feature can be formulated as:
∀x∀y(PPxw ∧ PPyw ∧ Cxy)). In contrast to subordination, coordination
does not impose a particular order among the parts of an aggregate. In fact,
any part of an aggregate stands in relation to any other part of the aggregate:
∀x∀y(Cxy).56
The second feature stands in contrast to a coalition. An aggregate is
atomistic in that there is a smallest part ∀x∀y(PPyx → ¬∃z(PPzy))).57
Again, the described features are properties of the mereological structure
and not of the entities themselves. Thus, when Kant claims that every
appearance is an aggregate (extensive magnitude), he does not claim that the
appearances themselves are atomic. In this manner, Kant implements the
transcendental nature of the mathematical principles: the appearances are
cognized as aggregates. The relation of coordination thus allows to cognize
given representations as magnitudes. A particular given representations can
be cognized as an aggregate with an arbitrarily chosen unit as atomic part.
Nothing excludes the possibility to cognize some parts of this aggregate as
another aggregate with a different unit as atomic part. Nevertheless, being an
aggregate, the cognition is build out of atomic parts.
55XXVIII:171, my translation of: ‘Coordiniert sind Erkenntnisse, wenn sie sich unter einander
wie Theile zu einem gemeinschaftlichen Ganzen verhalten’.
56The relation of coordination is symmetric for the same reason, but it does not make sense
to regard it as reflexive.
57Kant does not take into account the possibility of nested aggregates and transitivity. Accord-
ingly, he does not talk about parts of parts. The notion of an aggregate is one dimensional,
has one depth.
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Coalition
The third mereological product is that of a coalition. A coalition is the
product of rhapsodic coordination in which the parts fuse together. Kant
introduces the term coalition to explain the notion of intensive magnitudes.
Intensive magnitudes come into play when Kant formulates the second math-
ematical principle of the understanding, namely the principle of the an-
ticipations of perception. The difference between extensive and intensive
magnitudes is that the former is built out of parts whereas the latter is given
as a whole:
Between reality in appearance and negation there is a continuous
composition of many possible intermediate sensations. That is,
the real in appearance always has a magnitude [...] The apprehen-
sion takes place by means of the mere sensation in an instant and
not through successive synthesis of many sensations, and thus
does not proceed from the parts to the whole; it therefore has
a magnitude, but not an extensive one. Now I call that magni-
tude which can only be apprehended as a unity, and in which
multiplicity can only be represented through approximation [...],
intensive magnitude. 58
Appearances not only allow for successive cognition, which results in exten-
sive magnitudes, but also for the cognition of phenomena in a single moment.
Accordingly, the cognition is not generated by proceeding from part to part
and hence does not involve an aggregate. According to Kant, such an in-
stantaneous cognition of an appearance nevertheless represents a magnitude,
although it is of a different kind, namely an intensive magnitude. Examples
of intensive magnitudes are numerous, for example the warmth of objects or
the intensity of colors.59 Contrary to an extensive magnitude, for example
the height of a house, one cannot measure an intensive magnitude since one
cannot take a part as the unit of measurement. The height of a house can be
measured in terms of the height or length of another object, but one cannot
compare the warmth of objects in this way. In Kant’s terms, the measurement
of temperature with a thermometer involves the translation of the intensive
58B210.
59Cf. B211.
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magnitude of warmth into an extensive magnitude by means of quicksilver.
As we have seen, Kant regards an intensive magnitude as a coalition. Thus
the second mathematical principle of the understanding in fact states that the
real in appearances has the structure of a coalition.
Apart from the notions of extensive and intensive magnitude, Kant intro-
duces a third notion of magnitude:
(A) The property of magnitudes on account of which no part of
them is the smallest (no part is simple) is called their continuity.
[...] Magnitudes of this sort can also be called flowing [Fließen].
60
Examples of continuous or flowing magnitudes are space and time because
points and moments are limits of space and time rather than constituents of
space and time.61 According to Kant, these continuous magnitudes share an
important feature with intensive magnitudes, namely that they are not atomic.
Accordingly, Kant characterizes both continuous and intensive magnitudes
as flowing. Since the mereological features of continuous magnitudes are
identical to those of intensive magnitudes, continuous magnitudes also have
the structure of a coalition. One of Kant’s examples confirms this. If the
term ‘13 thaler’ refers to 13 coins, it refers to an aggregate. Yet, the same term
can refer to the amount of silver from which the coins are made.62 In the
latter sense, ‘13 thaler’ designates a continuous magnitude, since silver can be
divided into parts ad infinitum. In sum, since both intensive and continuous
magnitudes are coalitions, the difference between intensive and continuous
magnitudes is not to be found in their mereological structure.
To me it seems that the difference between the notion of continuous and
intensive magnitude is one of the level of generality. Whereas the former is
more theoretical or formal in nature, which allows it to be applied in any
context that involves magnitudes, the latter is reserved for cognitions of the
60B211.
61Although points and moments might seem to be the atomic parts of space and time Kant
argues that they are merely ‘places of their limitation’ (B211).
62For Kant’s time the example works much better than nowadays, since a Thaler actually
had an intrinsic value depending on the amount of silver. Thalers were defined in terms
of marks of fine silver which represented a standard amount of silver. Thus the primary
meaning of the term 13 taler at the time was a mark of fine silber and not thirteen taler
coins, which is the primary meaning of our current expression of 13 euros.
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real in appearances, such as the warmth of things. While extensive magnitudes
represent appearances from the perspective of the category of quantity, inten-
sive magnitudes represent appearances from the perspective of the category of
quality. The introduction of the notion of continuous magnitude allows Kant
to claim that all appearances are continuous magnitudes regardless of whether
they are considered to be extensive or intensive magnitudes. A line is the first
example of an extensive magnitude, at the same time a line is part of space.
As such it is infinitely divisible since space has no smallest part. Although
a line can be cognized as an extensive magnitude, the same line can also be
cognized as a continuous magnitude, but not as an intensive magnitude. For
this term is reserved for cognitions of the qualitative aspects of appearances.
Commentators often interpret the notion of flowing against the back-
ground of Newton’s conception of fluents.63 Friedman convincingly argues
that Kant was aware of Newton’s notion of fluent as a magnitude generated
by continuous motion on the basis of Kästner’s mathematical textbooks.64
However, in my view he exaggerates the importance of Newton’s influence.
To me it seems that the notion of flowing has a mereological and metaphysical
meaning that is independent of Newton’s mathematical use of it. For Kant
explicitly uses the term fluxion to designate the smallest possible difference in
a Reflection related to a section of Baumgarten’s metaphysics presenting the
so called law of continuity.65 This metaphysical law of continuity states that
all changes are continuous. In his Inaugural Dissertation, Kant formulates it
as follows:
(B) Now, the metaphysical law of continuity is as follows: All
changes are continuous or flow: that is to say, opposed states only
succeed one another through an intermediate series of different
states. For two opposed states are in different moments of time.
But between two moments there will always be an intervening
time, and, in the infinite series of the moments of that time, the
substance is not in one of the given states, nor in the other, and
yet it is not in no state either.66
63Cf. Kitcher, 1975, p. 41; Longuenesse, 1998, p. 269.
64Friedman, 1992b, p. 75.
65Cf. R5382 (XVIII:168, dated 1776-1778).
66II:399-400.
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In the case of changes, ‘continuous’ thus means that no sudden changes occur.
One can always find another intermediate state.
In my view, the passage of the first Critique that introduces the notion
of flowing alludes to this metaphysical law. Friedman seems to neglect an
important sentence that immediately precedes quote A:67
(C) The property of magnitudes on account of which no part of
them is the smallest (no part is simple) is called their continuity.68
Kant thus introduces the notion of continuity or flowing by means of a
reference to the mereological properties of magnitudes. At the time, these
mereological aspects were usualy dealt with in metaphysics (ontology). Con-
trary to Newton’s notion of fluxion, the metaphysical notion of continuity or
flowing does not involve the notion of time. For example, Kästner also treats
the law of continuity as a general metaphysical law in which the notion of
continuity does not generally depend on time.69 Thus, apart from Newton’s
specific mathematical use, flowing also has an independent mereological and
metaphysical meaning.70 Contrary to what Friedman suggests, it is the tradi-
tion of metaphysics that informed Kant rather than Newton’s mathematical
meaning of fluxion. The notions of motion and time involved in Newton’s
fluxion are not part of Kant’s notion of flowing. According to Kant, time
merely plays a role insofar as it is involved in the transcendental constitution
(Erzeugung) of a continuous magnitude through continuous progression in
time.71 According to Kant, time is a transcendental condition for the pos-
sibility of representing continuous quantities, but time is not required for
the notions of continuity and flowing as such. The then common notion of
fusing together suffices.72
67Friedman, 1992a, p. 74.
68B211.
69Kästner, 1793, §183, 187, p. 350-363.
70The early reception of Kant confirms the mereological meaning of the term. The Kantian
Kiesewetter uses continuous and flowing as synonymous and explains the notion of a
flowing quantity in mereological terms (Kiesewetter, 1804, p. XIII-XIV; see also Werder-
mann, 1793, p. 165). Newton merely defines flowing magnitudes in terms of motion of
geometrical objects and hardly speaks about it in terms of part-whole relations (Newton,
1736, p. 24).
71Cf. B212.
72Kant uses the term in the same meaning in many other occasions, for example in the context
of fusing together of states (XXIII:171), people (R1353, XV:591), and with regard to
representations (XXIII:19).
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The notion of flowing expresses the distinctive mereological feature of
coalitions as being infinitely divisible. This can be expressed as follows in
terms of a proper part-hood relation PP between the coordinated parts and
the constituted whole: ∀x∀y(PPyx → ∃z(PPzy)) (1).73 The idea that of
every part you can take a smaller part requires transitivity. This expression
formalizes the passage of quote C. In other passages Kant formulates the
notion of flowing in terms of intermediate states, such as in quote B. These
passages can be formalized in terms of relations between the coordinated parts
not mentioning the constituted whole as such: ∀x∀y(PPyx→ ∃z(PPyz ∧
PPzx)) (2). Nowadays, we call this density.74 On the one hand Kant’s
terminology of lacking a simple or atomic part suggests the first expression,
on the other hand, the terminology of flowing together of parts into a
continuity suggests the second. To me it seems that Kant sometimes describes
continuity as infinite divisibility and sometimes as density, because he was
not able to distinguish as sharply between them as we can with predicate
logic.
System
Finally, Kant provides the mereological product of a system, which results
from a methodical coordination of its parts. The resulting whole is such
that each part has its specific place. Removal or addition of parts would
destruct the order with the result that the whole collapses. Hence, a mere
aggregate would remain. In fact, we have already seen an example of a system
in the first section of this chapter. The methodology part of the first Critique
provides a systematic framework of rational cognition which explains how
philosophical knowledge and mathematical knowledge together constitute
the domain of rational cognition. Another example of a system is a body of
knowledge properly organized by the mathematical or Euclidean method.
A collection of all geometrical truths would be a mere aggregate, but the
Euclidean method organizes them into a system such that the theorems follow
from the axioms according to logical rules of inferences. As we will see, Kant
73My formulation in predicate logic aims to be analogous to Kant’s formulations in natural
language. Surprisingly, my formulation is identical to a modern mereological principle for
atomlessness, that is regarded as suitable for describing the structure of space-time (Varzi,
2016, P. 8ϕ).
74Cf. Varzi, 2016, P. 9.
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regards analytic judgments as superfluous for such a system. Throughout
Kant’s work many other examples of systems can be found, although one
might doubt the extent to which they are successful. Almost each of his
published work is organized by the table of the forms of judgments. Even
on a more fine grained level many parts of Kant’s work are organized by this
table, such as for example the principles of the understanding.
Equipped with Kant’s mereological notions, the remainder of this chapter
attempts to interpret Kant’s philosophy of mathematics from a mereological
perspective. The two subsequent sections argue that the hitherto presented
mereological distinctions provide relatively precise explanations for Kant’s
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments (§3.3), as well as, for his
distinction between the faculties of understanding and sensation (§3.4). The
latter shows how coordination provides a quite precise and formal explanation
of Kant’s notion of pure intuition. In the end, the role of coordination renders
mathematical knowledge into synthetic judgments. We will see in a later
chapter that the early Bolzano replaces Kant’s epistemological explanation of
coordination in terms of intuition by a conceptual notion (chapter 6). This
enables Bolzano to provide a conception of a priori synthetic knowledge in
which pure intuition plays no role at all.
3.3 Kant’s Distinction between Analytic and
Synthetic Judgments
This section introduces the general philosophical insight underlying the dis-
tinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, before several subsections
provide a detailed exposition of containment in analytic judgments in terms
of Kant’s mereological notions. In the passage preceding the section on ana-
lytic and synthetic judgments in the introduction to the first Critique, Kant
acknowledges that reason to a large extent occupies itself with the analysis of
confused concepts. He evaluates the results of analysis as follows:
This affords us a multitude of cognitions that, though they are
nothing more than illuminations or clarifications of that which is
already thought in our concepts (though still in a confused way),
are, at least as far as their form is concerned, treasured as if they
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were new insights, though they do not extend the concepts that
we have in either matter or content but only set them apart from
each other.75
Although the form of clarifications might be similar to the form of new
insights, they do not deliver additional content. Nevertheless, Kant regards
analysis as a worthwhile enterprise, since it delivers a priori cognition. How-
ever, the dominating role of analysis also hides a priori cognitions of a different
nature:
Now since this procedure does yield a real a priori cognition,
which makes secure and useful progress, reason, without itself
noticing it, under these pretenses surreptitiously makes assertions
of quite another sort, in which it adds something entirely alien
to given concepts a priori, without one knowing how it was able
to do this and without this question even being allowed to come
to mind.76
In order to be in the position to assess the possibility of synthetic a priori
knowledge, reason has to become aware of its erroneous attribution of all a
priori cognition to analysis. Reason has to be able to identify the cognitions
that do not result from analysis. For this purpose, Kant introduces the
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments as follows:
One could also call the former judgments of clarification and
the latter judgments of amplification, since through the predicate
the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject,
but only break it up by means of analysis into its component
concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly);
while the latter, on the contrary, add to the concept of the subject
a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have
been extracted from it through any analysis.77
Whereas analytic judgments merely clarify concepts, synthetic judgments
extend (Erweiterung) our knowledge. With this distinction Kant in fact
75B9.
76B10.
77B11. Cf. IV:266; RVII, XXIII:21; XXIV:539; R2397, XVI:345.
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criticizes the textbooks of the Wolffian tradition which mainly provide clari-
fications. A Reflection reveals that the clarifying nature of these textbooks is
especially problematic in the case of metaphysics:
My author Baumgarten is an excellent man when it comes to
judgments of clarification, but when he moves on to judgments
of amplification he is without any foundation, even though these
are the primary requirement in metaphysics.78
Wolff’s textbooks of for example mathematics might be satisfactory as a
thorough clarification of common mathematical knowledge that already
has an apodictic status. The bad state of metaphysics however requires an
increase of knowledge.79 Kant evaluates Wolff’s achievements in the field of
metaphysics in a similar way:
Now the celebrated Wolf has rendered an incontestable service to
ontology, by his clarity and precision in analysing these powers;
but not by any addition to our knowledge in that area, since the
subject matter was exhausted.80
Despite this criticism, Kant does not reject analysis as such, as it will be part
of his planned system of pure reason.81 The first Critique, however, is mainly
concerned with the sources of synthetic a priori knowledge. Precisely because
the rationalistic tradition provides extensive clarifications, the question arises
as to what are the conditions for the possibility of expansive knowledge. The
phrase ‘since the subject matter was exhausted’ explains why the analytic
method was so successful in the case of mathematics. Mathematics already
had established a considerable amount of knowledge that is known to be valid
for ages in the case of Euclidean geometry.
The primacy of the notions of clarification and expansion underlying
the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments also comes to the
fore when Kant, in a letter to Schultz, defends his view that arithmetic and
algebra (general arithmetic) consist of a priori synthetic knowledge.82 First
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of all, Kant takes it for granted that general arithmetic (algebra) is the a priori
science that is most prolific in extending its knowledge. Suppose it would
only consist of analytic judgments, the definition of analytic judgments as
explanatory judgments would be wrong:
If the latter [Algebra] consisted of merely analytic judgments,
one would have to say at least that the definition of ‘analytic’ as
meaning ‘merely explicative’ was incorrect. And then we would
face the difficult and important question, How is it possible to
extend our knowledge by means of merely analytic judgments?83
This quote illustrates that Kant regards clarification as the primary meaning
of analytic judgments rather than the logical explanation of containment.84
As soon as analytic judgments contribute to an increase in knowledge, they
must be redefined. As a result, the main problem of the first Critique would
change into the following question: what are the conditions for the possibility
of expansion of knowledge by means of analytic judgments? As a result, the
whole distinction would collapse.
Although Kant regards analytic judgments as useful, he denies that they
belong to science as a system. The Jäsche logic for instance states that Scholia
do not belong to the system because they only clarify things:
Scholia, finally, are merely propositions of clarification, which
thus do not belong to the whole of the system as members.85
Thus strictly speaking, analytic judgments do not belong to the system since
they are not strictly required by a system of knowledge. They can be missed.
83X:555.
84One could consider the law of non-contradiction, presented by Kant as the highest principle
of all analytic judgments, as an independent explanation of Kant’s notion of analyticity.
De Jong rejects this option and extensively discusses whether the definition of analytic
judgments as containment is compatible with the explanation in terms of non-contradiction
(de Jong, 1997, pp. 162-166; de Jong, 1995, p. 619, 630-632). In agreement with de Jong,
I do not think that Kant’s highest principle of all analytic judgments can be interpreted
as one of Kant’s ways to define his notion of analyticity because textual evidence for
such a claim lacks. Moreover, such a reading seems to require a quite modern axiomatic
perspective on foundationalism, according to which the axioms (highest principles) in fact
determine the meaning of the terms that are used to formulate the axioms.
85IX:112, §39. Translation modified in order to attain a consistent translation of Erläuterung.
Similar to examples, Scholia help to understand something (XV:I53).
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Table 3.1: Overview of three analytic-synthetic distinctions.
In this sense, analytic judgments do not belong to a science according to
Kant.86 We will see later that the early Bolzano holds a similar view.87
As already mentioned in the previous chapter one must not confuse the
three distinctions formulated by Kant in terms of analytic and synthetic.88
The first one is a common methodological distinction between analytic and
synthetic reasoning. Whereas analytic reasoning is regressive, proceeding
from theorems to axioms and definitions, synthetic reasoning, is progres-
sive proceeding from definitions and axioms to theorems. In his Prize Essay
of 1764, Kant presents a related, but new distinction between analytic and
synthetic definitions in order to distinguish philosophy from mathematics.
Whereas philosophy analyzes given concepts in order to clarify their content,
mathematics composes new concepts out of basic constituents.89 The first
Critique not only maintains this second analytic-synthetic distinction, but
also introduces a third distinction, namely between analytic and synthetic
judgments. Although they share the opposed attributes ‘analytic’ and ‘syn-
thetic’ these three distinctions must be distinguished carefully since they
apply to distinct logical entities (see table 3.1).90
86Kant’s distinction between canon and organon allows to regard logic as a science in that it
only functions as a canon (logic as the science that learns us how to evaluate knowledge
(Beurtheilung und Berichtigung), whereas for example mathematics also is a science in that
it functions as an organon. Cf. XXIV:505; IX:13.
87See §5.3.
88See chapter 2.
89For a more detailed discussion see §2.1.
90Even these three most important cases do not exhaust Kant’s extensive use of the attributes
‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’. Logic lectures also speak about analytic and synthetic character-
istics. In a mathematical context ‘analytic’ has yet another meaning, distinct from all three
distinctions, namely indicating that something is independent from geometry. Analyticity
in this sense will be discussed in chapter 4.
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The methodological distinction only concerns the method one follows.
One can for example present a proof either by an analytic method starting
from the conclusion or by following the synthetic method starting from
definitions and axioms. The chosen method neither affects the content nor
the validity or status of the proof, but only the manner of presentation. The
distinction between analytic and synthetic definitions also does not affect
the content. The distinction itself does not inform us about the content of
the defined concepts. Whereas an analytic definition is the outcome of the
process of analyzing a given concept, a synthetic definition is the outcome
of taking concepts together. As we have seen, Kant employs the distinction
to separate philosophy and mathematics in terms of certainty: whereas
mathematics is apodictic, philosophy can never be sure whether its results are
correct.91 According to Kant, this explains the difference in progress between
philosophy and mathematics.
In contrast to the first two, the distinction between analytic and synthetic
judgments does affect the content of judgments.92 To be more precise, it
affects the relation between the subject and the predicate of the judgment.
For the moment it suffices to describe this relation as containment of the
predicate in the subject in the case of analytic judgments, a relation that does
not obtain in the case of synthetic judgments. Thus, contrary to analytic and
synthetic methods and definitions, the content of an analytic and a synthetic
judgment cannot be identical. In sum, this distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments is independent of the distinction between a priori and
a posteriori judgments, as well as, of the way in which the judgments are
obtained. The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments thus
constitutes a characteristic of judgments themselves rather than the preceding
method of reasoning or the epistemic source of their content.
91See §2.4.
92Cf. IV:266.
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3.3.1 Extensional Containment as the Result of Intensional
Containment
As we have seen, Kant defines analytic judgments as judgments of clarifica-
tion.93 These judgments of clarification are the result of a process of analysis
of the content of concepts. They in fact express the characteristics of distinct
concepts. In the first Critique, Kant provides a logical explanation of analytic
judgments:
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate
is thought (if I consider only affirmative judgments, since the
application to negative ones is easy), this relation is possible in
two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject
A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A;
or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it
stands in connection with it. In the first case I call the judgment
analytic, in the second synthetic.94
Before discussing the crucial notion of containment in detail two remarks
must be made. First of all, Kant is aware that not all judgments involve a
relation between subject and predicate. The phrase ‘in which the relation
of a subject to the predicate is thought’ limits the explanation of analytic
judgments to those that have the form of categorical judgments.95 In accor-
dance with this first limitation, Kant signals a second, namely that he only
provides an explanation of affirmative judgments. Nevertheless, Kant allows
for a wider application of the notion of analytic judgments since the Prole-
gomena states that the distinction applies to all judgments regardless of their
logical form.96 In my view, the first Critique thus provides an explanation of
a particular type of analytic judgments as required by Kant’s opponent in
the introduction of the first Critique, namely the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition.
The result of the analysis of concept A is that its content contains concept B.
This takes the form of the judgment ‘A is B’. Thus insofar as one aims at a
93As argued in the previous section, I take the philosophical definition of analytic judgments
as judgments of clarification as the primary definition.
94B10.
95The question whether and how the distinction can be explained with regard to the other
logical forms is outside the scope of this project.
96IV:266.
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more precise description of the results of analysis by the tradition, it suffices
to provide an explanation of affirmative categorical judgments.
The second remark concerns the second phrase between brackets. Kant
defines analytic judgments as judgments in which the predicate is contained
in the subject. Again Kant adds a term between brackets, namely covertly
(versteckterweise). One could ask whether Kant intends to claim that the
subject of analytic judgments always contains the predicate in a hidden way
or that this only occurs in some cases. At this point, Kant’s lectures on logic
are helpful. They state that identical judgments (‘A is A’) are empty.97 There-
fore they have to be distinguished from analytic judgments since identical
judgments do not even contribute to clarity. The subject of an identical
judgment does not contain something that is clarified by the predicate. Thus,
Kant’s characterization of analytic judgments as clarification implies that the
predicate is implicitly part of the subject.98
Kant is often criticized for not providing a precise explanation for his no-
tion of analytic judgments, that is, for his notion of containment. However,
relatively recent contributions by Anderson and de Jong convincingly show
that a precise explanation is available if one recognizes the relevance of the tra-
ditional Porphyrian hierarchy of concepts.99 The value of these contributions
is further exemplified by the fact that they allow to provide a precise logical
argument for the synthetic nature of arithmetic as Anderson argues.100 In
the following I explain this interpretation. The subsequent section employs
this interpretation to assign analytic judgments to the mereological notion of
subordination.
Kant’s lectures on logic provide a crucial distinction between two notions
of containment.101 This distinction relies on the traditional hierarchical
tree of concepts. The concept ‘substance’ for example can be divided into
97Cf. RLXXIV, XXIII:29; IX:111; XXIV:581; XXIV:767; XIV:769; XXVIII:496; R3120,
XVI:668; Meier, 1752a, §315.
98Strictly speaking, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is not exhaustive.
Identical judgments constitute a third class of judgment, which however, has no importance
to Kant at all. As we will see in a later chapter, Bolzano will even claim of analytic
judgments, including empty judgments, that they are, properly speaking, not judgments at
all (§5.3).
99Anderson, 2005; de Jong, 1995.
100Anderson, 2004. The same argument can be found in Bolzano’s work (see chapter 6).
101IX:95; XXIV:911; XXIV:569; XXIV:655.
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living beings called organisms, and non-living beings called matter. In this
example the concepts of organism and matter are contained under (enthalten
unter) the concept of substance (see left side of figure 3.6). Together they
form the extension or sphere of the concept of substance. In the traditional
terminology, ‘substance’ is a genus relative to its species ‘organism’ and ‘matter’.
Where ‘organism’ is a species relative to ‘substance’, it also is a genus relative
to ‘man’ and ‘animal’.102 The eighteenth century logicians also frequently use
the terminology of lower and higher concepts. While ‘organism’ is a higher
concept than ‘man’ and ‘animal’, it is a lower concept relative to ‘substance’.
The logical form of disjunctive judgments plays an important role in
dividing a genus into species.103 An exclusive disjunction holds between the
species such that an object falling under the genus falls under precisely one of
those species. In other words, the species are mutually exclusive. An important
feature is that the species together exhaust the domain of objects falling under
the genus. Formulated in modern terms, the union of the extensions of the


















Figure 3.6: Example of extension and intension.
The other notion of containment concerns the content of the concept. For
example, the concept ‘rational’ is part of the concept ‘man’ and therefore
contained in the concept ‘man’ (see right side of 3.6). Insofar as a concept
(rational) is part of the content of another concept (man), it functions as a
characteristic or mark of the concept. Every representation - both concepts
and intuitions - that contain all characteristics of a concept fall under this
concept. Thus, the content or intension of a concept determines its exten-
sion. In our example, the content of the concept ‘organism’ is ‘living being’.
102In this example I use ‘animal’ as a term designating non-human living beings.
103Cf. XXIV:461.
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Accordingly, all representations having these characteristics in common fall
under the concept ‘man’. Therefore the concepts ‘man’ and ‘animal’ as well
as individual human beings and individual animals belong to the extension
of ‘organism’. Addition of a characteristic results in a lower concept (a new
species). For instance addition of ‘rational’ to the content of ‘organism’ re-
sults in the concept ‘man’. As a result, the extension has become narrower
because animals no longer belong to it. An increase in content thus results in
a decrease of the extension. The reverse also holds: an increase in extension
implies a decrease in content. This inverse relation between extension and
intension is called the law of reciprocity.
From a modern perspective, Kant’s use of the notion of extension is quite
confusing due to Kant’s rejection of singular concepts. According to the tra-
ditional logic of for example Meier, one can have concepts that are individual,
which means that all properties that distinguish one individual from another
are part of the characteristics of the concept.104 Going down the hierarchical
tree of concepts one finally reaches a lowest concept that only denotes an
individual (the infima species). According to Meier, there is a lowest species
which is not itself a genus. As a result, the singular concepts or infima species
belong to the extension of higher concepts. Contrary to Meier, Kant rejects
the existence of infima species:
Hence every genus requires different species, and these subspecies,
and since none of the latter once again is ever without a sphere,
(a domain as a conceptus communis), reason demands in its
entire extension that no species be regarded as in itself the lowest;
for since each species is always a concept that contains within
itself only what is common to different things, this concept
cannot be thoroughly determined, hence it cannot be related to
an individual, consequently, it must at every time contain other
concepts, i.e., subspecies, under itself.105
According to Kant, concepts are always general representations. He thereby
maintains a strict opposition between concepts (general representations) and
intuitions (individual representations). Although concepts can be used to
104Meier, 1752a, §249, XVI:533.
105B683-B684.
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designate a particular object, the concepts themselves are always general.106
Since Kant rejects the notion of infima species and claims that one can always
regard a species as a genus and divide it into species, there is a fundamental gap
between the tree of genus-species and the individuals in the sense that there
is no last species that functions as the last bridge towards the individuals. As
a result, concepts cannot be used to distinguish between individuals. From
a conceptual point of view, merely a purely numerical difference between
individuals remains. As a consequence, Kant needs something else to account
for the representation of individuals. We will see later, that the forms of
intuitions, space and time, allow to represent individuals.
The traditional logic of for example Meier does not reject infima species, and
accordingly does not distinguish between species and individuals. While Kant
rejects infima species, he maintains the traditional meaning of ‘containment
under a concept’ as including both general representations as species and
individual representations as objects. As a result, Kant’s term ‘contained
under’ refers to two cases that are quite distinct from the perspective of his
own logic. First of all, ‘contained under’ can refer to the concepts contained
under a concept A as its lower species. Let us call this form of containment
conceptual extension. Second, ‘contained under’ can refer to the intuitions,
that is, the individual objects contained under the concept A. The term
objectual extension is appropriate for this kind of extension.107
For Kant, the individuals fall under a concept because they share this
concept as part of their representational content, that is, they share the
concept as a mark or characteristic. As such, the containment of individuals
under a concept does not differ from the containment of a concept under a
concept. Precisely for this reason Kant is able to use the the term ‘contained
under’ for both conceptual and objectual extension.108 Nevertheless, an
interpretation of Kant’s theory of concepts greatly benefits from a sharp
106Kant, 1998a, p. 92-93, p. 152-153. As a result, Kant’s lectures on logic sometimes seem
ambiguous. Whereas the early lectures more closely follow Meier, the later lectures more
explicitly deviate from Meier. In the latter, Kant seems to distinguish the logical division
from the application of concepts to objects.
107Schulthess designates the distinction for which I introduce the terms conceptual and objec-
tual extension with the, in my view, confusing terms of intensional respectively extensional
extension (Schulthess, 1981, p. 16).
108Stuhlmann-Laeisz concludes that the ‘Relation "enthalten unter" umfaßt anschauliche und
begriﬄiche Vorstellungen’ (Stuhlmann-Laeisz, 1976, p. 87).
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distinction between the two forms of extensional containment because of the
fundamental gap between species and individuals.
Our contemporary notion of extension in the model theoretic sense adds
to the confusion surrounding the concept of extension. In my view, predicate
logic provides a third kind of extension. In predicate logic, a model provides
an interpretation function for every predicate by means of a set of the objects
to which the predicate applies. At first sight, the modern notion of extension
thus seems similar to objectual extension. However, the modern notion of
extension is quite different because the model theoretic approach merely
assigns predicates to objects and does not rely on a comparison of content.
In predicate logic, the predicate and the object do not have something in
common, that is, predicate logic does not provide something analogous
to Kant’s characteristics. Contrary to Kant’s logic, the content of neither
the predicate nor the object plays a role in determining the extension. As
a result, the modern notion of extension must be distinguished from the
Kantian notions. A suitable term to designate the modern kind of extension
is external extension.109
The preceding analysis of Kant’s theory of concepts allows for a straightfor-
ward interpretation of containment as an explanation of analytic judgments.
A judgment ‘S is P’ is analytic if and only if the predicate P is contained in
the subject S. In the analytic judgment ‘man is rational’ for example, the
concept ‘rational’ is a characteristic of the concept ‘man’. For the subject
‘man’ contains the predicate ‘rational’. Synthetic judgments on the other
hand connect a subject to a predicate that is not contained in the subject.
Accordingly, logical analysis of the subject does not suffice to justify the truth
of a judgment. According to Kant, synthetic judgments therefore require
the presence of a third element, an object, in order to connect the predicate
and the subject via a form of extension. This object could be an experienced
object for a posteriori judgments, but could also be a construed object in pure
intuition in the case of a priori judgments.110 As we will see later, such a
construed object can still be general.
109Schulthess does not introduce such a distinction, but instead describes Kant’s logic as an
intensional logic and predicate logic as an extensional logic (Schulthess, 1981, p. 16). I
regard this as misleading, since it suggests that extension plays no role in Kant’s work.
110Kant also allows for a priori synthetic judgments that merely allude to the possibility of an
object in intuition. Cf. B195-197; B750; B765.
3.3 Kant’s Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments 123
3.3.2 Analytic Judgments as Subordinated Cognitions
One of the characteristic features of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is that
it introduces most of its distinctions to relegate kinds of knowledge to a
particular human faculty thereby at the same time limiting the capabilities
of this faculty. This also applies to the distinction between subordination
and coordination, although indirectly. Several lectures limit the faculty of
reason to subordination in the context of the opposition between analytic
and synthetic judgments:
Through experience we can become aware of nothing but marks
that are coordinated, i.e., placed next to one another. Reason,
however, is only in a position to provide subordinate marks of a
thing, i.e., to portray for us series of marks.111
Kant thus associates experience with coordinated characteristics and the
faculty of reason with subordinated characteristics. A similar passage uses the
more general term of intuitive cognition instead of experience:
In the case of synthetic propositions a predicate is added to the
notion of the subject that is not contained in it. And all the propo-
sitions that are thus constituted can be cognized only intuitively,
not through reason. One cannot cognize any coordination at all
through reason, for reason only subordinates.112
As a source of knowledge, reason is not able to produce coordinative struc-
tures. According to Kant, synthetic judgments can only be known by means
of intuition. Only the faculty of sensibility is able to produce coordinative
structures. Yet, subordination by the faculty of reason is not limited to the
analysis of concepts. Kant distinguishes between logical and real subordina-
tion:
The subordination of concepts, however, can occur both logice
and realiter. Logical subordination consists in the fact that I
take that which is common to many concepts and thereby form
for myself a universal concept, under which I can subordinate
111XXIV:108 (Blomberg logic, dated 1771). Cf. XXIV:451; XXVIII:463; R1799, XVI:119.
112XXIV:232.
124 Chapter 3 A Mereological Perspective on Kant
the individual representations. In this way I make for myself
various genera and I subordinate the species and individua to them.
Real subordination, however, consists in the fact that I actually
combine concepts with one another, so that not only is one
contained under the other, but instead they also cohere as causes
and effects.113
Take for example the concepts ‘warm’ and ‘sun’. A reasonable logical sub-
ordination would render ‘sun’ as subordinated to ‘warm’, since the sun is a
warm object. A real subordination would render ‘sun’ as the cause of ‘warm’.
These kinds of subordination do not exclude each other. In their own man-
ner, both logic and real subordination realize the more general mereological
combination of subordination.114
In the first Critique, Kant more carefully distinguishes between the fac-
ulty of the understanding and the faculty of reason.115 He introduces the
faculty of the understanding as ‘cognition by means of concepts’ (Erkennt-
niß durch Begriffe), which means that the understanding subsumes multiple
representations under a common one.116 Recall that for Kant concepts are
always general. Relying on traditional terminology, Kant designates the
activity of the understanding as discursive. The discursive nature of the hu-
man understanding for Kant thus means that subsumption under a common
representation is the only way to cognize multiple representations. Insofar
as the understanding merely regards representations as concepts it thereby
establishes a logical subordination of species to genus. Thus the hierarchy of
concepts that explains analytic judgments is produced by discursive reasoning.
In other words, discursive reasoning results in analytic judgments.
Another possibility for the understanding is to regard the common repre-
sentations as a substance thereby establishing a real subordination of attribute
to substance. While the attributes differ among representations, the sub-
stances remain the same. Although analytic judgments are not the only
possible results of discursive reasoning, they are according to Kant the only
113XXIV:260.
114The application of the distinction to causal relations does not imply that real subordination
involves experience.
115For our purpose, a detailed investigation on the precise differences, although quite interest-
ing, is not required and therefore outside the scope of this project.
116Cf. B93; IX:58.
3.3 Kant’s Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments 125
legitimate cognitions insofar as merely the faculty of the understanding is
involved.117 Real subordinations require a role for the faculty of sensibility
in order to produce legitimate knowledge. In any case, the understanding
produces a combination of subordination.
In his lectures on logic, Kant explicitly connects subordination and coordi-
nation to the distinction between clarification and expansion:
I do not cognize more about things by means of subordinated
marks, but I do by means of aggregation. A cognition thus be-
comes distinct in a twofold manner: 1.) by means of an aggregate
of coordinated marks, in which case the distinctness grows ex-
tensively as the result of arriving at another mark; 2.) by means
of a row of subordinated marks, in which case the distinctness
grows intensively. The former is as appealing as the latter is dull.
Yet, the profundity of distinctness of the latter contributes to the
thoroughness and certainty of our cognitions.118
According to Kant, subordination of the characteristics of a concept increases
its distinctness rather than the knowledge of the things designated by the
concept. For instance, subordination of the characteristic ‘animal’ of the
concept ‘man’ to the concept ‘organism’ does not increase knowledge about
men. Knowledge increases by constituting an aggregate of coordinated charac-
teristics. Having merely the characteristic ‘animal’ of the concept ‘man’, one
might discover that people are rational and therefore coordinate ‘animal’ and
‘rational’ into an aggregate of characteristics. This increases our knowledge of
the concept ‘man’ on the condition that the concept ‘man’ is not a concept
that is already given (although in a confused way). In fact, but Kant does not
explicitly notice this, the coordination implicitly also establishes a relation
117The understanding is able to produce synthetic a priori judgments, but only by relying
on the objects of experience that are constituted by the principles of the understanding,
which, via the schematism, involves the forms of space and time. Cf. B357-358.
118XXIV:533, my translation of: ‘Durch die Subordination der Merkmale erkenne ich am
Dinge nicht das geringste mehr aber wol durch die aggregation. Ein Erkenntniß wird
also 2fach deutlich 1.) durch das Aggregat der coordinirten Merkmale, und hier wächst
die Deutlichkeit extensive durch die Ankunft eines jeden andern Merkmals. 2.) durch
die Reihe der subordinirten Merkmale, und da wächst die Deutlichkeit intensive. So
angenehm das erste ist so trocken ist das lezte. Die Tiefe der Deutlichkeit die hier entsteht
dient aber sehr zur Gründlichkeit und Gewißheit unsers Erkenntnißes’. Cf. Kant, 1998b,
p. 41/338; XXIV:109; XXIV:109; XXIV:835.
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of subordination, namely between ‘rational’ and ‘man’. Which relation is
epistemologically primary depends on the nature of the concept. In the case
of given concepts one merely establishes relations of subordination since the
coordinated characteristics are already given although in a confused form.
Empirical concept formation, however, takes place by constituting aggregates
of coordinated marks. The former is a task of philosophy and results in
judgments of clarification.
In sum, subordination results in clarification, that is, in analytic judgments
while coordination results in expansion of knowledge, that is, in synthetic
judgments. As a source of knowledge the understanding is only capable of
producing subordinated cognitions. They can take the form of for exam-
ple causal relations in the case of real subordination or the form of logical
subordination in the case of analysis of concepts. The latter constitutes the
epistemological source for analytic judgments. Only in this case are the cogni-
tions produced by the understanding sufficient. Other kinds of subordination
require substantial contribution from the faculty of sensation. Whereas a
structure of subordination is sufficient for analytic judgments, synthetic judg-
ments also require structures of coordination, namely aggregates. As we
will see in the next section, the faculty of intuition is capable of providing
coordinated cognitions.
3.4 Construction in Pure Intuition as Mereological
Composition
In the first half of this chapter, I have shown how the mereological distinction
between subordination and coordination provides a precise explanation of
Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. In this section,
I continue this approach with regard to the synthetic a priori judgments of
mathematics. I will introduce Kant’s notion of construction by analyzing the
famous passage in which Kant opposes the method of the mathematician with
that of the philosopher by describing the geometric proof that the angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles. In line with Shabel, my interpretation is
profoundly contextual by relating it into detail to the mathematical textbooks
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of the time, namely those written by Wolff.119 First, I will argue that Kant
follows the details of Wolffs’ proof, especially with regard to the role of the
‘diagram’.120 Secondly, I will show how Kant’s notion of pure intuition in his
epistemology can be made more precise by means of the previously sketched
mereological perspective. To my knowledge, such an approach cannot yet be
found in secondary literature.
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, Kant’s aim of discussing
mathematics in the final part of the first Critique is to draw a sharp method-
ological line between mathematics and philosophy. This also is the purpose of
the famous passage that describes the notion of construction that is involved
in the geometric proof of the theorem ‘the angles of a triangle equal two right
angles’. Whereas a philosopher reacts to this theorem with an attempt to pro-
vide a definition of the concept of a triangle by summing up its characteristics,
a mathematician starts with the construction of a triangle:
[a] He begins at once to construct a triangle. [b] Since he knows
that two right angles together are exactly equal to all of the
adjacent angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line,
he extends one side of his triangle, and obtains two adjacent
angles that together are equal to two right ones. [c] Now he
divides the external one of these angles by drawing a line parallel
to the opposite side of the triangle, [d] and sees that here there
arises an external adjacent angle which is equal to an internal one,
etc. [e] In such a way, through a chain of inferences that is always
guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and at the
same time general solution of the question.121
Thus, contrary to the philosopher, the mathematician does not analyze the
notions of ‘triangle’ and ‘two right angles’, but constructs such an angle at
the construed triangle by extending one side (b). Being aware that alternating
angles allow to derive the theorem by means of syllogisms, the mathematician




122Neither Kant nor Wolff aim to describe the discovery of a theorem or proof. Both aim
at an epistemologically and methodologically sound representation of already known
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mathematician perceives (sehen) from the diagram that the exterior angles
equal the interior angles (d).
A crucial point is that the equality of the angles is not measured, as would
be done in a mechanical demonstration, but made evident by means of how
the diagram is construed.123 Kant employs the term ‘perceives’ (sehen) to the
insight that the interior angles equal the exterior angles. Thus, the crucial
statement drawn from the diagram is that it provides two sets of alternate
angles. The sentence with the word ‘perceives’ (sieht) corresponds directly to
the way in which Wolff relies on the same diagram as described in the first
chapter:
From the figure it appears that the angles I and 1 are alternate
between the parallels AB and DE.124
The construction of the diagram allows the mathematician to apply the
theorem of alternating angles in order to conclude that the angles are equal
(see Wolff’s proof 1.6). Thus, Kant’s description of the construction provides
the mathematician with exactly those premises of Wolff’s proof that refer to
the angles in the diagram.
As we have seen, Wolff does not provide an epistemological foundation
for the role of diagrams. Whereas Wolff simply employs the naive Euclidean
notion of constructing geometric figures, Kant provides an epistemological
account for the role of construction that warrants the a priori synthetic nature
of mathematics. In the context of the eighteenth century, Kant’s designation
of the role of ruler and compass in Euclidean geometry as construction
in pure intuition is quite a step forward, but it also raises new questions.
The most important one concerns the exact nature of construction in pure
intuition from an epistemological point of view. How does it differ from
concepts? The remainder of this section attempts to answer this question
from a mereological perspective.
In the transcendental deduction, Kant claims that the cognition of some-
thing in space requires its construction.125 We have just seen an example:
mathematical proofs.
123See §1.6.
124GWI:1, p. 174, IV §23. See §1.6.
125B137-138.
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it requires the construction of a triangle together with parallel lines to cog-
nize that the interior and exterior angles are equal. Kant describes such a
construction in transcendental terms as follows:
But in order to cognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must
draw it, and thus synthetically bring about a determinate combi-
nation of the given manifold, so that the unity of this action is
at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a
line).126
The construction of a line thus consists of a composition of the given manifold
in a synthetic manner. Kant here uses synthetic in a methodological man-
ner.127 In this context, ‘synthetic’ means that the given manifolds of intuition
are put together to constitute a line rather than analyzed and subsequently
subsumed under the concept ‘line’ like dogs under the concept ‘animal’. Due
to the very nature of space and time, the multitude of representations must
be connected into a whole in order to constitute an object at all.128 Such a
description of construction strongly reminds of the mereological concepts
that we discussed previously.129
One could doubt whether the mereological distinctions also apply to
intuitions. In the Stuffenleiter, Kant explicitly states that cognition includes
both intuitions and concepts.130 Since the representations of space and time
are intuitions, they are also cognitions (see figure 3.7 on the next page).131
Kant’s mereological distinctions apply to cognitions, hence, they also apply
to intuitions. Since they are capable of establishing a whole, they promise
to explain the nature of this ‘determinate connection’. Hence, we face the
following question: in what mereological manner are intuitions connected
when a geometrical figure is construed?
126B138.
127Cf. §2.1.




131Kant’s use of the notions of space and time, as well as, intuition, is ambiguous: space and
time both refer to the form of intuition, as such they are singular, but they also refer to
cognitions in space and time and as such they are plural. In a similar way, pure intuition has
a confusing ambiguity in Kant’s text. The term intuition can both refer to a singular entity,
that is, to the capacity of having intuitions, and to the actual ‘intuitions’ (representations)
themselves.












Figure 3.7: Part of the Stuffenleiter: a partial tree of the species of ‘representation’.
Let us systematically consider each possibility as given by the scheme of
mereological distinctions. The first to consider is combination by means
of subordination. A first argument against this option is that, according to
Kant, such a subordination does not establish a proper whole. The quote
above, however, requires the connection to establish a whole. Although this
argument suffices, investigation of other arguments is quite worthwhile in
that they provide a more thorough understanding of Kant’s view on the
difference between intuitions and concepts.
A second argument against the combination of geometrical figures by
means of subordination can be found in the aesthetics of the first Critique
when Kant introduces the notion of space:
Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one
must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that
is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations
(as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself;
but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an
infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless space
is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are
simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is
an a priori intuition, not a concept.132
Kant first claims that it is not sufficient to regard space as a characteristic
132B40.
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of infinitely many concepts. The relation between the concept of space and
concepts like triangles, squares, circles, etc. is not such that the concepts of
triangle, square and circle each contain the concept of space as part of their
content, like the concepts ‘figure enclosed by three straight lines’. However,
the parts of space are considered as the content (in sich enthalten), and not as
the extension of the concept of space. The content of a concept cannot consist
of infinitely many parts. Thus, the cognition of space cannot be conceptual.
Hence, the mereological relation between the representations synthesized
into a whole when constructing a line is not that of subordination.
A third argument against subordination of intuitions seems quite similar
as it also appeals to the limitations of concepts, but nevertheless constitutes
a separate argument. According to Kant, the understanding alone can only
cognize multiple representations a1 . . . az as one by subsuming them under a
concept b.133 This means that the representations a1 . . . az share concept b as
their characteristic. When combining ‘triangle’ and ‘parallel line’ as required
by the constructive proof, the understanding can only do so by regarding
them as shared characteristics. These means that all representations subsumed
under the combination ‘triangle’ and ‘parallel line’ posses both ‘triangle’ and
‘parallel line’ as characteristic. However, noothing can be both a triangle
and a parallel line at the same time. So, the composition of ‘triangle’ and
‘parallel line’ would designate an impossible concept, which is evidently not
the case.134 The relation of subordination merely allows to narrow down
rather than extend a concept. The connection of subordination can thus
be ruled out as a candidate for the ‘determinate connection’ of the given
multitude.
Following the classification of mereological distinctions outlined in pre-
vious sections, intuitions must be composed by means of coordination.135
For, according to Kant, the notion of combination is either subordination or
133As we have seen, the understanding connects cognitions (Vorstellungen) by means of
subordination (§3.3).
134Later we will see that Bolzano allows for such a conceptual composition by introducing
a crucial distinction between two kinds of composition (chapter 6). The first one is a
composition of two concepts that require the resulting whole to posses both properties,
the other is a composition into a whole in which one halve possesses one property, the
other halve the other property. The construction of a diagram out of a triangle and a
parallel line is an example of the latter.
135See §3.2.1.
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coordination. Precisely, the mereological structure of coordination indeed
establishes a proper whole as required by the quote from the transcendental
deduction. Several Reflections confirm the conclusion that cognitions in the
form of intuitions are composed by means of coordination.136 One of them,
for example, claims about cognition that ‘the form is the coordination by the
objects of the senses, the subordination by the objects of reason’.137 Moreover,
Kant’s introduction of the distinction between the intellect and intuition in
his dissertation is formulated in terms of subordination and coordination.138
Thus, we have seen sufficient evidence to relegate subordination to the cogni-
tions of the faculty of understanding and coordination to the cognitions of
the faculty of sensation.
The question left concerns the type of coordination that is involved in the
connection of intuitions. Kant’s exposition of the mathematical principles
of the understanding in the first Critique helps to answer this question since
he extensively discusses the notion of magnitude in relation to part-whole
relations. The first mathematical principle of the understanding states that all
intuitions are extensive quantities.139 As argued before, the characterization
as extensive quantities in fact means that they are constituted as aggregates
in which the parts establish the whole.140 The first principle thus claims
that all intuitions are aggregates. Any actual intuition, construed or given,
is an aggregate, otherwise it cannot be cognized as something distinct from
136Cf. XXIV:108, 232, 451; XXVIII:463; R1799, XVI:119.
137R1799. XVI:119 (1769-1775).
138II:387, §12, §15.
139B202. This principle of the understanding, put forward in Kant’s transcendental logic,
must be distinguished from the axioms of mathematics themselves: Kant regards it as the
principle for the axioms of intuition. In the chapter on methodology, Kant explicitly
reserves the word axiom for the fundamental judgments of mathematics (B760). The
principle that all intuitions are extensive quantities is presupposed by for example the
axioms of geometry, such as for example ‘between two points only one straight line is
possible’ (B204). Kant’s effort to distinguish these two must be understood against the
background of the mathematical textbooks of Wolff. The latter’s textbook on algebra
provides the following statement:
Alles, was wir in der Welt antreffen [...] läßt sich mit andern Dingen von seiner
Art vergleichen, und darum als etwas, welches vermehret oder vermindert
werden kann, das ist, als eine Grösse betrachten. (GWI:12, pp. 1551-1552)
This statement expresses exactly the content of the first principle of the understanding.
Kant thus separates the more general presuppositions from the content of mathematics
itself.
140See §3.2.2. Cf. B203-204
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other intuitions.141 Thus, construction in intuition at least involves the
mereological structure of aggregation. For example, a line is construed
out of aggregated parts and a triangle is an aggregated whole construed out
of aggregated lines that intersect at their boundaries. In a modern formal
language, a triangle would have nested aggregated wholes. In my view, this
suggests a mereological system that is more precise and sophisticated than can
be substantiated on the basis of Kant’s texts.
Unfortunately, our current mereological model of construction in intuition
is too simplistic. Geometrical objects can be split at any arbitrary point, that
is, they are continuous and do not consist of atomic parts. Accordingly, Kant
claims that space and time are continuous:
Space and time are quanta continua because no part of them
can be given except as enclosed between boundaries (points and
instants), thus only in such a way that this part is again a space
or a time. Space therefore consists only of spaces, time of times.
Points and instants are only boundaries, i.e., mere places of their
limitation; but places always presuppose those intuitions that
limit or determine them, and from mere places, as components
that could be given prior to space or time, neither space nor time
can be composed.142
The statement that space and time are continuous effectively means that the
intuitions of space and time, either given or construed, are continuous. Since
both extensive and intensive magnitudes are represented as intuitions in space
or time, intuitions, regardless whether it constitutes an extensive or inten-
sive magnitude, are continuous. Sutherland convincingly argues that only
determinate magnitudes are either extensive or intensive.143 Undetermined
magnitudes are neither extensive nor intensive.144 For one can only decide
whether a magnitude is extensive or intensive when it is a determinate magni-
tude. Yet, the underlying mereological structures still apply to undetermined
magnitudes, that is, to intuitions. Thus, regardless whether an intuition
141Cf. B138.
142B211.
143Sutherland, 2005, p. 151.
144For an explanation of the distinction between undetermined and determined magnitudes
see Sutherland, 2004, p. 427.
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constitutes an extensive or intensive magnitude, it is continuous.145 Hence,
intuitions always seem to be continuous magnitudes.
How can this be reconciled with the previous conclusion that intuitions
consisted of aggregated wholes? To me it seems, that the solution can be found
in relating the distinction between aggregation and coalition to the process
of cognition. The process of synthesizing given manifolds into a whole is a
process in which the parts precede the whole and thus aggregate into a whole.
Under the condition that this process of synthesis occurs within the form
of intuition by means of the faculty of sensation, the construed whole is
continuous. Insofar as such a whole is already available, it therefore can be
regarded as a coalition: the whole precedes the parts. The relation between
aggregation and coalition, however, is not symmetrical from a trancendental
perspective: aggregation is primary because the synthesis of given manifolds
is primary. Without it no intuition is possible at all.146
The construed aggregates in intuition thus at the same time constitute
coalitions. For example, the construction of the object ‘triangle’ is a con-
struction of three aggregated multitudes that are connected to each other at
three common points. The common points are the boundaries of the lines.
Within these boundaries each line can be sliced or crossed at any point and
thus be divided into multiple lines because parts aggregated in intuition at
the same time constitute a coalition. Thus, taken together, the mereolog-
ical notions of aggregate and coalition are able to account for the ways in
which Euclidean diagrams can be construed. Kant’s mereological notion
of coalition generates the continuity traditionally realized by means of the
notion of motion. Later, we will see how Bolzano criticizes the role motion
plays in Euclidean geometry, as well as, the corresponding Kantian notion
of construction in intuition.147 In the following section, I will argue that
the a priori construction in intuition is intrinsically general in nature. The
aggregated coalitions do not have a particular length or relation. As a result,
the angles of the triangle do not have a particular angle unless this is explicitly
specified by the instructions for constructing the figure.
145Cf. B212.
146Cf. B138.
147See §4.2 and §5.2.
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3.5 Constructions as Signs: Representations of the
Universal in concreto
Now we have obtained a relatively precise notion of construction, we can
assess what can be regarded as the main problem of ‘construction in intuition’,
namely how construction in intuition can yield general conclusions. In his
general logic, Kant defines intuitions in opposition to concepts as individual
rather than general.148 Accordingly, the intuitions of a priori constructions
are also individual. Several commentators, such as Hintikka, Friedman, and to
a lesser extent Parsons therefore interpret construction in pure intuition as if
individual instances are construed. On their reading, the construction in pure
intuition of for example a triangle results in an individual instance of a triangle.
Hintikka substantiates his reading by referring to Kant’s characterization
of mathematics investigation of concepts in concreto and claims that Kant’s
philosophy of mathematics is ‘based on the use of general concept in concreto,
i.e., in the form of individual instances’.149 According to Hintikka, further
confirmation can be found in Euclid’s geometry which indeed functioned
as the paradigmatic model of mathematics. He notes that Euclid explicitly
returns from the particular figure to the general theorem: ‘after having
reached the desired conclusion about the particular figure, Euclid returned
to the general enunciation again, saying, e.g. "Therefore, in any triangle,
etc."’.150 According to Hintikka, this step is identical to the inference rule
of existential instantiation in modern predicate logic.151 Since Kant’s general
logic does not provide a corresponding rule, Kant had to resort to Euclid’s
notion of construction.
Friedman rejects the role Hintikka ascribes to existential quantification
and describes his alternative as follows:
The whole point of pure intuition is to enable us to avoid rules
of existential instantiation by actually constructing the desired in-
stances: we do not derive our "new individuals" from existential
148IX:91.
149Hintikka, 1967, p. 357 reprinted in Hintikka, 1974. We have discussed the distinction
between in concreto and in abstracto in §2.2.
150Hintikka, 1967, p. 362.
151Hintikka, 1967, p. 369. Cf. de Jong, 1997, p. 155.
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premises but construct them from previously given individuals
via Skolem functions.152
In modern logic, so called Skolemization allows to replace existential quan-
tifiers with a new function with the correct mapping. Since the model of
predicate logic also provides the evaluation of this function, the replacement
does not change the truth value of the formula in which the existential quan-
tifier is replaced. In my view, the substitution of a modern tool of logic for
another one does not make any difference at all. An analogy between the way
in which Skolem functions are able to replace existential quantifiers and the
way in which construction in pure intuition replaces an empirically drawn
figure, does neither constitute an argument against Hintikka’s interpretation,
nor provide a better understanding of Kant’s reasoning. Although modern
logic might have a pedagogic benefit and sometimes contributes to a sharper
and clearer understanding of what is at stake, it can also stand in the way of
attaining a better understanding of Kant’s philosophy in the context of his
time. The application of modern logic in cases like this is neither less nor
more than a metaphoric way of describing a thought developed in an entirely
different context.
Parsons also criticizes Hintikka for the role he attributes to existential
quantification and argues that the conclusions concerning the individual
constructions are general because ‘nothing is used about it in the proof
which is not also true of all triangles’.153 Although I regard this as a valid
argument, it merely is a systematic argument. Moreover, it implicitly still
treats constructions in intuition as individuals with individual properties.
A better argument against Hintikka attacks the way in which he applies
predicate logic. In my view, modern predicate logic is completely at odds with
Kant’s general logic. One cannot regard predicate logic as Kant’s general logic
plus a few quantifiers. As I argued before, Kant’s general logic is intensional in
nature whereas predicate logic is extensional.154 In the former, the content of
concepts is the primary source for their meaning. The (general) characteristics
of concepts determine their extension, that is, the collection of objects that fall
under them. Contrary to general logic, the extension of predicates determine
152Friedman, 1992b, p. 65.
153Parsons, 1983, p. 127, 132.
154See §3.3.1.
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the meaning of predicates in predicate logic. From the perspective of predicate
logic, general judgments about a construed object indeed necessarily require
the rule of existential instantiation because it merely provides the very notion
of an object with individual properties. The strategy of both Hintikka and
Friedman only makes sense insofar as one assumes that the construed objects
in intuition must be interpreted as the objects of predicate logic. In my
view, this is a complete arbitrary assumption which merely depends on the
chosen logical apparatus. The argumentative strength of the latter depends
completely on the extent to which one defends its applicability to the issue
that is to be solved.
Even liberated from the perspective of predicate logic, one could, of course,
still argue that geometrical proofs require a step of generalization as it can be
found in Euclid’s Elements. Yet, against the background of the epistemological
issues discussed in the first Critique, one would expect an explicit treatment
of this topic. However, to my knowledge, Kant never mentions such a step.
Whereas Hintikka will be right in claiming that Euclid explicitly mentions
this as the last step of the proof, the German textbooks of mathematics
like that of Wolff do notmention it.155 Wolff even explicitly states that the
proof consists of exactly the four syllogisms presented in the first chapter.156
Although this might suffice to reject Hintikka’s interpretation, it does raise
serious doubts.
These doubts increase further when one considers Kant’s reply to Eber-
hard’s criticism concerning a quite complex construction:
Now when Archimedes described a polygon of ninety-six sides
around a circle, and a similar figure within it, in order to deter-
mine that, and by how much, the circle is smaller than the first
and greater than the second, did he or did he not ground his con-
cept of the above-mentioned regular polygon on an intuition? He
inevitably did so, not in that he actually drew it (which would be
an unnecessary and absurd demand), but rather, in that he knew
the rule for the construction of his concept, [...] and thereby
demonstrated the reality of the rule itself, and likewise that of
155See my analysis of Wolff’s proof in §1.6.
156Cf. §1.6; GWI:1, p. 174, §23.
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this concept for the use of the imagination (Einbildungskraft).157
Apparently, construction in pure intuition does not realize a geometrical
object in full detail. Construction in intuition is not an idealized form of an
empirical construction, merely abstracting from the imperfections introduced
by mechanical tools employed in empirical constructions similar to the
way in which empirical concepts abstracts from their concrete individuals.
Contrary to the formation of empirical concepts and the analysis of concepts,
mathematics synthesizes concepts and construes objects in intuitions out of
the components specified in the definition of the mathematical object. As a
result, the construction in intuition only contains that which is specified in
the definition:
The second procedure [determination of an object in pure in-
tuition], however, is that of mathematical and here indeed of
geometrical construction, by means of which I put together in
a pure intuition, just as in an empirical one, the manifold that
belongs to the schema of a triangle in general and thus to its
concept, through which general synthetic propositions must be
constructed.158
Thus, according to Kant, the process of construction in pure intuition merely
adds what belongs to the scheme of a triangle as such. The latter does not
contain individual properties, such as a particular angle or length. As a
result, the construed object is general from its very outset.159 Since the
mathematician starts with the construction of a general object, the outcome,
namely the proven theorem, will also be general and does not require a step
of generalization.
A strong argument in favor of attributing individual properties to con-
structions in intuition seems to consists in Kant’s oppositions of intuition to
concept and investigation in concreto to in abstracto. If the construed object
157VIII:212.
158B746. Cf. B741.
159Further support can be found in passages where Kant writes that ‘the form of mathematical
cognition is the cause of its [i.e. mathematics] having solely to do with quanta. For only
the concept of magnitudes can be constructed, i.e. exhibited a priori in intuition’ (B742).
According to Sutherland, quanta refers to an abstract notion of magnitude (quanta) rather
than the more concrete kind of magnitude (quantitas) that can be measured (Sutherland,
2005, p. 147-148; Sutherland, 2004, p. 428).
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does not contain individual properties, is it still singular? In my view, it
can be said to be singular in comparison to concepts as such. For the latter
merely contain common characteristics, which excludes the possibility to be
combined in such a way as to build a geometrical figure out of simpler compo-
nents.160 In Kant’s lectures on logic, one can find such a relative application of
the terms in concreto and in abstracto, for example to the tree of Porphyrius.
A concept that is higher in the tree, has less characteristics, which means that
it is more abstract. Lower concepts, on the other hand, are more concrete.
For example, ‘man’ is a more concrete concept than ‘living being’.161
As argued in the previous chapter, the distinction between in concreto
and in abstracto should be interpreted in relation to the role of symbols.162
The distinction designates a difference in the way symbols are used rather
than a difference between an individual object and a concept. The symbols
allow mathematics to deal with general concepts as if they are particular.
Accordingly, mathematics does not need representations of individuals. The
symbols of for example an algebraic equation such as a2+ b2 = c2 are already
general in nature, although the symbols as such are singular. In a similar
way, the ostensive symbols of geometric constructions in pure intuitions are
singular as intuitions, but nevertheless represent an entire class of objects.163
3.6 Kant’s Method of Mathematics
Although they share the same title, as well as, an identical Euclidean method-
ology, Kant and Wolff’s account of the ‘Method of Mathematics’ have an
entirely different aim as we have seen in the first section of this chapter.164
Whereas Wolff merely presents the Euclidean method in the philosophical
terminology of his time, Kant offers a transcendental perspective on the
Euclidean method. Kant’s transcendental perspective establishes the limits,
positive as well as negative, of cognition by investigating the nature of a priori
cognition. In my view, this shift in perspective allows Kant to argue for an






140 Chapter 3 A Mereological Perspective on Kant
Wolff’s presentation of the Euclidean method. He not only acknowledges
the role diagrams play in Wolff’s geometrical proofs, but also agrees that the
thoroughness (Gründlichkeit) of mathematics stems from definitions, axioms,
and demonstrations.165 Accordingly, the doctrine of method presents each of
these from a transcendental perspective by explaining how their realization
differs between the two types of a priori knowledge, namely mathematics and
philosophy.166 This section summarizes Kant’s transcendental take on the
Euclidean method of mathematics as presented by Wolff to illustrate how
Kant’s treatment of mathematics is subordinated to the aim of separating phi-
losophy from mathematics. Each important element of Wolff’s mathematical
method, also presented in the first chapter, namely definitions, principles,
and demonstrations, will be presented shortly from Kant’s transcendental
perspective. The last one requires more extensive treatment, because many
controversies in the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics de-
pend on how construction in intuition, syllogistic reasoning, and synthetic
judgments play a role in Kant’s conception of mathematical demonstration.
Contrary to Friedman, I will argue that a mathematical demonstration cannot
be opposed to logical reasoning, since it merely consists of the combination
of construction in intuition and syllogistic inferences. In my view, there is
no such thing as a mathematical inference.
Definitions
As we have seen in the first chapter, Wolff allows to have an intended class of
objects represented by an obscure concept.167 Accordingly, such a nominal
definition can be erroneous, and therefore requires a proof to warrant that it
represents an object that is actually possible. Thus, for Wolff, the formation
and the definition of concepts are two separate concerns. However, Kant
regards the formation and the definition of mathematical concepts as one and
the same thing:
For since the concept is first given through the definition, it
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As a consequence, the representation contains exactly the content provided
by the definition. This not only holds for the concept as a concept, but also
for its full representation as a mathematical concept in intuition:
For the object that it thinks also exhibits it a priori in intuition,
and this can surely contain neither more nor less than the con-
cept, since through the explanation of the concept the object is
originally given, i.e., without the explanation being derived from
anywhere else.169
The mathematical object, construed in pure intuition according to the def-
inition of the concept, contains (enthält) exactly the same content as the
definition of the concept.170 However, Kant maintains that this kind of
definition is merely possible for mathematics. For the a priori concepts of
philosophy do not allow for construction in intuition. Moreover, similar to
the Prize Essay, Kant regards the concepts of philosophy as given in a confused
form while the concepts of mathematics are synthesized.171 Accordingly, the
formation of a philosophical concept does not coincide with its definition.
As a result, the definition of the former discipline always remains uncertain
whereas those of the latter are apodictic. Thus, contrary to Wolff, the defini-
tions of mathematical concepts play the role of concept formation. Contrary
to philosophical concepts, mathematical concepts are clear and distinct as
soon as they are available.
Principles
Similar to Wolff, Kant regards principles as the most fundamental judgments.
These judgments immediately stem from definitions.172 Whereas principles
(Grundsätze) designate fundamental judgments in general, Kant reserves the
term axiom for synthetic a priori principles that are immediately certain
(gewiß). Axioms thus differ from the principles of (transcendental) philoso-
169B758.
170This confirms my interpretation that a construction in pure intuition does not contain
individual properties that require the introduction of a universal quantifier in order to
draw general conclusions (see §3.5).
171See §2.1.
172Cf. §1.5.
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phy (principles of the understanding).173 For the latter need a third mediating
cognition, in the form of a possible relation to experience.174 Mathematics
allows for axioms ‘because by means of the construction of concepts in the
intuition of the object it can connect the predicates of the latter a priori and
immediately, for example that three points always lie in a plane’.175 The
receipt for the construction of mathematical concepts is laid down in the
definitions. Thus, proper axioms, that is, mathematical axioms, directly stem
from proper definitions, that is for Kant, mathematical definitions. Compari-
son to Wolff’s system reveals that this relation between definitions and axioms
is identical to that in Wolff’s system.176 However, Kant provides a much
more detailed account of why the axioms immediately stem from definitions,
namely because the construction in intuition immediately connects predicates
to subjects.
Demonstrations
According to Kant, a demonstration is an apodictic intuitive proof.177 In
reaction to Wolff, who admits empirical evidence for the possibility of math-
ematical objects, Kant argues that empirical evidence does not suffice for
apodictic proofs because they fail to show that it cannot be otherwise. In line
with the Prize Essay of 1664, Kant maintains that philosophy cannot provide
demonstrations since it merely examines the universal in abstracto:
Philosophical cognition, on the contrary, must do without this
advantage, since it must always consider the universal in abstracto
(through concepts), while mathematics can assess the universal
in concreto (in the individual intuition) and yet through pure a
priori intuition, where every false step becomes visible.178
173Kant explicitly states that the title Axiomen der Anschauung in the section on the principles
of pure understanding is misleading in this respect (B761).
174This mediation can be found in the section on schematism (B176-178). This topic is
extensively discussed by many commentators, but hardly plays a role in the early reception
of Kant, including Bolzano.
175B760. The principles of the understanding on the other hand require proof. Accordingly,
Kant provided each principle with a section entitled ‘Beweis’, that provides a proof or
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Kant thus employs the distinction between examination of the universal in
abstracto and in concreto to argue that, contrary to philosophy, mathematics
is capable of apodictic demonstrations. Demonstrations require apodictic
certainty, that, according to Kant, can only be provided by intuition because
it represents objects in general as a singular object in intuition.
Kant’s acknowledgement of the role of diagrams in mathematical demon-
strations by means of construction in intuition also affects the extent to
which mathematics can be said to be analytic. Kant explicitly addresses this
consequence when criticizing Wolff and his followers in the introduction to
the first Critique:
Mathematical judgments are all synthetic. This proposition seems
to have escaped the notice of the analysts of human reason until
now, indeed to be diametrically opposed to all of their conjec-
tures, although it is incontrovertibly certain and is very impor-
tant in the sequel. For since one found that the inferences of the
mathematicians all proceed in accordance with the principle of
contradiction (which is required by the nature of any apodictic
certainty), one was persuaded that the principles could also be
cognized from the principle of contradiction, in which, how-
ever, they erred; for a synthetic proposition can of course be
comprehended in accordance with the principle of contradiction,
but only insofar as another synthetic proposition is presupposed
from which it can be deduced, never in itself.179
This passage has raised some controversies between commentators. For some,
such as Beck, Panza, and most of all Martin, this passage supports their
so-called axiomatic reading of Kant.180 On their view, the theorems are syn-
thetic because the principles or axioms of mathematics are synthetic while the
proofs merely proceed by means of logical inferences. The role of construc-
tion is thus limited to the axioms of mathematics and the synthetic nature
179B14. The phrase ‘Zergliederer der menschlichen Vernunft’ must refer to Wolff, who is
generally -although probably partially incorrectly - described as someone who systematized
the philosophy of Leibniz. Wolff’s conception of the analyticity of mathematical theorems
means that a mathematical theorem can be analyzed (zergliedert) into definitions and
axioms such that the logical laws of identity, non-contradiction, and syllogistic inferences
suffice to derive mathematical theorems.
180Cf. Beck, 1965, p. 89; Otte and Panza, 1997, p. 276; Martin, 1972, p. 64-65, 124.
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of mathematics depends entirely on the synthetic nature of its principles.
However, Friedman rejects this view and provides four arguments.181
First of all, he notes that the first sentence does not imply that the principle
of contradiction exhausts the justification of all mathematical inferences, since
Kant regards the principle of contradiction as a necessary, yet insufficient,
criterion for truth.182 Apart from the principle of contradiction, other
elements might contribute to mathematical inferences. However, to me
it seems that, although the sentence as such indeed leaves room for other
readings, it is a description of Wolff’s point of view. As such, it must be read
as excluding other contributions. Moreover, Kant’s argumentation in the last
sentence presupposes that the principle of contradiction suffices to justify
mathematical inferences.
Secondly, Friedman doubts whether Kant refers to the axioms of math-
ematics by means of the term ‘principle’ (Grundsatz). Although Kant, in
the chapter on methodology, motivated by a fundamental methodological
distinction between philosophy and mathematics, indeed reserves the term
axiom for the first principles of mathematics, he does not employ this termi-
nology consistently.183 A few pages after the disputed quote, he refers to the
first propositions of geometry by means of the term ‘principle’.184 Moreover,
the passage criticizes Wolff, who uses the term principle in his textbooks of
mathematics.185 Thus, in my view, Friedman’s doubts cannot be justified.
Thirdly, on the axiomatic reading, Friedman argues, Kant would attribute
a ridiculous mistake to Wolff, namely that of transferring analyticity from
inference to axiom. Friedman’s alternative reading of Kant’s accusation runs
as follows: ‘because logic plays a central role in the proof of basic theorems it
is sufficient for securing their truth’.186 Indeed, Kant criticizes in this passage
the Wolffian position that the laws of logic are sufficient, but this reading does
not contradict the axiomatic reading. In my view, the axiomatic reading only
renders the mistake ridiculous insofar as it is seen in retrospective. Although
such a mistake indeed seems quite ridiculous from a Kantian point of view, it




185Cf. GWI:12, p. 16, p. 29; §1.5.
186Friedman, 1992b, p. 83.
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is quite natural to regard the results of methodological analysis on the basis of
the law of contradiction as analytic.187 Moreover, Friedman’s alternative does
not do justice to the text. Indeed, Kant also criticizes Wolff for regarding logic
as sufficient justification for the truth of mathematical judgments, but this
passage is much more precise and detailed. According to Kant, it is a mistake
to regard principles as analytic because they involve the law of contradiction.
So, in my view, the first three arguments against the axiomatic interpretation
are not convincing.
Friedman’s fourth argument seems much stronger. According to the ax-
iomatic reading, the synthetic nature of mathematics relies on the synthetic
nature of its principles. Hence, each mathematical discipline must have syn-
thetic principles. However, arithmetic does not have principles according
to Kant.188 Accordingly, one cannot use the axiomatic system to explain
why arithmetic is synthetic. This argument indeed suffices to reject Martin’s
axiomatic interpretation of Kant, which was mostly based on the work of
Kant’s students, such as Schultz.189 However, it does not suffice to reject a
more limited axiomatic interpretation of the disputed passage.
In my view, the reading that Kant accuses Wolff of ascribing analyticity
to judgments on the basis of the use of logical inferences and the law of
contradiction does not entail an axiomatic reading of Kant’s conception of
mathematics. Taking into account the context of criticizing Wolff, the first
sentence of the quote merely describes Wolff’s view as attributing analyticity
to principles because they solely rely on the law of contradiction. The last
sentence expresses Kant’s view that even the exclusive use of logical inferences
does not render the involved judgments analytic. The fact that the law of
non-contradiction suffices for logical inferences does not render the proven
judgments analytic according to Kant’s distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments because the relation of logical inference does not change
the relation between subject and predicate into a relation of containment.
187While the application of the predicates ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ to methods of reasoning
was common, Kant was the first to apply this distinction to judgments themselves. In the
then common distinction between analytic and synthetic methods, a single judgment could
be the result of either an analytic or synthetic method, which says nothing whatsoever
about the nature of the judgment itself (Cf. §2.1; §1.5).
188B204.
189Cf. Martin, 1972, p. 64-65. Contrary to Kant, the Kantian Schultz provides a few arithmetic
principles and uses them to argue that arithmetic is synthetic, as we will see later (§6.1).
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Thus, Kant indeed holds that synthetic judgments can be derived from other
synthetic judgments solely by means of general logic, without affecting the
synthetic nature of the involved judgments.190
Yet, it must be noted that Kant employs the more general term ‘judgment’
rather than the more specific term ‘principle’. The passage therefore does not
support a fully axiomatic interpretation. According to the latter, the synthetic
nature of the theorems would rely on the synthetic nature of the principles.
Nevertheless, the passage supports a limited axiomatic interpretation in the
sense that the synthetic nature of a judgment that is used as a premise, results
in a synthetic conclusion. For the synthetic nature of judgments depends
on whether the predicate is contained in the subject. The relation of logical
inference between judgments does not affect the containment relation between
predicate and subject. A logical inference between synthetic judgment A
and synthetic judgment B merely states that the truth of A involves the
truth of B. Thus, my limited axiomatic interpretation does not require a
mathematical discipline to possess synthetic principles in order to be synthetic.
The axiomatic transfer of syntheticity does not have to start at the most
fundamental judgments of mathematics, but may start at any point. As a
result, Friedman’s fourth argument does not affect my interpretation because
Kant’s conception of arithmetic does not constitute a counterexample to my
limited axiomatic interpretation.
A crucial question is still to be answered: how does this limited axiomatic
reasoning fit within Kant’s conception of mathematical demonstration as
a whole? How does it relate to construction in intuition? To me it seems,
that these questions can be answered relatively easily by describing Wolff’s
demonstration of ‘the angles of a triangle equal two right angles’ in terms
of Kant’s methodology, which is roughly in line with the interpretation of
Longuenesse.191 As we have seen, Wolff’s demonstration consists of a diagram
with a triangle and a line parallel to one of its sides and a chain of syllogisms
(see figure 3.8). Some of the latter’s premises refer to the angles of the diagram.
As we have seen, Kant’s famous passage describes how the mathematician
190De Jong argues for a similar interpretation by providing arguments against Hintikka’s
interpretation of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments as a method-
ological or directional distinction (de Jong, 1997, p. 164-165).
191Longuenesse, 1998, p. 289.








1 and I are alternate angles on parallel lines AB and DE (construction)
Alternate angles of a line crossing two parallel lines are equal (theorem)
1 and I are equal ∴
S2
2 and II are alternate angles on parallel lines AB and DE (construction)
Alternate angles of a line crossing two parallel lines are equal (theorem)
2 and II are equal ∴
S3
I, 3, and II are at one point of line DE (construction)
All angles at one point of a line are together 180◦ (theorem)
I, 3, and II are together 180◦ ∴
S4
1 and I are equal, 2 and II are equal (S1, S2)
I, 3, and II are together 180◦ (S3)
1, 2, and 3 are together 180◦ ∴
Figure 3.8: Mathematical demonstration as a combination of construction and syllogisms.
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construes this diagram.192 The triangle and parallel lines are construed in
pure intuition in accordance with their definitions. As such, they are already
general, yet singular, as argued in the previous section.193 The construction
links the geometrical objects, namely lines, together in accordance with the
definition of triangle and parallel line. This composition can only take place
in pure intuition because it requires coordinated wholes rather than rows of
subordinated species and genus. The subsequent syllogistic reasoning refers to
the parts of this coordinated whole.
The famous passage not only describes the construction in intuition, but
also states that ‘the geometrician arrives at a fully evident and universally valid
solution of the problem through a chain of inferences guided throughout
by intuition’.194 How does the chain of inference start and in what way
is it guided throughout by intuition? My analysis of Wolff’s proof revealed
that the premises of the syllogisms 1-3 refer to angles in the diagram. From
a Kantian point of view, they constitute synthetic judgments because the
relation between subject and predicate relies on the diagram rather than the
content of the subject. The subject of for example syllogism 1 refers to two
angles. They are alternate due to how the diagram is construed in pure
intuition. In this manner, the diagram answers the question posed by Kant in
the introduction to the first Critique:
What is the X here on which the understanding depends when
it believes itself to discover beyond the concept of A a predicate
that is foreign to it and that is yet connected with it?195
In my view, the diagram constitutes the third X that connects the subject
and predicate as required by Kant’s conception of synthetic judgments. More
precisely, the first premises of syllogisms 1-3 rely on construction in pure
intuition, and thus constitute X, that is, an a priori synthetic starting point
for a chain of syllogistic inferences.
By means of a theorem about alternating angles, the syllogistic inferences
result in the conclusion that the two alternating angles are equal. The way in
which the subject of the conclusion refers to the diagram is identical to that
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of the first premise. Analogously, the subject does not contain the predicate
‘equal’. Although the inference merely follows the law of contradiction, its
conclusion is still synthetic. In a similar manner, each intermediate conclusion
refers to the diagram. In this way, intuition guides the chain of inference
throughout. The same holds for the final conclusion of syllogism 4. Since the
construction already exhibits geometrical objects in general, the conclusion
also is a general one. Kant’s conception of mathematical demonstration thus
consists of a coherent combination of construction in pure intuition and
logical inferences. So in my view, it is misleading to oppose mathematical
demonstration or reasoning to logical reasoning as one can find in some texts
written by Friedman.196 Mathematical reasoning extends logical reasoning
rather than that it replaces logical reasoning.
In sum, Kant provides a quite precise explanation of the difference between
intuition and understanding in terms of the mereological structures they are
able to cognize. The sketched mereological distinctions might not be precise
enough from a contemporary point of view, yet, they are sufficient for the
Kantian aim to demarcate the capabilities of the faculties, and, as a result,
the sciences. They suffice to provide an epistemological foundation for the
difference between analytic and synthetic judgments, as well as, the role of
construction in the geometry of the time. Unfortunately, developments in
mathematics in the eighteenth century undermined both the paradigmatic
status of geometry and the central role of construction in it. Since the German
philosophers of the eighteenth century relied on the mathematical textbooks
in the tradition of Wolff, they were not aware of the far reaching consequences
of the progress in mathematics.197 As we will see in the subsequent chapters,
Bolzano not only acknowledged the problematic aspects of the traditional
methodology, including the role of construction and geometrical proofs, but
also developed a new conception of mathematics to address these issues.
196Friedman, 1992b, p. 80.
197Only at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury some mathematicians partly realized some of the methodological and philosophical






As we have seen in the previous chapters, Euclidean geometry had the role
of a paradigmatic model of mathematics for Wolff and Kant. Philosophical
reflections on mathematics were deeply influenced by the eighteenth cen-
tury representation of geometric proofs. Both Wolff and Kant regard the
Euclidean methodology of starting with definitions and drawing conclusions
(theorems) from principles (axioms) by means of syllogisms as the form a
mathematical demonstration must have and acknowledge the crucial role of
construction, although Kant provides a more detailed epistemological foun-
dation for construction. Meanwhile, developments in mathematics in the
eighteenth century slowly, but steadily, undermined the success of regarding
Euclidean geometry as the model of mathematics. Mathematical research by
Euler and Lagrange into what we now call analysis resulted in a new field of
mathematics independent of geometry of such an importance as to impose
new standards of rigor. These new standards even affect Euclidean geometry
according to Bolzano. Work by mathematicians like Euler and Lagrange
brought the weakness of methodology of Euclidean geometry to the fore.
At the very beginning of the nineteenth century, Bolzano developed an
ambitious program of reform in mathematics.1 Whereas Wolff and Kant
regarded mathematics as the paradigmatic example of apodictic knowledge,
Bolzano held that mathematics, although one of the most perfect sciences,
1A first description of his plan can be found in his early notes (GA2B2/2, p. 88).
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still needs many important improvements. The preface to his Beyträge zu
einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik (1810) compares mathematics
to a building of which the foundations are not secure.2 According to Bolzano,
the shortcomings of mathematics are to be found in the structure of its proofs
rather than in its theorems. Bolzano not only challenged the order and
organization of Euclid’s elements, but even rejected Euclid’s very method of
proof.3 Rather than incorporating new mathematical developments into the
existing framework, he sets himself the task of revising the very foundations of
mathematics. Although the new developments in mathematics contributed to
a new perspective on the Euclidean method of proof, these new developments
are not to be identified with Bolzano’s criticism of the Euclidean method
itself. For Bolzano the problems did not start with new developments
in mathematics, but with geometry such as it was known for more than
two thousand years.4 Both trained as a philosopher and mathematician,
Bolzano was well equipped to understand the far reaching epistemological
and methodological consequences of the direction in which mathematics was
developing. As illustrated by his notebooks, he spent most of his life on the
reform of mathematics itself, as well as, a much more sophisticated logic and
epistemology, which was written down in the early Beyträge of 1810 and the
remarkably extensive and advancedWissenschaftslehre of 1837.
Whereas later chapters describe Bolzano’s early work on logic and epis-
temology, this chapter aims to clarify the motivation and ultimate goal of
Bolzano’s extensive work on logic and epistemology by investigating this pro-
gram of reform in mathematics. The first section describes the developments
in mathematics that motivated Bolzano to initiate his program of reform for
mathematics and his work on logic and epistemology (§4.1). While mathe-
matics had emancipated itself from physics and had developed into a much
more advanced field, the philosophy of mathematics was still dominated by
Wolff’s mathematical method. Trained as a philosopher and mathematician,
Bolzano was confronted with a large discrepancy between the advanced state
2Bolzano, 1810, p. IV, 87.
3Bolzano, 1810, p. X, p. 88.
4In my view, Behboud’s sketch of how Bolzano’ s work fits into these new developments
must be complemented by emphasizing that Bolzano’s reform of mathematics was much
more fundamental than the problems addressed by the Berlin academy in their quest for a
strict theory about the infinite (Behboud, 2000, p. 2, 5).
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of mathematics and the outdated philosophical reflections on mathematics.
At the end of the eighteenth century, Wolff’ s methodology, modeled on Eu-
clid’s Elements, was often combined with some (semi-)Kantian conception of
construction in intuition. Several philosophically interested mathematicians,
mostly forgotten nowadays, attempted to integrate mathematical develop-
ments into the philosophy and epistemology of their time. Many references
in Bolzano’s works and diaries indicate that he had great interest in these
mathematicians. The most important one is the Kantian Schultz, who, as
we will see, anticipated some of Bolzano’s approaches, something which
is overlooked by most commentators.5 Much more than his predecessors,
however, Bolzano aimed to develop a fundamental criticism of Euclidean
geometry as such, accepting the radical consequences of his attack on what
had been the paradigm of mathematical rigor for centuries.
The second section, mainly based on Bolzano’s article on geometry of 1804
and the Beyträge of 1810, describes this criticism in some detail (§4.2).6 We
will see how Bolzano reinterprets and employs Aristotelian themes such as
the distinction between knowing that and knowing why, and the ban on kind
crossing, in order to reorganize the mathematical disciplines. Subsequently,
a case study of the philosophical aspects of Bolzano’s contribution to a
fundamental mathematical theorem, namely the intermediate value theorem,
illustrates how Bolzano’s criticism of Euclid’s proofs contributed to the
development of nineteenth century mathematics (§4.3).
The last three sections of this chapter are devoted to Bolzano’s early at-
tempts to reform and reorganize mathematics. Contrary to other commenta-
tors, like Rusnock and, to a lesser extent, Cantù, I will argue that Bolzano’s
new definition of mathematics as formulated in the Beyträge, is deeply in-
fluenced by Kantian philosophy (§4.4).7 Finally, I examine how Bolzano
demarcates mathematics from the other scientific disciplines by means of a
table of the forms of judgments (§4.5). As we will see, the early Bolzano
distinguishes between several copulas, each of which gives rise to a scientific
discipline. At a more detailed level, Bolzano’s new definition of mathematics
5Only Johnson mentions a few authors (Schultz and Langsdorf) and provides some historical
information in his study of Bolzano’s geometry (Johnson, 1977, p. 268).
6Bolzano, 1804.
7Rusnock, 2000; Cantù, 2014.
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results in a reorganization of mathematics that, contrary to the eighteenth
century tradition, grants quite a special place to general mathematics (§4.6).
The latter includes a new mathematical discipline, called aetiology, which is
concerned with the nature of the proper grounds of mathematical theorems.
According to Bolzano, a successful realization of this discipline would prevent
the problems of Euclidean geometry and the use of geometric proofs in other
mathematical fields, such as analysis.
4.1 Developments in Mathematics
One of the most important results of the scientific revolution of the seven-
teenth century consists of the invention of the differential or infinitesimal
calculus by Newton and Leibniz. Looking backward, these results can be
seen as one of the most important milestones in the birth of the mathe-
matical field of analysis.8 Driven by problems in physics, mechanics, and
astronomy, Newton and Leibniz independently developed a powerful mathe-
matical apparatus to deal with changes of quantities. Infinitesimal calculus
was developed in close connection with physics and mechanics. Derivatives
made it possible to get a firm mathematical grip on physical changes, such as
motion and acceleration. Infinitesimals, or ‘infinitely small quantities’ were
accepted insofar as they served as a solution to problems in natural sciences.9
However, they had not yet become an independent mathematical topic on
their own, that is, independent of a geometrical, mechanical or physical
interpretation. Infinitesimals were considered to be fictitious entities that
have no counterpart in reality.10 They merely functioned as a tool to solve
8Cf. Jahnke, 2003, p. vii.
9Cf. Roche, 1998, p. 224.
10An exception can be found in Leibniz’s early work on the characteristica universalis within
which symbolic systems do not require a geometric interpretation by means of which
infinitesimal calculus or algebra could become independent from geometry (Cf. Pasini,
1997, p. 41.). Yet Leibniz did not publish work of this kind possibly due to the lack of
positive reactions by colleagues like Huygens. The result was that many manuscripts
employing purely symbolic methods have become known only recently and remained
unknown during the eighteenth century itself. Thus, this part of his innovative work was
overshadowed by his work on geometry and mechanics in the reception of Leibniz in the
eighteenth century. Although Wolff mentions the characteristica universalis occasionally
as an ideal, it seems he does not regard it as something that could be actually achieved
(GWI:11, p. 869).
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problems in the natural sciences.11 Thus, analysis was not yet an independent
mathematical discipline, but, as Ferraro claims, merely a method to discover
new truths about geometrical entities (ars inveniendi).12 In a similar way,
real and irrational quantities were understood against the background of a
geometric model. The square root of 2, for example, was represented as the
diagonal of a square by taking each side as a unit. Algebra too was mainly
used and developed within the context of solving problems in other fields,
such as geometry and physics.
Throughout the eighteenth century important mathematicians like Euler
and Lagrange increasingly treated the new mathematical entities indepen-
dently of their role in geometry or physics. An important development of
this kind was Euler’s replacement of the geometrical curve by an ‘analytic
relation’, namely a ‘functional equation between two variables’.13 According
to Fraser, Euler ‘was motivated in doing so by the belief that a geometrical
demonstration would "draw from an alien source", that is, from a source that
is alien to analysis.14 They became aware of the possibility and desirability
of using so-called analytical methods to prove theorems of the (infinitesimal)
calculus.15 This meaning of the term ‘analytic’ should not be confused with
its meaning in relation to elements of logic, such as the syllogisms, definitions,
or judgments discussed in previous chapters. In the context of mathematics,
the term ‘analytic’ refers to the use of the language of equations and functions,
whereas ‘synthetic’ refers to Euclidean geometry and the theory of propor-
tions.16 Mathematicians who were looking after ‘analytical’ proofs, wanted
to make mathematics independent of geometrical truths and a geometrical,
mechanical or physical interpretation. Euler thus initiated a development
towards analysis as an independent and general discipline, a development
11 Although Leibniz aimed for a completely formal treatment of infinitesimals, he did not yet
fully achieve this. In accordance with this ideal, the Leibnizeans critized the geometrical
proofs of Newton. For an enlightening discussion of this topic see Guicciardini, 2003, p.
101-102.
12Ferraro, 2001, p. 545-546.
13Cf. Fraser, 1997, p. 70.
14Fraser, 1997, p. 71.
15Cf. Fraser, 1997, p. 63.
16Otte and Panza, historically somewhat misleadingly, call this the ‘linguist interpretation’ of
analytic versus synthetic (Otte and Panza, 1997, p. xi). As Ferraro convincingly argues,
the enterprise of the mathematicians of the eighteenth century was not yet formal and
syntactic (Ferraro, 2001, p. 550).
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which was continued by Lagrange.
This is not to say that they completely realized their ideal. Whereas during
the eighteenth century the study of curves was replaced by the notion of
function, calculus continued to be based on geometry.17 As Ferraro claims,
they merely transferred geometrical properties such as continuity to func-
tions without providing a new non-geometrical basis for these properties,
something which would require a theory of real numbers.18 At the beginning
of the nineteenth century, Bolzano was among the first to remove the last
geometrical remainders from analysis, thus establishing analysis as an inde-
pendent mathematical discipline. As we will see, this involved a notion of
continuity that was not based on curves.19 Bolzano not only pursued this ana-
lytical direction of mathematical research, but also radicalized it by extending
it to geometry itself. As I will argue in the next section, his investigations
into logic and epistemology led to a program of reform of mathematics that
is more fundamental than merely the establishment of the mathematical
discipline of analysis.
4.2 Bolzano’s criticism of Euclidean proofs
As was common in those days, Bolzano’s education of mathematics mainly
relied on the widespread mathematical textbooks of Kästner published from
1758 onward until the end of the eighteenth century.20 These textbooks stand
in the tradition of the widely used textbooks by Wolff, especially insofar
as the methodology and philosophy of mathematics are concerned.21 In
his historical study, Baasner concludes that Kästner rehabilitated Wolff’s
systematisation of mathematics.22 Indeed, in his contributions to Eberhard’s
Philosophical Magazin, Kästner argues for a Wolffian rationalistic position
17As we will see later, Euler and Lagrange still relied on geometrical truths with respect to
their version of the so called intermediate value theorem.
18Ferraro, 2001.
19See §4.3.
20Cf. Curt, 1981, p. 42.
21Apart from the almost identical methodological parts of the mathematical textbooks of
Wolff and Kästner, support for the claim that Kästner endorsed Wolff’ s philosophy and
method of mathematics can also be found in letters and prefaces.
22Baasner, 1991, p. 560.
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in accordance with the anti-Kantian aim of the journal.23 Similar to Wolff,
Kästner’s treatise on mathematics starts with a chapter on the method of
mathematics, which boils down to a short treatment of essential parts of
the logic of the time under the heading of terminology such as ‘definition’,
‘axiom’, ‘theorem’, etc.24 Whereas this methodological part almost copies
Wolff’s treatment of these issues, Kästner’s discussion of the mathematical
topics reflects recent developments in mathematics.25 As discussed in the
first chapter, the notion of construction plays important roles in Wolff’s
method of mathematics and can also be found in Kästner’s textbooks. On
their account, a real definition must show how the mathematical object can
be construed while geometrical proofs require the construction of diagrams.26
While the development of mathematics as described in the previous section
continuously diminished the role of construction, diagrams, and related
notions such as motion, they still were part of the epistemological heart of
the mathematical method of the time. With an up to date education and
interest in both mathematics and philosophy, it is no surprise that Bolzano
developed a criticism of an epistemology of mathematics that ascribes such
an important role to the notion of construction.
His criticism of the role of construction even takes a more radical turn in
that it not only applies to the method of mathematics, but also to its mathe-
matical source, namely Euclidean geometry itself. As early as 1804 Bolzano
developed a fundamental criticism of Euclidean geometry, the very discipline
of mathematics that had been conceived as the paradigm of apodictic knowl-
edge for centuries. In his article Betrachtungen über einige Gegenstände der
Elementargeometrie, Bolzano claims to provide only a sample of his investi-
gations into the first principles of geometry instead of a complete system
of geometry. Although the aim of his article is modest, his criticism is
23Kästner repeatedly refers to Wolff as soon as he turns to methodological topics, such as clear
and distinct concepts , and axioms (Kästner, 1790a; Kästner, 1790b; Kästner, 1790c).
24For a discussion of these topics see chapter 1.
25In his extensive biography, Baasner describes Kästner’s mathematical textbooks as including
new material that is presented in a much more compact way, but, compared to the
textbooks of Wolff, without extensive proofs and explanations(Baasner, 1991, p. 570).
Although he did not really contribute to the development of mathematics, Kästner was
an active mathematician who worked on the main problems of the time, such as the fifth
postulate of Euclid (the parallel postulate). In this manner, Kästner’s textbook provided a
starting point for new mathematical developments.
26See §1.3; §1.6.
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revolutionary.27 As we will see, the presentation of the first principles of
geometry means for Bolzano to provide a theory of the straight line. In the
preface of the article Bolzano promises a follow up about the first principles
of mechanics if his proposal is received well.28 This shows that Bolzano was
primarily interested in the first principles of a particular domain of mathe-
matics. Accordingly, as we will see, he criticizes the generally accepted theory
concerning the very foundations of geometry by addressing three main is-
sues, one relates to proofs, one to definitions, and the third one employs the
Aristotelian ban on kind crossing.
First of all, Bolzano’s criticism employs the Aristotelian distinction be-
tween knowing that a theorem is true and knowing why a theorem is true.29
Knowledge that may be based on authority or by experience or practical
application of the theorem. Bolzano also applies this distinction to proofs. A
proof might be sufficient to convince someone that a theorem is true without
providing the proper ground, that is, the objective scientific foundation, of
the theorem.30 Thus, for example a diagram consisting of a curve might
suffice to convince someone of the validity of a proof of the intermediate
value theorem - which we will discuss later - but it does not provide its proper
ground. Arguing for a more positive role of diagrams, Brown misunderstands
Bolzano when he writes that ‘until Bolzano, we couldn’t really be sure the
[intermediate value] theorem is true’.31 At the time, mathematicians, includ-
ing Bolzano, were completely convinced of the truth of the theorem and did
not doubt its truth at all when looking for proofs that do not rely on geom-
etry and diagrams.32 Contrary to what Brown seems to assume, Bolzano
would completely agree that ‘the geometric picture gives us a very powerful
reason for believing the result quite independently of the analytic proof’.33
Bolzano did not avoid geometrical truths in analysis because of the fallibility
of geometric intuition as Brown claims, but because a geometrical proof does
not reveal the proper scientific foundation for the truth of the theorem. In
27Bolzano, 1804, p. 12, 33. Sebestik provides a precise analysis of the geometrical content of
the article including the theory of parallel lines (Sebestik, 1992, p. 34-51).
28Bolzano, 1804, p. 12, 33.
29Bolzano, 1804, p. 6-8, 31.
30Cf. Bolzano, 1817, p. 6-8, 254.
31Brown, 1997, p. 162; Brown, 2008.
32Cf. Bolzano, 1817, p. 7, 254.
33Brown, 1997, p. 164. Cf. Bolzano, 1817, p. 9, 255.
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my view, Brown’s overall idea that pictures can play an important role in
the development of mathematics is not in conflict with Bolzano’s focus on
looking for the proper grounds of mathematical theorems. Insofar as the
development of mathematics is concerned, they need not exclude each other,
since each of them might be successful at some stage in the development of
mathematics. The mathematicians who established the mathematical disci-
pline of analysis, such as Bolzano, were convinced that purely analytic proofs
contribute to the development of mathematics. History has proved them to
be on the right track for the field of analysis.
Bolzano’s second line of criticism concerns the definitions within Euclidean
geometry. In notes stemming from around 1804, Bolzano claims that many
geometrical concepts such as ‘point’, ‘line’, ‘direction’, and ‘angle’ are unde-
fined and that mathematicians relied merely on the intuitive meanings of these
concepts.34 These meanings seem to be quite clear in relation to geometrical
objects constructed in diagrams by means of compass and straight-edge. Yet,
Bolzano insists on the need to provide proper definitions. These definitions
have to satisfy the following criterion:
A genuine definition must contain only those characteristics of
the concept to be defined which constitute its essence, and without
which we could not even conceive of it.35
The requirement of essential characteristics excludes scholastic definitions
of for example a point as the limit of a line, and the line as the limit of
a surface. Thus, in accordance with the Leibniz-Wolffian notion of a real
definition, Bolzano argues that a proper definition must reveal the essential
characteristics that together constitute the concept. In the case of geometry,
the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition considered the essential characteristics to deter-
mine not only the constitution of the concept, but also the construction of
the mathematical object itself.36 On this account, the definition of, for exam-
ple, a triangle not only contains the essential characteristics of the concept
‘triangle’, but also provides the manner of construction of a triangular object.
34Cf. GA2B2/1, p. 71; p. 79-80. Bolzano does not want to use an angle as a quantity and
refuses all proofs of Euclid where angles are treated as quantities as useless (Bolzano, 1804,
p. 21, 37). With this claim Bolzano effectively rejects most of Euclid’s proofs.
35Bolzano, 1804, p. 61, 69.
36See §1.3.
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In other words, a real definition not only shows the possibility of the concept,
but also the possibility of the object. In Bolzano’s terms: it also shows the
actuality (Dasein) of the triangle. Contrary to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition,
as we will see, Bolzano does not regard it as the task of mathematicians to
prove the possibility of mathematical objects.37 Thus, Bolzano argues for a
distinction between the mathematical concept and the mathematical object.
Whereas the possibility of the first is purely conceptual (that is, logical), the
latter is a matter of actual construction.
Although Bolzano follows the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition insofar as a real
definition must ensure the conceptual possibility of its object (definiendum),
he rejects their definitions, especially those of geometrical concepts.38 The
traditional definition of a circle in terms of the motion of a line around a fixed
point provides the mathematician with the essential characteristics to construe
the circle.39 According to Bolzano however, the concepts required for the
construction of the circle are not necessarily the essential characteristics of
the concept of a circle itself while a definition must provide the essential
characteristics. Therefore he does not accept the traditional definitions of
geometrical objects in terms of motion, such as the definition of a line as the
motion of a point or a circle as the motion of a line attached to a fixed point.40
37See §4.4.
38See Bolzano, 1804, p. 34, 46. Furthermore, according to Bolzano, problems, such as
for example ‘construe an angle similar to a given angle’, do not belong to theoretical
geometry since they require construction. In Bolzano’s example, the possibility of a line d
proportional to c with the same ratio as line a has to b can be inferred from the theorem
that all straight lines are similar.
39See §1.3.
40Cf.Bolzano, 1804, p. 4, 32; GA2B2/1, p. 71, 79-80; GA2B5/2, p. 129. Similar criticism of
the role of motion can be found in some mathematical textbooks published at the end
of the eighteenth century as discussed before. Schulz prefers nominal (or theoretical)
definitions over real (or genetic) definitions, because they do not use the heterogeneous
concept of motion (Schultz, 1790, §30, p. 16). Yet, the theoretical definitions of Schulz
do not satisfy Bolzano’s criterion. Langsdorf also mentions the problematic role of the
concept of motion in definitions and refers to Kästner as someone who does not regard it
as a problem, whereas Lagrange did regard it as a problem (Langsdorf, 1802, p. 3). Fischer
dislikes the role of motion, but maintains that it does not harm the evidence of geometry
(Fischer, 1808, p. 91). Thus, at the end of the eighteenth century the problem was put
forward by several authors studied by Bolzano as also indicated by Johnson (Johnson,
1977, p. 268). Compared to these authors Bolzano recognized that a solution of this
problem requires a foundational reform of geometry which requires concepts of a kind far
beyond the concepts of traditional geometry. History has shown that this reform in fact
requires a modern style axiomatization as presented by Hilbert.
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The concept of line cannot rely upon the concept of motion.41 Moreover, as
we will discuss later, we are not even permitted to use ‘motion’ because this
violates the ban on kind crossing because the theory of motion presupposes a
theory of space.42 The underlying motivation for Bolzano’s radical criticism
of traditional definitions consists in his requirement of a science to reveal the
proper why of its truths. Since proofs, via syllogisms and axioms, rely on the
precise definition of the involved concepts, improper definitions will lead to
proofs that might be convincing without conveying the objective scientific
ground of the theorem.
A second requirement for definitions can be found in Bolzano’s notes on the
mathematical method when he discusses manners to find correct definitions
and theorems. In this context, Bolzano requires concepts and principles to be
general.43 In the case of definitions this means that the concepts used to define
another concept must be more general than the defined concept. Let me
discuss the notion of line as an example. The definition of a line as the limit
of a plane is mistaken because of the requirement both of generality and of
essential characteristics. As to the former, the generality constraint requires
that the definition of a concept does not involve concepts that are more
specific than the defined one. In the case of a line as the limit of a plane, the
concept of plane is more specific than that of a line, since it presupposes the
notion of line as indicated by its object which contains an infinite multiplicity
of lines.44 The generality constraint thus allows the definition of a plane to
use the concept ‘line’, but not vice versa. As to the latter, we can conceive of
a line without the notion of a plane, a notion which is less general than that
of a line.
As we have seen, Bolzano also rejects the option that figured prominently
in the Wolffian tradition, namely the definition of a line as the motion of a
point. Short comments by Bolzano onWolff’s Latin textbook of mathematics
contain highly critical remarks on Wolff’s concepts of nominal and real
definitions in general.45 According to Bolzano, Wolff’s exposition of how
to attain definitions is partly false, partly worthless. Therefore Bolzano
41Cf. Bolzano, 1804, introduction.
42Cf. GA2B2/1, p. 79.
43GA2B2/1, p. 79.
44Cf. Bolzano, 1804, introduction.
45GA2B5/1, p. 161.
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considers another option, namely to define a line as a thing whose limits are
precisely two points. But, the proposed definition already presupposes the
concept of a line, which renders the definition circular. For this definition
should be rephrased as ‘a line is a thing which is limited by itself and two
points’.46 Such a definition is in fact the reverse of the common definition of
a line as the limit of a surface. Moreover, it only indicates a single property
of a line. Furthermore, the definition is problematic in the case of a line
that returns to itself, since such a line is not limited by two points. The final
option Bolzano considers in his notes is that of a line as a thing for which a
given equation holds. However, this is completely unacceptable on the basis
of his essential characteristics criterion. For no one needs to have the thought
of an equation when thinking a line.47
While Bolzano’s notes only reject all these options, the article of 1804
proposes a definition that does not suffer from these deficiencies. In this
article, Bolzano’s approach of the theory of straight lines proceeds from
general to more specific concepts and objects. He defines a straight line
between a and b as ‘an object which contains all and only those points which
lie between the two points a and b’.48 This definition only uses the general
concepts ‘point’ and ‘between’. Subsequently, the definition of an angle can be
based on two lines meeting at one point. None of these definitions involves a
more specific concept than the one which is being defined. Proceeding further,
Bolzano defines a triangle neither as a surface enclosed by three lines (Wolff’s
nominal definition) nor as a construction out of some kind of motion. Instead
Bolzano defines a triangle as the system of straight lines in which there is a
straight line ab through the arms ca and cb of an angle.49 Although Bolzano
did not succeed in developing a complete system of geometry in this manner,
his early geometrical investigations show what he thought the definitions of a
proper mathematical system should look like and how a geometrical system
46GA2B2/1, p. 79.
47At this point it is interesting to note that the early Bolzano did not yet systematically
distinguish between a subjective and objective concept as he does in hisWissenschaftslehre.
The early Bolzano quite often employs terms that (in)directly refer to the faculties of
the subject as is common in Kant and his followers. He uses, for example, the terms
proposition (Satz) and judgment synonymously.
48Bolzano, 1804, p. 73, 76.
49Bolzano, 1804, p. 21, 38.
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might be build in this manner.50 Sofar, an illustration of Bolzano’s criticism
of the traditional definitions and his approach to find better alternatives.
Bolzano’s third line of criticism of Euclidean geometry consists of an
extension of Aristotle’s veto on crossing of genera or kinds.51 According
to Aristotle, one cannot prove algebraic truths by means of geometry be-
cause they are concerned with different kinds of entities. Since geometry is
concerned with magnitudes and algebra with numbers, algebra cannot be
involved in geometrical proofs.52 In the course of the proof one would im-
plicitly switch from one kind of quantity to another, namely from numbers
to magnitudes and back. Although this application of Aristotle’s ban on kind
crossing was well known, it received increasing attention at the end of the
eighteenth century. According to the Kantian Schultz, whose works were
well-known to Bolzano, one cannot take the proofs for algebra from geome-
try. One must be able to completely and thoroughly understand algebra and
higher arithmetic without any knowledge of geometry whatsoever.53 The
application of the ban of kind crossing on the level of disciplines involves a
particular hierarchy of those disciplines, which we will discuss later.
Schultz also criticizes the role of motion in geometry for similar reasons.54
Bolzano explicitly refers to him and employs the ban on kind crossing most
prominently and repeatedly to attack the role of motion used by many
mathematicians in proofs of (purely) geometrical truths.55 Since it is not
possible to represent an object capable of motion without representing it
in space, the theory of motion presupposes the theory of space.56 If one
50Mathematical notes made throughout his career during the first four decades of the nine-
teenth century reveal repeated attempts and continuous work on new systems of geometry
and mechanics. For more information about Bolzano’ s geometrical investigations see the
excellent article by Johnson, 1977 and also Behboud, 2000.
51Bolzano, 1804, p. 9, 32. Bolzano refers to Aristotle, 1993, 75a38. In a similar manner, he
refers to Aristotle’s ban on kind crossing in the Beyträge and the pure analytic proof (1817),
which I will discuss in the subsequent section.
52For a more extensive discussion see Cantù, 2010a.
53Schultz, 1790, p. 11.
54Schultz, 1790, p. a2. A similar work written by Langsdorf has as its subtitle auf Revision
der bisherigen Principien gegründet. In this work, exactly the same themes can be found,
including the issue of the order in geometry and of problematic definitions of geometrical
concepts (Langsdorf, 1802, p. 5).
55Cf. Schultz, 1790; Bolzano, 1804, introduction, p. 33. See for example Kästner who uses
rotation in a proof (Kästner, 1758, p. 350).
56Bolzano, 1804, introduction, p. 32.
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uses a certain motion in a geometrical proof, one has to prove that this
motion is possible. To do this, one cannot use the thesis of the geometrical
proof, otherwise the proof would become circular. Moreover, a proof of the
possibility of this motion presupposes some theorems about space. Thus, the
use of motion in the proof of a geometrical truth will lead to kind crossing
between space (geometry) and motion (mechanics). The ban on kind crossing
thus contributes to Bolzano’s foundational program, which requires a unique
order ending in simple concepts and first principles, as we will see later.57 A
similar argument concerning the use of geometrical theorems in analysis will
be discussed in the subsequent section.
Bolzano applies the ban on kind crossing on two levels. In most of his
early works he uses it at the same level as Aristotle and Schultz, namely
at the level of the disciplines of mathematics.58 At several places Bolzano
extends the ban on kind crossing to the level of theorems within a single
mathematical discipline. For example, within geometry, the notion of a plane
is not available for definitions, theorems, and proofs within the theory of
straight lines:
Secondly, I must point out that I believed I could never be sat-
isfied with a completely strict proof if it were not derived from
the same concepts which the thesis to be proved contained, but
rather made use of some fortuitous, alien, intermediate concept
[Mittelbegriff ], which is always an erroneous crossing to another
kind. In this respect I considered it an error in geometry that all
propositions about angles and ratios [Verhältnissen] of straight
lines to one another (in triangles) are proved by means of consid-
erations of the plane for which there is no cause in the theses to
be proved.59
In this passage, Bolzano employs the Aristotelian ban on kind crossing as
a precise criterion by formulating it in terms of the concepts involved in
syllogistic reasoning. On his account, many demonstrations of Euclidean
geometry rely on intermediate concepts (Mittelbegriffe) that do not belong
57See §5.6.
58Bolzano, 1804, introduction, p. 32; Bolzano, 1810, p. 117, 126; Bolzano, 1817, p. 6, 254.
59Bolzano, 1804, introduction, p. 33.
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there.60 For Bolzano this includes, for instance, all proofs about triangles,
angles and relations between lines where one relies on the notion of a plane.
A strict proof must follow from the concepts of the thesis itself alone and not
contain an arbitrary heterogeneous ( fremdartig) intermediate concept. Such
an intermediate concept can never show the proper why, or ground of the








Bolzano’s notes provide an example from geometry involving a parallelo-
gram (see figure 4.1).61 The theorem to be proved is the following hypotheti-
cal judgment: if ab is parallel to cd, ac is also parallel to bd.62 The first step of
Euclid is to prove that the triangles4bad and4cda are equal, or, in modern
terminology, congruent.63 From this similarity several truths follow:
1. the lines ac and bd are equal in length
2. the angles α and β are equal
3. ac is parallel to bd
Bolzano’s complaint is that one proves too much: it is superfluous to prove
(1) and (2) if one only has to prove that ac is parallel to bd (3). The cause
of this is the use of a wrong intermediate concept, namely the equality of
triangles, a concept that lies outside the scope of the theorem. The proof thus
involves concepts that do not belong to, or are not involved in, the thesis. If
one only needs the concept of straight lines to formulate the theorem, one
should not use other concepts in the proof. Thus, proofs about lines, cannot
60Bolzano, 1804, introduction, p. 32; GA2B2/1, p. 79-80.
61GA2B15, p. 170/171.
62Euclid, 1956, book I, proposition 33.
63Bolzano’s states 4bad =4cda. The tradition seems to have argued from the equality of
surface, which includes size.
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use the concepts of triangles or surfaces. To the contrary, the theorems about
triangles and surfaces must be based on theorems about straight lines, as
their definitions are likely to involve the notion of line. This does not mean
that Bolzano regards the proof as incorrect or non-convincing. Bolzano’s
complaint is that the proof does not exhibit the proper ground of the theorem.
The proof might be very useful to convince someone that the theorem is true,
but it does not reveal the reason why the theorem is true. The sketched role
of the ban on kind crossing has consequences with regard to the organization
of mathematics, as we will see in the final section of this chapter.64 The next
section presents a case study illustrating how Bolzano’s employment of the
Aristotelean distinctions support the development of analysis towards an
independent discipline.
4.3 A case study of Bolzano’s criticism: The
Intermediate Value Theorem
The enterprise of criticizing geometry because of its foundations without
doubting its truth, might seem useless insofar as one is interested in the
extension of mathematical knowledge. Although it did not lead Bolzano
himself to a new successful system of geometry, the history of mathematics
has shown, however, that Bolzano pursued a worthwhile enterprise. For he
became famous for his purely analytic proof of the intermediate value theorem
which became an important tool in modern calculus (part of the field of
analysis).65 Moreover, the overall tendency of Bolzano’s work toward a more
abstract form of mathematics detached from the application of mathematics
and independent of the natural sciences, has proved to be the overall direction
of the development of mathematics in the nineteenth century.66 The history
of the so called intermediate value theorem greatly helps to understand
64See §4.4.
65Important steps towards topology and set theory can be found in Bolzano’s work. Cf.
Johnson, 1977, p. 292; Bolzano, 1851.
66From a contemporary perspective it is quite unfortunate that Bolzano held on to Euclidean
geometry although the founders of non-Euclidean geometry were his contemporaries. He
even repeatedly attempted to proof the parallel postulate. In my view, Waldegg’s treatment
of this topic is historically misleading in some respects, since she reads philosophical views
and a notion of space into Bolzano’s article of 1804 that he only developed much later
(Waldegg, 2001).
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Bolzano’s place in the history of mathematics, as well as the way he intended
to reform mathematics illustrating the aims of his philosophical program.67
In the remainder of this section I discuss the relevant history of this theorem
along with the philosophical aspects of Bolzano’s article on this theorem
published in 1817.68
At the very beginning of this article Bolzano praises Gauss for his proofs of
theorems as much as he regrets the failure of many important mathematicians
of the time, including Gauss, in their attempts to provide such a proof for
the intermediate value theorem. The reason for Bolzano’s appraisal is that
Gauss had succeeded in proving theorems within the domain of mathematical
analysis without taking recourse to geometrical theorems. As Bolzano notices,
Gauss himself regarded the use of geometrical truths in proofs of the theorems
of analysis as a defect. Already in the Beyträge of 1810, Bolzano criticizes
Lagrange for deriving the continuity of a function from the geometrical
continuity of a curved line.69 The aim of Bolzano’s mathematical article is to
follow in the footsteps of Gauss and present such a proof for the intermediate
value theorem that is solely based on the mathematical discipline of analysis
instead of resorting to geometrical truths somewhere during the proof. It is in
this mathematical sense that Bolzano describes his proof as purely analytical.70
Let us consider a special case of the intermediate value theorem, namely
the so-called intermediate zero theorem, to get a basic understanding of what
is at stake. Suppose we measure the temperature at 4pm and measure 10
degrees Celsius. Seven hours later, at 11pm we again measure the temperature.
This time we get the result of 13 degrees Celsius below zero. Everybody will
67For a case study of the history of this theorem in relation to Lakatos see Koetsier, 2009.
68Bolzano, 1817. Until the end of the nineteenth century when Bolzano’s mathematical
articles were rediscovered and republished, the proof was solely attributed to Cauchy. Yet,
Bolzano’s work was reviewed in 1823 and its importance was properly understood by the
mathematician Hoffmann as described by Schubring (Schubring, 1993). The reviewer
agrees with Bolzano criticism of Lagrange and others for relying on geometrical truths
in the proof of a theorem of analysis and encourages Bolzano to devote his talent to an
improved foundation of mathematics (the review is partially reprinted in Schubring, 1993,
p. 51-52). For a detailed analysis of the proof presented in the article see Rusnock, 2000, p.
69-83.
69Bolzano, 1810, p. 117, 126.
70See §4.1. In the context of the article of 1817, ‘analytical proof’ and ‘analytical truth’ are
not used in a logical or epistemological sense, but in the mathematical sense. According to
the latter, analytical proof means that the proof or truth belongs to analysis and does not
use a geometrical truth.












Figure 4.2: Diagram illustrating the family of Intermediate Value Theorems
admit that there must have been a point in time between 4pm and 11pm
such that the temperature was exactly zero degrees Celsius (see figure 4.2).
This physical example can easily be generalized such that we get a simplified
physical application of the intermediate value theorem: for each temperature
between -13°C and 10°C there is a point in time between 4pm and 11pm.
In an article published in 1751, Euler was the first to prove a special
case of what later became the intermediate value theorem.71 Euler’s special
case, namely the intermediate value theorem for polynomials, claims that an
equation of an odd degree has a real root. In his proof Euler relies on the
curve of a diagram of such an equation.72 Similar to our example, he relies on
the places where the curves cross an axis. Exactly at these places the equation
has a real number as its solution. Around half a century later, several other
mathematicians attempted to prove the theorem. Some of these proofs, such
as those of Klügel and the first proof of Lagrange, are simply circular.73 This
first proof of Lagrange uses a fundamental theorem of algebra. Unfortunately,
Lagrange’s proof of this theorem of algebra relies on the intermediate value
theorem for polynomials which renders the proof circular. Others, like the
second proof by Lagrange in 1808 violates the ban on kind crossing, for it
71I do not take into consideration related theorems of Euclid and Leibniz as discussed by
Koetsier because they are themselves geometrical in nature (Koetsier, 2009, p. 34, p. 36).
72Euler, 1751, Theorem 1, §20.
73Klügel, 1805, §173, p. 447.
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relies on notions foreign to analysis, namely objects moving along a line such
that they must meet somewhere in between. Insofar as the method of proof is
concerned, this is as bad as Kästner’s proof of his version of the intermediate
zero theorem in 1760.74 Kästner’s proof refers to geometrical theorems to
argue that a variable quantity must become zero in order to change from
a positive to a negative value. Moreover, the proof ultimately relies on the
motion of a point along a line.75
Bolzano explicitly mentioned all these authors (except Euler) and criticized
them for using either geometrical truths or the concepts of time and motion.
All these mathematicians, including Gauss and Bolzano were completely
convinced of the truth of the theorem. Bolzano accepted the use of diagrams,
curves and the notion of a moving object for the sake of clarification and
persuasion, similar to our use of time and temperature in our physical example.
Yet as analysis became a topic of its own, Bolzano, following Gauss, regarded
it as his task to provide a proof that was methodologically satisfactory:
There is certainly nothing to be said against the correctness, nor
against the obviousness of this geometrical proposition. But it is
also equally clear that it is an unacceptable breach of good method
to try to derive truths of pure (or general) mathematics (i.e. arith-
metic, algebra, analysis) from considerations which belong to
a merely applied (or special) part of it, namely geometry. [...]
In fact, anyone who considers that scientific proofs should not
merely be confirmations [Gewißmachungen], but rather ground-
ings [Begründungen], i.e. presentations of the objective reason for
the truth to be proved, realizes at once that the strictly scientific
proof, or the objective reason of a truth, which holds equally for
all quantities, whether in space or not, cannot possibly lie in a
truth which holds merely for quantities which are in space.76
Thus, Bolzano distinguishes between confirmation and grounding. Whereas
the former is sufficient to know the truth, only the latter provides the objec-
tive reason for the truth. The intermediate value theorem of pure mathematics
74Kästner, 1760, §316, p. 163-164.
75Kästner, 1760, §304, p. 154.
76Bolzano, 1817, p. 6, 254.
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(analysis) grounds the continuity of curves in geometry and motion in me-
chanics and not vice versa. Bolzano’s article thus presents a mathematical
result that illustrates how a philosophical program contributes to progress in
mathematics.77 At the same time, the philosophical program stems from a
detailed study of mathematics.
4.4 Bolzano’s Definition of Mathematics
Traditionally, mathematics is defined as the science of quantity. In the first
section of the Beyträge, Bolzano refers to Kant’s criticism of this traditional
definition and subsequently formulates his own criticism. He agrees with
Kant’s analysis that the central role of the concept of quantity in mathematics
is an effect rather than a part of the definition of mathematics.78 However,
Bolzano and Kant differ greatly with respect to their argumentation and
alternatives. According to Kant, as we have seen, the very form of mathe-
matical knowledge, namely construction in pure intuition, implies that it
is concerned with quantities.79 Whereas philosophical knowledge has the
form of the analysis of discursive concepts, mathematics has the form of
the construction of concepts in pure intuition. Thus, Kant does not distin-
guish philosophy from mathematics in a traditional manner by distinguishing
between different objects, but by distinguishing between different forms of
knowledge. Bolzano’s arguments are completely different in nature: they
refer to parts of mathematics that are excluded by the traditional definition,
but also to parts of other sciences that are erroneously included by the tradi-
tional definition. An example of the former is combinatorics, which does not
study quantities as such, but the possible arrangements of a multiplicity of
quantities.
77The article does not fully solve the problem. As Rusnock writes: ‘the lack of a theory
of real quantity, coupled with the difficulties of his proof, do indicate that Bolzano
still had a substantial amount of work to do’ (Rusnock, 2000, p. 84). Bolzano indeed
worked on a theory of real numbers after the publication of this article in 1817. The
manuscripts concerning this theory were described for the first time by Rychlík and judged
as containing manageable errors (Rychlík, 1957; GA 2A8). Rootselaar has a different
opinion and regards it as inconsistent (van Rootselaar, 1963). Rusnock argues that Bolzano
even grasped the distinction between pointwise and uniform continuity in his study of
functions (Rusnock, 2005) .
78Cf. Bolzano, 1810, p. 2, 91; B742.
79See §3.4.
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Bolzano develops his own definition of mathematics, and additionally also a
new organization of the subject, by quoting a critical, at the time anonymous,
review of a mathematical textbook by Vieth:
Quantity is only an object of mathematics because it is the most
general form, to be finite, but in its nature mathematics is a general
theory of forms. Thus, for example, is arithmetic, insofar as it
considers the general form of forces; the theory of motion, insofar
as it considers the general form of forces acting in space.80
Apparently, the anonymous author of the review agrees with Kant and
Bolzano in regarding the role of quantity as the consequence of what mathe-
matics really is. In other respects, however, the author sharply criticizes the
Kantian view on mathematics as construction in intuition, a view which dom-
inated the German textbooks on mathematics that were published around
the turn of the century, including that of Vieth. According to the alterna-
tive definition of mathematics put forward by the reviewer, the object of
mathematics consists of the notion of ‘general form’. On this account, each
mathematical discipline is concerned with its own particular kind of form.
For example, geometry studies space insofar as space is the general form of
nature. Contrary to a Kantian position, mathematics does not study the form
of pure intuition, namely space or time, but the form of a class of objects.
The question arises what the author exactly means by the notion of form.
Bolzano is unsure whether he understands the author correctly, and provides
a further specification of ‘form’ as ‘general law’ and ‘condition of possibility’
in his own definition of mathematics:
I therefore think that mathematics could best be defined as a
science which deals with the general laws (forms) to which things
must conform [sich richten nach] in their existence [Dasein]. By
the word ‘things’ I understand here not merely those which pos-
sess an objective existence independent of our consciousness, but
80Bolzano, 1810, p. 10-11, 93-94; Neue Leipziger Literaturzeitung, 1808, LXXXI, p. 1291. Cf.
Vieth, 1805. For a biography of Vieth see Lukas, 1964. As was usual at the time, the author
of the review is anonymous. Cantù suggests that it could be Bolzano himself (Cantù, 2014,
p. 298). However, to me this seems highly unlikely, for this would imply that he would be
saying of himself that he is not sure what he means (Bolzano, 1810, p. 11, 94).
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also those which simply exist in our imagination, either as in-
dividuals (i.e. intuitions), or simply as general concepts, in other
words, everything which can in general be an object of our [faculty]
for representation [Vorstellungsvermögens]. Furthermore, if I say
that mathematics deals with the laws to which these things conform
in their existence, this indicates that our science is concerned not
with the proof of the existence of these things but only with the
conditions of their possibility.81
Evidently, Bolzano interprets ‘form’ as a general law, that is, as a condition
for the possibility of ‘things’ such that ‘things’ should not be interpreted
in an existential manner.82 Bolzano explicitly allows mathematics to study
entities of which we merely have a representation. In the next chapter we will
see how this enables Bolzano to treat arithmetic in a mereological manner.
This is completely opposite to the status of mathematical objects within
the traditional Wolffian framework. Contrary to Wolff, Bolzano no longer
restricts the range of possible objects to those that actually can be realized.
As a result, infinitesimals and the square root of -1 are no longer problematic.
Moreover, it allows the square root of 2, for example, to be interpreted
independently of its geometric presentation. Bolzano’s new definition thus
allows for the development of mathematics as the study of abstract structures
instead of the study of quantity.
Aware of the radical change he has initiated, Bolzano tried to find support
for his new definition in the work of others in order to gain confidence in
it.83 In other words: he tries to argue that it is not as radically new as it seems
81Bolzano, 1810, p. 11, 94 (modified translation).
82See also Bolzano, 1810, p. 23, 97; GA2B2/2, p. 78. A few years later Bolzano changed his
mind, returned to the traditional definition and abandoned the notion of form. Bolzano
notes that his opinion on this matter changed in April 1814. At this point, Bolzano
describes general mathematics as the science of abstract quantities and special mathematics
as concerned with a specific kind of quantity. In his later Größenlehre, Bolzano advocates
the traditional definition (GA2A7, p. 27). Cantù convincingly argues that this is not a
u-turn with regard to Bolzano’s conception of mathematics, but the result of a ‘deeper
understanding of the meaning and the nature of the general mathesis’ and changes in his
logic and epistemology, which involves an ‘increased distance from the Kantian framework’
(Cantù, 2010b, p. 22). Bolzano’s notes concerning the definition of ‘mathematics’ and
‘quantity’, written during the period between the publication of the Beyträge and his work
on the Grössenlehre, show a continuous struggle with finding satisfying definitions, which
confirms this view..
83A similar strategy can be found in his mature work, the Wissenschaftslehre. On the one
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to be. According to him it is even ‘dimly’ present in the traditional definition
when quantity is defined as ‘that which is’. Bolzano also uses the anonymous
reviewer, as well as, Kant for this purpose. According to Bolzano, a similar
view can also be found in Kant’s definition of one domain of mathematics,
namely mechanics, as formulated in the Metaphysical Foundations:84
Kant defines pure natural science [reine Naturwissenschaft] which
has always been regarded, under the name of mechanics, as a part
of mathematics) as a science of the laws which govern the existence
of things (of phenomena). This definition can lead very easily
to our definition as given above. Time and space are also two
conditions which govern the existence of appearances, therefore
chronometry and geometry (which consider the properties of these
two forms in abstracto) deal likewise, though only indirectly,with
the laws which govern the existence of things (i.e. things open to
the senses [sinnliche Dinge]). Finally arithmetic,which deals with
the laws of countability, thereby develops the most general laws
according to which things must be regulated in their existence,
even in their ideal existence.85
This passage shows both how Bolzano relied on Kant for his notion of ‘form’
and how Bolzano distinguishes between general and special disciplines of
mathematics. The latter will be discussed in the next section.
Apparently, Bolzano draws on Kant’s notion of the forms of space and time
as ‘the conditions for the possibility of the appearance of things’ to associate
Kant’s definition of mechanics with his own idea of mathematics as the
science of forms. Although Bolzano indeed takes over the conditional aspect
hand he criticizes many predecessors in a sharp and detailed manner, on the other hand he
tries to find places where they nevertheless seem to aim, although in a confused manner, at
concepts and distinctions similar to his own.
84Bolzano studied the Metaphysical Foundations already into detail in the years before the
publication of the Beyträge. Notes during these years contain a detailed discussion of the
principle and theorem of the phoronomy chapter and a reference to Kant’s introduction
to the Metaphysical Foundations where Kant extensively explains his notion of natural
science also implies a detailed reading (GA2B2/1, p. 160; GA2B15 p. 201). The systematic
treatment of mechanics with attention to philosophical aspects must have been appealing
for Bolzano.
85Bolzano, 1810, p. 15, 95.
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of Kant’s notion of form, he emphatically rejects the role of intuition.86 With
this step Bolzano applies the heart of Kant’s transcendental philosophy to
mathematics. In my view, Bolzano, paving the way for modern mathematics,
developed his criticism of Wolff’s philosophy of mathematics, by means
of a move central to Kant’s philosophy, namely the so-called ‘Copernican
revolution’. Just as Copernicus reversed the sun-earth relationship, so Kant
reversed the relation between thought and experience: pure (schematized)
concepts makes experience possible and not the other way around. An almost
identical view is explicitly stated by Bolzano:
Everything which is to be perceptible as real in experience, must
already be recognized as possible.87
Just as Kant’s transcendental logic is concerned with the conditions for the
possibility of the experience of a causal connection, Bolzano’s theoretical
mathematics is concerned with the conditions for the possibility of things
regardless of whether they actually exist, can exist, or can only be imagined.
Whereas Kant limits the domain of mathematical objects to those that can
be constructed in pure intuitions, Bolzano extends the domain to that of
representations themselves insofar as they are regulated by the most general
laws. In this manner, the problematic new concepts of mathematics, like
infinitesimals and complex numbers, can become the center of new mathe-
matical fields rather than merely being accepted as tools to arrive at results
one can make sense of.
4.5 The Place of Mathematics among the Sciences
Bolzano’s new definition of mathematics seems extremely wide and thus raises
the question how his new conception of mathematics relates to the other
sciences. A manuscript written around the same time as the Beyträge offers
an attempt to answer this question. The Beyträge was a first issue of a long
series of works presenting a reformed account of mathematics. In fact, the
Beyträge only offers what traditionally (Wolff, Kästner) was the first chapter
86Bolzano’s criticism on the notion of pure intuition and its epistemological role in Kant’s
philosophy will be discussed in §5.2.
87Bolzano, 1810, p. 32, 100.
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of a textbook on mathematics, usually entitled On the Method of Mathematics.
The unpublished second installment to the Beyträge deals with the first part
of his reorganized domain of mathematics, namely Allgemeinen Mathesis.
Bolzano never continued his early project that has started with the Beyträge,
but instead focused on logic and epistemology resulting in his impressive
mature work entitledWissenschaftslehre. The first section of the unpublished
part of the Beyträge is concerned with a more precise demarcation of the
domain of mathematics.88 Apparently, Bolzano was aware that his definition
of mathematics as the science of forms in the Beyträge is quite general and
allows to include a range of knowledge wider than allowed by the traditional
definition as science of quantities. For Bolzano this means that he has to
delineate the domains of other sciences. The more truths are relegated to the
other sciences, the less Bolzano risks a too wide definition of mathematics.
He formulates his starting point to reorganize the sciences as follows:
Since we consider the essence of all sciences to be that they
present their truths according to the objective cohesion as it ex-
ists between truths themselves, that their proofs indicate this
cohesion rather than aim at certainty, that judgments relate to
each other according to their variety in copulas, one will under-
stand that the presented variety of judgments with respect to
their copula plays a crucial role in the division of the realm of
truths into singular disciplines. For example, all judgments with
the copula ‘should’ constitute an isolated science, namely that of
ethics and natural law.89
First Bolzano reminds us of his notion of science. For Bolzano, science has
to reveal the objective way in which truths support each other rather than
to contribute to the certainty of knowledge, which was a central notion in
88GA2A5, §1, p. 15.
89GA2A5, p. 16: ‘Da wir das Wesen aller Wissenschaft darin finden, daß sie die Wahrheiten
nach ihrem objektiven Zusammenhange darstellt, daß ihre Beweise - statt des Zwecks
Gewißheit zu bewirken, nur den haben, den Zusammenhang anzugeben, in welchem
diese Wahrheit an und für sich betrachtet mit andern stehet; da ferner Urtheile, nach
der Verschiedenheit ihrer Copula in einer eigenthümlichen [...] so wird man begreifen,
daß bei der Abtheilung des Reiches der Wahrheiten in einzelnen Wissenschaften die oben
aufgestellte Verschiedenheit der Urtheile nach ihrer Copula die wichtigste Rolle spielen
wird. So bilden z.B. alle Urtheile, deren Verbindungsbegriff jenen des Sollens ist - eine
ganz eigene für sich abgesonderte Wissenschaft (nähmlich Moral u. Naturrecht)’.
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Judgment of Form Copula
necessity S is a kind of P is
possibility S can be a kind of B can
duty N should do X should
perception I perceive X perceive
probability ?
Table 4.1: Bolzano’s early classification of judgments.
the work of Wolff and the early Kant.90 Accordingly, the organization of
the sciences into disciplines also does not depend on our subjective interests,
purposes, or pragmatic concerns. Bolzano uses his classification of the copula
as a systematic way to organize the sciences, because the sciences consist of
true propositions and the classification of the copula provides a first systematic
step to organize propositions.91
The early Bolzano rejects the traditional view that there is only one copula
and in the Beyträge presents five kinds of copulas or judgments (table 4.1):
judgments of necessity, possibility, perception, probability, and duty.92 In the
case of judgments of necessity the predicate and subject stand in a relation
of species to genus. Judgments of necessity are either analytic or synthetic. A
straightforward analytic example is ‘dogs are animals’. The more interesting
and complex examples of synthetic necessary judgments will be discussed
in the next chapter.93 The second kind of judgments are those that express
90Cf. §1.1; §2.1. Although the notion of certainty can still be found in the later work of Kant,
the focus shifts to a systematic organization of science (see van den Berg, 2014, pp. 15-51).
91Rusnock and Roski describe the table, but they do not mention its role in organizing the
sciences (Rusnock, 2000; Roski, 2014, p. 42).
92Bolzano, 1810, p. 73-76, 113-114. The first four can be regarded as four kinds of modality:
necessary, possible, probable, and contingent. Thus it seems that the early Bolzano
relegates each mode of modality its own copula and reserves an extra copula for ethics.
It must be noted that Bolzano does not explicitly claim that this ‘table of judgments’ is
exhaustive. In some manuscripts, such as the second installment, Bolzano proposes to
add a sixth, namely judgments with the copula that connects cause and effect (GA2A5,
§2, p. 16). As we will see in the next chapter, Bolzano’s revolutionary move of replacing
the single traditional copula ‘is’ by at least 5 primitive ways to combine concepts into
judgments is directly related to the nature of principles within his model of science.
93The early Bolzano is already aware that the logical form, that is, the particular copula
of a proposition, might not be immediately evident in many statements, for example in
mathematics as he writes ‘can be traced back to the form’. In his notes, he frequently
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a possibility, such as ‘a triangle can be equilateral’. These judgments have
the form ‘A can be a kind of B’. Contrary to judgments of necessity, judg-
ments of possibility do not exclude the possibility that some triangles are
not equilateral. Judgments of possibility only indicate one of the possible
differentia (in this case ‘equilateral’) to be added to the genus (‘triangle’). The
third class of judgments express obligations and have the form ‘N should do
X’. The letter ‘N’ stands for a subject and ‘X’ for an action.94 The fourth
class of judgments are empirical judgments of the form ‘I perceive X’. It is
remarkable that this includes perception of one’s own consciousness, or what
Kant would call inner experience. Finally, Bolzano mentions judgments of
probability of which he is not yet able to indicate the precise form.
attempts to rewrite propositions such that their logical form becomes explicit (GA2A5,
§15, §16; GA2B15 p. 169, p. 208). Quite often, this is a very difficult task, especially
for mathematical theorems, for relations are extremely difficult to express in traditional
logic. From a contemporary perspective one would say that it is impossible. Bolzano
did acknowledge these problems both for mathematics in particular and logic more in
general. In the laterWissenschaftslehre, Bolzano devotes quite some paragraphs to analyze
propositions into their logical structure (§169-184).
94Bolzano’s presentation consistently distinguishes between the kind of concept that can
take the place of a subject or predicate. He carefully chooses ranges of symbolic letters
to indicate differences in the ranges of subject and predicate. Judgments of necessity and
possibility share the same range of subjects and predicates.
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Figure 4.3: Organization of the sciences according to Bolzano’s classification of copulas.
Since every judgment is of one of the sketched logical forms, the classifi-
cation of copulas can be used to organize the sciences. Since the copulas are
simple, a division at a higher level is impossible. Therefore, the classification
of copulas is a perfect starting point for the organization of sciences. Similar
to Kant, Bolzano first of all distinguishes between a priori and a posteriori sci-
ences. Subsequently, Bolzano follows the strategy to relegate some (sub)kinds
of judgments to some of the sciences to show that his definition of mathe-
matics is not too wide since all a priori truths of other domains are already
accounted for (figure 4.3). The remaining judgments belong to mathematics.
Obviously, the judgments of obligation constitute the domain of ethics.95
Judgments of perception belong to physics, biology, and other sciences as
they provide for, what the tradition calls, historical knowledge. Since Bolzano
is not yet sure about the exact nature of judgments of probability, he does
95In the next chapter we will see how such a domain of knowledge according to Bolzano’s
model of science requires at least one fundamental principle, in this case the highest moral
law, which grounds all other ethical truths.
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not yet relate them to one or more scientific disciplines.
The relation of the classification of the copula to the a priori sciences, that is,
mathematics and metaphysics, is more complex since both disciplines contain
judgments of necessity. Bolzano therefore makes an additional distinction
with regard to judgments of necessity: a judgment of necessity expresses either
the existence of something or it does not.96 For example, the traditional
metaphysical judgment ‘the soul exists’ is a necessary judgment of existence
while ‘the angles of a triangle equal two right angles’ is a necessary judgment
in which existence does not play a role. Contrary to metaphysics, the objects
falling under the subject of a mathematical judgment need not exist, it suffices
to be a thing in thought (Gedankending). Contrary to the tradition, Bolzano
does not even require the possibility of existence for the objects involved in a
mathematical judgment.
A final distinction with regard to the certainty of necessary judgments
of existence allows Bolzano to relate the disciplines of mathematics and
metaphysics to his classification of the copula:
Judgments of existence come in two kinds, they possess either
complete certainty, or merely probability. They belong to metaph-
sics in the case of the former and to physics in the case of the
latter. The remaining judgments belong to mathematics.97
Thus, necessary judgments of existence belong to metaphysics and physics
while all other judgments belong to mathematics, which includes all judg-
96In my view, it is misleading to describe the difference in terms of ontological versus logical
necessity because the necessity of the latter does not necessarily rely on logic. Since the
copula must be simple, Bolzano regards the aspect of existence of a necessary judgment of
existence as part of the predicate (GA2A5, p. 16). In the Beyträge Bolzano, also describes
judgments of perception as having the aspect of existence (Bolzano, 1810, p. 76, 114).
From a systematic perspective this is unproblematic, since Bolzano relegates the aspect of
existence to the predicate rather than to the copula.
97GA2A5, p. 17: ‘Daseinsurtheile können nun wieder von einer doppelten Art sein, entweder
sie haben völlige Gewissheit, oder sie haben nur Wahrscheinlichkeit. Im erstern FaIle
sollen sie in die Metaphysik, im zweyten in die Physik versetzt werden. Urtheile die
noch übrig bleiben gehören zur Mathematik’. Since Bolzano does not yet systematically
distinguish between the objective content and its subjective counterpart of judgments as
in the laterWissenschaftslehre, his early distinction between metaphysics and physics runs
the risk of becoming a subjective epistemological one as it depends on the certainty of
the judgments (WL, §34, §270, §290). On the other hand, Bolzano could have meant
that the content of judgments of physics are themselves merely probable. Lacking the
terminology of theWissenschaftslehre, the early Bolzano suffers from the same ambiguities
he later ascribes to other philosophers.
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ments of possibility. By their very nature, judgments of possibility only
contain laws ‘nach welchen dasjenige, was zur Existenz kommen soll, sich
richten muss’, which is precisely how the early Bolzano defines mathemat-
ics.98 Accordingly, Bolzano concludes that all judgments of mathematics
express a law that indicates conditions for the possibility of things:
Subject and predicate are concepts and therefore express at least a
law to which every representation that is to be contained under
the subject as species (a thing in thought) must comply. Therefore,
one can also say of all mathematical propositions that they con-
tain laws to which things must comply in their being (Dasein).99
Thus, Bolzano’s new definition of mathematics in terms of laws or forms can
be made more precise by saying that judgments of necessity express a general
law according to which the predicate holds for all species contained under the
subject.
As we have seen so far, Bolzano does not define the domain of sciences in
terms of their object of investigation as was common. Instead he characterizes
sciences by means of the kind of connecting concept (copula) in their true
judgments. This approach is only possible at the highest level of organizing
scientific judgments into disciplines. As soon as one attempts to organize
them at a more detailed level, a different method is required. The next section
analyses Bolzano’s demarcation of the sub fields of mathematics.
4.6 Bolzano’s Reorganization of Mathematics
Traditionally, theoretical mathematics was defined as a science of quantities
and, hence, divided into a science of continuous and discrete quantities. If
quantity is taken as the object of mathematics, the organization of mathe-
matics into disciplines has to follow the subdivision of its object, namely the
division of quantity into discrete and continuous quantities. Accordingly,
98GA2A5, p. 17.
99GA2A5, p. 17: ‘Subjekt und Prädikat ist ein Begriff, u. sonach sagen sie zum wenigsten
ein Gesetz aus, nach welchem sich jede Vorstellung, die unter dem Subjekt als Species
enthalten sein soll, (ein Gedankending) richten muss. Sonach kann man also von den
gesammten Sätzen der Mathematik sagen, daß sie Gesetze enthalten, nach welchen sich die
Dinge in ihrem Dasein richten müssen’.
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mathematics used to be divided into algebra with discrete quantities as its
object, and geometry with continuous quantities as its object (see figure 4.4).
Within the traditional organization, pure mathematics was considered to
consist of precisely the combination of geometry and algebra.100 Insofar as
the Wolffian tradition uses the term ‘general mathematics’, it either refers to
algebra or to the characteristica universalis of Leibniz which was considered
to be either impossible or at best non-existent.101 In reference to algebra, the
term ‘general mathematics’ did not carry the meaning of a mathematical field
that is presupposed by all other mathematical fields. Instead, the term ‘general’
stems from the idea of algebra as a generalization of arithmetic by replacing
numbers with letters. Accordingly, the influential textbook by Kästner does
not use the term general mathematics but uses the term ‘pure mathematics’ to
refer to geometry and algebra.102 Thus, general mathematics was effectively
absent in the German rationalistic philosophy of the eighteenth century. The
underlying reason consists in the definition of mathematics as the sciences of
quantities along with a quite practical conception of mathematics as a tool to
find and calculate unknown quantities.103 Since any quantity is either discrete
or continuous, which is the topic of algebra respectively geometry, no object













Figure 4.4: Classification of mathematics according to Kästner.
A slightly modified version of the traditional classification can be found in
100GWI:11, p. 863-869; Kästner, 1758, p. 3.
101GWI:11, p. 863-869. Cf. Sasaki, 2003, p. 202.
102Kästner, 1758, p. 3. According to Kästner, analysis, including calculus (infinitesimals)
belongs to either algebra or geometry (Kästner, 1758, p. 5).
103Kästner, 1758, p. 4; GWI:12, p. 37; p. 1549.
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the textbook of Schultz.104 He maintains the distinction between pure and
applied mathematics, but reserves the term ‘general mathematics’ for algebra.
Although the classification of the disciplines is still quite traditional, Schultz
takes two important steps forward with regard to general mathematics. Ac-
cording to Schultz, general mathematics should function as the foundation
(Grundlage) of applied mathematics and special mathematics, including geom-
etry. Referring to Aristotle’s ban on kind crossing, he maintains that general

















Figure 4.5: Classification of mathematics according to Schultz.
Secondly, contrary to theWolffian tradition, Schultz does not define algebra
and arithmetic in terms of finding numbers, but as sciences of the manner in
which parts are connected:
General mathematics, however, fully abstracts from the various
qualities of quantorum. Hence, general mathematics is merely
concerned with quantis as such, including its qualities. Therefore
general mathematics only investigates the ways in which the
homogeneous can be connected, which allow to actually construe
and determine the magnitude of a quanti.106
104Schultz, 1790, §8-23, p. 2-12.
105Schultz, 1790, §21, p. 21.
106Schultz, 1789, p. 212, my translation. "Die allgemeine Mathesis hingegen abstrahirt von
der verschiedenen Qualität der Quantorum gänzlich, mithin hat sie es bloß mit Quantis
als solchen und ihrer Quantität zu thun, und sie untersucht also nur alle die möglichen
Arten von Verbindung des Gleichartigen, durch welche die Größe eines Quanti überhaupt
erzeugt und bestimmt werden kann." Cf. Schultz, 1790, §7, p. 2.
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Schultz defines general mathematics as the science that abstracts from all
qualities and only investigates the various ways in which homogeneous units
can be composed into wholes. His description of general mathematics is
reminiscent of Kant’s definition of general logic. Just as general logic abstracts
from objects, general mathematics abstracts from the qualities of objects.
Both general logic and mathematics investigate what remains after such a
process of abstraction, namely the connections between concepts (forms of
judgments), and the connections between homogeneous things (mathematical
operations). Compared to Wolff and Kästner, Schultz’s conception of general
mathematics as a discipline that abstracts from qualities constitutes a first
step towards an explanation of mathematical concepts in terms of parts,
wholes, and kinds of composition. According to Schultz, the connection
between homogeneous units merely comes in two kinds, namely addition and
subtraction. As a result, general mathematics is not able to account for other
kinds of connections, such as those of combinatorics or geometrical objects.
Thus, Schultz’s account of general mathematics is still quite traditional in
that it does not yet provide the foundations for new mathematical disciplines,
but only includes arithmetic and algebra.
The early Bolzano, however, requires general mathematics to provide the
foundation for all mathematical disciplines and, for example, also wants to
include the mathematical field of combinatorics, which requires the composi-
tion of heterogeneous units. His new definition of mathematics allows him
to further develop Schultz’s approach. In his notes, Bolzano explains what is
meant by the ‘form of things’:
In mathematics, one abstracts from all particular properties of
objects and only considers their composition (the act of bringing
things together in thought (Zusammendenken).107
As science of the forms of things, mathematics studies all possible compo-
107GA2B2/2, p. 95. When Bolzano discusses the notion of proportion, he explicitly connects
the notion of composition to his new definition of mathematics as the science of the
most general form of things (GA2B2/2, p. 94). The dates of the notes, shortly before the
publication of the Beyträge (1810), and the second installment, shortly after the publication
of the Beyträge, indicate that Bolzano already had in mind the conception ‘form’ as the
composition of things when defining mathematics as the science of general forms of things
in the Beyträge.
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sitions including that of heterogeneous parts.108 He considers geometrical
objects, for example, to consist of different kinds of compositions of het-
erogeneous parts.109 Thus, according to Bolzano, composition is the simple
concept which determines the domain of the scientific discipline called math-
ematics rather than the notion of quantity. Accordingly, one of the most
important principles of general mathematics states that all things can be
connected in thought.110
Let us first describe Bolzano’s organization of the mathematical disciplines
before discussing the manner in which the other mathematical disciplines
rely on general mathematics. Since general mathematics abstracts from any
determination of the object’s content, it is not restricted to a limited range
of objects. Its domain thus consists of all unfree objects (figure 4.6).111 As
such, it provides a perfect starting point for defining the other mathematical
disciplines by means of genus-species relations. The definition of the objects
of the mathematical disciplines thus proceeds from simple to complex and
from general to specific by adding differentia.
108Bolzano introduces the notion of et composition, which is discussed more in detail in §6.2.
109For a more detailed explanation see §6.2.
110GA2A5, §41, p. 37.
111Bolzano’s table has ‘thing as such’ as the object of general mathematics (Bolzano, 1810, p.
37, 102). However, mathematics is not concerned with free things so the presentation of
the table in the Beyträge assumes that free things are already excluded. Cf. Bolzano, 1810,
p. 20, 97.































Figure 4.6: Classification of mathematics according to the early Bolzano.
In technical terms of the time: the other mathematical disciplines are
subordinated to general mathematics like gold and silver are subordinated
to their genus ‘metal’.112 This is reflected in the objects of study of the
mathematical disciplines. Just as gold consists of the characteristics of metal
plus an additional characteristic specific to gold, the object of the specific
mathematical disciplines consists of the form of object as such plus another
qualification. Arithmetic, part of general mathematics, is concerned with one
of the most general forms, namely countability and therefore contains the
most general laws. The special mathematical disciplines stand at the opposite
side of the tree where the object of investigation has become more specific
112Bolzano, 1810, p. 17, 96.
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and complex. Geometry, for example, is the science of a more specific form,
namely the conditions under which things can be perceived. As such it still
abstracts from the intuitions and only takes into account the conditions under
which these intuitions can be given.
Since gold shares part of its characteristics with metal, the properties and
statements about metal also apply to gold. However, the properties and
statements valid for gold, due to its additional characteristics, do not apply to
metal. In the same way, all theorems of general mathematics are valid within
the specific disciplines of mathematics, but not vice versa.113 The theorems
of geometry are thus neither available to general mathematics, including
algebra, nor to chronology. Moreover, the notion of motion is not available
to geometry, because it relies on space and time which constitutes the much
more specific field of mechanics. Bolzano’s organization of mathematics into
disciplines thus provides the limits within which disciplines are allowed to
use each other theorems in their proofs. These limits correspond exactly with
the ban on kind crossing. At the same time, these limits can be regarded as
tests which a proof must pass successfully in order to provide the objective
ground of its theorem.114
Apart from being the root of the Porphyrian tree of disciplines, general
mathematics has an additional role with regard to the other mathematical
disciplines. In the Beyträge, Bolzano introduces a new part of general mathe-
matics under the title ‘aetiology’:
Now there are certain general conditions according to which ev-
erything which is produced through a ground (in or out of time)
must be regulated in its becoming or existence. These conditions
taken together and ordered scientifically, will therefore constitute
the first main part of mathesis, which I call, for want of a better
name, the theory of grounds [Grundlehre] or aetiology.115
113Traces of this type of reasoning and manner of organizing mathematics can already be
found in the article of 1804 (Bolzano, 1804, p. 32, p. 44).
114A most important task of Bolzano was to further establish what may count as proper
ground-consequence relations. Investigation of these relations themselves is outside the
scope of this project. For a recent study of Bolzano’s notion of ground see Roski, 2014.
115Bolzano, 1810, p. 21, 97. At the time, similar to contemporary usage, the term ‘aetiology’
was almost exclusively used in reference to the causes of diseases. An exception is the work
Erster Versuch einer allgemeinen Aetiologie (1792) written by Werner, who mentions and
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Aetiology provides the foundations for any form of grounding in other
disciplines. He regards the relation of cause and effect of the natural sciences
as a special case of the general relation of ground and consequence:
[F]or example, the theorems: ‘every effect is simultaneous with
its cause; the size of the effect originating from a constant cause
varies as the product of the degree of the cause and the time for
which it acts’, and similar ones. These theorems are in fact so
general that they hold not only for spatial material things but
also for spiritual forces, our ideas, and generally for all things
which appear in time and are subject to the law of causality. Thus
I distinguish the words ground [Grund] and cause [Ursache].
The latter means for me a ground which acts in time.116
Aetiology is the science of the general notion of ground while the more
specific notion of cause is relegated to the more specific discipline of temporal
aetiology. Suppose a proper proof of a theorem such as ‘the angles of a
triangle sum up to two right angles’ is available. The proof thus provides the
objective grounds of the theorem, that is, each step between principle and
theorem provides the proper ground of the intermediate judgment. These
steps themselves must be justified, that is, grounded themselves. Aetiology
provides these grounds.117 A short description of its content will clarify the
refers to his own work in Eberhard’s Philosophisches Archiv (Werner, 1792; Werner, 1793,
p. 60). Bolzano not only might have known him from this journal, but also possessed a
copy of Werner’s book on aetiology with quite a lot of notes indicating a detailed study of
this work (Jan Berg, 2002, p. 402). From the 1790’s onwards the term became increasingly
popular in a medical context. This observation is based on data made available by Google’s
ngram viewer by a case insensitive search after ‘aetiologie’ in German books published
between 1700 and 2000. According to Schopenhauer, proper use of the term refers to all
branches of physics (Naturwissenschaft) and concerns rules governing relations between
changes in matter (Schopenhauer, 1819, p. 142). The philosophical dictionary of Krug,
very often discussed by Bolzano, provides a lemma on aetiology that testifies of a twofold
use of the term, namely empirical aetiology as the study of the causes of for example
diseases and a transcendental aetiology as the study of causes and effects in general (Krug,
1827, p. 62).
116Bolzano, 1810, p. 25, 98. Cf. GA2A5, §7, p. 80. Ignoring the details, this is quite similar to
Kant. As I have shown elsewhere, Kant grounds his laws of mechanics in the more general
analogies of experience (Blok, 2013). The latter involve the category of causality which
can be regarded as a realization of the corresponding function of the understanding, the
logical form of hypothetical judgments, in space and time.
117Bolzano presents the forms these steps can take in the Beyträge and in several notes written
shortly after the publication of the Beyträge (GA2B15, p. 222-224; 238-246). For an
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exact nature of aetiology.118 In the second installment, Bolzano presents quite
an extensive version of aetiology. Several of its principles used to be part of
ontology in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition. An example, is a version of the
principle of sufficient reason: ‘for each thing I know, a ground exists that
explains why I know it’.119 Other examples are principles expressing the
conditions for the similarity of grounds and what we nowadays would call
the transitivity of grounding.120
The generality of these principles raises the question whether it is indeed a
mathematical discipline. Bolzano seems aware of this issue and notes that:
Aetiology can precede all of mathematics as an introduction.121
Aetiology thus functions as an introduction to mathematics as a whole
(gesammten Mathesis) in the same way as the first chapter on mathemati-
cal method served as an introduction to mathematics in the textbooks by for
example Wolff and Kästner. As discussed before, this mathematical method is
in fact a summary of logic. Whereas the Beyträge lists aetiology as a mathemat-
ical discipline among the usual mathematical disciplines such as algebra, this
note suggests aetiology to be part of logic rather than mathematics itself. This
move coincides with Bolzano’s return from the quite general definition of
mathematics in the Beyträge to a slightly narrower version of the traditional
definition of mathematics as the science of quantities.122 Bolzano’s mature
work on logic and epistemology, theWissenschaftslehre, indeed contains con-
tent similar to his early work on aetiology.
In sum, we have seen how Bolzano’s reorganization of the sciences con-
tributes to the proper grounding of their theorems in order to prevent the
fundamental problems of Euclidean geometry. The limits imposed by the
reorganization of the sciences prevents the use of alien concepts, which results
in proofs that do not show the proper grounds of theorems. Additionally, the
new mathematical discipline of aetiology provides the conditions for having
extensive discussion of this topic see Roski, 2014, pp. 45-61.
118For a comparison to Bolzano’s later notion of grounding and a short description of the
principles of aetiology see Roski, 2014, pp. 84-90.
119GA2A5, p. 78-79.
120GA2A5, p. 87; p. 90.
121GA2A5, p. 77.
122Cf. §4.4, §6.5.
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proper grounds. The next chapter investigates the nature of the first grounds




Bolzano’s Early Logic of
Synthetic Principles
As we have seen in the first three chapters, the aspect of construction became
more and more central in the methodology and philosophy of mathemat-
ics, culminating into Kant’s notion of construction in pure intuition as the
primary explanation of mathematical knowledge. In retrospective, this de-
velopment uncovers the problematic aspects of the traditional mathematical
method. Whereas Euclidean geometry was taken as the most successful sci-
ence, and accordingly as the paradigmatic model of science by Wolff and
Kant, Bolzano criticized the realization of the mathematical method in Eu-
clid’s Elements and the mathematical textbooks of the eighteenth century
in a fundamental manner. As we have seen in the previous chapter, his crit-
icism of the definitions and proofs provided by Euclid’s Elements and the
role of geometrical proofs in other mathematical fields asks for a reform of
mathematics.
The latter not only consists of a new definition of mathematics, a reorga-
nization of its fields, proper definitions of mathematical concepts, but also
of an improved methodology that indeed shows the objective grounds of
mathematical theorems. Since many proofs fail to establish a proper ground-
ing relation between the most fundamental truths (principles) and theorems,
Bolzano devotes quite some attention to the notion of grounding, both in his
early and in his later work. Later developments in analytic philosophy, such
as with regard to the notion of logical consequence, have raised quite some
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interest in this topic.1 To me it seems that the modern notion of consequence
has resulted in such a huge interest in Bolzano’s relation of grounding that
it overshadows the role of the ultimate starting point of grounding, namely
the principles. Especially in his early work, Bolzano puts quite some effort
into the investigation of the nature of principles, as well as, the search for
the proper principles of mathematics and ethics. In my view, most of his
early work is mainly motivated by this search, which accordingly must be
investigated in order to understand Bolzano’s position within the history of
philosophy.
Another reason for the neglect of Bolzano’s search for synthetic principles
stems from the anti-Kantian perspective on his work, which is due to a focus
on theWissenschaftslehre and the posthumously published Neuer Anti-Kant.2
For example, George finds such a huge gap between Kant and Bolzano that
he can hardly understand Bolzano’s appreciation of Kant’s philosophy and
therefore attributes the attention Bolzano payed to Kant and his followers
to their monopoly on the handbook market for logic.3 In his commentary
on the early work of Bolzano, Rusnock even claims that Kant’s distinction
between analytic and synthetic judgments was of little use to Bolzano.4 In my
view, Bolzano’s appreciation, at least in his early years, is much deeper, both
from a systematic and historical perspective.5 Contrary to Rusnock, I will
argue in this chapter that Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction is not only as
important to the early Bolzano as it was to Kant, but also plays a similar role,
namely as a criterion of truly scientific judgments. As we will see, the Kantian
idea that science consists of synthetic judgments determined Bolzano’s early
ideas concerning logic and epistemology and influenced the Beyträge in many
respects. In contrast to existing commentators of Bolzano’s early work, I will
1Siebel, 1996; Tatzel, 2002; Roski, 2014.
2Príhonský, 2003. Cf. Coffa, 1991; Sebestik, 1992; Sebestik, 1997.
3George, 1999, p. 130.
4Rusnock, 2000, p. 50.
5Moscher describes the connection to Kant more appropriately: ‘Von Kant erhielt Bolzano
zahlreiche Anregungen was Problemstellungen betrifft; in der Lösung ging er fast im-
mer andere, entgegengesetzte Wege. Kant war für Bolzano so etwas wie ein geistiger
Reibebaum.’ (Príhonský, 2003, p. XXII). Although Rusnock puts Bolzano within the his-
tory of the method of analysis (Rusnock, 1997), he neither discusses Bolzano’s immediate
predecessors, like Wolff and Kant, nor contemporary philosophers and logicians although
Bolzano carefully studied their work as it was relevant to the philosophical method of
analysis.
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emphasize that Bolzano relied on Kant’s distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments and merely rejected Kant’s epistemological explanation
of synthetic judgments in terms of construction in pure intuition.6
This chapter presents Bolzano’s early conception of logic and focuses on
his treatment of principles as it can be found in the Beyträge, the lecture
Etwas aus der Logik, and notes stemming from 1803-1810.7 The first section
describes Bolzano’s early conception of logic by situating it within the most
influential conceptions of logic of the time, namely that of Wolff and Kant
(§5.1).8 According to Bolzano, the purpose of logic is to contribute to an ob-
jective grounding of truths in proper principles by making explicit the precise
nature of grounding and of principles. The second section discusses Bolzano’s
criticism of Kant’s view of mathematics (§5.2). Arguments against Kant are
collected from his published early work, as well as unpublished manuscripts
and notes. I will argue that Bolzano’s early criticism of Kant’s view of math-
ematics was directed against Kant’s explanation of synthetic judgments in
terms of pure intuitions rather than against the synthetic nature of mathemat-
ics per se. My conclusions concerning the role of Kant’s analytic-synthetic
distinction in Bolzano’s early work are in line with de Jong’s assessment
of Bolzano’s later criticism of Kant.9 Subsequently, I investigate Bolzano’s
theory of judgments (§5.3) and his interpretation of Kant’s distinction be-
tween analytic and synthetic judgments (§5.4). While the first part of this
chapter clarifies Bolzano’s understanding of the distinction between analytic
and synthetic judgments, the second half shows how Bolzano employed it
in his quest for proper principles. We will first see how he participates in
the methodological debates of the time by criticizing the principles of Kant
and the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition (§5.5). Subsequently, it will become clear
how Bolzano characterizes principles as synthetic judgments that consist of
simple subjects and predicates (§5.6). Similar to Kant, Bolzano claims that the
synthetic nature of theorems relies on a priori synthetic principles. Finally, I
will further substantiate my claim that the early Bolzano followed Kant in
6Rusnock, 2000; Krickel, 1995.
7The private lecture Etwas aus der Logik is most likely dated between 1811 and 1813 (GA2A5,
p. 10).
8Discussions and references in Bolzano’s notes and his remarks in the Wissenschaftslehre
indicate that Wolffians and Kantians were Bolzano’s most important sources.
9de Jong, 2001, p. 342, 344.
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emphasizing the synthetic nature of knowledge.
5.1 Logic as the Method of Mathematics
Before we focus on Bolzano’s notion of principle and its role in ground-
ing true judgments, let us position Bolzano within the eighteenth century
methodological debates concerning the nature of logic and mathematics. As
we have seen, Kant distinguishes between logic and the method of mathemat-
ics whereas the Wolffians regards them as identical.10 In Kant’s view, logic,
abstracting from any object, merely considers the general form of thinking,
whereas mathematics presents its object by means of construction in pure
intuition. As I argued before, the early Bolzano employs the Kantian notion
of form to provide a new definition of mathematics as the study of the general
forms any object must take.11 Bolzano’s conception of mathematics thus
takes the form of objects as its object and abstracts from (non-mathematical)
objects in a way similar to Kant’s conception of logic.12 Bolzano thus widens
the notion of mathematics, which enables him to account for new mathemat-
ical entities, such as infinitesimals, real and complex numbers. Moreover, this
move allows Bolzano to regard the method of mathematics as identical to
logic, thereby taking side with the Leibniz-Wolffian position in the eighteenth
century debate on the methodology of philosophy and mathematics.13 Since
Bolzano regards the method of mathematics as identical to logic, it provides
the rules for any scientific treatise, including ethics. His work on the latter
throughout his career shows that the validity and application of his logic
was never meant to be limited to mathematics. Nevertheless, as we will see
in the subsequent sections of this chapter, Bolzano cannot be regarded as a
Leibnizean in other respects, for example with regard to the role and nature
of principles.
Yet, Bolzano’s treatment of logic in both the early Beyträge (1810) and
the matureWissenschaftslehre (1837) exhibits another remarkable similarity
10See §1.1; §2.4; §3.6.
11See §4.4.
12In the next chapter we will see how this definition supports the important role that Bolzano
attributes to general mathematics.
13Bolzano’s understanding of the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition was mainly based on the text-
books by Wolff. Wolff’s view is discussed in §1.1. Cf. Tonelli, 1959.
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with the textbooks on logic in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, namely the
idea that logic is relevant to the ‘presentation of sciences in textbooks’. Al-
though this second theme might seem trivial compared to the first one, it
becomes utterly important in the Wissenschaftslehre, while it also figures
prominently in the Beyträge. In the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano’s definition
of logic employs the notion of presentation in a textbook.14 The title of the
Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik already indicates
that Bolzano focused on the methodological nature of logic and its bearings
on the presentation of mathematics. In an early manuscript on logic, he states
that logic merely provides guidance for one’s own thinking, as well as, for
disclosing what is thought to others.15 Why is the notion of the presentation
so important to Bolzano?
Let us first consider two misunderstandings that can easily obscure our
reading. From a contemporary point of view, the role of logic with regard to
the presentation of sciences might seem merely a practical matter. However,
contrary to current scientific textbooks, the purpose of textbooks was not
purely educational in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. They
also served to demonstrate the foundation of a science. The first chapter of
a German textbook on mathematics was usually devoted to the method of
mathematics.16 In the tradition of Wolff and Kästner this boils down to a very
short introduction to logic in which the examples and the terminology are
adapted to mathematics. Logic itself did not belong to mathematics and was
treated in a distinct textbook. The Beyträge stands in this tradition and thus
provides the first methodological part of the much larger project of providing
a well ordered presentation of mathematics.17 Bolzano’s treatment of logic as
the method of mathematics is subordinated to the aim of a new presentation
of mathematics:
Meanwhile I may be permitted to make some remarks, as briefly
as possible, on individual parts of this method—especially since
14WL, §1.
15GA2A5, p. 156.
16Cf. GWI:12; GWII:29; Kästner, 1758.
17The unfinished mature work on mathematics entitled Grössenlehre exhibits the same struc-
ture (GA2A7). The first chapter serves as a concise introduction to the logic and episte-
mology of Bolzano’sWissenschaftslehre and is translated in On the Mathematical Method
(Rusnock and George, 2004).
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everything which we shall say here refers only to mathematics,
and primarily to the removal of certain of its imperfections.18
The quoted passage indicates that the early Bolzano did not intend to present
a complete system in full detail. He apparently expected the reader to be
educated in eighteenth century logic and mainly discusses the topics in which
he differs in important respects from the mainstream textbooks on logic of
the time. As such, it treats the mathematical method much more extensively
than Wolff’s and Kästner’s textbooks because Bolzano’s aim of a perfect
system of mathematics requires quite some modifications with regard to logic
and methodology. Nevertheless, the Beyträge is not meant as a textbook of
logic, but as the first part of a complete series of textbooks on mathematics.19
The scarce secondary literature on the Beyträge tends to neglect this historical
context, for example when Rusnock describes it as immature and surprisingly
underdeveloped.20 Although the Beyträgemight seem so from the perspective
of later work on logic, especially Bolzano’s extensiveWissenschaftslehre, it is
extremely detailed and sophisticated in comparison to the methodological
part of other mathematical textbooks. In my view, put into its historical
perspective and proper context, the logic of the Beyträge must be evaluated as
more sophisticated than it is often assumed.
A second misunderstanding arises if one regards the discovery of new
mathematical truths as the primary aim of the method of mathematics.
In Bolzano’s view, the method of mathematics aims to present the proper
grounds of all mathematical truths regardless of how evident they are and
regardless of how they have been or could have been discovered. Nevertheless,
an exposition in accordance with the mathematical method might help to
discover new mathematical truths.21 Lack of knowledge of the ultimate
grounds is likely to be a barrier for the expansion of mathematical knowledge.
An example of this are the geometrical grounds for theorems that later became
part of the newmathematical discipline of analysis.22 History proved Bolzano
18Bolzano, 1810, p. 39, 103.
19Cf. GA2A5, p. 15. Bolzano’s unpublished second installment to the Beyträge shows how
Bolzano intended to present the disciplines of mathematics as he conceived them (GA2A5).
We have discussed this in more detail in §4.6.
20Rusnock, 2000, p. 50; Rusnock and Sebestik, 2013, p. 1.
21Bolzano, 1804, p. 7, 31.
22See §4.3.
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to be at least partly right, since his own mathematical method helped him
to structure mathematics so as to prove the theorems he is still famous for.
Thus, the main contribution of logic neither consists of pragmatic concerns
with regard to the presentation of sciences nor of methods for the invention
of mathematical truths.
Bolzano’s motivation for a better presentation of mathematics has a much
deeper source. Whereas Wolff, Kant, and most eighteenth century philoso-
phers regarded the mathematics of the time as the paradigmatic example of an
almost perfect science, Bolzano repeatedly criticizes the state of mathematics
with respect to quite fundamental aspects. In the preface to the Beyträge,
for example, Bolzano mentions the diversity in textbooks on arithmetic to
support his claim that even the most elementary theories of mathematics, in
this case the theory of negative quantities, contain many crucial defects.23 He
held this view already in 1804 when he criticized Euclidean geometry for its
lack of appropriate definitions and its inappropriate use of middle terms in
proofs.24 These issues indicate a more general problem:
Up until now, geometry does not show that and why it must be
presented as it is. Yet, I think that it must be possible to invent a
system which is so perfect as to show this.25
Already for the early Bolzano, the notion of a perfect system involves a
manner of presentation that reveals why the science is presented as it is,
that is, why some truths are presented as principles and others as theorems.
Proper definitions and middle terms will result in proofs that show the proper
grounding of a theorem in principles. Thus, the purpose of the mathematical
method, or logic, is to provide the means for presenting the proper foundation
of the truths of a particular domain of knowledge.
23In his article on binomials of 1816, Bolzano still endorses the logic of the Beyträge and
claims that he follows this method in his mathematical article to a large extent. However,
he cannot follow this method all the way because it would require a new treatment of the
first concepts and principles of arithmetic (Russ, 2004, p. 163). As I show in chapter 6, the
unpublished draft of the second installment to the Beyträge provides a sketch of such a new
treatment.
24Cf. Bolzano, 1804; GA2B2/1, p. 79-80.
25GA2B2/1 p. 80: ‘Überhaupt sieht man in unserer bisherigen Geometrie nicht, daß und
warum sie gerade so vorgetragen werden müsse, als sie wird. Und mich deucht doch,
es müßte möglich seyn, ein so vollkommenes System zu erfinden, wo man dieß zeigen
könnte’.
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This is in fact a quite traditional conception of logic. Wolff defines the aim
of logic in similar terms: it provides the rules for demonstrating the truth
of judgments. Despite these similarities, Bolzano formulates a devastating
criticism of what the tradition actually had achieved. In Bolzano’s view, the
tradition often mistakes a convincing presentation for a presentation of the
objective foundation:
[T]he purpose of a scientific exposition is usually imagined to be
the greatest possible certainty and strength of conviction. It there-
fore happens that the obligation to prove propositions which, in
themselves, are already completely certain, is discounted. This
is a procedure which, when we are concerned with the practical
purpose of certainty, is quite correct and praiseworthy; but it
cannot possibly be tolerated in a scientific exposition because it
contradicts its essential aim.26
The notion of subjective certainty, that is, of becoming convinced by the
truth indeed plays an important role in the influential work of Wolff.27 He
for example describes logic as providing explanations for why we become
convinced of true judgments by means of demonstrations. According to
Wolff, the aim of a scientific treatment of knowledge according to the rules
of logic consists in an increase of confidence in the truth of the presented
knowledge. In accordance with this aim, the burden of proof only exists for
judgments that lack sufficient evidence. In other words, judgments considered
to be self-evident do not require a demonstration.28
Bolzano radically criticizes the role of this notion of certainty. Although
certainty might be an effect of presenting science in accordance with the rules
of logic, it should not play a role in these rules themselves. In other words,
the positive effects of a scientific treatment must be distinguished from the
scientific treatment itself. According to Bolzano, we must return to the real
aim of the scientific enterprise as exhibited by Euclid:
[T]he most immediate and direct purpose which all genuinely
philosophical thinkers had in their scientific investigations was
26Bolzano, 1810, p. 40, p. 103.
27Cf. §1.1; GWII:1, p. 160-163, §139; GWI:12, p. 3; GWI:1, p. 105.
28As we have seen in the first chapter, Wolff regards them as principles. As we will see,
Bolzano rejects this alleged self-evidence of axioms or principles (§5.6).
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none other than the search for the ultimate grounds of their
judgments. And this search then had the further purpose, on
the one hand, of putting themselves in the position of deriving
from these clearly recognized grounds some of our judgments,
perhaps also some new judgments and truths; and on the other
hand, of providing an exercise in correct and orderly thinking
which should then indirectly contribute to greater certainty and
strength in all our convictions.29
Although Bolzano thoroughly criticizes Euclid’s realization of geometry, he
adheres to what he regards as Euclid’s aim, namely to present the ultimate
grounds of geometrical theorems.30 Only in this manner is logic able to con-
tribute to one of the purposes of the mathematical method often mentioned
in the eighteenth century, namely an exercise in correct, precise and profound
thinking. The aim of science is to find the proper grounds. Apart from the
search for proper grounds themselves, in itself a common theme, Bolzano
focuses on the objective connection of these grounds to the truths that rely
on them:
[I]n the realm of truth, i.e. in the collection of all true judgments,
a certain objective connection prevails which is independent of
our accidental and subjective recognition of it. As a consequence
of this some of these judgments are the grounds of others and
the latter are the consequences of the former. Presenting this
objective connection of judgments, i.e. choosing a set of judg-
ments and placing them one after another so that a consequence
29Bolzano, 1810, p. 41, 104.
30Betti emphasizes that the so called classical model of science, that is, roughly speaking,
the Euclidean mathematical method, was widely accepted as an ideal and that Bolzano
merely criticized the extent to which this ideal was realized (Betti, 2010, p. 289). The main
difference between the classical model of science, which is formulated in quite general
terms, and the Euclidean mathematical method, especially as it was conceived by Wolff
and Kant, consists of the crucial role that construction plays in geometry and, as a result,
in the mathematical method itself (de Jong and Betti, 2010; §1.3, §1.6, §3.4, §3.5). As we
have seen, Bolzano’s most fierce criticism was directed against the role of construction
and its associated notions, alien to most mathematical disciplines, like motion (§4.2).
Insofar as one regards construction as a main characteristic of Euclid’s methodology,
Bolzano rejects this methodology. Yet, he accepts the overall axiomatic model in which
theorems are grounded in principles via those syllogistic inferences that are accepted as
ground-consequence relations (see Roski, 2014, pp. 61-78).
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is represented as such and conversely, seems to me to be the real
purpose to pursue in a scientific exposition.31
Even if one agrees on the ultimate aim, one might present the wrong prin-
ciples and inappropriate connections to consequences, as Bolzano thought
was the case in Euclid’s Elements.32 Humans often err in quite a sophisticated
way, namely by adhering to a truth for reasons that indeed contribute to
certainty, but do not belong to the objective grounds of this truth.33 Precisely
for this reason the main task of Bolzano’s project is to investigate how to
achieve knowledge of objective relations of ground and consequence. As we
will see, Bolzano holds that the ultimate grounds of mathematical theorems
are not to be found by means of the analysis of concepts as in the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition. As a result, the nature of Bolzano’s principles differs from
those threated in this tradition in that they do not immediately stem from
definitions. The remainder of this chapter discusses Bolzano’s early views on
the a priori synthetic nature of the ultimate grounds, namely principles.
5.2 Bolzano’s Criticism of Kant in the Beyträge
This section aims to reveal the precise nature of the criticism of Kant that
Bolzano put forward in his early Beyträge. Accepting both Kant’s distinc-
tion between analytic and synthetic judgments and the synthetic nature of
arithmetic, Bolzano joins the starting point of Kant’s project in the first
Critique, namely, the question concerning the possibility of a priori syn-
thetic judgments. On the basis of his definition of analytic and synthetic
judgments, Kant is able to formulate this question more precisely as ‘what
is the X here on which the understanding depends when it believes itself to
discover beyond the concept of A a predicate that is foreign to it and that is
yet connected with it?’.34 Following Kant, Bolzano maintains that the distinc-
tion between analytic and synthetic judgments is so important as to require
that synthetic judgments have a source different from analytic judgments.35
31Bolzano, 1810, p. 39, 103.
32See §4.2.
33The preface of the Beyträge assumes that human knowledge is always partial and fallible
(Bolzano, 1810, p. III, 87).
34B13.
35Cf. Bolzano, 1810, p. 138-139, 133.
5.2 Bolzano’s Criticism of Kant in the Beyträge 201
Synthetic judgments require other grounds than the principles of identity
and non-contradiction, which only suffice to ground analytic judgments:
The latter are all based on that one general proposition which
is expressed by the formula: (A cum B) is a kind of A. If this is
called the law of identity or of contradiction then it can always
be said that the law of contradiction is the common source of
all analytic judgments. However, it is entirely different with the
synthetic judgments: these obviously cannot be derived from
that axiom.36
In the case of analytic judgments, the principle of identity or non-contradiction
suffices to ground their truth since the subject contains the predicate as ex-
pressed by Bolzano’s logical analysis of analytic judgments into the subject
‘A cum B’ and the predicate ‘A’.37 For example, the judgment ‘All human
beings are rational’ is analytic because the concept ‘human being’ contains
the characteristic ‘rational’.38 Analysis of the concepts involved in an analytic
judgment suffices to justify its truth. In the case of synthetic judgments,
however, Kant requires an epistemological notion other than conceptual
analysis to explain its predication. According to Bolzano’s reading of Kant,
this explanation can ‘be nothing but an intuition which we connect with the
concept of the subject and which at the same time contains the predicate’.39
Insofar empirical synthetic judgments are concerned, Bolzano agrees with
Kant’s answer.40 In the case of a priori synthetic judgments, by contrast,
Bolzano rejects Kant’s answer to the question as to how synthetic a priori
36Bolzano, 1810, p. 136, 132.
37Bolzano’s early explanation of analytic and synthetic judgments will be discussed more in
detail in the subsequent section.
38Bolzano’s logical analysis of this example results in the subject ‘living being cum rational’
and the predicate ‘rational’. Regardless of the debate in secondary literature on Kant’s
precise explanation of analytic judgments, Bolzano’s formula ‘(A cum B) is a kind of A’
indicates that Bolzano interpreted Kant’s notion of containment in terms of genus-species
relations constituted by essential marks. An influential version of this interpretation is
nowadays advocated by Anderson and de Jong (Anderson, 2004; de Jong, 1995). For
a discussion of this topic see chapter 3. Interestingly, de Jong claims that the analysis
of judgments into the form ‘(A cum B) is B’ can be traced back to Leibniz who even
introduced a symbol for cum (de Jong, 1995, pp. 628-629).
39Bolzano, 1810, p. 136-137, 132. Similar expressions can indeed be found in Kant’s work
(B357).
40Bolzano, 1810, p. 143, 134.
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judgments are possible. Contrary to Kant, Bolzano regards the subject as
the only possible ground (Grund) of the connection between subject and
predicate. Later we will discuss what this means, as well as, the far reaching
consequences of Bolzano’s answer (§5.6).41
Bolzano’s alternative as such does not yet constitute an argument against
the Kantian role of intuition. He merely states that the subject and predicate
of the judgment alone are able to serve as the ground for synthetic judgments.
Scattered throughout Bolzano’s early writings one can find at least three kinds
of arguments against the role of intuition in Kant’s philosophy of mathe-
matics: intuitions cannot yield general conclusions, construction of complex
geometrical objects is impossible, and imaginary mathematical objects cannot
be construed in intuition.42
The first argument criticizes Kant’s alleged step from the individual intu-
ition of a triangle to claims about triangles in general.43 One point is that
intuitions are singular, and therefore cannot ground general judgments.44
Bolzano’s notes provide a more detailed exposition of this argument in a
logical form, which is typical of Bolzano’s style. The strategy of his argumen-
tation is to reject a judgment that involves intuition as a possible premise for
a conceptual thesis.45 Bolzano’s argument for this thesis is that any a priori
conceptual proposition requires a general proposition or judgment as major
(figure 5.1 shows an example close to Bolzano’s notes).46
41See Bolzano, 1810, p. 142, 134. Of course, the subject of synthetic judgments must be the
ground for the predicate in a way different from that of analytic judgments. Elsewhere
I provide a more detailed account of how the subject of a priori synthetic judgments
grounds the predicate (§5.3).
42The first two arguments resemble the - Leibnizian - criticism that can be found in the work
of Eberhard and other articles published in his magazine (Kant, 2004; Schwab, 1791a;
Schwab, 1791b; Bendavid, 1792; Kästner, 1790c; Kästner, 1790a).
43Bolzano, 1810, p. 144, 135. Hintikka’s interpretation reads such a step in Kant’s philosophy
of mathematics and accepts Kant’s reasoning by interpreting it as a step of generalization as
found in natural deduction. As I argued in chapter 3, the mathematical and philosophical
context makes it implausible that this problem is indeed present in Kant’s philosophy of
mathematics (§3.5).
44Bolzano, 1810, p. 146, 134.
45GA2B2/2, p. 79. The context reveals that Bolzano uses Intuition and Anschauung inter-
changebly, since he uses the term Anschauung on the next page to make the same point
(GA2B2/2, p. 80). Bolzano maintains in these notes the following thesis: the a priori
knowledge that B is a consequence of A implies that one must be able to determine a priori
the properties (Eigenschaften) of B by means of the properties of A (GA2B2/2, p.78).
46In Bolzano’s early work, contrary to the later Wissenschaftslehre, the terms ‘proposition’
(Satz) and ‘judgment’ (Urteil) are almost interchangeable.
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Triangles with a have property b
This triangle abc has property a
This triangle abc has property b ∴
Figure 5.1: Example of a syllogism with a minor containing an intuition
To draw an a priori conclusion requires the subsumption of a judgment
based on intuition as a minor under the general major. The only option to
draw the conclusion is to follow the syllogistic scheme of the subsumption of
the minor ‘Socrates is a men’ under the general major ‘All men are mortal’.47
Since the minor is particular, the conclusion of such a syllogism will also
be particular.48 Since the logic of the time did not provide a legitimate step
from a particular proposition to a general proposition without the help of
another general proposition, particular propositions cannot ground general
propositions.49
In his conclusion, Bolzano adheres to the Kantian dichotomy of particular
intuitions and general concepts:
Concepts can always only follow from concepts. Of course,
they can be applied to intuitions (individual representations), but
the former cannot resemble the latter to such an extent that
the former exclusively applies to this intuition alone, but always
to multiple intuitions, which requires a rule, that is, a concept,
47In syllogisms the major contains the predicate of the conclusion, the minor contains the
subject of the conclusion. Bolzano sometimes wants to reverse the order of major and
minor if the latter is less complex or more general, since he requires the presentation of a
science to start with the most simple and most general concepts and judgments.
48In the same notes, Bolzano maintains that intuitions can only be the subject of a judgment
(GA2B2/2, p. 76). The intuition can therefore only be part of the minor (which yields a
conclusion about an intuition).
49Bolzano in fact interprets Kant’s use of intuition in the same way as Hintikka, namely as
the instantiation of the general quantifier. However, contrary to Hintikka, Bolzano uses
it as a criticism since, contrary to contemporary logic, traditional logic does not provide
a suitable generalization. In the later Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano makes a similar point
arguing that conceptual truths never depend on Anschauungssätze, although they might
help to attain knowledge of a conceptual truth (WL §221, p. 384, p. 199). However, in
my view, the Kantian role of intuition is not about generalization at all, since an a priori
intuition is general enough to reach the desired conclusions, although not as general as a
merely conceptual mathematical notion (see §3.5).
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according to which they are applicable in general.50
Only concepts function as rules in virtue of which they are generally appli-
cable, that is, a concept A provides a rule that allows to decide whether an
object falls under A or not. In other words, Bolzano’s question to Kant is
how it is possible that pure intuition is particular and general at the same
time.51 Bolzano regards this as impossible because of the dichotomy between
intuitions and concepts introduced by Kant.52 Since Kant rejects infima
species, the representation of individuals (intuitions) fundamentally differs
from general representations (concepts). Therefore concepts follow from
other concepts rather than from intuitions. The introduction of an intuition
in a premise of a syllogism will always result in a singular conclusion. Accept-
ing Kant’s dichotomy between intuitions and concepts, Bolzano thus rejects
intuitions as possible grounds for general synthetic judgments. Bolzano thus
assumes that synthetic predication must be conceptual. However, the purpose
of Kant’s notion of intuition is precisely to introduce the possibility of a
non-logical and non-conceptual ground of synthetic predication. Thus, apart
from his denial of the role of motion and construction in Euclidean geometry,
Bolzano also rejects construction in pure intuition because he requires the
ground of synthetic predication to be conceptual.
Yet, Bolzano’s rejection of the Kantian role of intuition does not mean that
intuition does not come into play at all when doing mathematics. According
to Bolzano, the intuition of mathematical objects is unavoidable, but not
necessary:
According to my ideas it is of course unavoidable that when
we think of some frequently seen spatial object, our imagina-
tion paints us a picture of the same thing. It is also useful and
convenient that this image appears in our minds, as it makes the
assessment of the object easier. But I do not regard it as absolutely
50GA2B2/2, p. 80: ‘Begriffe können immer wieder nur aus Begriffen folgen. Sie können wohl
angewandt werden auf Anschauungen auf individuelle Vorstellungen, aber sie können nie
ihnen so eigenthümlich sein, daß sie nur dieser Anschauung allein zukämen, sondern immer
mehreren, und dann muß es eine Regel, einen Begriff geben, nach welchem sie allgemein
anwendbar sind’.
51This indeed constitutes a legitimate and difficult question for Kant. For my solution to this
question see §3.5.
52See §3.3.1.
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necessary for this assessment. There are actually even theorems
in geometry for which we have no intuitions at all. The proposi-
tion that every straight line can be extended to infinity has no
intuition behind it: the lines which our imagination can picture
are not infinitely long. In stereometry we are often concerned
with such complicated spatial objects, that even the most lively
imagination is no longer able to imagine them clearly; but we
none the less continue to calculate with our concepts and find
truth.53
Bolzano’s interpretation of pure intuitions as pictorial images can hardly
be regarded as a sophisticated interpretation of Kant, but was common at
the time, even in the works of Kant’s followers. Regardless of how Kant’s
text itself can and must be interpreted, Kant’s followers, and especially the
mathematicians among them, held that the construction of a mathematical
concept results in a particular intuition that represents it.54
The quoted passage ends with the second kind of argument, which was
also used against Kant’s position two decades earlier by Eberhard. This kind
of argument refers to complex or infinite geometrical objects that are beyond
the limits of our imagination, such as for example an infinitely long line or
a thousand-sided polygon.55 The argument again depends on the view that
regards intuition as a form of pictorial imagination for which very complex
objects indeed would be a problem. As such the argument is not convincing
since the first Critique provides ample reason to treat Kant’s faculties of
sensation and imagination, as well as, the notion of pure intuition in a much
less psychological fashion. Apart from the section on schematism in the
first Critique, Kant’s response to Eberhard on this point in an unpublished
manuscript relies on the notion of a rule which indicates that pure intuition
cannot be identified with a pictorial notion of imagination.56
53Bolzano, 1810, p. 149-150, 136.
54See for example Michelsen, 1789.
55Kant, 2004, p. 48. The argument and example can be found much earlier in the sixth
meditation of Descartes (Descartes, 1996, p. 50 ). Leibniz uses this case to argue for the
importance of symbolic cognition (Leibniz, 1989; §2.3.1).
56B172-187; VIII:212. Cf. B741; B746.
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A third argument can be found in Bolzano’s first publication, namely
his article on the foundations of geometry, which was published in 1804.57
According to Bolzano, the concept of a point refers to an imaginary object
since it is not part of space and does not occupy space.58 Since everything
given in intuition is a solid, any pure intuition of points, but also of lines and
surfaces defined by means of the motion of a point, is impossible. Alterna-
tively, Bolzano regards them as ‘simple objects of thought’ (Gedankendinge).
Accordingly, his geometrical definitions avoid the notion of motion and
merely assumes that geometrical objects are objects in thought. Similar to the
previous two arguments, this one also relies on a notion of intuition similar
or identical to a pictorial notion of imagination, since Bolzano’s argument
requires every spatial intuition to be three-dimensional.59 Indeed, there is
some textual evidence that Kant would have adhered to this latter claim.60 On
this condition, pure intuition, and therefore the faculty of sensation, would
strictly speaking not be sufficient to yield the intuition of a point or line.
The intuition of a point would involve a process of abstraction and thereby a
role for the understanding. This would violate Kant’s separation of the two
faculties of sensation and the understanding. In this way, Bolzano’s argument
seems to hinge on a problem internal to Kant’s transcendental philosophy,
although Bolzano does not explicitly spell out the consequences of his ar-
gument along these lines. Regardless of whether the arguments really affect
Kant’s view, however, it paved the way for a conception of mathematical
objects as independent of spatial imagination. During its development in
the eighteenth century, mathematics increasingly needed such a conception
of mathematical objects to account for the increasing importance of new
mathematical notions like infinitesimals and complex numbers.
In sum, an investigation of the arguments offered in the appendix shows
that the sole aim of Bolzano’s criticism of Kant is to reject his view that math-
ematical knowledge depends on construction in pure intuition. Bolzano’s
57See Russ, 2004.
58Bolzano, 1804, p. 47, 69. The notion of imaginary object is not yet to be understood in the
sophisticated sense of theWissenschaftslehre.
59Throughout his career Bolzano tries to prove that space is three-dimensional. Cf. Bolzano,
1843. The immediate reception of Kant, including Bolzano, did hardly notice Kant’s
passages on symbolic construction.
60B41.
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early work does not offer any argument against the synthetic nature of math-
ematics or any other discipline, but only argues against Kant’s explanation
of synthetic judgments in terms of intuition. Since Bolzano rejects Kant’s
explanation of a priori synthetic judgments in terms of pure intuition while
maintaining the synthetic nature of mathematical truths, the question arises
how Bolzano accounts for the synthetic nature of mathematical judgments.
An answer to this question requires a detailed investigation of Bolzano’s early
logic as presented in the Beyträge and several notes, which I will undertake in
the subsequent sections.61
5.3 Analytic and Synthetic Judgments as Judgments
of Necessity
Before discussing Bolzano’s conception of principles let us first investigate the
class of judgments they belong to, namely judgments of necessity. In accor-
dance with the tradition, the early Bolzano defines judgments as connections
between concepts such that something is stated.62 Contrary to his later work,
the early Bolzano does not yet systematically distinguish between proposition
(Satz) and judgment (Urtheil), but, similar to Wolff and Kant, uses these two
terms almost interchangeably in his early work.63 Although the distinction
between the objective content of propositions and the subjective cognition
of this content is sometimes assumed, one cannot read the sophisticated and
systematic division of logic in an objective and subjective part as put forward
in the Wissenschaftslehre into his early work, as sometimes seems to be the
tendency of commentators.64 The most prominent occasion in Bolzano’s
early work is the quoted passage on the objective connections between true
judgments within the realm of truth.65 Yet, precisely this passage consistently
employs the term ‘judgment’ and merely criticizes the organization of judg-
ments in the form of demonstrations according the degree of certainty that
61See chapter 5.
62Cf. GA2A5, p. 33, 146.
63As we will see, at some places he reserves the term ‘proposition’ for analytic judgments
because he does not regard them to be proper judgments.
64Cf. Rusnock, 2000; Rusnock and Sebestik, 2013. Roski is aware of this issue (Roski, 2014, p.
35-36).
65Bolzano, 1810, p. 39, 103.
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is achieved by a particular demonstration. Precisely when discussing the
inference schemes for possible objective relations of ground and consequence,
Bolzano uses the term ‘proposition’. Thus, although the early Bolzano al-
ready removed the subjective aspects from demonstrations by introducing the
notion of objective grounding, he still embraced the traditional conception of
judgment, which includes a subjective element of cognizing the concepts that
are involved in a judgment. My claim that the early Bolzano’s removal of the
role of the faculties of the knowing subject is limited to grounding, is further
confirmed by his (early) conception of general mathematics, which centers
around the notion of ‘thinking together’, as we have seen in the previous
chapter.66
As discussed before, the early Bolzano rejects the traditional view that
there is only one copula and replaces the traditional copula ‘is’ with five
distinct copulas, each of which constitutes a distinct class of judgments:
judgments of necessity, judgments of perception, judgments of possibility,
judgments of probability, and judgments of obligation.67 Judgments of
obligation for example have the copula ‘ought’ while judgments of perception
have the copula ‘perceive’. Each copula is a simple concept that constitutes a
connection between subject and predicate of a distinct nature. In the case of
judgments of obligation for example, the copula ‘ought’ connects an agent to
an action. The copula of judgments of necessity has a similar function as the
traditional copula and connects two concepts. The remainder of this section
only discusses judgments of necessity, for they comprise the most important
part of an a priori science, such as mathematics.
According to Bolzano, all judgments of necessity ultimately have the form
‘S is a kind of P´. He describes the relation between subject and predicate
as the ‘containment of a certain thing, as individual or kind, under a certain
genus (enthalten unter)’.68 This description in terms of containment already
reminds of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and
Bolzano indeed introduces this distinction as a subdivision of judgments of
necessity:
A classification of judgments quite different from those consid-
66See §4.6.
67See §4.5.
68Bolzano, 1810, p. 74, 113.
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ered so far, which has, since Kant, become particularly important,
is the classification into analytic and synthetic judgments. In our
so-called necessity judgments, §15 no. I, the subject appears as a
species whose genus is the predicate. But this relation of species to
genus can be of two kinds: either there is a characteristic which
can be thought of and stated in itself, which is added in thought
as a differentia specifica to the genus (predicate P) to produce the
species (subject S), or not. In the first case the judgment is called
analytic; in every other case, [...] it is called synthetic.69
According to Bolzano’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of analytic judg-
ments, judgments of necessity are analytic if the involved concepts contain
a characteristic that functions as a differentia specifica. Notes confirm that
Bolzano endorses Kant’s definition of analytic judgments and provides an
example relying on the traditional hierarchy of concepts on the basis of genus,
species, and differentia.70 They consider for instance an analytic judgment
in which the subject indirectly contains the predicate. In one of his notes,
Bolzano provides the following example.71 Suppose a rose is defined as a red
flower, a flower is defined as some kind of plant, and a plant is defined as
an organic body. Figure 5.2 shows the hierarchy of concepts corresponding
to these definitions.72 Read from top to bottom, the hierarchy shows the
extensional relation between the concepts. The concept ‘organic body’ for
instance, contains all objects contained under the concept ‘plant’ plus all
objects contained under ‘animal’. Read in the other direction we find the
partial content of a concept. For example, a rose is a flower, and a flower is
a plant. With the additional step of ‘a plant is an organic body’ it is shown
that the judgment ‘a rose is organic’ is analytic since the predicate ‘organic’
is indirectly, via repeated steps of analysis, contained in the subject ‘rose’.
Although they are not specified in full detail in this example, we can find dif-
ferentia such that they together with the predicate ‘organic’ form the subject
69Bolzano, 1810, p. 80, 115.
70Similar to Kant, Bolzano distinguishes between empty identity judgments that even do not
explain anything at all and proper analytic judgments. The latter have the form ‘A cum B’
is a kind of A (GA2A5, §5, p. 19).
71GA2B2/1, p. 78.
72Note that the figure does not indicate the exact content, that is the genus proximum and the
differentia.
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‘rose’. Bolzano thus explains Kant’s notion of analytic judgments similar to
the convincing interpretation of de Jong and Anderson.73 Contrary to what
is sometimes assumed, Bolzano does not evaluate Kant’s notion of analytic
judgment as vague, but regards it as a notion as well and precisely defined as





Figure 5.2: Example of analytic judgments according to the early Bolzano.
The question arises as to how exactly the Kantian distinction relates to
Bolzano’s classification of judgments. According to the passage just quoted,
only judgments of necessity can be analytic judgments, since only in this
case is there a relation of genus to species. Since Kant defines it in such a
way that all other judgments are synthetic without giving a precise (logical)
characterization of these judgments, Bolzano can also easily regard all other
four kinds of judgments as synthetic judgments. Thus, analytic judgments
effectively pick out only a part of the class of judgments of necessity. Thus
Bolzano employs Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction to single out a subclass
of judgments of necessity as analytic. All other judgments, including judg-
ments of perception and obligation, as well as the the rest of the judgments
of necessity, are synthetic. In my view, Bolzano hereby takes over Kant’s
strategy of defining analytic judgments as those where the subject contains the
predicate, thus rendering all other judgments as synthetic without providing a
positive definition of synthetic judgments. In accordance with Kant, in other
words, Bolzano´s notes present a view of synthetic judgments as judgments in
which the predicate is neither directly nor indirectly present in the definition
73See §3.3; de Jong, 1995; Anderson, 2005.
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of the subject.74
5.4 A Priori Synthetic judgments without Intuition
Whereas both Kant and the early Bolzano account for analytic judgments by
means of a relation of containment, they differ greatly with respect to syn-
thetic judgments. As we have seen, Bolzano rejects Kant’s solution according
to which pure intuition establishes the connection between the subject and
predicate of synthetic judgments.75 Unfortunately, Bolzano’s alternative is far
from clear. Despite the importance of the question, Roski argues, it does not
seem to constitute a problem for Bolzano, who simply states that knowledge
of synthetic judgments requires to form judgments about known concepts.76
Since it is not at all clear how this explains the possibility of synthetic judg-
ments, Roski provides a brave attempt to solve the problem by resorting to
three components of the part on judgments of theWissenschaftslehre, namely
confidence, clarity, and proofs. Together they establish knowledge of a syn-
thetic conceptual truth.77 Since the early Bolzano did not yet systematically
distinguish between the objective and subjective aspects of knowledge, the
problem cannot be solved, or even formulated, in the same way. The aim of
this section is to attain an understanding of Bolzano’s conception of a priori
synthetic judgments based on his early work, including recently published
notes.
My analysis of Kant’s distinction in chapter 3 might help to understand
Bolzano’s notion of a priori synthetic judgments. Recall the distinction
between extensional and intensional containment, designating the content of
a concept and the objects or concepts that fall under a concept respectively,
74Cf. GA2B2/1, p. 78; GA2B15, p. 178.
75See §5.2.
76Roski, 2013, p. 110-111.
77Whereas Roski’s results are convincing with regard to judgments with complex concepts,
to me it seems that the case of a priori synthetic principles requires a more solid answer
than merely that ‘a number of well-established propositions are derivable from’ them
(Roski, 2013, p. 127). Compared to Bolzano’s early characterization of principles in
terms of simple concepts, this is a much more pragmatic description, because quite a lot of
theorems also satisfy this criterion. Apparently, Bolzano became less certain about the
exact nature of a priori synthetic principles in that theWissenschaftslehre merely provides
ways to corroborate whether a proposition is a principle rather than a characterization of
the nature of principles themselves, such as in the Beyträge.
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and let us reconsider Bolzano’s conception of necessary judgments.78
Due to the form of judgments of necessity as put forward in the Beyträge,
the subject relates to the predicate as a species to its genus, regardless of whether
a judgment of necessity is analytic or synthetic. In the case of an analytic
judgment, the subject contains the predicate intensionally and for this reason,
the predicate contains the subject extensionally. For example, the traditional
definition of a human being as a rational living being allows for the following
analytic judgment: ‘humans are rational’. The content of the subject ‘human’
contains the mark ‘rational’, that is, the subject ‘human’ intensionally contains
the concept ‘rational’ because its content of the subject ‘human’ contains the
mark ‘rational’.
Within the framework of traditional logic, also accepted by the early
Bolzano, all concepts are organized according to the Porphyrian tree of
which we have seen several examples. Within such a tree, every intensional
definition has its extensional counterpart, as we have seen in the case of the
definition ‘humans are rational living beings’. One can say that ‘rational’ is
intensionally contained in the concept of a human being, but one can also say
that ‘human being’ is extensionally contained under the concept of rational.
Thus, depending on what one regards as primitive, the same relation can
be expressed in two different ways. The rationalistic tradition, as well as
Kant, focuses on the analysis of our concepts and accordingly regards the
intensional definition as primitive. According to this tradition, the extension
of a concept is a result of how it is defined in terms of its intension.
Contrary to the approach of Kant, Bolzano’s early texts provide cases in
which the extension is defined independently of the intension of the con-
cept. Bolzano’s notes provide a clear example.79 One can define the concept
‘European people’ by specifying the extension of the concept. This can be
done at several levels, for example at the level of individual people, which
would require summing up the name of every individual living in Europe. In
this way, the extensional way of defining the concept does not explain why
for example the concept ‘German people’ falls under the concept ‘European
people’, unless the extensional definition of the concept ‘German people’ is
taken into account. An intensional definition, on the other hand, could sum
78See §3.3.1.
79GA2B15, p. 123.
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up all countries that are part of Europe. In this case the intensional definition
itself already explains why Germans fall under the concept ‘European people’.
A definition provides the content or intension of the concept, for example
‘European people are people living in Europe’. Being an intensional descrip-
tion, a definition of a concept does not specify its extension, but indirectly
determines the extension of the concept.
Although the intensional way of describing judgments is present through-
out the Beyträge, the extensional way becomes dominant at crucial stages in
the Beyträge.80 For example, when he discusses principles, as we will see,
Bolzano relies on the extensional definition of judgments of necessity.81 Al-
though he uses an intensional formulation, namely ‘S enthält den Begriff P’
in other passages, his introduction of the form of necessary judgments in the
Beyträge relies on the notion of extensional containment. The Beyträge thus
testifies to a transition from a Kantian intensional approach to the extensional
approach of the laterWissenschaftslehre.
This shift to an extensional approach helps to understand Bolzano’s concep-
tion of a priori synthetic judgments. Recall Bolzano’s description of necessary
judgments as the ‘containment of a certain thing, as individual or kind, under
a certain genus (enthalten unter)’.82 The extensional form of containment
between predicate and subject also holds for synthetic judgments. Yet, its
corresponding relation of intensional containment, which holds for analytic
judgments, does not hold for synthetic judgments, because this would mean
that the content of the subject contains the predicate as a differentia and,
hence, the judgment would be analytic.83 Take for example the synthetic
judgment that the sum of the angles of a triangle equal two right angles.
According to Bolzano’s analysis of necessary judgments, this means that all
80A likely source of influence is the work of Maaß, since Bolzano already carefully studied
Maaß’s logic (Maaß, 1793). The quite unknown mathematician Maaß offered a for the
time remarkably modern logic in that he formulated very precisely the conditions for
many logical concepts. Moreover he provided quite formal definitions of distinctions in
terms of the extensions of concepts.
81See §5.6. Another indication for Bolzano’s shift towards extensional formulations is
Bolzano’s early treatment of objective ground consequence relations where he limits the
inferences by a condition on the extensions of subject and predicate.
82Bolzano, 1810, p. 74, 113.
83Bolzano rejects the suggestion by Selle and Platner that the relation of intensional contain-
ment between subject and predicate is reverse in the case of synthetic judgments, namely
that the predicate intensionally contains the subject (GA2B15, p. 179, 199).
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triangles fall under the genus ‘figures of which the sum of their angles equal
to two right angles’ (extensional containment). However, the corresponding
relation of intensional containment, which according to the tradition estab-
lishes the extensional containment, does not hold because it would mean
that the subject ‘triangle’ contains the genus ‘figures of which the sum of
their angles equal to two right angles’ as one of its characteristics, that is, as a
differentia, which would make the judgment analytic.
In the case of complex subjects a differentia can often be found.84 There-
fore, necessary judgments consisting of complex concepts are often analytic.
However, this is not the case with simple subjects. Since a simple subject
does not contain a characteristic at all, it is in this case impossible to find a
characteristic or differentia that together with the predicate forms the subject
as required by Bolzano’s description of analytic judgments. Thus if there are
to be judgments of this kind, they will have to be synthetic, since differentia
by their very nature can only be found in complex concepts. Nevertheless,
Bolzano’s very definition of judgments of necessity requires the simple con-
cepts to have a genus, if there are to be necessary judgments with simple
subjects at all, something which Bolzano indeed assumes.
Unfortunately, Bolzano does not explicitly defend his assumption that there
are a priori synthetic judgments with simple subjects. My reconstruction
runs as follows. If there are no a priori judgments with simple subjects, there
would only be one simple concept since we would not be able to distinguish
simple concepts from each other. As soon as we presuppose a multiplicity of
simple concepts, as Bolzano does, we assume that they differ from each other.
Insofar they are distinct, simple concepts cannot have the same extension,
since they would be identical 85 Their domain of objects must differ and
insofar as we understand the differences between simple concepts, we are
able to attribute different predicates to them. Since these predicates cannot
be contained intensionally in the simple concepts, they must be contained
84My formulations are careful at this point, because it is at least theoretically possible to
have an a priori synthetic judgment with a complex subject and a predicate that is not a
characteristic of this subject. However, the early Bolzano does not consider this possibility,
most likely because he would regard such a judgment as based on a judgment with a simple
subject or as a bad formulation of such a judgment.
85GA2B15, p. 230. Analysis of their content cannot yield any difference, since as simple
concepts they do not have any characteristic.
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extensionally under the simple concepts.86 Thus, although simple concepts
cannot contain each other intensionally because they would no longer be
simple, simple concepts can contain each other extensionally. For example,
Bolzano regards the concepts ‘real’ and ‘possible’ as simple, and maintains
that the concept ‘real’ is extensionally contained under the concept ‘possible’
since all real objects also belong to the extension of the concept ‘possible’.87
Since Bolzano claims that there are a priori synthetic judgments with simple
subjects, he must presuppose that a simple concept can be extensionally
contained under another simple concept. For, contrary to Kant, a priori
synthetic judgments exhibit a relation of (extensional) containment and
accordingly exhibit a relation of the subject to the predicate as species to
genus. Thus, precisely the claim that simple concepts allow for extensional
containment enables Bolzano to take over Kant’s definition of the analytic-
synthetic distinction while rejecting intuition as the explanation for the
connection of subject and predicate in synthetic judgments.
Indeed, several notes confirm that Bolzano admitted species-genus relations
between simple concepts. When discussing the simple notion of having,
Bolzano explicitly claims of a simple concept that it has a genus:
The concept of being [the property] of something, or having is a
simple one. Indeed, it has a genus but not a differentia specifica.88
According to Bolzano, the notion of attribution (Haben/Seyn an etwas) is
simple.89 He also claims that the simple notion of attribution has a genus.
Bolzano does not specify its genus, but it is quite likely that he thinks of
being (Seyn) as the genus of ‘attribution’. Accordingly, one can formulate a
synthetic necessary judgment: ‘attribution is a kind of being’.
Notes written only a few years after the publication of the Beyträge contain
a fascinating passage that reveals Bolzano’s early ideas about the difference
between analytic and synthetic judgments. In reaction to a section of the logic
86Recall that for Bolzano necessary judgments have the form of expressing a genus-species
relation between subject and predicate.
87GA2A5, §29, p. 32.
88GA2B16/1, p. 31: ‘[D]er Begriff des Seyns an etwas, oder Habens ein einfacher sey. Er hat
freylich ein Genus aber keine differentia specifica’.
89One might object that it is quite unlikely that such a complex expression designates a simple
concept. However, the fact that we need multiple words to designate something does not
imply that the concept is complex.
216 Chapter 5 Bolzano’s Early Logic of Synthetic Principles
of Maaß, which claims that every lower concept has a differentia, Bolzano
writes:
N.b. n.b. n.b. At this point a serious mistake slipped in. So
Maaß thinks that every lower concept is distinct from higher
ones by means of characteristics. Thereby he turns all judgments
in analytic ones, etc.90
This confirms that Bolzano assumes the possibility of synthetic judgments
under the presupposition that in some extensional containment relations
no differentia can be found.91 The Beyträge even states this explicitly when
presenting rules for deciding whether a concept is simple or complex:
Not every concept which is subordinate to a more general one
therefore ceases to be simple. [...] For example, if one tries to
go from the concept of a spatial object, as genus proximum = a,
to the concept of a point = A in the form of a definition then it
will be seen that the characteristic that must be added to a so as
to obtain A is none other than the concept of a point itself = A,
which is what was to be defined.92
The concept ‘spatial object’ is the genus of the concept ‘point’, that is, the
concept ‘point’ belongs to the extension of the concept ‘spatial object’. All
points are included in the domain of ‘spatial objects’, but we cannot find a
differentia to construe the content of the concept ‘point’ by starting from
its genus ‘spatial object’. Thus, Bolzano separates extensional species-genus
relations from relations that pertain to the content of concepts. Extensional
containment does not rely on an analysis of the content or characteristics of
90GA 2B16/1 p. 23: ‘NB NB NB. Hier ist ein arger Fehler unterlaufen. Maaß glaubt also, daß
jeder niedrigere Begriff durch Merkmahle von dem höheren unterschieden sey. Dadurch
verwandelt er alle Urtheile in analytische, u.s.w.’. Cf. Maaß, 1793, §79 p. 55. The note is
certainly written before march 1812, since the subsequent notes that describe plans for the
Wissenschaftslehre are dated as written in march 1812. The note on Maaß may very well be
written in 1811, since their content is closely related to a previous note that was written in
1811.
91Additional confirmation can be found in a note where Bolzano suggests that all concepts,
including simple concepts, have at least the concept ‘concept’ as their genus proximum
(GA2B15, p. 192). This can only be understood in such a way that all simple concepts
extensionally fall under the concept ‘concept’ without adding differentia to their genus
‘concept’, since this would render them complex.
92Bolzano, 1810, p. 48, 105.
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the concepts, but can be established by investigating the domain of objects
that fall under a concept.
From the perspective of traditional logic, Bolzano’s use of extensional
containment to allow for a priori synthetic judgment raises the objection
that this is impossible since the Porphyrian tree on the basis of proximus and
differentia requires a corresponding relation of intensional containment that
is impossible for simple subjects taking the subject position in judgments of
necessity. According to the law of reciprocity, accepted by traditional logi-
cians, including Kant, the hierarchy of concepts into genus (higher concepts)
and species (lower concepts) satisfies the following two criteria:
1. If the intension (content) of the concept increases, the extension de-
creases.
2. If the extension of the concept increases, the intension decreases.
For example, the extension of the concept ‘living being’ contains both the
extension of the concept ‘man’ and ‘animal’. If one adds the characteristic
‘rational’ to the content of the concept the extension narrows down to ‘man’
(1). In the opposite direction, the extension of the collection of all man to all
animals requires to remove the characteristic ‘rational’ from the concept ‘man’
(2). As a result, the content of the concept, that is, the intension decreases.
Bolzano indeed acknowledges that the possibility of species-genus relations
between simple concepts has consequences for the law of reciprocity which
was accepted by traditional logicians, including Kant.93 As we have seen,
according to the early Bolzano simple concepts can extensionally contain each
other without relying on intensional containment. Simple concepts can stand
in a relation of species to genus without increasing the content of the genus
with a differentia. In other words, Bolzano claims that it is possible to have
simple species. Accordingly, he rejects the second half of the law of reciprocity.
Although Centrone acknowledges a tension in the Beyträge between the law
of reciprocity and the existence of simple species, she nevertheless claims that
the early Bolzano accepts the second half of the law of reciprocity.94 She
interprets the quoted passage such that one adds the species ‘point’ itself to
93See §3.3.1.
94Centrone, 2010, p. 311.
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the genus ‘spatial object’ in order to attain the concept of the species ‘point’.95
The context, however, makes clear that this procedure is meant to decide
whether a concept is simple. If this is the only way to arrive at the concept
starting from a genus, a characteristic cannot be found; hence, the concept
is simple. Precisely because a differentia cannot be found, the concept is
simple and accordingly the second half of the law of reciprocity does not
obtain. The conclusion that Bolzano rejects the second half of the law of
reciprocity is confirmed by his early lecture on logic. In this lecture, Bolzano
formulates only the part of the law of reciprocity according to which the
content (intension) and the extension of a concept stand to each other in a
reciprocal relation:
The larger the content of a concept becomes, the smaller its
extension.96
The lecture thus mentions the first half of the law of reciprocity, but omits
the second half. Due to the systematic nature and the publishable state of
the text it is quite unlikely that Bolzano simply forgot to add the second half.
In my view, this illustrates that Bolzano was aware of the inconsistence of
simple species with the second half of the law of reciprocity.
Rejecting the second half of the law of reciprocity, Bolzano paves the way
for an alternative to Kant’s answer to the question concerning the possi-
bility of a priori synthetic judgments. Bolzano rejects Kant’s fundamental
dichotomy between discursive thinking and intuition by allowing a form of
non-discursive thinking, namely a species-genus relation between simple con-
cepts that relies neither on intuition nor on the analysis of content. This step
introduces a form of conceptual cognition that fundamentally differsfrom
the role of analysis in the rationalistic Leibniz-Wolffian tradition and the
philosophy of Kant. According to the intensional approach of these philoso-
phers, extensional relations rely on analysis. The extension of a concept is
determined by various concepts in view of their common characteristics, an
activity that is carried out by discursive reasoning. Bolzano introduces a
conception of extension that does not rely on an analysis of the content of
95Centrone, 2010, p. 314.
96GA2A5, §8 p. 143: ‘Je größer der Inhalt eines Begriffes wird, um desto kleiner wird sein
Umfang’.
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the concept, but entirely depends on a determination of the extension of a
concept that is independent of the content of the concept.
In sum, Bolzano introduces a way of thinking that is neither discursive, nor
intuitive, but still conceptual. As a result, one can have a priori synthetic judg-
ments, involving simple concepts, without the help of discursive thinking or
logical analysis, and without resorting to some form of intuition as in the phi-
losophy of Kant. Contrary to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, Bolzano allows
for necessary judgments in which one cannot find the predicate by analyzing
the subject. By rejecting the second half of the law of reciprocity and allowing
for extensional containment without intensional containment, Bolzano can
account for the possibility of a priori synthetic necessary judgments without
relying on the Kantian notion of intuition. In the next section we will see
how Bolzano employs the notion of synthetic judgments as a requirement for
principles when he criticizes the first principles of the rationalistic tradition.
5.5 Bolzano’s Criticism of Leibnizean and Kantian
Principles
Throughout the eighteenth century a lot of German philosophers adhered
to a foundational view on science. Most of them considered all scientific
knowledge, in line with the structure of Euclid’s Elements, to rely on a few
axioms, that is, on first principles.97 Although both Kant and the rationalistic
school of Wolff held this view, the precise nature of these principles was
highly controversial.98 Whereas Kant required principles to be synthetic,
the Wolffians regarded them as immediately evident from definitions alone,
something which in Kant’s view renders them analytic. In the following, I
explain how Bolzano, accepting Kant’s notion of a priori synthetic principles,
rejects the principles of Wolff and Kant as worthwhile contributions to
the foundation of science. Focusing on the proper grounds of scientific
knowledge, Bolzano had to discuss the first principles offered by the schools
of philosophy of the eighteenth century. During the eighteenth century these
principles where at the heart of the most important philosophical debates.99
97For a description of this so called classical model of science see de Jong and Betti, 2010.
98Cf. §2.4; Tonelli, 1959; Engfer, 1982.
99Tonelli, 1959; Engfer, 1982.
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Asking for a reform of mathematics by means of finding a new foundation,
Bolzano had to challenge these diverse eighteenth century conceptions of
principles.
The largest part of the first section of the second installment to the Beyträge
is devoted to a discussion and reorganization of the principles offered by
Wolff and Kant. According to the rationalistic tradition of Wolff and Leibniz,
general metaphysics (ontology) delivers the most general principles of all
sciences. Limiting these principles to objects represented by the faculties of
sensibility and understanding, Kant offers his version of these principles in
the section on the principles of the understanding in the first Critique. Since
Bolzano’s early definition of mathematics renders general mathematics into
a discipline that is as general as general metaphysics, Bolzano systematically
discusses the principles of Wolff and Kant to decide whether they belong to
general mathematics or not. I will now first describe Bolzano’s criticism of
the principles of the rationalistic tradition and continue with his criticism of
Kant’s moral law.
In the rationalistic tradition of Leibniz, as received and interpreted in the
eighteenth century, three principles, namely the logical laws of identity and
non-contradiction, and the principle of sufficient reason, constitute the very
foundation of all knowledge.100 The early Bolzano explicitly rejects these
principles as proper principles.101 His criticism of the first two is the most
devastating and illustrative for his stance towards the rationalistic tradition:
We must honestly admit that we regard this proposition [prin-
ciple of non-contradiction] [...] as a purely analytic or rather
merely identical one. Therefore it does not belong to science. It
does not even express a proper truth and is not even a proper
judgment, let alone a proper principle.102
Bolzano argues that the law of non-contradiction is an identical proposition,
100Cf. Hettche, 2014.
101Bolzano also discusses the principle of thoroughgoing determination, which states that for
each possible property, every object either has this property or does not have this property
(GA2A5, §7, p. 20). It can be regarded as the ontological version of the law of excluded
middle.
102GA2A5, §5, p. 18: ‘Wir müssen aufrichtig gestehen, daß wir diesen Satz [principle of
non-contradiction] [...] für einen bloß analytischen oder vielmehr bloß identischen halten,
der also in die Wissenschaft gar nicht gehört, gar kein eigentliches Urtheil keine eigentliche
Wahrheit ausspricht, um so viel weniger ein eigentlicher Grundsatz ist’.
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that is, that it is of the form ‘A ist A’. Analysis of the principle of non-
contradiction ‘no thing is A and not A’ reveals that it is equivalent to ‘a
thing that is A, is-not not A’.103 Bolzano’s equivalent proposition transfers
the first part of the predicate, namely ‘A’, to the subject and the negation
of the subject to the copula. Since the denial of not-A is equivalent to the
affirmation of A, the proposition is in fact equivalent to ‘ein Ding das A
ist, ist A’. Therefore Bolzano concludes that the law of non-contradiction
is merely a ‘derivation from an identical proposition, merely definitions,
changes of words’.104 Referring to Kant and Selle, Bolzano claims that this
principle is analytic because it does not establish a proper judgment. It does
not provide sufficient content as to ground a science. As such, it does not
belong to science and does not play a significant role in the foundation of
science. Thus, contrary to the rationalistic tradition of Leibniz and Wolff,
Bolzano denies that the logical principles of identity and non-contradiction
contribute to science as principles.
With Bolzano’s focus on the proper grounds of theorems in mind, it is
no surprise that Bolzano discusses the principle of sufficient reason quite
extensively. He considers several formulations of this principle, including
those ofWolff and Kant. Bolzano criticizesWolff in two ways. He first accuses
Wolff of including a very outlandish concept into the notion of ground when
he claims that the ground of a thing is that from which it can be known why
the thing is.105 According to Bolzano, grounds and consequences are possible
even if there is no intelligible creature to know them. Although grounds and
consequences indeed provide answers to the question why something is the
case, it is not essential for the notions of grounds and consequences that they
are actually known by someone.106
Bolzano’s second criticism of Wolff’s principle of sufficient reason concerns
its generality. Since it applies to everything, it applies to principles as well
as to existing things. However, Bolzano is of the opinion that both the
103GA2A5, §9, p.21.
104GA2A5, §9, p. 21: ‘Herleitung aus einem identischen Satze, bloße Definitionen, Wortverän-
derungen’.
105GA2A5, §11, p. 23.
106This is one of the few early texts where Bolzano explicitly preludes to the later distinctions
between objective and subjective. The early Bolzano however does not yet apply the
distinction as consistently as in his laterWissenschaftslehre.
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realm of things in thought (Gedankendinge) and the realm of existing things
contain many entities that have no ground.107 In the realm of things in
thought, all (proper) principles are without a ground precisely because they
are the first principles that ground other truths.108 In the realm of existing
things both God and all free actions are without ground. An additional
argument against such a general principle of sufficient reason is the following.
The principle of sufficient reason does not allow for other principles that
provide the reason why a proposition is true, because it is so general that
such a principle cannot be the ultimate ground, and, hence cannot be a
principle. Therefore the principle of sufficient reason as advocated by the
rationalistic tradition severely limits the amount of principles that provide
grounds. According to Bolzano, however, there are multiple final grounds.
As we will see in the next section, each simple concept allows for at least one
principle. Thus, Wolff’s principle of sufficient reason is too general.109
In his notes, Bolzano formulates his criticism of Kant’s categorical im-
perative in a quite interesting way in that it starts from within the Kantian
framework. He mentions the highest moral law as an example in which Kant
did not correctly understand his own notion of analyticity. In Bolzano’s view,
Kant’s categorical imperative is evidently analytic:
This impressive thinker [Kant] himself has proposed many an-
alytic propositions as principles. Even his highest moral law
clearly is a purely analytic proposition.110
Since Kant held the view that principles are synthetic, Kant is inconsistent
here and did not strictly adhere to his notion of analyticity. However, it
107GA2A5, §12, p. 24.
108Bolzano refers to the Beyträge where he argues that in every sequence of related grounds
their must be a final ground which starts the sequence, even if their is an infinity of
grounds in between (Bolzano, 1810, p. 69-70, 122).
109On the other hand, Bolzano rejects Kant’s principle of sufficient reason for being too
limited. Bolzano regards the second analogy of experience, which states that every
change in appearances has its cause, as Kant’s version of the principle of sufficient reason.
According to Bolzano, Kant’s second analogy is too limited since non-sensible things, such
as truths, also have grounds (GA2A5, §11, p. 22; §15, p. 26). Within the limitations of
transcendental idealism, which limits the principle of sufficient reason to the possibilities
of objects of experience, Kant cannot provide a more general principle of sufficient reason
although he would agree with Bolzano that the notion of ground is much wider.
110GA2A5, p. 19: ‘[D]ieser große Denker [Kant] hat selbst so viele bloß analytische Sätze als
Grundsätze aufgestellt, selbst sein oberstes Sittengesetz ist ein offenbar bloß analytischer
Satz’.
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is not as ‘offenbar’ as Bolzano seems to think under which reading Kant’s
categorical imperative turns out to be analytic. Before showing how Bolzano
continues this kind of criticism in the later Religionswissenschaft, I want to
clarify how the analyticity of Kant’s categorical imperative might have been
‘offenbar’ to Bolzano. In the following I present several interpretations of
passages in Kant’s texts on ethics that must have struck Bolzano’s attention
because of his focus on the precise nature of principles.
First of all, both Kant’s Groundwork and the second Critique contain a pas-
sage that allows to regard the categorical imperative as an analytical principle
provided that one rejects transcendental idealism:
It forces [categorical imperative] itself on us as a synthetic a priori
proposition, which is not based on any intuition, either pure or
empirical. It would, indeed, be analytical if the freedom of the
will were presupposed, but to presuppose freedom as a positive
concept would require an intellectual intuition, which cannot
here be assumed.111
According to this passage, Kant regarded the categorical imperative as analytic
under the condition that the freedom of the will would be a ‘positive’ concept,
that is, a concept we have knowledge of to the same extent we have knowledge
of for example ‘triangle’. However, in accordance with Kant’s transcendental
idealism, we are not capable of an intellectual intuition of the free will analo-
gous to our capability to construe ‘triangle’ in pure intuition. This however
still means that the principle is analytic from a standpoint transcending the
limits of the human subject. Since Bolzano does not accept the transcendental
idealistic position that rejects such a transcending standpoint, he is even more
inclined to read Kant’s categorical imperative as analytic. However, denial
of Kant’s transcendental idealism does not support Bolzano’s criticism that
Kant proposed a highest moral law that is analytic to Kant’s own views.
In the Religionswissenschaft, Bolzano continues to use analyticity as an ar-
gument against Kant’s categorical imperative. Although this kind of criticism
seems to be much more implicit at first sight with regard to Kant, it is in fact
111V:30. Cf. IV:447. I refer to the second Critique since Bolzano used it in several texts.
Moreover, the notes written in his copy of the second Critique indicate that he studied it
quite carefully. Cf. Jan Berg, 2002, p. 219.
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issued in a more general way against all ethical theories known to Bolzano.
In the Religionswissenschaft, Bolzano also accuses, to mention the most fa-
mous authors, Aquinas and Hume of providing an analytical principle.112
Although most authors provide a moral law that is indeed true, it is not a
proper principle, either because it is analytic or because it does not ground
all other practical truths. Bolzano for example reads Thomas Aquinas such
that his moral law says ‘Thue was gut ist’ where ‘good’ is defined as ‘was
gewollt werden soll’. This results in the following moral law ‘Es soll gewollt
werden, was gewollt werden soll’. Since this is a typical example of Bolzano’s
philosophical style, there are good reasons to suppose that Bolzano’s reading
of Kant’s categorical imperative is similar. In the following I reconstruct an
analogous argument with regard to Kant’s moral law.
Let us first investigate Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative
under the heading of the principle of pure practical reason:
Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time
hold as a principle of universal legislation.113
Although Kant provides other formulations at several places, Bolzano would
have taken this formulation as the most important one. For, in the Reli-
gionswissenschaft, Bolzano starts his criticism of Kant quoting exactly this
formulation.114 According to Bolzano’s strategy we have to look for a defi-
nition of the non-primitive terms. The most striking complex term in this
formulation is ‘maxim of thy will’, which is defined by Kant as:
Practical principles are propositions which contain a universal
determination of the will, having under it several practical rules.
They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded
by the subject as valid only for his own will.115
Thus, maxims are practical propositions expressing a universal determination
of my own will. Following Bolzano’s strategy let us now replace ‘maxim of
thy will’ in Kant’s main formulation of the categorical imperative:
112RW, §90, p. 243.
113V:30.
114RW, §90, p. 233.
115V:19.
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Act so that the [propositions expressing a universal determination
of thy will] can always at the same time hold as a principle of
universal legislation.116
Provided that the term ‘universal’ is used equivocally, every maxim holds
as a principle of universal legislation because it is a universal determination
by the very definition of what a maxim is. To me it seems something
similar to this that lead Bolzano to the view that the categorical imperative is
evidently analytic.117 Following Bolzano’s strategy one only has to look up
one definition to show the analytic nature of the principle. Since Kant held
the view that principles are synthetic, Kant is inconsistent when he regards
the categorical imperative as the highest moral principle.
In sum, Bolzano rejects the principles of the rationalistic tradition. He re-
jects the logical principles because they are analytic, the principle of sufficient
reason because it is too general, and employs Kant’s own emphasis on the
synthetic nature of principles to reject Kant’s categorical imperative. Appar-
ently, Bolzano took side with Kant with regard to the nature of principles.
The following subsection explains how Bolzano, in line with Kant, conceives
of principles as a priori synthetic judgments.
5.6 Principles as Simple Synthetic judgments
As we have seen in the first chapter, the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition regards
principles or axioms as evident because they stem directly from definitions.118
Analysis of the concepts involved in a principle by means of their definitions
reveals the truth of the principle on the basis of the laws of identity and
non-contradiction. Another important aspect of principles is that they are
unprovable. These aspects are often combined. According to the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition, principles are not only evident but also unprovable because
they are judgments that do not follow from other judgments. Principles are
unprovable judgments because they stand at the very beginning of a chain
of syllogisms. Moreover, a proof is superfluous because the principle is
116Replacement relative to the formulation found at V:30.
117GA2A5, p. 19.
118See §1.5.
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self-evident.119
In the Beyträge, Bolzano rejects the characterisation of a principle as ‘self-
evident’ because it does not suffice to distinguish strictly between principles
(Grundsätze) and theorems (Lehrsätze).120 First of all, Bolzano argues that
evidence comes in degrees. Since every judgment has some degree of evidence,
‘evidence’ is not a suitable criterion to distinguish between two classes of
judgments, in this case principles and theorems. Moreover, ‘evidence’ depends
on many subjective and arbitrary circumstances. Theorems can even have
more evidence than their principles.121 Therefore, Bolzano rejects ‘self-
evidence’ as distinctive of principles and instead distinguishes theorems from
principles by dividing the class of judgments in provable judgments (theorems)
and unprovable judgments (principles).
Moreover, Bolzano carefully distinguishes between a subjective and objec-
tive notion of unprovability.122 In the case of the former, one is not able to
provide a proof although it is theoretically possible to prove the judgment.
If a judgment is objectively unprovable, by contrast, this is due to the very
nature of the judgment itself. A principle is both subjectively and objectively
unprovable, whereas a theorem can only be subjectively unprovable. For
Bolzano, an objectively unprovable judgment functions as the final ground
from which provable judgments follow:
Axioms are therefore propositions which in an objective re-
spect can only ever be considered as ground and never as conse-
quence.123
Two issues arise from the treatment of this definition as a logical criterion.
First of all, what is the exact nature of those judgments that can only function
as grounds? Do they have a specific logical form? The other is the nature
of objective ground-consequence relations and the extent to which they are
119Cf. Leibniz, 2012, §35.
120Bolzano, 1810, p. 59, 109. At the time, principle (Grundsatz) is a common philosophical
term for the most fundamental judgment, that is, a first judgment that does not rely on
other judgments. Mostly, the terms are interchangeable (GWI:11, p. 223-224). Kant
reserves the term ‘axiom’ for a specific kind of principles, namely mathematical principles
(B760).
121Bolzano, 1810, p. 94-95, 119.
122Bolzano, 1810, p. 40-42, 103-104.
123Bolzano, 1810, p. 64, 110.
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identical to logical consequences. The remainder of this section discusses
the first issue: how can we logically characterize those judgments that are
principles?
The Leibniz-Wolffian tradition regards the direct relation between princi-
ples and definitions as decisive. If analysis of a judgment reveals an immediate
relation to the definitions of the concepts involved in the judgment, the
judgment is a principle. On the other hand, the judgment is a theorem if it
turns out that syllogisms must be involved to establish its truth. Bolzano’s
rejection of the self-evidence of principles, as well as his rejection of defini-
tions as the starting point of scientific enterprise, asks for a new criterion to
identify certain judgments as principles.124 This additional characterization
of principles must not only be consistent, but must also coincide with the
unprovability of principles.
In the Beyträge, Bolzano step by step narrows down the candidates for
principles by arguing for the provability of a particular class of judgments.125
The first step excludes those judgments that have a complex subject. Bolzano’s
argument runs as follows. The properties of a complex concept ultimately
depend on the properties of its simple constituents. Properties of simple
concepts can only be expressed by judgments about these simple concepts.
Therefore, judgments with a complex subject rely on other judgments. Hence,
judgments with a complex subject are provable and do not count as suitable
candidates. In the second step, Bolzano argues in the same manner that
judgments with a complex predicate are provable. Thus, a principle neither
consists of a complex subject nor of a complex predicate. Removal of the
negations results in the conclusion that a principle has both a simple subject
and a simple predicate.
Repeated attempts to arrive at arguments for these claims can be found
in recently published notes written shortly before the publication of the
Beyträge.126 This indicates that these claims were of crucial importance to
Bolzano. Bolzano’s attempts in these notes are similar to the argument
provided in the Beyträge, but much more rooted in the traditional logic of
Wolff. The notes start with the observation that the ground of an a priori
124Bolzano explicitly asks this question (Bolzano, 1810, p. 71, 112).
125Bolzano, 1810, p. 87-89, 117-118.
126The manuscript most likely stems from 1809 (GA2B14, p. 12). Cf. GA2B15, p. 193, 197.
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judgment is to be found in its subject.127 In the case of a complex subject, this
ground is to be found in its parts. Therefore one must investigate its parts and
judge about them to find the ground of the a priori judgment. This means
that the judgment relies on other judgment(s); hence, it is provable. Bolzano
provides the following example: ‘a European is mortal’.128 According to its
definition, the complex subject ‘European’ has the following parts ‘human
being who lives in Europe’. The predicate of mortality applies to one of these
parts, namely ‘human being’. Thus, the judgment ‘a European is mortal’ is
provable.
A possibility not offered by the Beyträge, but discussed in the notes is that
the predicate only applies to the whole of the complex subject, but not to its
constituents individually. Yet, Bolzano does not provide a clear argument in
this case. As a kind of predication that was not present in eighteenth century
logic, it cannot be accounted for by the traditional logical framework of the
Beyträge. A few pages later, Bolzano raises the question whether there are
indeed judgments of this kind.129 Bolzano provides an example: ‘the spacial
thing that is common to two distinct straight lines, is a point’ and claims
that the predicate of the judgment in fact should be ‘only one point’. He
even requires a further transformation into a negative sentence: ‘that which
is shared by two distinct straight lines are not two points’. Since his notes
break off at this point, it is not completely clear what the example is intended
to show. Yet, the example suggests that Bolzano thought that judgments of
the kind of the third case do not exist. The line of reasoning suggests that
judgments that seem to be of this third kind can be transformed such that the
predicate turns out to be complex.
Bolzano’s notes provide us with an additional argument for the provability
of judgments with a complex predicate.130 This argument relies on his
ideas about proper ground-consequence relations and applies the rule that
conclusions are more complex than grounds. The argument runs as follows.
From a judgment (1) ‘M is (X+Y)’ it follows by logical consequence that
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complex than the first judgment (1), they are the proper ground for the
first judgment and not vice versa (see figure 5.3). Hence, a judgment with a
complex predicate is provable.
A ist B
A ist C
A ist B cum C ∴
Figure 5.3: Composition as a proper ground-consequence relation.
As discussed before, Bolzano borrows Kant’s distinction between ana-
lytic and synthetic judgments, according to which the predicate of analytic
judgments is directly or indirectly contained in the subject.131 According
to Bolzano, Kant’s definition entails that an analytic judgment can never
function as a principle:
From this definition it now follows immediately that analytic
judgments can never be considered as axioms.132
For an analytic judgment is provable by means of the definition of the complex
subject. It also immediately follows from the definition of the distinction
between analytic and synthetic judgments that judgments with a simple
subject are synthetic.133 Although it must be admitted that Bolzano does not
explicitly describe principles as synthetic in the Beyträge, the conclusion that
he considers principles to be synthetic is inevitable. Fortunately, his notes
almost explicitly states that principles are synthetic:
A proposition of which the subject cannot be defined is either
identical or (according to my definition) synthetic, as well as
unprovable.134
Thus, a synthetic judgment with a simple subject is unprovable. Hence, it is a
principle.
131See §5.3; Bolzano, 1810, p. 80, 115.
132Bolzano, 1810, p. 81, 115.
133Bolzano, 1810, p. 82, 116.
134GA2B2/1, p. 78: ‘Ein Satz dessen Subject nicht mehr definirt werden [kann], ist also
entweder identisch, oder (nach meiner Erklärung) synthetisch. Und zugleich unerweislich’.
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Bolzano not only claims that a science requires synthetic principles, but
also provides an argument for the claim that synthetic principles result in
synthetic conclusions (theorems). The line of reasoning is similar to that
of Kant.135 Starting from synthetic principles, analytic inferences, that is,
inferences solely based on the laws of logic, do not render the conclusion
synthetic. Bolzano provides a syllogism to argue for the claim that a synthetic
conclusion must follow if one of the premises is synthetic (see figure 5.4).
Small letters are simple concepts, while the capital ‘A’ denotes a complex
concept that contains ‘a’ among its characteristics (‘A is a’ is analytic). The
first premise ‘a is c’ with a simple subject and predicate is a principle and as
such a synthetic judgment. Although the subject ‘a’ is extensionally contained
under the predicate ‘c’ in a species-genus relation, the predicate ‘c’ is not
intensionally contained in the subject ‘a’. Therefore the conclusion ‘A is
c’ cannot be analytic. A first step of analysis of the complex subject ‘A’ is
possible and reveals that it contains ‘a’ as part of its content. At this point the
process of analysis comes to an end because ‘a’ is a simple concept. Hence,
the conclusion must be synthetic.
a is c (synthetic)
A is a (analytic)
A is c (synthetic) ∴
Figure 5.4: Syllogism with synthetic premise and conclusion.
In sum, the characterization of principles as unprovable requires principles
to have the logical form of a simple subject, that, via a simple copula, is
combined with a simple predicate. Contrary to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition,
Bolzano’s principles do neither stem immediately from the definition of
complex concepts nor rely on any notion of self-evidence, but instead consist
of simple concepts. Since judgments consisting of simple concepts cannot be
analytic, principles must be synthetic.
135B14, see §3.6.
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5.7 The Overestimated Role of Analytic Judgments
Although the common description of Bolzano as the anti-Kant also holds
for some aspects of his early work, we have seen ample reason to refine the
perspective on Bolzano by putting him into his historical context. As we
have seen, Bolzano discusses a wide range of principles circulating in the
philosophical systems of his predecessors. Among them are the principle
of sufficient reason and the principle of non-contradiction. Whereas the
followers of Leibniz and Wolff claim that these two principles are sufficient
to ground all knowledge, others, like Crusius and Kant, maintained that
additional principles are required.136
As we have seen, the second installment reveals Bolzano’s position to be
Kantian in this respect. The early Bolzano considers the principle of non-
contradiction as an analytic proposition which therefore cannot be part of
science, let alone serve as the foundation of a science. Analytic propositions
cannot serve as the ultimate ground from which other truths follow by means
of proper relations of ground and consequence. Kant is less outspoken on this
issue as he does not explicitly state whether the principle of non-contradiction
is analytic or synthetic. It is not at all evident from his explanation of the
synthetic-analytic distinction that the principle of non-contradiction itself
is analytic, although it is the highest principle of all analytic judgments.137
Thus, compared to Kant, Bolzano is more radical in rejecting the principle of
non-contradiction as an ultimate ground at all..
Further confirmation that Bolzano regarded himself as a Kantian in this
respect can be found in the following notes:
I maintain (with Kant), that every science requires synthetic prin-
ciples. Every synthetic judgment presupposes another available
judgment. One cannot deduct a synthetic inference from purely
analytic propositions.138
The claim that science requires synthetic principles still leaves room to let an-
136Cf. B191. According to Kant, the highest principles of analytic judgments are not sufficient
to ground scientific knowledge.
137B191.
138GA2B2/1, p. 78: ‘Ich behaupte (mit Kant) , daß jede Wissenschaft synthetischer Grundsätze
bedarf [...]; jedes synthetische Urtheil [...] setzt ein anderes freyes Urtheil voraus. Aus
lauter analytischen Sätzen läßt sich keine synthetische Schlußfolge abziehen’.
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alytic judgments play an important role in science. Yet, Bolzano’s early work
exhibits a strongly negative view on analytic judgments. At several places,
Bolzano even notes that analytic propositions are not proper judgments at all:
I do not regard analytic propositions as proper judgments.139
A phrase in the same notebook states that propositions are wider than judg-
ments because they include analytic judgments. Taken together this suggests a
distinction between propositions and judgments in which the former includes
analytic judgments. However, Bolzano does not systematically employ this
distinction throughout his early work, although many early passages share
the negative stance towards analytic judgments. Nevertheless, since Bolzano
holds that knowledge consists of true judgments, this means that Bolzano
does not regard analytic judgments as representations of knowledge at all.
Indeed, several passages confirm this conclusion, such as for example:
If all our judgments would be analytic, our entire thinking would
be a mere labeling of objects with sounds or symbols. Since these
are random, so would be our entire thinking.140
Thus, the early Bolzano not only employs Kant’s distinction between ana-
lytic and synthetic judgments but also shares Kant’s negative stance towards
analytic judgments.
In his notebooks stemming from around 1813, Bolzano mentions plans
for a more extensive work on logic and the foundations of mathematics, a
work which much later became the Wissenschaftslehre. In these early notes,
Bolzano mentions the following title of a section of this work: ‘on the unsci-
entific nature of analytic judgments’.141 In fact, Bolzano follows Kant more
in general in claiming that the non-trivial judgments of science, including
mathematics, are synthetic:
139GA2B15, p. 205: ‘[I]ch [halte] analytische Sätze für keine wahren Urtheile’. Evidently, the
term ‘wahr’ here is not used in the sense of ‘true’, but in the sense of ‘truly’, or ‘proper’.
Bolzano claims something similar for the proposition ‘A is not not A’ (GA2B15, p. 212).
140GA2B15, p. 178: ‘Wenn alle unsre Urteile analytisch wären; so wäre unser ganzes Denken
nichts als ein Benennen der Gegenstände mit Tönen oder Zeichen, und wie dieses willkürlich
ist, so wäre auch unser ganzes Denken willkürlich’.
141GA2B16/1, p. 36.
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They [analytic judgments] do not even deserve a place in a scien-
tific system, and if they are used, it is only to recall the concept
designated by a certain word, just as with conventions.142
Thus, according to the early Bolzano, science consists entirely of synthetic
judgments. The principles, as well as the conclusions derived from them by
means of the laws of logic, are synthetic a priori judgments. Thus, similar to
Kant, Bolzano held that the main constituents of mathematics consist of a
priori synthetic judgments. However, contrary to Kant, Bolzano does not
think that the synthetic connection of subject and predicate requires a third
element, namely intuition. Instead, he rejects the second half of the law of
reciprocity to allow simple concepts to be extensively contained under other
simple concepts. The early Bolzano thus combines the rationalistic criticism
of the Kantian role of intuition with Kant’s view that mathematics consists
of synthetic judgments.





Mathematics and the Synthetic
Nature of Arithmetic
While the previous two chapters introduced Bolzano’s program for a re-
form of mathematics and the important role of synthetic principles as the
proper ground of mathematical truths, this chapter reconstructs the impact
of Bolzano’s reform of mathematics more in detail. Arithmetic occupies
a special place within the history of analytic philosophy, especially since
Kant introduced the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.
Whereas Kant declared mathematical knowledge including arithmetic to be
synthetic, later analytic philosophers often use the case of arithmetic to argue
against Kant’s view. In discussions concerning analyticity, arithmetic became
a paradigmatic example of analytic knowledge. Frege, for example, accepted
the synthetic nature of geometry, but categorically denied that arithmetic is
synthetic.1 Precisely because Bolzano is often interpreted as a forerunner of
Frege, Bolzano’s position with regard to arithmetic is a fascinating case to
study his conception of a priori synthetic judgments. Accordingly, this chap-
ter investigates Bolzano’s early conception of general mathematics to explain
why he considered arithmetic to be synthetic. It provides a reconstruction of
how Bolzano realized his reform of mathematics for arithmetic and is based
1Frege, 1884.
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on a detailed study of hitherto neglected manuscripts and notes.2
The unpublished and largely neglected second installment of the Beyträge
provides a conception of general mathematics that regards arithmetic as syn-
thetic knowledge. The manuscript not only clarifies Bolzano’s definition of
mathematics as the science of the forms of things, but also provides a founda-
tion for the proof of arithmetical truths that he presents in the appendix to the
published installment of the Beyträge.3 In providing a detailed explanation of
Bolzano’s early foundation of arithmetic, I challenge Chihara’s evaluation of
Bolzano’s Beyträge as ‘hopelessly vague and unrealistic’.4 Like Chihara, com-
mentators on the Beyträge neglect crucial features of Bolzano’s view. In his
important study of the Beyträge, Rusnock denies the important role Bolzano
attributes to Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments
and describes Bolzano’s proof of arithmetical truths as Leibnizean.5 In his
important study of Bolzano’s mereology, Krickel also regards Bolzano’s proof
of arithmetical truths in the Beyträge as Leibnizean. Contrary to Rusnock
and Krickel, I argue that Bolzano’s proof is fundamentally different from Leib-
niz’s proof and cannot be understood without taking into account Bolzano’s
engagement with Kant and Schultz. As we will see, the proper direction of
Bolzano’s views come to the fore in a fascinating manner in his early account
of general mathematics.
The first section compares Bolzano’s proof of arithmetical truths to Leib-
2To my knowledge, only Laz pays some attention to the second installment of the Beyträge
with respect to the notion of composition in thought (Laz, 1993). In his study of grounding,
Roski uses one of Bolzano’s early manuscripts to summarize the discipline of aetiology
(Roski, 2014, p. 84-90).
3The manuscript of the second installment was written shortly after the publication of
the Beyträge in 1810 (GA2A5). Important elements, such as the conception of general
mathematics, parts of the theory of numbers, and the manners of conception can already
be found in notes written before 1810. So we can assume that Bolzano already had in mind
the idea of general mathematics as concerned with composition in thought when working
on the Beyträge. An exception is his conception of ideal composition. Comparison of
the Beyträge and notes written a few years later shows that he did not yet realize some
of the consequences for the rules of inferences when writing the Beyträge. For a detailed
discussion of these rules see Roski, 2014, p. 48-56 and Centrone, 2012, p. 14-20.
4Chihara, 1999, p. 359. Parsons also discusses Bolzano’s treatment of arithmetic in the
Beyträge, but does not take into account the manuscript of the second installment to
the Beyträge. Accordingly, he can only conjecture what the exact disagreemt with Kant
amounts to (Parsons, 2012, p. 92-96).
5Rusnock, 2000, p. 50; p. 47.
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niz’s proof as presented in the New Essays (§6.1).6 I will contend that
Bolzano’s proof of arithmetic truths stems not so much from Leibniz as
from Schultz’s defense of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Schultz here for
the first time presents the laws of commutativity and associativity as axioms
of arithmetic.7 The three subsequent sections explain how Bolzano’s early
account of general mathematics in the second installment explains the syn-
thetic nature of arithmetical truths by introducing a new way of composing
wholes out of parts (§6.2-6.4). The notion of order inherent to this type
of composition requires that the law of commutativity is understood as a
synthetic principle. Finally, I will discuss how and why Bolzano changed his
view concerning the synthetic nature of arithmetic (§6.5). Surprisingly, the
reason will turn out not to be the refined distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments of his laterWissenschaftslehre.
6.1 The Law of Commutativity and Arithmetical
Proofs
The appendix of the Beyträge argues against the Kantian role of intuition, not
only in geometry but also in arithmetic. In this context, Bolzano provides a
proof of an arithmetical truth to show that, contra Kant, it does not require
the intuition of time. Secondary literature often interprets this proof as
a Leibnizean one, leaving Bolzano’s insistence on the synthetic nature of
arithmetic unexplained. Krickel’s study of Bolzano’s mereology even claims
that Bolzano’s position is close to Leibniz and Frege:
In this discussion, Bolzano and Frege support Leibniz’s position.
Already in the Beyträgen zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der
Mathematik, Bolzano criticizes Kant’s argumentation. Without
any reference to Leibniz, he in fact reasons along Leibniz’s lines.
He acknowledges that the absence of the law of associativity
constitutes a defect in the argumentation.8
6At the time, most of Leibniz’s work was unknown, but the New Essays was first published
in 1765.
7Schultz, 1789.
8Krickel, 1995, p. 240: ‘In dieser Diskussion schlagen sich Bolzano und Frege auf die Leib-
niz’sche Seite. Bereits in den Beyträgen zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik
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Krickel reads Frege’s criticism of Kant into Bolzano and does not seem to
consider the possibility that Bolzano’s proof fundamentally differs from
Leibniz’s precisely because it takes the law of associativity as a synthetic
principle. As I will show in the subsequent sections, Bolzano’s account
of mathematics and epistemology renders the law of associativity into a
decisive factor for the nature of arithmetical truths. Krickel even overlooks
that Bolzano regards arithmetic as synthetic when he assumes that Bolzano,
similar to Frege, regards arithmetical truths as analytic:
Frege also strongly maintains that the formulas of numbers are
provable and analytic.9
Although the later Bolzano of theWissenschaftslehre (1837) may regard the
‘number formulas’ (Zahlformeln) of arithmetic as analytic, as we will see
later, this is evidently false for the early Beyträge.10 Whereas Rusnock recog-
nizes that Bolzano regarded arithmetic as synthetic, he nevertheless regards
Bolzano’s argument as Leibnizean because he takes it to show that philosoph-
ical analysis suffices:
Philosophical analysis (dissection), do what it might, would never
be able to calculate the sum. Hence, Kant reasoned, intuition
must be dragged in. Bolzano’s proof of the result (like that of
Leibniz in the New Essays) shows that this is not so, that, as
soon as one removes the artificial restriction to single judgments,
synthetic propositions can be established by purely conceptual
means.11
Similar to Krickel, Rusnock overlooks the role of the law of associativity
and too easily identifies ‘conceptual means’ with ‘philosophical analyis’. My
wendet sich Bolzano gegen die Kantische Argumentation. Ohne auf Leibniz Bezug zu
nehmen, vollzieht er im Grunde seine Argumentation nach. Er erkennt dabei das fehlende
Assoziativgesetz als Mangel der Beweisführung’.
9Krickel, 1995, p. 241: ‘Daß die Zahlformeln beweisbar und analytisch sind, ist eine Ansicht,
die auch Frege nachhaltig vertritt’.
10See §6.5.
11Rusnock, 2000, p. 47. In my view, Rusnock also opposes Kant and Bolzano in a quite
strange way when he writes ‘the result is not derived by dissecting the concept ‘sum of 7,
2’; instead, several definitions must be taken into account.’ For Kant it is no problem at all
to take into account multiple definitions when dissecting or analyzing a concept.
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investigation of Bolzano’s early account of general mathematics in the follow-
ing sections will show that philosophical analysis is not sufficient to establish
synthetic propositions and that Bolzano provides other conceptual means
than those of philosophical analysis. The treatment of Bolzano’s proof in
secondary literature asks for a more careful comparison to Leibniz’s proof
and the mathematical context of the time. Comparing the proofs provided
by Leibniz, Bolzano, and the Kantian Schultz, I argue in the remainder of
this section that Schultz influenced Bolzano’s conception of arithmetic.
Let us consider the arithmetical proposition 7 + 2 = 9 that Bolzano
discusses instead of Kant’s example 7+5 = 12 and Leibniz’s example 2+2 = 4
for reasons of brevity and easy comparison. Leibniz’s proof of arithmetical
truths solely relies on the definition of numbers and a principle that allows
for substitution (see iv in figure 6.1).12
Principle of substitution: if equals be substituted for equals, the equality re-
mains.
i) 7 + 2 = 7 + 1 + 1 (2 =def 1 + 1)
ii) 7 + 1 + 1 = 8 + 1 (8 =def 7 + 1)
iii) 8 + 1 = 9 (9 =def 8 + 1)
iv) 7 + 2 = 9 (substitution)
Figure 6.1: Leibniz’s proof of arithmetical truths.
Leibniz defines each number as the addition of its predecessor and one.
Since 2 is defined as 1+ 1, analysis of the constituent ‘2’ of our example 7+ 2
results into 7 + 1 + 1 (step 1 in figure 6.1). The definitions of 8 and 9 allow
to simplify this result into 9 via the intermediate result 8 + 1 (step 2 and 3
in figure 6.1). The substitution principle claims that if equals are substituted
for equals, in this case 7 + 2 and 9, equality still holds. Thus Leibniz’s proof
only uses definitions to show that the expression 7 + 2 means the same as
9 and subsequently only relies on the substitution principle to establish the
equality of the two expressions. This substitution principle in fact serves as a
more specific version of the principle of identity according to which one can
12Leibniz, 1704 (1996), IV, vii, p. 10.
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claim that A is b+c if A is defined as b+c, since this claim in fact boils down
to A is A. Accordingly, in Kant’s view, it is an analytic principle.
As was commonly known, Kant did not accept Leibniz’s proof and argued
that arithmetical truths require the pure intuition of time to establish the mul-
tiplicity presupposed by numbers. According to Kant, pure intuition suffices
and arithmetic does not require synthetic principles.13 The mathematical
textbooks in the tradition of Wolff did present principles in their treatment
of arithmetic, but they boil down to specialized versions of the common
notions of Euclid.14 Kant did not even regard these common notions as
proper principles because he thought that they were analytic.15 Thus, no
suitable candidate principles for arithmetic were available to Kant.
Schultz, the mathematician and well-known defender of Kant, disagreed
with Kant on precisely the issue whether arithmetic requires principles (or
axioms).16 He not only defended a Kantian position with regard to the role of
time in arithmetic, but also presented two synthetic principles for arithmetic
in his Prüfung der Kantischen Critik der reinen Vernunft.17 These principles
of arithmetic are nowadays called the principle of commutativity and the
principle of associativity (see figure 6.2).18 Expressed informally, they state
that, in the case of addition, the order in which numbers are added to each
other does not matter for the outcome. In contrast to Kant’s rejection of
arithmetic axioms, Schultz claims that these axioms are required by arithmetic
and illustrates this by providing a proof of Kant’s example 7 + 5 = 12.
Anticipating Bolzano’s early account of general mathematics that I describe
in the next section, I analyze the difference in structure in more detail. For
reasons of brevity and easy comparison I use Bolzano’ s example 7 + 2 = 9
to present Schultz’s proof of arithmetical truths (see figure 6.2).
13For an enlightening discussion on these topics see Longuenesse, 1998, p. 279-286 and Shabel,
1998.
14Cf. GWI:12, p. 44-48; Kästner, 1758, p. 4.
15For a discussion of this subject see the footnote in §28.
16For a short analysis of this debate see Longuenesse, 1998, p. 282.
17Schultz, 1789, p. 219. Cf.Schultz, 1790, p. 41. One of Martin’s important achievements is
to draw attention to Schultz’s work for the first time (Martin, 1972, p. 64-65, 119-126).
18These terms seem to have been introduced at the start of the nineteenth century by Joseph
Servois.
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Principle of commutativity: a+ b = b+ a
Principle of associativity: c+ (a+ b) = (c+ a) + b
1. 7 + 2 = 7 + (1 + 1) (2 =def 1 + 1)
2. 7 + (1 + 1) = (7 + 1) + 1 (associativity)
3. (7 + 1) + 1 = 8 + 1 (8 =def 7 + 1)
4. 8 + 1 = 9 (9 =def 8 + 1)
5. 7 + 2 = 9 (substitution)
Figure 6.2: Schultz’s proof of arithmetical truths.
Schultz considers numbers as wholes, and in the case of an addition, takes
the manner of composition, that is, the kind of connection between the
parts, to be that of mathematical addition. He defines numbers in the same
way as Leibniz, but does not accept that step ii from 7 + 1 + 1 to 8 + 1
in figure 6.1 solely relies on the definitions of ‘2’ and ‘8’. When analyzing
‘2’ into ‘1+1’ we only replace the second component of 7+2 and not the
expression as a whole. Leibniz’s views on mathematics might allow for merely
syntactic operations in the sense that the definitions and the substitution
principle merely manipulate symbols. Due to Schultz’s conception of general
mathematics, however, they concern the composition of wholes out of parts
as I will discuss more in detail in the next section. Whereas Leibniz’s theory
of signification might allow to regard it as a merely syntactic operation,
Schultz regards the analysis of the constituent ‘2’ as a decomposition of a
whole into its parts. Relative to the whole composed of ‘7’ and ‘2’, ‘2’ is a
whole composed of ‘1’ and ‘1’. The whole composed of ‘7’, ‘1’, and ‘1’ differs
from the whole composed of ‘7’ and ‘2’ because it has a different structure,
that is, it is built out of different parts. In the usual syntax of mathematics
this can be indicated by brackets: (7 + 1) + 1 versus 7 + (1 + 1). Thus,
according to Schultz, Leibniz’s step ii is not allowed without the introduction
of an additional principle,because this step changes the parts of a whole, and
therefore the whole itself. In this case, the axiom of associativity holds and the
order of composition does not matter.19 According to Schultz, we therefore
19The axiom of associativity does not hold for other manners of composition, such as
exponentiation (23 6= 32 ).
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need the principle of associativity to conclude that the whole composed of
‘7’ and ‘1+1’ is the same as the whole composed of ‘7+1’ and ‘1’ (step 2 in
figure 6.2).
In sum, compared to the proof of Leibniz, Schultz claims that the proof re-
quires an additional step that is based on the axiom or principle of associativity.
Schultz’s mereological perspective requires the principles of commutativity
and associativity to establish the mathematical fact that the order does not
matter in the case of addition. According to Schultz’s axiomatic conception
of synthetic judgments, these principles suffice to render arithmetic itself
synthetic.20
Many references in the Beyträge and the philosophical and mathematical
notes indicate that the early Bolzano carefully studied many of Schultz works
on mathematics and evaluated many of Schultz efforts positively.21 One
example is Schultz’s effort to remove alien concepts such as motion from
geometry.22 As I will discuss more in detail in the next section, Bolzano’s
early definition of general mathematics is also similar to Schultz’s definition.
With the exception of those by Schultz, mathematical textbooks at the time
only conceived of Euclid’s common notions as principles of arithmetic and no
other textbook even mentioned something like the laws of associativity and
commutativity. Therefore it must have been under the influence of Schultz
that Bolzano provides exactly the same arithmetical proof:
The proof of this proposition is not difficult as soon as we as-
sume the general proposition, a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c, i.e.
that with an arithmetic sum one only looks at the number of
terms not their order (certainly a wider concept than sequence
in time). This proposition excludes the concept of time rather
than presupposing it. But having accepted it, the proof of the
above proposition can be carried out in the following way: the
statements 1 + 1 = 2, 7 + 1 = 8, 8 + 1 = 9 are mere definitions
and conventions. Therefore, 7 + 2 = 7 + (1 + 1), per def.) =
(7 + 1) + 1, (per propos. praeced.) = 8 + 1 (per def.) = 9, (per
20See §3.6 for a discussion of the axiomatic interpretation of Kant.
21GA2B2/1; GA2B2/2; GA2B3/1; GA2B3/2; Bolzano, 1804; Bolzano, 1810; Jan Berg, 2002.
22For a discussion of this topic see §4.2.
6.1 The Law of Commutativity and Arithmetical Proofs 243
def.).23
This passage provides two arguments against the role of time in arithmetic.
According to Bolzano, it is precisely the principle of associativity that weakens
Kant’s view of the role of time qua pure intuition. Since this principle states
that the order does not matter, time is not required. However, it seems to
me that a more sophisticated reading of Kant requires time for a reason more
fundamental than that of the order of addition. In my view, Schultz needs his
axioms of arithmetic precisely because his Kantian framework forces him to
base arithmetic on a successive process. We will encounter something similar
in Bolzano’s theory of numbers.24 Bolzano’s second argument against the
role of time in arithmetic is expressed by the phrase between brackets in the
quoted passage. According to Bolzano, the notion of an arithmetical sum
replaces the role that Kant attributed to time. Within Bolzano’s organization
of mathematics, the more general notion of an arithmetical sum is much
more appropriate to characterize the general nature of arithmetic than the
notion of time, which is, in his view, the topic of a more specific mathematical
discipline.25 Thus, Bolzano’s argument relies on the ban on kind crossing,
quite similar to what we have seen in a previous chapter with regard to the
role of motion in geometrical demonstrations.26
In sum, the case of arithmetic perfectly illustrates how Bolzano maintains
the Kantian notion of synthetic a priori truths while he rejects the Kantian
role of pure intuition. Contrary to the Leibnizean school and the mathe-
matical textbooks that issued from this tradition (Wolff and Kästner), but
similar to the one of Schultz, Bolzano holds that arithmetic requires the law
of commutativity rather than a notion of temporal order. In this manner,
he combines the criticism of Kant’s notion of pure intuition put forward
by Leibnizeans like Eberhard with Kant’s criticism of the Leibnizean view
that all a priori knowledge is analytic. The following sections explain how
Bolzano’s early foundation of general mathematics provides an alternative to
23Bolzano, 1810, p. 147, 135.
24See §6.4.
25See §4.6. From a Kantian point of view, one could argue that arithmetic only relies on
time insofar it is required as a transcendental condition for the possibility of arithmetical
objects. Such a notion of time seems to be as general as Bolzano’s notion of arithmetical
sum. As a result, the dependence of arithmetic on this transcendental conception of time
does not violate the ban on kind crossing.
26See §4.2.
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the foundational role of time and thereby accounts for the synthetic nature
of arithmetic.
6.2 General Mathematics as a Science of Ideal
Composition in Thought
The previous section sketched Schultz’s influence on Bolzano’s view of arith-
metic. Since Bolzano, contrary to Schultz, rejects pure intuition of time as
the epistemological ground for multiplicities, he had to develop an alternative,
conceptual, account of multiplicities. Recall Bolzano’s early conception of
(general) mathematics as discussed in a previous chapter.27 As we have seen in
chapter 4, the early Bolzano rejects the traditional definition of mathematics
as the science of quantities and redefines mathematics as the science of the
forms (or laws) of all things.28 As such, mathematics is concerned with the
composition of things in thought. A change in the conception of mathemat-
ics as revolutionary as this, requires a sophisticated account of composition
along with examples of how mathematical disciplines actually can be build
upon it. The unpublished second installment to the Beyträge provides such
an account in the exposition of the theory of numbers. The proposed theory
of numbers, developed within the exposition of general mathematics, relies
on a new understanding of part-whole composition. This section introduces
Bolzano’s new notion of composition and reveals its properties, which in
later sections will turn out to be crucial for Bolzano’s view of arithmetic.
The second installment of the Beyträge provides a presentation of general
mathematics that includes a section entitled Von dem Begriffe der Zusam-
mendenkbarkeit der ersten allgemeinen Eigenschaft der Dinge.29 This subsec-
tion explicitly presents a classification of the ways in which representations
can be brought together in thought, which was already presupposed in the
Beyträge.30 The classification of composition boils down to a crucial distinc-
27See §4.6.
28See §4.4; Bolzano, 1810, p. 11, 94.
29The title indicates that it really is a part of general mathematics, although it traditionally
belonged to logic. Contrary to his later definition of mathematics, Bolzano’s early
definition is so wide that it tends to incorporate logic (see §4.4). Apart from the treatment
of general mathematics, this is also visible in the treatment of the mathematical discipline
of aetiology (see §4.6).
30GA2A5, §30 p. 33. The early Bolzano consequently talks about representations in thought
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tion between ideal or subjective composition A et B and real or objective
composition A cum B.31 An example of an ideal composition is ‘house and
wood’ and an example of real (objective) composition is ‘wooden house’.32
For instance, a pile of wood next to a house already falls under the concept
established by ‘house’ et ‘wood’. Whereas the et composition of ‘wooden’ and
‘house’ does not require the house to be made of wood, the cum connection
results in a concept that merely refers to all houses made of wood. The latter
composition is such that the concept ‘wooden’ provides a restriction to the
concept ‘house’ and thus establishes a relation of subordination.33
As Bolzano points out, some combinations of concepts cannot be combined
by cum, such as for example ‘triangle’ and ‘three right angles’ because the
latter concept contradicts a property of the first, namely the fact that the
three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. However, they can be
combined objectively by et, which resultsin a concept that refers to all figures
in which a triangle is combined with a figure with three right angles (for
an example see figure 6.3).34 Yet, other combinations by means of cum are
possible, such as for example ‘triangle’ and ‘equiangular’. As the examples
illustrate, the cum connection requires that neither the involved concepts nor
their properties contradict each other. Since the involved concepts affect each
other, a cum connection would result in an inconsistent concept. In fact, the
cum connection pertains to what used to be called predication. For example
and did not yet distinguish between subjective and objective representations (Vorstellungen
an sich) as in the laterWissenschaftslehre. Unfortunately, the Beyträge does not properly
introduce the kinds of composition. For an important part Bolzano apparently presup-
posed knowledge of traditional use of these kinds of composition, such as cum, as we
find it in the work of Wolff. Yet, Bolzano’s peculiar notion of et composition certainly
requires a proper introduction in order to understand his manuscripts and notes on general
mathematics, as well as, the inference schemes of the Beyträge.
31Bolzano regards quod as a more adequate signifier of what cummeans. He also mentions
the possibility to form a new concept by means of a negation (GA2A5, §36, p. 35). By
means of negation, et, and quod the other possible combinations of concepts can be defined.
A et non B is A abstracto B, and A quod non B is A sine B. Notes written at most a few
years after the publication of the Beyträge also distinguish between A cum B, and B cum A
(GA2B16/1, p. 21).
32GA2A5, §33-34, p. 34-35.
33For an explanation of the notion of subordination see §3.2.1.
34Sometimes an objective composition can be achieved by adding a third concept. For
example, ‘straight line’ and ‘moment’ can only be combined by et and not by cum because
they cannot modify each other. However, addition of a suitable third concept, for example
‘point’, allows to combine the concepts by means of a cum connection into ‘a point situated
on a straight line at a particular moment’ (GA2A5, §38, p. 36).
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Figure 6.3: Example of et composition of ‘triangle’ with ‘three right angles’.
‘equiangular’ cum ‘triangle’ in fact expresses the predication of ‘equiangular’ to
‘triangle’. Such a characteristic might contradict other characteristics inherent
in the concept of a triangle, as actually is the case in the example of ‘three
right angles’ cum ‘triangle’. Contrary to ideal composition, composition by
means of cum is limited by what can actually be combined without raising
contradictions. This explains why Bolzano calls the cum connection an
objective or real composition.
So far I mainly characterized the distinction between real and ideal composi-
tion by means of examples that point out how various kinds of compositions
result in various extensions. In his early work, however, Bolzano introduces
the distinction in an intensional manner: the resulting concept differs in
content (intension). As we have seen before when discussing the nature of a
priori synthetic judgments, Bolzano increasingly described concepts in an ex-
tensional way while developing his philosophical ideas.35 Seen in this way, the
meaning of a concept is determined by the object or set of objects to which
the concept refers rather than by the representational content of the concept.
The Beyträge testifies of Bolzano’s struggle to replace the Kantian explanation
of subordination that is primarily intensional by an extensional approach.
Considered from a purely extensional point of view, the cum connection
establishes a set theoretic intersection of A and B. Of the objects falling under
the concepts ‘wooden’ and ‘house’ only those fall under ‘wooden cum house’
that both fall under ‘wooden’ and ‘house’. A more traditional example is
35See §5.4.
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the following: the objects falling under ‘rational animals’ are precisely those







Figure 6.4: Extension of the concepts ‘rational’ and ‘animal’.
As the example indicates, by connecting differentia to genera so as to gen-
erate species (according to the traditional Porphyrian tree) we establish what
Bolzano calls a cum connection. Bolzano’s ‘cum’ captures precisely the way
in which additional characteristics puts further constraints on the objects
that fall under the concept and thereby limits the extension or domain of
the concept. In Bolzano’s terms, the tradition defined concepts by means of
the following structure: A cum B. For example, the definition of the concept
‘human being’ or ‘man’ is ‘rational cum animal’.
Whereas the extensional consequences straightforwardly follow from the in-
tensional meaning of the cum composition as a composition of non-contradictory
characteristics, the intensional meaning of the et composition itself is not
clear at all. The nature of the et composition seems to be such that a merely
intensional description does not suffice to understand the extension of ideal
composition. In the following I clarify Bolzano’s understanding of the nature
of et composition by reconstructing Bolzano’s implicit extensional under-
standing based on the manuscript of the second installment and recently
published notes.36 A straightforward extensional interpretation of A et B
would be to say that the extension of A et B is the union of the extension
of the concepts A and B. Jan Berg straightforwardly advocates this inter-
36GA2B15.
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pretation in prefaces and notes to his edition of Bolzano’s Gesamtausgabe.37
Centrone and Roski are aware of the difficulties, but in the end interpret the
et connection in the same manner.38 The inferences provided by the Beyträge
that involve the et connection indeed suggest such an interpretation.39 How-
ever, Bolzano’s examples of et connections in the second installment and in
notes contradict such an interpretation as the following analysis of Bolzano’s
examples of et connections shows.
The second installment provides an example that is quite helpful to under-
stand the precise nature of concepts composed by et:
For example, Dintzeug and Streusandfaß together result in the
concept of a Schreibzeug. We have called this kind of composi-
tion (A et B). This composition is possible between every two
concepts.40
This example depends on the practice of writing in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, which involved the use of quill pens and reservoirs of
ink. The use of ink easily causes stains. In order to let the ink dry faster
one used a special kind of sand which was scattered on the paper with ink.
Proper handwriting thus required both an ink pot (Dintzeug) and a pot
containing the sand (Streusand). At the time not only ink pots and pots for
sand were produced (see figure 6.5a), but also pots that combined these two
functionalities (see figure 6.5b). These combined pots were designated by the
term ‘writing tool’ (Schreibzeug).41 Whereas the modern meaning of ‘writing
tool’ implies that the extension of the term is a union of the extensions of the
concepts ‘pencil’, ‘pen’, ‘eraser’, and others, the old meaning referred only to
one specific kind of objects. At the time the term ‘writing tool’ referred to
objects that combine the two functionalities of the inkpot and the sandpot.
In a passage that further explains the example, Bolzano relies on this specific,
but for his time common, meaning of the term ‘writing tool’:
37See GA2B14, p. 13-14; GA2B15, p. 222.
38Cf. Centrone, 2012, p. 16, 18; Roski, 2013, p. 50.
39Bolzano, 1810, p. 66, p. 114. Cf. Roski, 2014, p. 50.
40GA2A5, p. 34 §32: ‘Es gibt fürs erste eine Zusammensetzung 2er Begriffe zu einem dritten,
die das Wort und andeutet, z.B. Dintzeug und Streusandfaß zusammen geben den Begriff
eines Schreibzeugs. (A et B) haben wir diese Zusammensetzungsart bezeichnet. Diese
Zusammensetzung ist zwischen jeglichen 2 Begriffen möglich’.
41Cf. Jacob Grimm, 1854, p. 1708.
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(a) A sandpot (Streusandfaß ) and an inkpot
(Dintfaß ).
(b) A writing tool (Schreibzeug) pro-
vides at the same time a pot for
sand and a pot for ink.
Figure 6.5: Sandpot and writing tool.
[A] Schreibzeug is neither an object that is Dintfaß nor an object
that is Streusandfaß, but a sum of Dintfaß and Streusandfaß.42
Contrary to the modern meaning of ‘writing tool’, according to which this
term can refer to just an inkpot, Bolzano’s analysis of the then common
use of the term explicates that neither inkpots nor sandpots belong to the
extension of ‘writing tool’. Thus Bolzano’s example only supports Berg’s
interpretation of et composition as a set theoretic union if one attributes a
modern meaning to the term ‘writing tool’.
Other examples also support my interpretation. When Bolzano criticizes
one of his inference schemes of the Beyträge that involves et composition,
he suggests an alternative inference scheme that contains the following et
composition: ‘flower’ et ‘pot’.43 Bolzano explicitly explains the result of this
composition as the concept ’flower in pot’ and not as ‘flowerpot’, which
would be the result of the composition ‘flower’ cum ‘pot’. The extension
of ‘flower’ et ‘pot’ contains pots filled with flowers, whereas the extension
of ‘flowerpot’ contains just a special kind of pots designed for flowers. In
another example, Bolzano mentions a rider on a horse as an example of the
ideal composition of ‘horse’ et ‘rider’.44 In this context, Bolzano refers to
the sign + as used by Lambert for this kind of composition.45 Lambert
describes this composition in ontological terms rather than that of concepts
42GA2A5, §34, p. 35: ‘Schreibzeug ist nicht ein Gegenstand der Dintfaß ist, weder ein
Gegenstand der Streusandfaß ist; sondern eine Summe von Dintfaß und Streusandfaß’.
43GA2B15, p. 223.
44GA2B2/2, p. 170.
45See also GA2A5, p. 34.
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or representations and contrasts it to his version of the cum connection. The
et composition of two substances A and B constitutes a new substance rather
than that B amends a property of A.46
Thus we have seen that Bolzano’s manuscripts and notes provide ample
evidence to reject the interpretation of et composition as a union or intersec-
tion of the extension of the involved concepts. In my view, the mentioned
commentators are mislead by the perspective of set theory. The question
left concerns the alternative description of the extension of et composition
in, preferably, terms as formal and precise as the rejected solutions. Unfortu-
nately, Bolzano did not explicitly describe the extension of et composition in
a general way. Examination of the examples provided by Bolzano allows to
formulate the following condition for the extension of the concept resulting
from an et composition: an object belongs to the extension of A et B iff it
is a whole composed of exactly one part that belongs to the extension of
A and one part that belongs to the extension of B. An object belongs to
the extension of, for example, a writing tool (Streusandfaß ) if this object is
composed of an inkpot and a sandpot. Whereas a straightforward application
of set theory suffices to properly represent the extensional consequences of
cum composition as intersection, the extensional aspects of concept formation
by means of et composition cannot be captured by set theory. A formal
description of the extensional consequences of et composition requires to
model part-whole relations. Let PPxy mean that x is a proper part of y, and
d(φ) be a function that maps a concept φ to its extension. Formulated in
predicate logic, the following holds for Bolzano’s notion of et composition:
∀z(zd(AetB)→ ∃xy(PPxz∧PPyz∧xd(A)∧yd(B)∧¬∃u(PPuz))).47
An object of the domain of A et B consists of exactly two parts, of which
one belongs to the domain of A and the other to the domain of B. This
description of Bolzano’s notion of et composition might help modern readers.
However, one must be aware that the early Bolzano is not working in the
context of a modern logic, such as predicate logic, in which the extension
determines the truth of the propositions. Despite an ongoing transition to a
more extensional approach, Bolzano’s early work is mostly based on an inten-
46Cf. Lambert, 1782, §12, p. 149; §14, p. 150.
47Based on a suggestion by Arianna Betti. In the mereological logic of Stanisław Leśniewski it
can be expressed much more easily.
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sional understanding of et composition, that is, he relies on the content of the
notion of et composition rather than the specification of what is contained
under the concept that results from an et composition.
Being the central concept of general mathematics, the notion of et compo-
sition imposes constraints on its mathematical objects. The most important
concerns the order of the parts of an et composition. Depending on the
operator, the order of arithmetical operations can be relevant or not. For
example, 2³ has the same parts as 3² and the same kind of connection, as
well as the same operator, but a different order which results in a different
outcome. In the case of for example 2 + 3, the order does not make any
difference. Is the order of et composition relevant? The following passage
states that et composition does not abstract from the order of parts:
Yet, if one abstracts from all qualities of the parts that are to be
connected, merely the order of succession in our mind can be
different, for example a, b, c, or a, c, b, or, or b, a, c, or b, a, c.48
Since general mathematics is based on ideal composition, which occurs in
thought, the composition of parts always has a particular order. When
Bolzano considers the proposition that everything can be thought together
with something else, he also considers the proposition that thinking together
always occurs between two things.49At this point Bolzano seems to be deeply
influenced by a Kantian argument, in the sense that the structure of general
mathematics depends on the capabilities of our faculties. The second install-
ment provides a quite precise claim concerning the order of the parts of an
ideal composition:
In my opinion, all ideal composition is in fact only of the form
A et B or [A et B] et C. I want to state that any ideal com-
position only takes place between two things (representations),
but not A+B+C+D. This is important because of its many
48GA2A5, p. 52, §21: ‘Wird aber von allen Beschaffenheiten der zu verbindenden Theile
selbst abstrahirt, so kann nur noch die Ordnung, in welcher wir sie in unserem Gemüthe
aufeinander folgen [lassen], verschieden sein, z.B. a, b, c, oder a, c, b, oder b, a, c, oder, b, a,
c’. Cf. GA 2B2/2 p. 91-92. Bolzano regards combinatorics as the mathematical discipline
that has order itself as its topic of study.
49GA2B2, p. 170.
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consequences.50
Laz takes this quote to mean that ideal composition is ‘independent of the
order and property of its components’.51 Accordingly, he identifies the notion
of an arithmetical sum, in which order does not matter, with ideal compo-
sition. As we have seen, properties of parts can even contradict each other,
so ideal composition can indeed be said to be independent of the properties
of its parts. However, in my view this quote claims exactly the opposite of
Laz’s reading with regard to the order of the parts. According to Bolzano,
ideal composition always takes place between exactly two representations,
let us call this Bolzano’s ordering principle. This can only mean that ideal
composition does not allow for A et B et C, but merely allows for [A et B] et
C or A et [B et C]. Thus, contrary to Laz’s claim, ideal composition cannot
be identified with the notion of an arithmetical sum. For Bolzano defines the
latter such that it abstracts from any order.52
As we will see in the next section, the early Bolzano does not base his
theory of numbers on the concept of a sum or an arithmetical sum, but on
the notion of ideal composition. In the quoted passage, Bolzano notices that
the ordering principle has important consequences. Unfortunately, he does
not indicate which consequences he has in mind. In the following sections,
we will see that the synthetic nature of arithmetic is one of them.
6.3 Bolzano’s Foundation of Arithmetic in a
Recursive Part-Whole Structure
In the eighteenth century, arithmetic with numbers was regarded as the old
form of algebra while arithmetic with letters was regarded as the new algebra.
The latter was invented by Viète in the sixteenth century.53 Both disciplines
were defined as a ‘search for quantities’.54 Calculating the outcome or solving
50GA2A5, §39, p. 37: ‘Es ist nähmlich meine Meinung, daß alle ideale Verbindung eigentlich
nur von der Form sey: A et B; oder [A et B] et C; ich will sagen, daß mir alle ideale
Verbindung eigentlich nur zwischen je zwey Dingen (Vorstellungen) statt findet. Nicht
aber A+B+C+D. Dieses ist wegen mancher Folgen wichtig’.
51Laz, 1993, p. 65.
52GA2A5, §22-23, p. 52.
53GWI:11, p. 36, 38; p. 178, 180.
54GWI:12, p. 37-38; p. 1549-1550.
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an equation was regarded as a process of finding the correct quantity. Subse-
quently, textbooks of the time provided rules to manipulate these signs so
as to find the correct number for all common arithmetic operations.55 In
the influential mathematical textbooks of Wolff and Kästner, arithmetic with
letters to a great extent relied on arithmetic with numbers.56 For example, the
rules of calculation of arithmetic with letters simply refer back to the rules of
arithmetic with numbers. Arithmetic with numbers constituted the math-
ematical discipline of rational numbers required by all other mathematical
disciplines, including arithmetic with letters. In my view, the Wolffian treat-
ment of mathematical concepts, including the concept of number, suffices to
achieve the aim of these disciplines, namely finding the correct quantity, but
does not provide insight in the underlying structures, which would pave the
way for a conception of general mathematics.
As discussed before, Schultz’s (re)introduced the notion of general math-
ematics as a subdiscipline presupposed by both arithmetic and geometry
by defining it as concerned with the composition of wholes out of parts.57
Although the textbooks of the eighteenth century provide some principles
that concern parts and wholes, such as that the whole is larger than each of its
parts, they do not play a substantial role.58 Moreover, these textbooks do not
really define numbers in terms of part-whole structures, but instead consider
numbers as signs that refer to a corresponding collection, thus employing at
best a merely intuitive notion of collection.
The early Bolzano distinguished the two forms of arithmetic in a similar
way, but recognized that a proper theory of numbers was lacking.59 In
the second installment to the Beyträge, however, Bolzano does not directly
address the problem of defining the concept of number. Fortunately, his
55See §2.3.1.
56GWI:12, p. 1550; Kästner, 1758, p. 70-72.
57See §4.6.
58Cf. GWI:12, p. 44-46.
59According to Bolzano, arithmetic with letters involves concepts additional to arithmetic
with numbers, which makes arithmetic with letters a less general, hence more specific,
mathematical discipline (GA2B2/2, p. 136). As usual at the time, Bolzano’s early theory of
numbers does not account for real numbers, but only takes into account natural numbers.
Traditionally, real numbers were explained in terms of geometrical constructions. Rejecting
such a role for geometry, the later Bolzano is one of the first to develop an ‘analytic’ -
in the mathematical sense of the word - theory of real numbers. For more detail see my
footnote at page 170.
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notes provide an attempt at a definition of the concept of number, as well as,
a theory of numbers:
The thinking of multiple things into one whole provide, when
one does not think of anything else, a multiplicity (Vielheit),
which is determined and expressed by a number. Number the-
ory.60
According to this passage, the concept of number stands for a whole composed
of multiple things insofar as one abstracts from the particular properties of
the parts, as well as from the order and nature of the composition.61 In
other words, one thinks a number by merely thinking a whole composed of
(multiple) parts.
Let us see how this description corresponds to Bolzano’s treatment of a
particular number.62 Both in notes and the second installment, Bolzano
explicitly defines particular numbers as wholes constituted by units:
‘Two’ is a composite of which its parts are units (out of an unit
and an unit). ‘Three’ is a composite out of a ‘two’ and an ‘one’.63
Bolzano regards all numbers larger than one as complex wholes that consist
of multiple units. To be more precise, Bolzano defines each number in terms
of its previous one, namely as the composition of the previous number and
another unit. This greatly differs from the mathematical textbooks of the
time. For they regarded numbers as signs that refer to a collection (Menge)
of units. Whereas the tradition considered numbers as collections of units
to which units can be added or from which units can be removed, Bolzano
60GA2B2/2, p. 136: ‘Mehrere Dinge in Ein Ganzes zusammengedacht, geben wenn sonst
auf nichts anders gedacht wird, eine Vielheit, deren bestimmter Ausdruck eine Zahl ist. -
Zahlenlehre’.
61Note that ‘thing’ can refer to anything, from representations to concrete objects.
62I use ‘particular’ to avoid confusion with the common distinction between a concrete and an
abstract number, for example ‘five bikes’ respectively ‘five’. My use of the term ‘particular’
designates an opposition to the general concept of number. A particular number is part of
the extension of the concept of number and would be called an abstract number in the
common terminology, which however in our context is to easily be confused with the
generality of the concept of number.
63GA2B2, p. 173-174: ‘Zwey ist ein Zusammengesetztes, dessen Theile Einheiten sind (aus
einer Einheit und einer Einheit). Drey ein Zusammengesetztes aus einer Zwey und einer
Eins’.
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considered numbers to be interrelated in such a way that the previous number
is part of the next number.64
Evidently, the extension of the concept of number itself consists of the
defined particular numbers. Hence, the definition of the notion of number
must include both number one, which is a simple object, and the subsequent
numbers which designate complex wholes. Thus, the simplicity of number
one conflicts with the definition of the very concept of number in terms of a
multiplicity, that is, as a whole, as Bolzano himself indicates in notes written
shortly before the publication of the Beyträge:
‘One’, ‘two’, ‘three’ share the name ‘number’. ‘Number’ is the
determination whether a thing is composed or not and if it is
composed, how?65
The first remark merely describes the extension of the concept of number.
The second sentence can be considered as an attempt to define the concept
of number: it determines whether something is complex or simple. If it is
complex, a number also determines how complex. This definition clearly
includes number one and deviates from the earlier definition of the concept
of number as a complex whole. This clearly shows that Bolzano regarded
numbers neither as simple nor as equivalent to the notion of a sum as main-
tained by Laz.66 On the contrary, Bolzano defines the concept of number in
terms of the simple concept that he takes to be central to general mathematics,
namely composition.67
As I will argue, he considers the concept of numbers to be a special kind
of ideal composition, namely precisely the one in which order does not
matter. In the second installment, Bolzano presents an important proposition
concerning numbers:
If one is added to a number, a new number has arisen.68
64Cf. GA2A5, p. 43.
65GA2B2, p. 174: ‘Eins, Zwey, Drey, ... heissen gemeinschaftlich Zahlen. Oder Zahl ist die
Bestimmung, ob ein Ding zusammengesetzt sey oder nicht; und wenn es zusammengesetzt
ist, wie?’.
66Cf. Laz, 1993, p. 67.
67Kästner for example defines the notion of number as a collection (Menge) of the same
kind (Kästner, 1758, p. 21, 25-31). This last aspect is simply out of the scope of general
mathematics.
68GA2A5, §4, p. 61: ‘Wenn zu einer Zahl noch 1 hinzugedacht wird, entsteht eine neue Zahl’.
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This proposition is a general statement of what Bolzano takes to happen
in each definition of a particular number. As he sees it, each subsequent
number is composed of the previous one and an additional unit. This general
rule for generating all possible numbers is radically new compared to the
eighteenth century mathematical textbooks. In fact, it is akin to the modern
notion of a successor function. Bolzano informally formulated the idea of a
successor function almost eighty years before Peano expressed the same idea
in a modern axiomatized form.69
As we have seen in the previous section, Bolzano considers general math-
ematics to be concerned with composition in thought, that is, with et com-
positions. Within this context the ‘thinking together’ in the quote above
cannot but refer to an et composition. Due to the ordering principle, this
type of composition is able to combine merely two parts at a time. Thus, each
number is an et composition of the previous number and an additional unit
thereby constituting a recursive structure. Bolzano’s definitions of particular
numbers can be expressed as follows:70
1. [1]
2. [1 et 1] (composition of a unit and a unit)
3. [[1 et 1] et 1] (composition of 2 and a unit)
4. [[[1 et 1] et 1] et 1] (composition of 3 and a unit)
5. [[[[1 et 1] et 1] et 1] et 1] (composition of 4 and a unit)
6. etc.
Bolzano’s early account of numbers relies on the idea of an increasing complex-
ity of the structure of compositions of multiple units. As such it resembles
the standard set theoretic accounts of natural numbers, but, contrary to set
theoretic accounts, it shares with traditional mereological accounts that the
amount of basic constituents, that is, the amount of units, resembles the
number. The set theoretic account of 3 as {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} merely uses
complexity to represent the number 3 as the amount of basic constituents,
69See van Heijenoort, 2002, p. 83, 94.
70The sign ‘1’ indicates a unit.
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that is the amount of empty sets, does not equal to three. Thus, Bolzano’s
early account of numbers combines a quite modern approach of complexity
of structure with the traditional intuitive account of number as a collection
of things.
On the basis of this new conception of numbers, Bolzano provides several
propositions to establish the validity of usual calculations, such as addition.
One among them expresses that the order of composition does not matter:
n+ (m+ o) = (n+ o) +m The number that arises by thinking
together multiple others is identical regardless the order in which
one thinks these parts together.71
In my view, this passage must be interpreted such that the algebraic formula-
tion combines the law of commutativity and associativity.72 For Bolzano’s
expression in words states that the order does not matter which includes both
laws. Moreover, the transformation of the left hand side of the algebraic
formula into the right hand side requires both the law of commutativity and
of associativity. If we first apply the law of commutativity to m+ o of the
left hand side of the algebraic formula, the result is n+ (o+m). Subsequent
application of the law of associativity yields the right hand side of the alge-
braic formula. Both Bolzano’s formulation in words and in algebraic symbols
thus express the two arithmetical principles of Schultz at the same time.
Before we consider the exact status of this proposition in the next section,
let us see how this proposition is required for solving arithmetical problems
as presented by Bolzano in the second installment. The problem stated by
Bolzano is fairly simple, namely the question how we have to understand the
basic arithmetical procedure of addition. We have to find the number that is
n + m. Bolzano presents the following strategy to find this number:
71GA 2A5, §8, p. 62: ‘[D]ie Zahl welche durch [...] das Zusammendenken mehrerer andrer
entsteht, ist dieselbe, in welcher Ordnung man diese Theile zusammendenken mag’.
Unfortunately, the algebraic formula printed in the Gesamtausgabe suffers from some
typographic mistakes which I corrected in my quote. Bolzano’s formulation in words
perfectly expresses the aim of the formula: the number composed in thought by thinking
together other numbers does not depend on the order in which one proceeds. Without any
doubt, the zero printed in the Gesamtausgabe should have been the alphabetic successor of
n, namely o. Furthermore, one of the two m’s of the right half of the equation must be
erroneous, since it makes the equation obviously false.
72Based on a suggestion by Arianna Betti.
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Solution. First find (n+1)+(m-1) then etc.73
Let us apply this to an actual arithmetical problem and for reasons of brevity
take n = 3 and m = 2. Our task is to find the number 3+2 by applying
Bolzano’s solution for the problem of addition, as well as, his definition
of the concept of number. Figure 6.6 represents the problem at the top as
the problem is formulated in general, in the middle as a concrete example
expressed in the usual signs for numbers, and at the bottom in Bolzano’s mere-
ological terms as the composition of [[1 et 1] et 1] and [1 et 1] representing
respectively 3 and 2.
n + m
3 + 2
[[1 et 1] et 1] et [ 1 et 1 ] (R)
Figure 6.6: First intuitive solution of the problem to find the number 3+2.
As the figure illustrates, Bolzano’s description of addition as thinking
together allows him to regard addition as a form of ideal composition. Ac-
cordingly, the intuitive solution of the problem is to compose the result by
connecting 3 and 2 by means of et. This first result is depicted as the structure
R in figure 6.6. Although the amount of units is identical to the amount of
units in the definition of number 5, the structure and therefore the order of
composition differs.74 In fact, the composition does not represent a number
at all, since Bolzano’s definitions of numbers do not allow for such a structure.
An additional step is required to achieve a result that indeed represents the
correct number.
In the quoted passage, Bolzano provides a method for solving addition,
which first requires to find (n+ 1) + (m− 1). If we apply this first step, it
suffices to attain a result representing a number.75 Application of this method
73GA 2A5, §8, p. 62.
74For Bolzano’s mereological definition of number 5 see item 5 on page 256.
75To avoid an unnecessary complex explanation, I assume the subtraction of 1 as trivial. In
accordance with the tradition, Bolzano defines subtraction in terms of addition. To solve
a− b one has to find the number x such that b+ x = a (GA2A5, §13, p. 62).
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to n = 3 and m = 2 results in the structure S represented in figure 6.7.
The representation in terms of et compositions shows that the method for
solving the mathematical problem of addition results in precisely Bolzano’s
definiendum of number ‘5’. In the case of an addition withm > 2 this method
should be repeated. Thus, Bolzano’s method for solving addition provided
by the discipline of arithmetic indeed relies on the recursive mereological
conception of numbers put forward by general mathematics.
n + 1 + m - 1
3 + 1 + 2 - 1
[[[1 et 1] et 1] et 1 ] et 1 (S)
Figure 6.7: Solution of the problem 3+2.
Despite its correct outcome, the solution can be questioned by asking on
what grounds one is allowed to claim that the composed wholes of figure
6.6 and 6.7 are equivalent. The solution presupposes that the structure of
these compositions does not matter insofar as numbers are concerned. More
specifically, the solution of this particular arithmetical problem presupposes
that R is arithmetically equal to S (R = S ), which in this example means
that 3+(1+1) = (3+1)+1. Thus, the transition presupposed by Bolzano’s
solution of addition requires the law of associativity, that is, the proposition
of Bolzano’s theory of numbers that claims the irrelevance of order. This
comes to the fore precisely because Bolzano’s account of general mathematics
sharply distinguishes between the different structures of R and S due to the
ordering feature of ideal composition.76
The algebraic expression of Bolzano’s law of commutativity and asso-
ciativity indeed allows us to find a composition of units with an order
corresponding to the definition of ‘5’. The upper half of figure 6.8 illus-
trates the change in the order that is expressed by the algebraic expression
n+ (m+ o) = (n+ o) +m by depicting the left-hand and right-hand sides
of the equation above each other. If we investigate what this means in terms
76Cf. §6.2.
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n + ( m + o
ww
)
(n + o ) + m
[[1 et 1] et 1] et [ 1 et 1
uu
] (R)
[[[1 et 1] et 1] et 1 ] et 1 (S)
Figure 6.8: Ideal composition and the laws of commutativity and associtavity.
of ideal composition, we see that the algebraic expression supports precisely
the transition presupposed by Bolzano’s solution for addition (see lower half
of figure 6.8). Thus Bolzano’s law of commutativity and associativity allows
us to transform the compositions underlying addition into the composition
underlying the correct number.
As we have seen, Bolzano’s theory of numbers is deeply rooted in his early
definition of mathematics as the science of forms or general laws of things.
According to the second installment, general mathematics is concerned with
‘the most general form of existence [Daseyn] of things, that is, with the
way they are composed out of parts [Zusammengesetztheit aus Theilen]’.77
Accordingly, the manuscript presents an approach of arithmetic that defines
numbers as wholes composed of units. Since the early Bolzano held that
only two parts can be thought together at a time, numbers must have a
recursive structure. Therefore an arithmetical sum in which the order does
notmatter can only be obtained by stipulating that the order that is necessarily
presupposed in all composed wholes does not matter in the case of addition.
Consequently, a proper account of arithmetical addition requires explicit laws
of commutativity and associativity. As we have seen, the second installment
indeed provides such a law. In the following section I argue that the early
Bolzano must have considered this law to be an a priori synthetic principle
by investigating the available strategies to argue for the synthetic nature of
arithmetic propositions. An attentive reader might wonder why the notion
77BGA2B2/2, p. 94.
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of quantity has not yet been discussed. In a later section I will argue that
Bolzano deliberately choose to define numbers and the notion of ‘number’
without using the notion of quantity.
6.4 The Synthetic Nature of Arithmetic
We saw how Bolzano developed a mereological account of arithmetic on the
basis of his conception of general mathematics. This section explains how
this account of arithmetic allows him to argue for the synthetic nature of
arithmetic without relying on the Kantian notion of intuition. Investigation
of Bolzano’s notes reveals that he pursued two different strategies to achieve
this aim. These two strategies correspond to the twofold description of the
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in the first Critique.78
The first strategy stems from the introduction to the first Critique, where
Kant defines analytic judgments as containment of the predicate in the subject.
The other strategy corresponds to Kant’s description of analytic judgments
as judgments of which the validity can be determined by the logical laws of
non-contradiction and identity alone.79 In the second installment, Bolzano
employs the second strategy. Quite often it is easier to decide whether a
judgment only relies on these laws than to decide whether something is
contained in the subject because the latter requires a complete analysis of
concepts. An important part of Bolzano’s reform of mathematics is precisely
his criticism of the view that we can possess such a complete analysis of
concepts. This section proceeds by discussing the first, more difficult, strategy,
a strategy in which the way one analyses arithmetical propositions plays an
important role. My subsequent discussion of the second strategy involves
Bolzano’s notes with objections to a Leibnizian point of view.
In the Beyträge, Bolzano invokes Kant’s distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments to claim that analytic judgments do not belong to sci-
ence.80 According to Kant’s definition, a proposition is analytic when the
78Cf. §3.3; §3.6. One of the issues in the interpretation of Kant is whether these two strategies
indeed result in a consistent conception of analytic judgments. In a convincing article, de
Jong argues that the principle of non-contradiction of the second strategy indeed provides
a sufficient and necessary condition for the analyticity of a judgment (de Jong, 1995, p.
638).
79Cf. B189-193.
80Bolzano, 1810, p. 81, 115.
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subject contains the predicate, that is, when the predicate is one of the essential
marks of the subject.81 Application of this definition to arithmetic requires
a way to render arithmetic formulas as judgments with a subject-predicate
form. The most natural way to do this seems to consider the number 7 as the
subject of 7 = 5 + 2 and the expression 5 + 2 as the predicate, which results
in the judgment ‘7 is 5 + 2’. This view treats the equality sign as the copula
‘is’.82
In notes, written in the early twenties, Bolzano discusses precisely this
way of analyzing arithmetic formulas. In his view, this approach makes
it impossible to regard the latter as analytic for at least two reasons. The
first reason draws on the traditional Porphyrian hierarchy of concepts and
the definition of concepts by means of differentia, in Bolzano’s terms, by
means of cum composition. Bolzano’s argument starts with the observation
that if 5 + 2 = 7 is analytic, than 9 − 2 = 7, 11 − 4 = 7, and infinitely
many others are also analytic. According to the subject-predicate form of
arithmetical formulas sketched above, the number ‘7’ is the subject of all
these propositions. In each case the subject ‘7’ contains a different predicate,
in our examples ‘5 + 2’, ‘9 − 2’, ‘11 − 4’, and one can add infinitely many
others. Thus if ‘7’ is the subject, than the concept 7 contains infinitely many
characteristics, which is impossible.83 A concept cannot contain infinitely
many essential marks because we cannot think such a concept.84
At the moment that these notes were written, namely a decade later than
the Beyträge, Bolzano used the infinite amount of characteristics of the subject
as an argument to reject such an analysis of arithmetical judgments and
provides an alternative, as we will see in the next section. In my view, it seems
safe to assume that the early Bolzano was already aware of this argument. For
the early Bolzano dealt intensively with the traditional theory of concepts
trying to overcome its limits from within. At that stage, the described
analysis of arithmetical judgments provided an argument in support of the
synthetic nature of arithmetic. For this reason, he introduced his notion of et
81Cf. §3.3; de Jong, 1995, p. 628.
82As we will see in the next section, the later Bolzano of theWissenschaftslehre (1837) rejects
this view.
83GA2B11/1, p. 69.
84Anderson pointed out the same argument in his convincing explanation as to why Kant
regards arithmetic as synthetic (Anderson, 2004).
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composition in his account of general mathematics. Precisely this new form
of concept formation allows for a conceptual answer to Kant’s question as to
why arithmetical truths are synthetic. According to Bolzano’s early account
of numbers, the content of the subject ‘7’ is a whole composed of seven units,
which can be represented as [[[[[[1 et 1] et 1] et 1] et 1] et 1] et 1]. Likewise,
the content of the predicate ‘5+2’ can be represented as [[[[[1 et 1] et 1] et 1]
et 1] et [1 et 1]. Obviously, this latter predicate is not contained in the subject
‘7’, not even if one prefers a subject-predicate form of arithmetic formulas that
reverses the subject and predicate. Although the amount of units is identical,
the structure is such that a relation of containment cannot obtain since, given
Bolzano’s ordering feature, both compositions have a specific order.85
The second strategy does not refer to a relation of containment and there-
fore does not depend on a specific subject-predicate form of arithmetical
propositions. The method of the second strategy is merely to show that the
principles of identity and non-contradiction do not suffice to prove arithmeti-
cal propositions. If its proof requires an additional principle, the proposition
cannot be analytic.86 The obvious candidate is the proposition expressing
that the order does not matter in the case of addition. Unfortunately, the
manuscript does not elaborate on its epistemological status, that is, it does not
point out whether it functions as a definition, a principle, or as a theorem.87
This might raise some doubts concerning the claim that the proposition of
associativity indeed establishes the synthetic nature of arithmetic. Despite
the lack of explicit evidence of the status of the law of associativity in the
second installment, it is my contention that the early Bolzano regarded the
law of associativity as a synthetic principle. As I see it, the following note
provides strong evidence for this:
Objection All arithmetical judgments are, it seems, analytic. For
example the proposition 2+2=4 is analytic. For it follows from
definitions only. From the definitions 1+1=2, 2+1=3, 3+1=4,
and the definition of addition according to which a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c.
One does not need principles, but only the assumption that a, b,
85See §6.2.
86This strategy is similar to the axiomatic interpretion of Kant’s conception of synthetic a
priori knowledge as advocated by Martin (Martin, 1972, p. 64-65, 124).
87This also holds for other propositions presented by the theory of numbers. Cf. GA2A5, p.
60-62.
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c are things such that the order in which they are connected does
not matter for the effect. Addition is only applied to things in
case of which the assumption holds. Therefore the proposition
a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c is identical.
Responsum This proposition is an identical inference from the
condition, but not in itself identical. [...] Not the proposition
[...] is identical, but the inference of the one to the other.88
In this passage, Bolzano discusses a Leibnizean objection to his own view
that arithmetical judgments are synthetic in the style of a dialogue, as he does
more often in his notes. In the objection, Bolzano formulates a Leibnizean
defense of the analyticity of arithmetical truths. This defense explicitly
mentions the law of commutativity, something which lacks in Leibniz’s
proof of 2 + 2 = 4 in the New Essays.89 The objection regards the law of
associativity a+(b+c) = (a+b)+c as part of the definition of addition. This
way of defining addition does not comply with Bolzano’s own standards for
definition, but in my view Bolzano wants to raise a much more fundamental
criticism.
The strategy for deciding on the analyticity here clearly is the second strat-
egy in which the sufficiency of logical principles, including the law of identity,
renders the judgment analytic. The Leibnizean opponent regards the algebraic
formula expressing the law of associativity as an identical proposition, which
means that it is of the form ‘A is A’. If the law of associativity is identical, then
arithmetical judgments are analytic. Bolzano, however, does not accept that
the law of associativity is identical. In his response, he sharply distinguishes
between formulas expressing identical numbers, identical propositions, and
88GA2B3/1, p. 128: ‘Objectio Alle arithmetischen Urtheile sind, wie es scheint, analytisch.
Z.B. der Satz 2+2=4 ist analytisch. Denn er ergibt sich aus bloßen Definitionen. [...]
Man braucht keines Grundsatzes dazu; sondern nur der Annahme, (Hypothesis) daß
a, b, c solche Dinge sind, bey deren Vereinigung es in Betreff der Wirkung gleichgültig
ist, in welcher Ordnung sie verbunden werden. Nur bei solchen Dingen bei denen diese
Bedingung Statt findet, wird Addition angewandt. Also ist der Satz a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c
identisch. Responsum Er ist eine identische Folgerung aus der Bedingung. Aber nicht an
sich identisch. [...] Nicht der Satz [...] ist identisch; sondern die Folgerung des Einen aus
dem anderen’.
89In this note, Bolzano targets a Leibnizean position and takes exactly Leibniz’s example of
2 + 2 = 4 while he starts with Kant’s example of 5 + 7 = 12 when criticizing Kant in the
appendix to the Beyträge. Cf. §6.1.
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identical inferences. Two mathematical expressions might designate an identi-
cal number, like for example 2² and 3 + 1, but that does not mean that the
expressions themselves are identical. The representations differ although they
result in exactly the same object:
The symbol of equality that one places between two non-identical
formulas, for example 3+4=7 or 4/2=1+1 etc., does not mean
an equality of expressions, but an equality of the effects that are
brought about, thought of as causes, by these right and left rela-
tions.90
The same holds for the law of associativity. Although the two sides yield the
same numerical outcome, they differ from each other. Thus, the predicate and
the subject of the law of associativity are not identical. Hence, the proposition
itself is not identical.
One might object that it is indeed an identical inference to conclude a+
(b+ c) = (a+ b) + c from the assumption that the order in which a, b, and c
are connected does not matter, an assumption that might already be present
in the definition of addition. However, for Bolzano this still would not imply
that the conclusion itself is identical. The important point of Bolzano’s
response is that the equation which expresses the law of associativity already
rests on the assumption that the order does not matter. Although the two
claims are logically equivalent, this logical equivalence neither proves their
truth, nor renders them into identical propositions. The underlying idea,
which we have seen before in Bolzano’s early logic and a text by Kant, is that,
contrary to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, the inference of a conclusion on
the basis of merely the laws of logic does not render the conclusion analytic.91
Thus, the law of associativity is an additional, synthetic, principle. Therefore
the truth of arithmetic propositions does not rest on the laws of logic alone,
hence arithmetic propositions are synthetic.92
90GA2B3/1, p. 99: ‘Das Gleichheitszeichen welches zwischen 2 nicht identischenGliedern steht
Z. B. 3+4=7 oder 4/2 =1+1 dergleichen; bedeutet nie eine Gleichheit dieser Ausdrücke,
sondern eine Gleichheit der Wirkungen, die diese Verbindungen rechts und links als
Ursachen gedacht erzeugen’. Similarity in effects and differences in expression anticipates
Bolzano’s later analysis in terms of differences in objective representations of the same
object.
91Cf. §3.6; B14; §5.7.
92Given Bolzano’s definitions of numbers, the exceptions are those arithmetical judgments
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6.5 Arithmetic in theWissenschaftslehre and
Grössenlehre
As we have seen, the early Bolzano employs both the strategy of containment
in the subject and the strategy of additional principles to argue for the syn-
thetic nature of arithmetic. However, later, in theWissenschaftslehre (1837)
and the unfinished manuscript of the Grössenlehre, Bolzano seems to have
changed his view and regards arithmetical propositions as analytic, although
he still holds that the truths of mathematics are mostly synthetic.93 In the
notes where Bolzano draws this conclusion for the first time, he immedi-
ately warns us not to conclude that general mathematics as a whole becomes
analytic:
However, with all this I do not mean that all theorems of gen-
eral mathematics are, without any exception, analytic theorems.
According to what is stated till now, this holds at most of all
equations, or at least of all equations that can be derived from the
proposition a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c. Other propositions, for exam-
ple those that express a mere possibility, can still be synthetic.94
This raises the question of why Bolzano changed his view. Is it a consequence
of the achievements presented in theWissenschaftslehre, such as the new logic
of variation and the refined distinction between analytic and synthetic judg-
ments based on the idea of variation? In this section, I will answer this
question by investigating the development of his ideas as it can be recon-
structed by means of his notes. Additionally, this investigation shows that
not only the notion of number, but also that of quantity plays an important
role in his early view of arithmetical judgments as synthetic judgments.
First signs of this change occur in notes of 1820 when Bolzano undermines
the first strategy to argue for the synthetic nature of arithmetic because he
that directly correspond to the definitions of numbers, namely all those arithmetical
judgments in which one adds 1 to another number. For example, the judgment 2 + 1 = 3
is analytic because Bolzano defines ‘3’ as 2 + 1.
93WL, §305, p. 186; §315, p. 241.
94GA2B11/1, p.72-73: ‘Durch alles dieß will ich jedoch nicht sagen, daß alle Lehrsätze der
Allgemeinen mathesis ohne Ausnahme nur analytische Lehrsätze sind. Dieß gilt nach
dem bisher gesagten höchstens von allen Gleichungen. (oder wenigstens allen denjenigen
Gleichungen die aus dem Satze a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c hergeleitet werden) Andere Sätze, z.B.
solche, die eine bloße Möglichkeit aussagen, dürften noch immer synthetisch sein’.
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now takes it to rely on an erroneous view of the subject-predicate form of
arithmetical propositions:
But it is incorrect to regard ‘7’ or ‘5+2’ as subject, ‘5+2’ or ‘7’
as predicate and ‘=’ as copula in the case of a proposition of
the form 7=5+2. The subject of this proposition rather is the
relation of ‘7’ to ‘5+2’ and the predicate the relation of equality.95
Contrary to his early work, Bolzano here rejects the view that renders one
side of an equation into the subject and the other one into the predicate.
Instead, he proposes to regard the proportion between the two sides of the
equation as the subject. Since the equality sign signifies the proportion of
equality, the latter is the predicate. For example, the arithmetical proposition
7 = 5 + 2 in fact states ‘the relation between 7 and 5 + 2 is a proportion of
equality’.96
According to this new logical analysis, an arithmetical proposition is an-
alytic if the subject contains the concept of equality rather than 5 + 2. So,
on this account, arithmetical propositions can be analytic. Because each
arithmetical proposition has a different subject, the analyticity of arithmetical
propositions does not imply that the logical subject contains infinitely many
marks. Thus, merely a new analysis of the subject-predicate form of arith-
metical propositions, allows the later Bolzano to regard the number formulas
of arithmetic as analytic.97
95GA2B11/1, p. 70: ‘Allein es ist unrichtig, in einem Satze von der Form 7=5+2 7 oder 5+2
als Subjekt, und 5+2 oder 7 als Prädicat, das = als die Copula zu betrachten. Vielmehr
ist das Subjekt dieses Satzes das Verhältniß von 7 zu 5+2, und das Prädicat das Verhältniß
der Gleichheit’. This quote occurs in a passage discussing whether the mathematical
equations are analytic. In the Grössenlehre, Bolzano seems to provide a similar analysis of
arithmetical propositions when stating that the two sides of an equation are equivalent
representations (gleichgeltende oder Wechselvorstellungen GA2A7, §44-45, p. 122-124).
From this perspective, the arithmetical proposition 5 + 2 = 7 states that the subject
‘relation of 5 + 2 to 7’ has the property of being equivalent, which roughly means that all
objects that fall under the representation ‘5 + 2’ also fall under ‘7’.
96This logical analysis indicates more in general how Bolzano deals with relations within
his traditional subject-predicate analysis of propositions. The relation itself becomes the
subject whereas the predicate expresses which kind of relation it is. For example 7 > 5 is
analyzed into a proposition that states that predicate ‘greater than’ applies to the subject
‘the relation of 7 to 5’.
97At this stage, Bolzano did not yet develop the notion of variation as used by him to improve
the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in theWissenschaftslehre. The
very first idea of varying the representations of a judgment occurs when he, influenced by
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Bolzano’s later work also contains several remarks in which he claims
that the analyticity of arithmetic relies on the second strategy of required
principles. According to one of these passages, mathematical textbooks of
the time did not provide the principle of associativity because they did not
properly define the notion of a sum:
Thus the usual textbooks of arithmetic do not give an exact
definition of the concept of a sum. If this had been done, and
if they had said that a sum is a class (Inbegriff ) of objects where
the order of parts is not taken into account, and where the
parts of the parts are considered parts of the whole (§84) they
would have found that the following analytic proposition follows
immediately from this definition ‘a+(b+c) = (a+b)+c’.98
A definition of the notion of a sum would be sufficient to see that the law of
associativity is analytic. Since this law constitutes the only candidate for a
synthetic principle that is involved in the proof of arithmetical formulas, its
analyticity implies that the highest principles of analytic judgments, that is,
the laws of identity and non-contradiction are sufficient to ground arithmeti-
cal truths. Consequently, arithmetical propositions are analytic according to
the later Bolzano. This view relies on important changes in the conceptual
structure of the notions of number and quantity, as Bolzano’s reasoning in
the quote already shows. For the issue of the synthetic or analytic nature of
arithmetic the hierarchy of the concepts of quantity, number and composi-
tion established by their definitions is crucial. Bolzano’s change in position
from a synthetic to an analytic conception of arithmetic is a direct result
from fundamental changes in Bolzano’s view on the concepts of quantity and
number.
Maaß, suggests to answer the question what the probability of the truth of a judgment
means when it is somewhere between 0 and 1 (GA2B17, p. 125). If the probability is
m
m+n
the judgment must have a variable representation that ism times true and n times
false. These notes follow notes on references to a book published in 1824. So, in the
early twenties his logic of variation, as well as his new version of the analytic-synthetic
distinction had yet to be developed. Hence, in these notes Bolzano’s still relies on the
Kantian definition of analytic judgments. Thus, Bolzano’s change of opinion with regard
to the analyticity of arithmetics is not due to his later version of the analytic-synthetic
distinction. For a comparison of this version to Kant’s view see de Jong, 2010.
98WL, §305, p. 186.
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Let us take a look on Bolzano’s conception of quantity. Contrary to
most authors of the eighteenth century, the early Bolzano does not define
quantity in terms of a composition out of units. His concerns, however,
are exactly those that became central to the works of several authors at the
end of the eighteenth century which he studied.99 On their account, the
traditional definition only accounts for discrete quantities, and following new
developments in mathematics Bolzano did not want the mathematical field of
analysis to rely on a geometrical account of continuous quantities. Moreover,
he required the definition of quantity to include complex numbers. To
tackle these problems, Bolzano in the second installment defines the notion
of quantity by means of the notion of number rather than the other way
around:
Magnitude is the property of an object, by means of which a unit
and one or multiple or even infinitely many numbers, which are
interconnected according to a rule, can be determined.100
Thus the early Bolzano defines quantity as the property that can be de-
termined by one or more numbers. Thus defined, the notion of quantity
allows to use numbers and units to measure properties of objects. The defini-
tion does not claim anything about the composition of the property itself.
Contrary to the traditional definitions of for example Wolff and Kästner,
Bolzano’s definition does not involve a collection of homogeneous units. As
a result, Bolzano is able to account for all kind of numbers within general
mathematics, including real and complex numbers.101
Recall Bolzano’s early attempt to define numbers described in the previous
section.102 Whether the definition of the concept of number itself is con-
vincing or not, its extension, that is, the constitution of particular numbers,
is perfectly clear. As described in the previous section, the early Bolzano
considers each particular number to be a composition of units established by
means of et connections.103 As we have seen, et connections, and therefore
99Cf. Michelsen, 1789; Langsdorf, 1802; Fischer, 1808.
100GA2A5, p. 45: ‘Größe ist jene Eigenschaft eines Gegenstandes, welche durch eine Einheit
und Eine oder mehrere selbst∞ viele Zahlen welche nach irgend einer Regel mit einander
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the composition of numbers, always have a particular order. Since Bolzano
defines quantity as the property of an object that can be determined by means
of numbers, the concept of quantity itself does not involve the notion of com-
position, let alone the (ir)relevance of the order of composition. Moreover,
this definition of quantity means that Bolzano cannot define the concept of
number in terms of quantity since this would make the definitions of quantity
and number circular. Thus, neither the notion of quantity nor that of number
includes the idea that the order does not matter; hence both notions do not
involve the notion of a sum. Therefore Bolzano’s early theory of numbers
requires a synthetic principle, namely the law of associativity as we have seen
in the previous section, to explicitly claim that the order is irrelevant in the
case of addition.
As we have seen, Bolzano’s remarks in theWissenschaftslehre state the oppo-
site, namely that the law of associativity is analytic and that this law follows
directly from the notion of an arithmetical sum. Already in the early twenties,
when he had just started working on theWissenschaftlehre, Bolzano not only
realized that the epistemological status of the law of associativity depends on
the definition of quantity, but he also returned to a more traditional definition
of quantity:
If one defines the concept of sum as the concept of a whole such
that one purely considers the set (Menge) and the properties of the
parts out of which the whole exists, yet not the order in which
they can be connected, one can immediately state the theorem
a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c. [...] Yet, that one defines the concept of
sum as it is done above, already follows from the definition of
magnitude. In the case of the latter one equally merely regards
the set and the properties of the parts, but not the way in which
they are connected. [...] Well, this may indeed be an analytic
proposition.104
104GA2B11/1, p. 70: ‘Wenn man den Begriff einer Summe erklärte als den Begriff eines Ganzen,
an welchem bloß die Menge und Beschaffenheit der Theile, aus denen es besteht, nicht
aber die Ordnung, in der sie etwa verbunden sein mögten, betrachtet wird: so ließe sich so
fort der Lehrsatz aufstellen, “daß man schreiben könne a+(b+c)=(a+b)+c. [...] Daß man
aber den Begriff einer Summe so wie es oben geschehen ist, bestimme; folgt schon aus dem
einer Größe, bei welcher gleichfalls nur auf die Menge und Beschaffenheit der Theile, nicht
aber auf die Art, wie sie verbunden sind gesehen wird. [...] Dieß dürfte nun allerdings ein
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Thus, Bolzano is aware that a definition of the notion of quantity and of sum
as unordered compositions of units renders the law of associativity into an
analytic theorem rather than a synthetic principle. Accordingly, arithmetical
formulas also become analytic.105
Since he already defined the notion of an arithmetical sum in this manner
in the second installment to the Beyträge, the change of his view concerning
the analyticity of arithmetic cannot be due to a different conception of
sum.106 However, such a definition does not suffice to yield the analyticity of
arithmetic as long as the theory of numbers neither employs the notion of
an arithmetical sum nor imports the irrelevance of order via another notion,
such as that of quantity. The second installment neither defines the notion
of number in terms of arithmetical sum, nor in terms of quantity. As the
last sentence of the quote indicates, Bolzano’s attitude towards arithmetic
changed because he changed his conception of quantity in such a way as to
include the irrelevance of order.
In the Grössenlehre, Bolzano remarks that the notion of quantity caused
him many troubles.107 One can find extensive deliberations concerning the
notion of quantity in Bolzano’s mathematical notes. In the end, the prevailing
definition is quite traditional and regards quantity as ‘the property of a thing
that can be regarded as purely a set (Menge) of parts without taking into
account the connection that these parts have’.108 This definition becomes
part of a slightly more complex and careful definition in the Grössenlehre,
which solves the problem that the traditional definition of the notes does not
apply to all quantities, but only to those that are composed.109 For the later
Bolzano, the irrelevance of order is already part of the notion of quantity.110
analytischer Satz sein[.] ’.
105GA2B11/1, p. 71. It must be noted that Bolzano in these notes, to my knowledge for the
first time, applies his later, refined, definition of analytic in terms of variation. Further
research must clarify whether this application is indeed consist with theWissenschaftslehre.
106GA2A5, §22-23, p. 52.
107GA2A7, §1, p. 25.
108GA2B9/1, p. 74: ‘diejenige Eigenschaft eines Dinges, die als eine bloße Menge von Theilen
betrachtet werden kann, ohne auf die Verbindung zu sehen die diese Theile haben.’. Cf.
GA2B9/1, p. 83, p.89.
109GA2A7, p. 25-26. We saw the same problem in Bolzano’s attempt to define the concept of
number (see §6.3).
110Both theWissenschaftslehre and the Grössenlehre already define the concept of a collection
(Menge), employed by Bolzano’s later definition of quantity, such that the order does not
matter (WL, §84; GA2A7, p. 34, p. 220).
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Being defined as a special kind of quantity, the notion of number inherits the
irrelevance of order. As a result, the law of associativity immediately follows
from the definitions and no longer needs to be expressed by means of an
additional synthetic principle.111
To conclude, both the early and later Bolzano offer explanations of the
synthetic respectively analytic nature of arithmetic along both the strategy of
looking for containment and the strategy of looking for synthetic principles.
Bolzano changes his position with regard to arithmetic, contrary to what one
might expect, as the result of fundamental changes in the logical analysis of
arithmetical propositions and conception of quantity rather than as the result
of his new logic of variation and his new definition of analytic-synthetic
judgments offered by theWissenschaftslehre.
6.6 Bolzano’s General Mathematics in its Historical
Context
We have seen that an investigation of the unpublished second installment of
the Beyträge delivers important insights into Bolzano’s early conception of
mathematics. First of all, this text reveals Bolzano’s deep insight into the
foundation of mathematics. This includes his, relative to its historical context,
sophisticated treatment of general mathematics, which was in fact already
presupposed by the peculiar definition of mathematics and the et connection
111The later Bolzano explicitly states that the law of commutativity and arithmetical formulas
like 5 + 2 = 7 are analytic (WL, §305, p. 186; §315, p. 241). On his early account,
the arithmetical formulas rely on the synthetic principle of commutativity. However,
one should not transfer this relation of grounding to Bolzano’s later position such that
the analytic arithmetical formulas are grounded in the analytic law of commutativity.
As van Wierst et al. writes, this would constitute a counter example to de Jong’s thesis
that every analytic truth is grounded in a synthetic truth according to the later Bolzano
(de Jong, 2001, p. 346; van Wierst et al., forthcoming). For the early Bolzano, a relation
of grounding exists exactly because he regards the law of commutativity as synthetic. As
soon as this law ceases to be synthetic, the relation of grounding no longer holds. In
the hypothetical case that the early Bolzano would have defined the notion of number
such that it already includes the irrelevance of order, both the law of commutativity
and the arithmetical formulas immediately follow from the very definition of numbers.
Accordingly, they would be analytic, but there would not be a relation of grounding. For
both would follow independently and immediately from the same definition. I would like
to suggest that something similar is the case for the later Bolzano, but this requires an
investigation into Bolzano’s later conception of definition in theWissenschaftslehre, which
is beyond the scope of this study.
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offered by the Beyträge. Already at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Bolzano imagined a foundation of mathematics based on complex structures
of wholes and parts, while one has to wait for similar approaches until the
invention of relational predicates by Frege and of set theory by Cantor at the
end of the nineteenth century. Taking into account the second installment,
the Beyträge, sometimes described as immature, provides for a conception of
mathematics that anticipates later developments.
Secondly, the second installment illustrates how Bolzano is settled within
the philosophical movements of the eighteenth century. Especially remark-
able is how Kantian themes come into play at crucial moments. Although
Bolzano can correctly be described as the anti-Kant insofar as one focuses
on the notion of pure intuition, in other respects Bolzano’s early account
of general mathematics is deeply influenced by Kant and his followers. The
early notes and manuscript of the second installment show crucial Kantian
influences, although - except the distinction between analytic and synthetic
judgments - they are often applied in a different way and often yield different
outcomes. In what follows, I summarize the most important Kantian themes.
Recall Bolzano’s somewhat peculiar definition of mathematics as the science
of the forms of things in the Beyträge.112 As we have seen, Bolzano’s early
account of general mathematics in the second installment offers a more precise
understanding of the notion of form that is involved in this definition of
mathematics. He here argues that mathematics studies how objects can be
composed by means of et compositions. When discussing definitions of
mathematics, the early Bolzano accepted Kant’s criticism of the traditional
definition of mathematics as the science of quantity and further developed
Schultz’s account of general mathematics as abstracting from objects. This
way of defining mathematics stems from Kant’s treatment of general logic
as abstracting from all content. As we have seen, Schultz played a role as
a mediator in transferring this way of defining and organizing disciplines
from logic to mathematics. Thus, Bolzano’s early definition of mathematics
relies on an application of Kant’s distinction between form and content to
mathematics.
Contrary to Leibniz and Frege, the early Bolzano regards arithmetic as
synthetic, which means that the definitions of numbers and the logical princi-
112See §4.4.
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ples of identity and contradiction are not sufficient to derive the propositions
of arithmetic. Bolzano agreed with Kant that analytic judgments and the
traditional hierarchy of concepts organized in genus-species relations cannot
account for arithmetical judgments. Numbers are not the result of recogniz-
ing marks that are common to all instances of ‘2’. Analysis of concepts into
common marks as advocated by the Leibnizean tradition does not suffice,
even if one provides a theory of concepts richer than that of the traditional
tree of genus and species.
Repeating the Kantian question concerning the possibility of a priori syn-
thetic judgments in arithmetics, Bolzano provides for a completely different
answer. He replaces Kant’s notion of pure intuition by a new kind of con-
ceptual composition (et) to account for multiplicities. Together with the
ordering feature, this new form of composition provides an explanation of
the synthetic nature of arithmetic that does not rely on a non-conceptual
faculty such as pure intuition. Since this form of composition is explicitly
bound to thinking and not grounded on actual objects, Bolzano’s ideal com-
position can be described as a kind of conceptual constructivism in contrast
to Kant’s notion of construction in intuition.
Given Bolzano’s early definition of mathematics and account of general
mathematics in the second installment, he can conceive of arithmetic as
grounded in principles concerning the nature of composition (et) and does not
rely on the notion of quantity. Arithmetical proofs require the composition
and decomposition of wholes, as expressed by the law of associativity and
Bolzano’s solution for the problem of addition, rather than on the Leibnizean
analysis of concepts as Rusnock and Krickel claim. One should not be
misled by the later Bolzano when investigating the development of his ideas
by reading his early work. Whereas in Bolzano’s early account of general
mathematic the idea of order is from the very outset built into the notion
of composition (et), it is explicitly left out in Bolzano’s later conception of
quantity. Since composition as such does not involve the irrelevance of order,
arithmetic requires an additional synthetic principle to claim the irrelevance of
order in the case of addition. Whereas Bolzano’s later account of mathematics
and quantity results in a Leibnizean proof of arithmetical truths, Bolzano’s
early definition of mathematics and the notion of quantity requires the law
of commutativity as a synthetic principle. Investigation of notes and the
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second installment gives ample reason to claim the opposite, namely that
the law of commutativity renders Bolzano’s proof as fundamentally different
from Leibniz’s. The axioms of Schultz’s arithmetic, namely the laws of
commutativity and associativity, paved the way for Bolzano to maintain the
Kantian view that arithmetic is synthetic, as well as, to reject the Kantian role
of pure intuition.
Contrary to Kant’s approach, Bolzano’s early approach ties in with develop-
ments in mathematics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. At
the same time, its fundamental concepts remain deeply rooted in eighteenth
century German philosophy. The fundamental concept of composition, for
example, is a notion intrinsically bound to thought. For the early Bolzano,
composition in thought allowed for a wide range of mathematical concepts as
required by the developments in mathematics. The notion of ideal compo-
sition enabled Bolzano to reform mathematics and solve the problems with
mathematical topics like infinitesimals, complex numbers, and combinatorics





The aim of the present study is to gain insight into the development of the
ideas of Bolzano, the grandfather of analytic philosophy, out of the German
philosophy of the eighteenth century. In my view, even philosophical work
as abstract as that of logic and philosophy of mathematics highly depends on
the actual state of the scientific knowledge on which it reflects, as well as the
dominating philosophical views, and thus depends on the broader context in
which mathematics and philosophy are practised, applied, and educated. In
line with recent trends in the scholarship of Kant and the history of analytic
philosophy, I have shown how the understanding of the ideas offered by
philosophers such as Kant and Bolzano benefits from putting these ideas into
the context of their time. This context mainly consists of the textbooks on
logic by Meier and Wolff, the mathematical textbooks of Wolff and Kästner,
as well as, the work of the Kantian Schultz who influenced the early Bolzano.
While the previous chapters focused on the historical and textual details of the
philosophical ideas of Wolff, Kant, and Bolzano, I conclude by considering
the main results of the first part on Wolf and Kant as well as the second part
on the early Bolzano.
In the first part, I have shown how Kant fills the epistemological gap that
results from the role of construction in Wolff’s geometric demonstrations
and the absence of a methodological account for the role of construction.
In line with the recent sophisticated scholarship of Kant, I have argued that
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics and the role of methodology, can only
be understood against the background of Wolff’s work. As we have seen,
Wolff systematized the Euclidean or mathematical method and was quite
influential for a long time by means of widespread textbooks on metaphysics,
logic, mathematics and other disciplines. Regarded as a follower of Leibniz,
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he determined the reception of Leibniz’s rationalistic philosophy in the
eighteenth century. As such, he is known for his systematic application of
the mathematical method to many disciplines. According to the rationalistic
Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, all knowledge relies on a few principles, namely
the laws of logic and the principle of sufficient reason. However, I have
argued that his presentation of the mathematical method and his treatment
of geometry involve an essential role for the construction of diagrams, both
with regard to definitions and proofs. Looking for a methodological account
for the role of construction, especially with regard to proofs, I have concluded
that Wolff does not acknowledge the methodological consequences of using
construction in proofs. In my view, the lack of such an account constitutes
one of the problems Kant wanted to solve, both in his Prize Essay and in the
first Critique.
Taking into account the context of Kant’s treatment of mathematics, I
conclude in the third chapter that Kant merely integrated Wolff’s treatment
of mathematics into his transcendental framework. In the first Critique, Kant
does not intend to present a new philosophy of mathematics, but merely
accounts for the role of construction that lacks in Wolff’s method of mathe-
matics by means of the notion of construction in pure intuition. A broader
perspective on Kant’s work might help to appreciate this conclusion. Accord-
ing to the introduction to the first Critique, the aim of Kant’s transcendental
philosophy is, contrary to Hume, to provide a firm foundation for Newton’s
physics, including strong causal relations, without resorting to a dogmatic
form of rationalistic metaphysics as in the Leibniz-Wolffean tradition. In
this context, it is of uttermost importance that mathematics is applicable to
physical objects. Moreover, one must be aware that both Wolff and Kant
regard mathematics as the most successful science and accordingly take Eu-
clid’s Elements as the paradigmatic model of science. Kant’s notion of pure
intuition achieves both the applicability of mathematics to objects given in
space and time and the a priori synthetic nature of mathematics, especially of
Euclidean geometry. In sum, I have shown in detail how Wolff’s influential
presentation of mathematics determined Kant’s philosophy of mathematics
by the absence of an account for the role of construction. As a result, the no-
tion of construction became not only explicit, but also central to the German
philosophy of mathematics at the end of the eighteenth century.
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Another important result of the first part is my interpretation of the way
in which Kant’s Prize Essay (1764) distinguishes between philosophy and
mathematics. Already in his early essays, Kant criticizes Wolff for applying
the mathematical method to all disciplines, including philosophy. Accord-
ing to my analysis of the Prize Essay in chapter two, Kant’s separation of
philosophy from mathematics hinges on two distinctions. According to the
first one, the results of the analysis of philosophical concepts, in the form of
analytic definitions, are uncertain because they are given in a confused form,
whereas mathematical concepts are built out of known constituents, which
result in synthetic definitions that possess apodictic certainty. The second
distinction characterizes the difference between philosophy and mathematics
as a difference between examination of the universal under signs in abstracto,
in the case of philosophy, versus examination of the universal under signs
in concreto in the case of mathematics. While my interpretation of the first
distinction is not uncommon, my interpretation of the second one differs
from the usual readings. The latter interprets the opposition between in
abstracto and in concreto as one between general and particular. However,
the examination of an arithmetical problem of, for example, addition by
means of signs, such as 7 + 5, cannot be regarded as more particular than the
examination of, for example, the notions of cause and effect by means of the
sign ‘causality’. For the relation between the signifier and the signified is not
more particular in the first case than in the second. Instead, I have shown
that in concretomeans that the structure of the sign mirrors the content of
what is signified. Whereas the letters of the word ‘causality’ do not inform
us about the notion of causality, the signs of 7 + 5 do inform us about the
problem that is to be solved. I have emphasized that a fundamental distinc-
tion between philosophy and mathematics requires this distinction to apply
in the same manner to all disciplines of mathematics, including geometry.
Accordingly, I have argued that Kant regards the construction of diagrams
as the composition of complex signs. The structure of these complex signs
resembles that of the geometrical objects that are to be construed. On the
basis of close reading of some passages of the Prize Essay, I have shown that
the pictorial resemblance of the signs with the diagrams is an accidental rather
than a necessary feature of the examination of universal geometrical truths
under signs in concreto.
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The first part provides the context that I use in the second part to explain
how Bolzano developed his ideas concerning the role of synthetic a priori
principles in mathematics. Due to another context, mainly a different phase in
the development of the sciences, Bolzano faced an entirely different problem.
While Kantian philosophy and the dominating textbooks at the end of the
eighteenth century still took the methodology of Euclid’s Elements, including
diagrammatic proofs, as the paradigmatic model of mathematics, mathematics
itself had developed into a field that is much more independent of diagram-
matic proofs and the natural sciences. As I have described in chapter four, an
independent mathematical field of analysis was born as the result of the work
by Euler, Lagrange, Gauss and others, in which geometrical proofs more and
more became at odds with the much more general nature of the field. Thus,
one could say that Kant’s notion of construction in pure intuition, although
it constitutes the most sophisticated philosophical account of construction,
was already outdated when it was published.
Around the turn of the eighteenth century, a few publications, known to
Bolzano, illustrate that attempts to confine Kant’s philosophy of mathematics
with these developments by Fischer, Langsdorf and Michelsen resulted in
even more problematic and even inconsistent theories. Contrary to Kant
and Wolff, Bolzano no longer ignored the developments in mathematics
that are at odds with a conception of mathematics modeled after Euclidean
geometry, which includes a crucial role for the construction of geometrical
objects. In chapter four, I have shown how Bolzano maintains the view that
conceptions of mathematics that are modeled after geometry are no longer
tenable. Moreover, I have shown that Bolzano radically criticized the role
of motion in Euclid’s Elements and accordingly the role of construction in
Euclidean geometry itself, and, as a result, rejects the notion of construction
in pure intuition. In this way, Bolzano set himself the task of reforming
mathematics and its method, that is, logic.
Due to an interpretation as the grandfather of analytic philosophy and
partly due to the posthumous publication of a critical commentary on Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason Bolzano is often known as the anti-Kant.1 His work
indeed contains highly critical discussions of Kantian distinctions and posi-
tions, especially in theWissenschaftslehre. Indeed, there are several important
1Príhonský, 2003.
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disagreements with Kant, which, in my view, stem from struggling with
entirely different problems. Whereas Kant set himself the task of providing
a non-dogmatic foundation for Newtonian physics, Bolzano did not regard
a dogmatic form of metaphysics as a pressing problem. Accordingly, he did
not have Kant’s problem of integrating a strong notion of causality, required
by Newtonian physics, with empiricism, which allows to limit dogmatic
accounts of metaphysics. Being faced with an entirely different problem,
namely a shaky organization and foundation of mathematical knowledge,
Bolzano could not appreciate Kant’s motivation for developing transcenden-
tal idealism. As a result, both the early and later Bolzano reject the notion of
construction in pure intuition as well as the Kantian stance of transcendental
idealism.
Despite their different starting points, Kant and Bolzano share several
philosophical positions and approaches. I have argued that Bolzano employs
Kant’s characterization of logic as a study of the form of things to establish a
new definition of mathematics as the study of the forms of things. As I have
shown on the basis of hitherto neglected manuscripts, Bolzano developed his
new definition of mathematics as the science of the forms of things into a
conception of general mathematics, which is concerned with the composition
of things in thought by means of the so called et connection. In the sixth
and final chapter, I have clarified Bolzano’s notion of et composition on the
basis of manuscripts and notes in order to reconstruct his early theory of
(discrete) numbers. I have shown that Bolzano developed, at that time, quite a
modern theory of numbers, which defines numbers, similar to Peano’s theory
at the end of the nineteenth century, in terms of a successor ‘function’. My
reconstruction of Bolzano’s quite sophisticated account of numbers explains
in detail why the early Bolzano regards both arithmetical formulas and the
laws of commutativity and associativity as a priori synthetic truths. Therefore
the early Bolzano cannot be regarded as Leibnizean or Fregian with respect
to arithmetic as claimed by Rusnock and Krickel. Arithmetic thus constitutes
a prime example of how science is based on a priori synthetic principles.
The other solution shared with Kant, is the view that science consists
of a priori synthetic truths. To be more precise, they share the view that
scientific knowledge relies on a priori synthetic principles rather than merely
on the laws of logic and the principle of sufficient reason as maintained by the
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Leibniz-Wolffian tradition. As I have shown in chapter five, contrary to this
rationalistic tradition, they share a strong preference for synthetic principles.
Both Kant and Bolzano maintain that the laws of logic are not sufficient to
ground scientific knowledge and that the principle of sufficient reason is much
to general to ground synthetic knowledge, that is, knowledge that actually
extends knowledge rather than merely clarifies existing knowledge. According
to both Kant and Bolzano, scientific knowledge requires synthetic principles
for which logical analysis does not suffice to provide an epistemological
explanation of the connection between predicate and subject. Whereas Kant
accounts for such a connection by means of pure intuition, Bolzano accounts
for it by means of judgments that consist of both a simple subject and a simple
predicate. As I have explained in chapter five, this requires Bolzano to reject
two important features of traditional logic, namely the law of reciprocity and
the claim that all judgments are built by means of the same copula ‘is’. In this
manner, I have shown that there is a strand of direct influence between Kant
and Bolzano. Bolzano’s ideas were not only indirectly shaped by opposition to
Kant’s philosophy, but also deeply influenced in a more direct way, namely by
the adoption of Kant’s notion of a priori synthetic propositions as the proper
constituents of knowledge. Taking into account the methodological debates
of the eighteenth century, Bolzano’s conception of principles continued the
criticism of the Leibniz-Wolffian view started by Crusius and elaborated by
Kant. In sum, Kant’s philosophy provided a prominent source of inspiration
and criticism, a source without which Bolzano could not have developed
his own philosophy. Especially his early work (1804-1816) shows a deep
entanglement with Kantian philosophy. Apart from devastating criticism, for
example on the Kantian notion of pure intuition and its role in mathematics,
Bolzano’s early work also exhibits the great influence of Kant’s philosophy,
most strikingly with regard to the distinction between analytic and synthetic
judgments.
An unexpected outcome of this study is that the investigation of the
philosophy of mathematics of both Kant and the early Bolzano shows a
fundamental role for so called mereological distinctions. Even in the Prize
Essay the notion of composition implicitly characterizes mathematics. The
definitions of mathematics are synthetic because they are composed wholes
out of constituents (parts). Contrary to philosophy, mathematics composes
283
complex structures of signs out of more elementary elements. One could
regard such a complex sign as a whole of which the order and kind of relations
between the parts are significant. As I have shown in the third chapter, the
kind of cognitions that can be produced by the faculties of the understanding
and sensibility can be understood in terms of Kant’s mereological distinctions.
I have argued not only that they provide a precise explanation of Kant’s
notion of analyticity, but also how they explain why mathematics requires
construction in pure intuition. In this manner, I have shown that Kant’s
distinction between synthetic and analytic truths relies on differences between
the mereological structures of cognitions. In chapter four, I have discussed
how the early Bolzano even defines general mathematics as concerned with
the composition of mereological wholes. Analogous to the modern role
of set theory, Bolzano attempted to base arithmetic on the composition of
mereological wholes as I have shown in chapter six. As such, this study





Bolzano’s zoektocht naar a priori synthetische principes:
mereologische aspecten van de vroege Bolzano en Kants
onderscheid tussen analytisch en synthetisch
De wiskunde staat algemeen bekend als een vakgebied met absolute waar-
heden. Niemand betwijfelt de waarheid van een rekenkundige propositie
zoals 2 + 2 = 4. Tegelijkertijd is er tot op de dag van vandaag geen algemene
overeenstemming over de grondslagen van de wiskunde. Dit geldt zelfs ten
aanzien van de definitie van de meest basale begrippen van de wiskunde,
zoals het begrip ‘getal’. Hiervan was in nog veel grotere mate sprake in de
achttiende eeuw, toen naar aanleiding van de gevolgen van de wetenschap-
pelijke revolutie in de zestiende en zeventiende eeuw verhitte filosofische
debatten over de wiskunde en haar methoden ontstonden. Het werk van
wetenschappers zoals Copernicus, Newton en Leibniz had grote gevolgen
voor de logica, de metafysica en de epistemologie (kenleer). Achteraf gezien
vormt de achttiende eeuw een tijdperk waarin deze gevolgen geleidelijk aan
duidelijk werden. Met name de implicaties van de ontwikkelingen in de wis-
kunde voor de epistemologie lieten relatief lang op zich wachten en werden
door de wiskundige en filosoof Bolzano als eerste ten volle gerealiseerd.
Dit proefschrift traceert de ontwikkeling van de ideeën van de vroege
Bolzano ten aanzien van de fundering van de wiskunde alsmede haar directe
voorgeschiedenis. Het traceert de ontwikkeling van de logica en epistemolo-
gie van Bolzano terug naar de belangrijkste onderdelen van de Duitse filosofie
in de achttiende eeuw, namelijk het invloedrijke werk van Wolff, Meier, Kant,
Kästner en Schultz. Hierbij maak ik intensief gebruik van tot nog toe nauwe-
lijks bestudeerde dagboeken en aantekeningen van Bolzano. Het doel is om te
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begrijpen hoe Bolzano de mathematische methode uit de leibniz-wolffiaanse
traditie en Kants begrip van a priori synthetische principes gebruikt en trans-
formeert om een nieuwe fundering voor de wiskunde te leggen die recht doet
aan de nieuwe ontwikkelingen in de wiskunde.
De eerste helft van dit onderzoek bestaat uit drie hoofdstukken over de
geschiedenis van de meest invloedrijke Duitse filosofie van de wiskunde in de
achttiende eeuw, namelijk het werk van Wolff en Kant. De tweede helft is
gewijd aan het werk van de vroege Bolzano tijdens de eerste twee decennia
van de negentiende eeuw.
De euclidische meetkunde, zoals gepresenteerd in de Elementen van Eucli-
des, diende als het paradigmatische model voor de fundering en organisatie
van de wetenschappelijke kennis in de hele achttiende eeuw. Dit is vooral
het geval in het zeer invloedrijke werk van Wolff. Zijn handboeken over
wiskunde en logica werden tijdens de eerste helft van de achttiende eeuw op
grote schaal gebruikt en bleven zelfs invloedrijk tot aan de eerste decennia van
de negentiende eeuw. Sterke sporen van de leibniz-wolffiaanse traditie kan
men nog steeds te vinden in filosofische reflecties op de wiskunde tot in de
eerste decennia van de negentiende eeuw, zoals in het werk van Bolzano. Het
eerste hoofdstuk introduceert de toenmalige dominerende leibniz-wolffiaanse
achtergrond, die werd gedeeld door zowel Kant als Bolzano. Veel van hun
concepten en argumenten zijn veel beter te begrijpen als ze worden gezien
als een reactie op de rationalistische leibniz-wolffiaanse traditie. In het eerste
hoofdstuk behandel ik Wolffs invloedrijke versie van de zogenaamde mathe-
matische methode, die gebaseerd is op de methode van de Elementen van
Euclides en het werk van Leibniz. Als zodanig introduceert het de elementen
die samen de mathematische methode vormen, zoals de traditionele analyse
van begrippen en de aard van definities, principes en bewijzen.
In dit eerste hoofdstuk betoog ik, anders dan vaak gedacht, dat diagram-
men en constructies ook bij Wolff, doorgaans als rationalist beschouwd, een
cruciale rol spelen bij de definitie van wiskundige begrippen en de bewijsvoe-
ring van geometrische stellingen. Uit mijn analyse van zijn mathematische
methode en van zijn bewijs van geometrische stellingen blijkt dat de notie
van constructie noodzakelijk is voor het aantonen van de mogelijkheid, d.w.z.
realiteit, van wiskundige begrippen. Constructie heeft een soortgelijke rol
als het gaat om het aantonen van de mogelijkheid van de samenstellingen
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van geometrische figuren zoals die in de geometrische bewijzen van Euclides
en Wolff gebruikt worden. Hieruit concludeer ik dat zijn opvatting van
wiskundige concepten en geometrische bewijzen niet zo rationalistisch is
als zijn filosofie vaak wordt omschreven. Tot slot levert onderzoek naar
de vervolgvraag of Wolffs mathematische methode ook een verantwoording
biedt voor deze rol van constructie een ontkennend antwoord op. Daaruit
blijkt dat Wolffs mathematische methode vanuit epistemologisch oogpunt
een lacune vertoont.
Het tweede hoofdstuk analyseert Kants reactie op Wolff in zijn vroege
Preisschrift (1764). Hierin richt Kant zich op één van de belangrijkste metho-
dologische debatten van de achttiende eeuw, namelijk of de methodologie van
de wiskunde ook in andere domeinen, zoals die van de filosofie, kan worden
toegepast en of filosofische kennis dan even zeker kan zijn als wiskundige
kennis. In tegenstelling tot Wolff betoogt Kant dat wiskunde en filosofie
elk hun eigen methode en daardoor ook hun eigen status wat betreft de
zekerheid van kennis hebben. Volgens mijn interpretatie pleit Kant voor een
fundamenteel verschil tussen wiskunde en filosofie, dat zich baseert op de
twee onderscheidingen die Kant introduceert in het Preisschrift. Het eerste
betreft het verschil tussen analytische en synthetische definities. Terwijl analy-
tische definities in de filosofie tot verheldering van bestaande begrippen leiden,
creeëren de synthetische definities van de wiskunde nieuwe begrippen. Het
tweede onderscheid karakteriseert het verschil tussen wiskunde en filosofie
als kennis van het universele middels symbolen in concreto respectievelijk in
abstracto. Terwijl de letters van het woord ‘causaliteit’ ons niets vertellen over
het begrip causaliteit, informeren de symbolen van 7 + 5 ons gedetailleerd en
precies over het probleem dat moet worden opgelost.
Terwijl de eerste distinctie, als voorloper van het beroemde onderscheid
tussen analytische en synthetische oordelen uit de Kritik der reinen Vernunft
(1781), uitvoerig wordt besproken door commentatoren, heeft het tweede
onderscheid niet veel aandacht gekregen. In het tweede hoofdstuk betoog ik
dat dit onderscheid minstens zo cruciaal is om het doel van het Preisschrift
te bereiken, namelijk de onderbouwing van een fundamenteel verschil tus-
sen wiskunde en filosofie zodanig dat de eerste in staat is tot apodictische
kennis. Om dit te bereiken, dient het tweede onderscheid op alle toenmalige
disciplines van de wiskunde op dezelfde manier van toepassing te zijn, dus
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ook ten aanzien van de geometrie. Ondersteund door enkele fascinerende
passages uit het Preisschrift beargumenteer ik dat Kant geometrische figuren,
evenals de formules uit de algebra, beschouwt als structuren die samengesteld
zijn uit symbolen. In het geval van de geometrie hebben deze symbolen een
toevallige uiterlijke overeenkomst met het betekende.
Ter voorbereiding op het deel over Bolzano behandelt het derde hoofdstuk
Kants beroemde onderscheid tussen analytische en synthetische oordelen in
relatie tot zijn filosofie van de wiskunde. In dit hoofdstuk interpreteer ik
Kants begrip van a priori synthetische oordelen vanuit een nieuw perspectief,
namelijk dat van zijn mereologische onderscheidingen, d.w.z. onderschei-
dingen betreffende deel-geheel relaties. Het eerste deel van dit hoofdstuk
biedt voor het eerst een systematische reconstructie van Kants mereologi-
sche onderscheidingen op basis van enkele passages uit de eerste Kritiek en
zijn lezingen over logica en metafysica. Voortbouwend op de interpretaties
van de Jong en Anderson, interpreteer ik Kants onderscheid tussen analyti-
sche en synthetische oordelen in termen van Kants mereologische distincties.
Daarbij beargumenteer ik dat de afzonderlijke mereologische structuren zijn
gebonden aan specifieke vermogens. Daarmee verklaren deze mereologische
structuren waarom het verstand als zodanig uitsluitend analytische oorde-
len kan voortbrengen en waarom synthetische oordelen, met inbegrip van
wiskundige oordelen, tevens het vermogen van de aanschouwing vereisen.
Wiskundige oordelen vereisen een deel-geheel relatie die het verstand niet kan
voortbrengen.
Ongetwijfeld is de notie van constructie in zuivere aanschouwing het meest
bediscussieerde begrip uit de filosofie van de wiskunde van Kant. Er zijn
tal van uitstekende studies over dit onderwerp verschenen, zoals die van
Longuenesse, Friedman en Shabel. Hun verfijnde interpretaties houden
in toenemende mate rekening met de historische context waarin Kant zijn
ideeën ontwikkelde. Door gebruik te maken van de reconstructie van Kants
mereologische distincties, biedt de tweede helft van het derde hoofdstuk een
analyse van Kants begrip van constructie in zuivere aanschouwing. Zij biedt
een relatief precieze uitleg van de rol die constructie in zuivere aanschouwing
heeft.
Anders dan de meeste commentatoren, benadruk ik in het derde hoofdstuk
dat Kant de mathematische methode van Wolff op zichzelf genomen volledig
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accepteert, hoewel deze volgens Kant wel ingekaderd dient te worden binnen
het transcendentaal idealisme. Zonder dit transcendentaal idealistische kader
zou de aard van de methode van de wiskunde nog steeds verborgen blijven,
waardoor zij ook zou worden toegepast op andere domeinen. Volgens Kants
opvatting zou dit resulteren in ongerechtvaardigde vormen van filosofie zoals
de dogmatische metafysica van Wolff. Tegelijkertijd vult dit transcendentaal
idealistisch kader de lacune in de epistemologie van Wolff, die, zoals we
gezien hebben in het eerste hoofdstuk, de rol van constructie in definities en
geometrische bewijzen niet verantwoordt.
Afgezien van enkele korte opmerkingen in de transcendentale deductie,
is Kants beschrijving van het begrip ‘constructie in zuivere aanschouwing’
alleen te vinden in het methodologische deel van de eerste Kritiek, d.w.z. het
deel dat de aard en de grenzen van de twee disciplines van a priori kennis
onderzoekt, namelijk de wiskunde en de filosofie. Kants onderzoek naar de
aard en de beperkingen van de wiskundige methode door deze af te zetten
tegen de filosofie in relatie tot onze cognitieve faculteiten, levert ook een
epistemologische basis voor de methode van de wiskunde doordat duidelijk
wordt waarom onze cognitieve vermogens tot kennis in staat zijn. Deson-
danks is het methodologische deel van de eerste Kritiek niet gericht op een
expositie van de notie van constructie in zuivere aanschouwing, maar op de
grenzen van a priori kennis. Langs deze lijnen beargumenteer ik in het derde
hoofdstuk dat Kant geen nieuwe grondslagen van de wiskunde levert, maar
de bestaande methodologie van de wiskunde overneemt en plaatst binnen
zijn transcendentaalfilosofie.
De tweede helft van deze studie onderzoekt het vroege werk van Bolzano.
In het vierde hoofdstuk beschrijf ik de motivatie van Bolzano voor het ont-
wikkelen van zijn nieuwe ideeën ten aanzien van logica en epistemologie.
Deze motivatie komt voort uit een felle kritiek op de rol van construc-
tie en beweging in de geometrie en op de rol van geometrische bewijzen
in niet-geometrische delen van de wiskunde, zoals de analyse. Vervolgens
behandel ik zijn argumenten voor deze kritiek zoals die te vinden zijn in
vroege publicaties en aantekeningen. Deze maken duidelijk waarom hij fun-
damentele methodologische kritiek heeft op de euclidische geometrie. Ook
wordt duidelijk hoe deze kritiek samenhangt met historische factoren, zoals
de ontwikkelingen in de wiskunde gedurende de achttiende eeuw waarin
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het vakgebied van de analyse zich langzaam maar zeker losmaakte van de
geometrie. Nieuwe wiskundige begrippen, zoals dat van oneindig kleine
hoeveelheden en complexe getallen, werden onafhankelijk van hun toepassing
in de natuurwetenschappen en daarmee een op zichzelf staand object van
studie. De analyse werd een wiskundige discipline die onafhankelijk is van de
geometrie. Tegelijkertijd werden filosofen nog geïnformeerd door leerboeken
wiskunde uit de traditie van Wolff en waren zij zich tot aan het eind van de
achttiende eeuw nauwelijks bewust van de gevolgen van deze ontwikkelingen
in de wiskunde. Bolzano daarentegen lijkt één van de eerste filosofen sinds
Leibniz te zijn die niet alleen een goed begrip had van de achttiende en vroeg
negentiende-eeuwse ontwikkelingen in de wiskunde, maar ook zelf bijdroeg
aan de ontwikkeling van de wiskunde; zo is hij nog steeds bekend om zijn
tussenwaardestelling.
In het vierde hoofdstuk gebruik ik Bolzano’s tussenwaardestelling om
te laten zien hoe de ontwikkeling van de wiskunde, waarin geometrische
bewijzen werden vervangen door puur analytische bewijzen, resulteert in
een fundamentele kritiek op de rol van constructie en verwante begrippen
zoals beweging in wiskundige bewijzen. De rest van het vierde hoofdstuk
behandelt Bolzano’s hervormingsprogramma voor de wiskunde. In de Bey-
träge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik (1810) bekritiseert
Bolzano de traditionele definities, die de wiskunde definiëren in termen van
het begrip kwantiteit, en stelt een nieuwe definitie voor. Volgens deze nieuwe
definitie houdt wiskunde zich bezig met de meest algemene wetten, d.w.z.
met de vorm van de dingen. Ik beargumenteer dat deze nieuwe definitie sterk
werd beïnvloed door Kants definitie van de algemene logica. Een ongepubli-
ceerd manuscript, bedoeld als voortzetting van de Beyträge, biedt aanvullende
onderbouwing voor mijn stellingname.
Het laatste deel van het vierde hoofdstuk behandelt de gevolgen van Bol-
zano’s nieuwe definitie van de wiskunde voor de organisatie van de wiskundige
disciplines en de andere wetenschappen. Een belangrijk gevolg van Bolzano’s
nieuwe definitie is dat zij ruim baan geeft aan de mathesis universalis, een al-
gemene wiskunde waarop de overige wiskundige disciplines voortbouwen. In
een vroeg manuscript beschrijft de vroege Bolzano deze algemene wiskunde
als de wetenschap van de compositie van ‘dingen’ als deel-geheel relaties.
Hoewel het idee van een algemene wiskunde in de achttiende eeuw weinig
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aandacht kreeg, is Bolzano’s omschrijving van algemene wiskunde in termen
van deel-geheel relaties niet geheel nieuw. Op basis van onder meer de be-
kendheid van Bolzano met het werk van de kantiaan Schultz beargumenteer
ik dat het zeer waarschijnlijk is dat Bolzano op dit punt beïnvloed is door het
werk van Schultz die aan het einde van de achttiende eeuw de eerste stappen
zet naar een soortgelijke algemene wiskunde.
In het vijfde hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat de vroege Bolzano werd gedreven
door een zoektocht naar de a priori synthetische principes waarop de a priori
kennis van de wiskunde, de metafysica en de ethiek gebaseerd is. Anders
dan de meeste commentatoren van de vroege Bolzano, zoals Rusnock, be-
argumenteer ik dat zijn opvatting betreffende de rol en aard van principes
sterk beïnvloed werd door het werk van Kant. De vroege geschriften van
Bolzano bieden ruim voldoende ondersteuning voor de bewering dat Kants
onderscheid tussen synthetische en analytische oordelen een cruciale en domi-
nante rol speelt in het denken van de vroege Bolzano. Dit blijkt bijvoorbeeld
uit zijn zoektocht naar de a priori synthetische principes van de ethiek. De
vroege Bolzano nam niet alleen Kants definitie van het analytisch-synthetisch
onderscheid over, met inbegrip van het standpunt dat wiskunde synthetisch is,
maar gebruikte het ook voor de hervorming van de logica, de epistemologie
en de wiskunde.
Ten opzichte van de leibniz-wolffiaanse traditie neemt Bolzano het kanti-
aanse standpunt in dat principes synthetisch a priori zijn. Tevens kenmerken
deze zich volgens Bolzano niet persé door evidentie of zekerheid, maar door
de logische structuur. Volgens Bolzano bestaan principles uit een enkelvou-
dig subject en een enkelvoudig predikaat, waardoor zij noodzakelijkerwijs
niet bewijsbaar zijn. Bolzano neemt niet alleen Kants begrip van a priori
synthetische principes over, maar herhaalt ook Kants vraag naar de moge-
lijkheid van zulke a priori synthetische oordelen, hoewel hij zijn antwoord
afwijst omdat het een beroep doet op de door Bolzano afgewezen notie van
zuivere aanschouwing. Aan de hand van Bolzano’s aantekeningen geef ik
een reconstructie van zijn alternatief voor Kants antwoord. Tevens blijkt
uit een analyse van Bolzano’s aantekeningen dat hij, vergelijkbaar met Kant,
het standpunt inneemt dat een conclusie niet analytisch is als zij middels een
strikt analytische afleiding volgt uit een synthetische premisse.
Het laatste hoofdstuk geeft een gedetailleerde reconstructie van de alge-
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mene wiskunde zoals de vroege Bolzano die blijkens zijn manuscripten voor
ogen stond. De algemene wiskunde is gebaseerd op een specifieke deel-geheel
(mereologische) compositie, de et compositie. Op basis van voorbeelden uit
Bolzano’s aantekeningen ontwikkel ik een nieuwe interpretatie van zijn eigen-
aardige notie van et compositie. Vervolgens illustreert het zesde hoofdstuk
Bolzano’s algemene wiskunde door middel van een gedetailleerde reconstruc-
tie van Bolzano’s behandeling van de rekenkunde in een vroeg manuscript.
Juist de rekenkunde was de eerste wiskundige discipline die door analytisch
filosofen, zoals Frege, als analytisch werd beschouwd. Uit mijn onderzoek
blijkt dat commentatoren Bolzano te gretig interpreteren als een voorloper
hiervan als met name Rusnock en Krickel een fregeaanse en een leibniziaanse
opvatting lezen in Bolzano’s opmerkingen over de rekenkunde. Op basis van
een vergelijking van de bewijzen van aritmetische proposities door Leibniz,
Schultz en Bolzano betoog ik dat Bolzano’s bewijs in de bijlage bij de Bey-
träge eerder gebaseerd is op het bewijs van de kantiaan Schultz, dan op dat
van Leibniz. In tegenstelling tot Leibniz baseert Schultz zijn bewijs op de
wetten van commutativiteit en associativiteit en beschouwt dit als een a priori
synthetisch principe.
In de rest van het zesde hoofdstuk reconstrueer ik Bolzano’s getalstheorie
om daarmee uit te leggen waarom Bolzano de rekenkunde als synthetisch be-
schouwt. Zijn vroege manuscripten bevatten voldoende aanknopingspunten
om te betogen dat Bolzano de wetten van commutativiteit en associativiteit
als a priori synthetische principes behandelde. Tot slot blijkt uit mijn inter-
pretatie van Bolzano’s aantekeningen dat Bolzano zijn visie ten aanzien van
de rekenkunde tijdens de jaren twintig niet veranderde vanwege zijn latere
definitie van analytische proposities uit de Wissenschaftslehre (1837), maar
vanwege een veranderende opvatting van het begrip getal en een veranderende
logische analyse van rekenkundige proposities.
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